The Uneasy Case for the Flat Tax

Social contract theories assume thatbecause personal security and private property are at risk ina state of nature, citizens will agree to grant Leviathan a monopolyof violence. But what is to prevent Leviathan from turning onhis citizens once they have lain down their arms? The socialcontract leaves citizens worse off unless Leviathan can fetterhimself, as constitutional democracies seek to do. Self-bindingfetters are hard to find. We suggest that schemes of progressivetaxation, in which marginal tax rates increase with taxable income,may be useful incentives to realign Leviathan's incentives withthose of his citizens. Income taxes give Leviathan an equityclaim in his state's economy, and progressive taxes give hima greater residual interest in upside payoffs. Leviathan willthen demand higher side payments from interest groups beforehe imposes value-destroying regulations.     

Alternative Sustainability Criteria,Externalities, and Welfare in a Simple Agroecosystem Model: A Numerical Analysis

Using the numerical technique of value iteration, this paper imposes several sustainability constraints on a simple multi-sector agroecosystem model, and provides analysis of the costs tradeoffs of the product and externality is insufficient for intergenerationally equitable welfare paths, while sustaining a physical resource over time in the interests of equitability can result in a less equitable distribution of welfare across generations. Furthermore, a value sustainability constraint imposed on the social welfare maximization problem acts as a welfare transfer mechanism from the productive sector to the sector affected by the externality, but implies growth in profits for the productive sector and declining utility for the non-productive sector.     

The Mordukhovich Normal Cone and the Foundations of Welfare Economics

The statement that Pareto optimal allocations require the equalization of marginal rates of substitution, or in an economy with public goods, require the equalization of the aggregate of the marginal rates in consumption to those in production, is formalized through the use of the Mordukhovich normal cone. Since this cone is strictly contained, in general, in the Clarke normal cone, the results generalize earlier work of Khan and Vohra, Quinzii, Yun, and Cornet. The results are an application of Mordukhovich's 1980 theorem on necessary conditions for optimality in constrained optimization problems involving functions that are not necessarily differentiable or quasi-concave. As such, the results suggest a distinction between the mathematical programming approach to the "second welfare theorem," as in the work of Hicks, Lange, and Samuelson, and that based on the separation of sets, as pioneered by Arrow and Debreu.     

网络外部性条件下的技术革新

自然彼特创新理论提出之后，创新研究在众多学者的努力下不断丰富和完善，但是传统上对技术革新的分析大多立足于企业角度（即技术提供者角度），消费者对技术推广的影响分析尚未深入，本文以Ozshy模型出发，讨论消费者态度对技术革新的影响。     

Thematic Clubs and the Supremacy of Network Externalities

We explore the issue of minorities' survival in the presence of positive network externalities. We rely on a simple example of thematic clubs to illustrate why and how such survival problems might appear, first considering the case of simple‐network effects (fully anonymous externalities) and then the case of cross‐network effects (type‐dependent externalities). In both cases, the analysis is framed as a simple noncooperative game with a continuum of players and binary action sets. There is a unique and interior Nash equilibrium under mild network effects and two corner equilibria under strong network effects, with one club driven out. A utilitarian planner would accentuate the clustering effects of network externalities, and call for the disappearance of the minority club more often than the noncooperative solution. A simple myopic learning algorithm capturing the progression of network lock‐in effects is studied.     

The Effects of Consumer Bliss on Welfare Economics

Some developed countries have sought to counteract what they see as unfair competition faced by their domestic industries arising from the employment of child labor in the production of consumer goods in developing countries by including a "social clause" in the World Trade Organization (WTO) charter. Many people and civil society organizations in developed countries are also genuinely concerned with child labor employment purely on humanitarian grounds. In this paper we have argued that a more appropriate approach to tackle the child labor problem would be to facilitate acceleration of growth in developing countries through greater, not less, integration of these countries into the world trading system. We have also argued that directing development assistance for improving institutions and social infrastructure would be more effective than trade sanctions.     

网络外部性与基于行为的区别定价

近年来,基于行为的区别定价成为区别定价领域研究的热点,但是这方面的文献却鲜有涉及到市场中存在着网络外部性的情形。在理性预期的假设下,本文通过一个两阶段双寡头博弈模型分析了网络外部性与基于行为的区别定价对子博弈精炼纳什均衡的影响。在成熟市场上,网络外部性会对具有不同初始市场份额的厂商产生不同影响;在新兴市场上,无论厂商采取何种定价策略,网络外部性都会加剧市场上的竞争,导致厂商利润下降。与统一定价下的子博弈精炼纳什均衡相比,基于行为的区别定价会加剧竞争从而导致厂商利润的下降,但是会造成较多社会福利的无谓损失。     

The Welfare Economics of Water Resource Allocation over Time

An operational stochastic capacity expansion model for a survival conscious firm is developed and applied to shrimp fishing in which the entrepreneur evaluates all the information known to him at the time of decision. The results show the effect of survival considerations on the growth in net worth of a firm making sequential and irreversible purchases of physical capital with uncertain future yields. The survival model is applied to shrimp fishing on the Texas Gulf Coast and the reults are compared with those of a simple model in which survival is not considered. Bankruptcy could clearly result from use of the simple model; survival of the firm is guaranteed by use of the survival model.     

福利经济学视角下的效率与公平

效率与公平问题是当前社会讨论的热点话题,关于效率与公平的内涵、关系以及组合模式,国内理论界众说纷纭.笔者试从一个新的视角--福利经济学的角度--来重新阐释效率与公平问题.笔者认为:第一,既要重视收入分配公平,又要重视社会公平;第二,实现效率与公平的最优组合需要市场和政府双管齐下;第三,我国当前应实行效率与公平并重的原则.     

中国经济国民投资率的福利经济学分析

本文首次系统地从福利经济学角度出发,运用前沿计算方法,试图回答中国投资率是否过高这一重要问题。本文首先计算了两个投资率:一是境内投资率;二是国民投资率,即(境内投资+对外投资)/GDP。通过横向的对比,发现无论是境内投资率还是国民投资率,即便考虑高经济增长率,中国经济都远高于世界各国。其次,采用经济增长理论的基准模型,利用中国的参数进行校准,并且进行稳健性检验,运用逆向积分法模拟中国经济福利最大化的投资路径。结果表明,中国经济上世纪90年代平均境内投资率低于福利最大化的投资率6%,国民投资率4%;2002年后,平均境内投资高于福利最大化的投资率5%,国民投资率12%;1990—2008年实际投资相对福利最大化的投资路径总福利损失约为5.9%,相当于每期损失约3.8%的GDP。最后,本文进一步分析,如果适当地降低国民投资率,同时改善投资效率,中国经济的GDP增长率并不会大幅下降。