A Note on Market Power in an Emission Permits Market with Banking

In this paper, we investigate the effect of market power on equilibrium path of an emission permits market in which firms can bank current permits for use in later periods. In particular, we study the market equilibrium for a large (potentially dominant) firm and competitive fringe with rational expectations. We characterize the equilibrium solution for different permits allocations and discuss the large firm’s stock-holding constraints needed for credible market manipulation.     

不同市场条件下的初始排污权免费分配方法的选择

要实施排污权交易制度，在理论和实践中首先要解决的一个关键问题是初始排污权的分配问题。因为在实践中以初始排污权的免费分配方式更具有操作性，所以亟待解决的是初始排污权免费分配方案的选择与制定。本文研究的是在不同的市场条件下分析、建立并选择适合的初始排污权免费分配的分配模型。     

Auction Design for the Allocation of Emission Permits in the Presence of Market Power

To the extent that emission permits have been allocated using market mechanisms, this has been done using a sealed-bid auction design, typically with discriminatory prices. However, several authors have recommended the ascending auction format. Basically, two competing ascending auction designs have been suggested, the standard ascending auction (with clock or demand schedules), or an alternative ascending-clock implementation of Vickrey-pricing. The latter design was introduced as a response to problems of bid shading under the sealed-bid and the standard ascending auction format. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the allocation of permits under these two alternative mechanisms. The auction process and the resulting market outcome in the presence of oligopolistic competition are simulated. In this setting, it is not obvious that bid shading is the optimal strategy under the standard design, nor is it obvious that sincere bidding is the optimal strategy under the alternative ascending auction design. The alternative auction format makes it less costly to pursue a strategy to increase market shares through the acquisition of emission permits, thus increasing the competitor's costs, leading to overbidding as the optimal strategy.     

基于模糊层次评判模型的确定排污权总量方法研究

简要总结排污权总量确定问题研究的历史及现状,从协调经济增长与环境保护的角度出发,建立了确定排污权总量的评价指标体系,并借助AHP模糊评判数学方法对确定排污权总量问题进行了探讨。通过实际算例表明,该评判模型为我国建立排污权交易制度,确定排污权总量提供了有效的解决途径。     

On the Efficiency of Competitive Markets for Emission Permits

It is typical for economists andpolicy makers alike to presume that competitivemarkets allocate emission permits efficiently.This paper demonstrates that competition in theemission permits market cannot assureefficiency when the product market isoligopolistic. We provide the conditions underwhich a bureaucratic mechanism is welfaresuperior to a tradeable emission permitssystem. Price-taking behaviour in the permitsmarket ensures transfer of licenses to the lessefficient in abatement firms, which then becomemore aggressive in the product market,acquiring additional permits. As a result, theless efficient firms end up with a higher thanthe welfare maximizing share of emissionpermits. If the less efficient in abatementfirms are also less efficient in production,competitive trading of permits may result inlower output and welfare.     

市场过程内生的垄断:市场权势和自然垄断

作为内生的垄断现象,市场权势实际上是争胜竞争过程的结果,并非垄断的市场结构所决定。如果将竞争理解为一个动态过程,市场权势具有竞争性和暂时性。自然垄断现象也是市场过程演化过程中的自然现象,无论源于规模经济还是范围经济,都表明自然垄断具有动态效率特征。除非政府人为阻碍争胜竞争过程的展开,通常市场过程内生力量能够有效制约非政府垄断现象。     

基于Internet的排污权交易平台分析与设计

利用现代信息技术进行排污权交易平台的开发是河南省排污权交易体系的一个重要组成部分,也是排污权交易发展的必然趋势。排污权交易平台的开发以排污权交易为核心,基于B/S三层体系架构,实现排污权总量控制、申购、交易、跟踪预警、信息管理、平台维护和信息发布等为一体的系统功能,为更好地实现排污权交易提供了系统性的支持平台和有力的实施保障。     

Tradeable Emission Permits Regulations in the Presence of Imperfectly Competitive Product Markets: Welfare Implications

In the present paper, we analyse the interaction of a competitive market for emission permits with an oligopolistic product market. It is well known that a competitive permits market achieves the cost minimizing distribution of abatement effort among the polluting firms for a given reduction in emissions. However, when the product market is oligopolistic, it may redistribute production inefficiently among firms. It has been suggested that this inefficiency can outweigh the gains obtained from using emission permits instead of command and control. Although this argument is clearly correct under full information, it is shown in the present paper that it reverses under incomplete information. In particular, it is shown that when tradeable emission permits are specified according to the standard textbook example, they yield higher social welfare than the command and control regulation.     

排污权交易会计国际发展评述及启示

作为环境管理的有效手段,排污权交易自上世纪70年代提出后得到迅速推广,而由排污权交易引致的会计规范问题也日益受到国际机构及各国会计准则委员会的关注,美国、欧盟及日本等西方发达国家和组织纷纷在理论规范和实务应用两个层面予以推进,排污权交易会计准则体系已逐渐形成。因此,在构建我国排污权交易会计规范体系时,应针对实际情况,首先采用非活跃市场下的无形资产法和无交易市场下的环境负债净额法,待时机成熟时再引入公允价值法,边试边做,循序渐进。     

Market Power in Laboratory Emission Permit Markets

Many proposals suggesting the use of markets tocontrol pollution assume markets will becompetitive. When markets do not exhibitcompetitive characteristics, however, shouldthey still be expected to result in efficiencyimprovement relative to traditional approaches? This paper employs experimental economicmethods to examine the effect of marketstructure on the use of marketable emissionspermits. Results indicate that in a market withone dominant firm and a number of fringe firms,strategic manipulation occurs repeatedly in thelaboratory as predicted by market power models,undermining the allocative and dynamicefficiency benefits such markets offer. Whenfirms compete in a downstream product marketdominated by the same single firm, marketefficiency can actually be reduced with theimplementation of permit markets. Final marketefficiencies reflect initial endowments and areinfluenced by competitive conditions elsewherein the economy, indicating that policy-makersshould carefully consider whether markets areappropriate in such circumstances.     

The Emergence of Market Power in Emission Rights Markets: The Role of Initial Permit Distribution

This paper offers an analytical model of emission permit markets in which a large number of regulated emitters participate, and derives formulae that estimate the degree of market distortion. These formulae clearly show the entire dependence of the ratio of market prices to competitive levels on the permit initial distribution as well as the existence of a threshold for effective market power. While the findings challenge a well-known conception of the Coase Theorem, they have significant policy implications vis-à-vis the Kyoto Protocol and the related policy debates on excess emission rights known as hot air.     

排污权有偿使用阶梯式定价研究——以化学需氧量排放为例

依据河南省2010年污染源普查数据,分析了不同行业化学需氧量排放的公平性问题,基于不同行业经济贡献与排污量之间的差异性的基础上,参考阶梯水价和电价的制定思路,提出了排污权阶梯式定价,并对其内涵与经济学特征进行了分析,最后,在恢复成本法定价的基础上制定了河南省化学需氧量有偿使用阶梯式价格。     

Emission Taxes and Tradeable Permits A Comparison of Views on Long-Run Efficiency

We compare three different views on the long runefficiencies of emission taxes which includethresholds (inframarginalexemptions), and of tradeable emission permitswhere some permits areinitially free. The differences are caused bydifferent assumptions aboutwhether thresholds and free permits should besubsidies given only to firmsthat produce, or full property rights. Treatingtax thresholds, as well asfree permits, as property rights would departfrom the conventional view,but would allow greater flexibility in makingeconomic instruments bothefficient and acceptable. Such flexibilitycould be very important inachieving efficient control of greenhouse gasemissions.     

中国省域碳排放权分配——基于环境FCAM

考虑CO_2排放的非期望产出特性,以最大化整体平均效率为目标,构建省域碳排放权分配的环境固定成本分摊模型(FCAM)。对世袭制、平等主义和支付能力三种公平分配原则下的省域碳排放权初始分配结果进行加权组合,从而获得综合公平原则下的省域碳排放权分配方案。以基于环境FCAM的分配方案趋同综合公平原则下的分配方案为目标,构建优化模型,以融合效率和公平。2020年省域碳排放权分配结果表明:最终分配方案在达到效率最优的同时,属于"绝对平均",较好地融合了效率和公平;基于强度减排压力和总量减排压力对30个样本省进行分类的结果基本一致。最后,针对四类省区的具体情况提出了相应的减排建议。     

Markets for Tradeable Emission and Ambient Permits: A Dynamic Approach

This paper discusses trade mechanisms in pollutionpermit markets. Proofs are given, that sequential,bilateral trade in tradeable emissions permitsconverges to a market equilibrium with minimal totalcosts of pollution control. If ambient or depositionpermits are traded, the convergence of bilateraltransactions occurs only in the case of a singlereceptor. For multiple receptors, the proof ofconvergence for tradeable emissions and ambientpermits is given for two trade mechanisms: sequential,multilateral trade and a Walrasian auction.     

Enforcing Transferable Permit Systems in the Presence of Market Power

We derive an enforcementstrategy for a transferable permit system inthe presence of market power that achievescomplete compliance in a cost-effective manner.We show that the presence of a firm with marketinfluence makes designing an enforcementstrategy more difficult than enforcing aperfectly competitive system. We alsore-consider Hahn's (1984) suggestion that afirm with market influence should be allocatedpermits so that it chooses to not participatein the permit market. When enforcement and itscosts are taken into account, Hahn's suggestiondoes not hold except in a very special case.     

排污权交易的层级市场理论与价格研究

借鉴股票的发行、流通、监管程序,提出排污权交易的层级市场结构理论,并据此对排污权交易进行了系统的研究。研究表明,作为排污权交易一级市场（发行市场）的补充,规范有序的排污权交易二级市场（流通市场）对提高排污权交易的效率是必要的;考虑竞争替代的因素采用双方叫价博弈模型研究二级市场的价格问题;最后分析排污权交易中的政府监督及监管问题,认为中央政府和地方政府的双重代理人特性会使政府监督严重失灵,可替代的选择是引进地方政府代理人竞争,通过“社区监督”以强化“政府监督”。     

电力市场中厂网合作的CO2减排调度模式研究

本文通过分析电力市场中独立发电商与电网公司之间的合作激励,提出厂网合作的CO2减排调度模式。基于CO2减排调度规则及独立发电商报价系数对竞价市场的影响,确定了厂网合作方式与约束条件,构建厂网合作模型,求解出最优合作策略,并设计了相应的增量收益分配方案。最后,通过实例检验了所述调度模式的合理性。     

Monetary Policy and Market Power in Banking

Applying a spatial competition model to banking, we analyze the effects of the choice of a monetary policy rule by the central bank on banks market power as measured by the Lerner index. We show that a procyclical monetary policy may reinforce the countercyclical movement of the Lerner index. That is, this measure of competitiveness of the banking sector may vary more over the business cycle due to the monetary policy rule.JEL classification: G21, E52, L13.Acknowledgements The author thanks Hans Degryse, Hans van Ees, Marco Haan, Eko Riyanto, Bert Schoonbeek, Elmer Sterken, three anonymous referees, and participants of the EARIE 2001 conference (Dublin), the NAKE Day 2002 (Amsterdam), and a seminar at Ghent University for their constructive comments.revised version received November 11, 2003     

Assessing the Degree of Spot Market Integration for U.S. Natural Gas: Evidence from Daily Price Data

This paper assesses the degree of market integration in the U.S. natural gas market following the FERC’s ‘open access’ reforms. Daily spot prices at 76 market locations from 1993 to 1997 are used to examine the geographic extent of the market and the speed with which market forces move prices toward equilibrium in the face of ongoing price shocks. The empirical results suggest that the East and Central regions form a highly integrated market, but that this market is quite segmented from the more loosely integrated Western market.