驰名商标反淡化保护理论探讨

驰名商标具有较高的声誉和商业价值,具有十分重要的经济意义。关于驰名商标的认定和保护,各国法律都进行了详细的规定。尤其是对驰名商标的保护已成为世界范围内备受关注的问题,不少国际公约及我国的法律对此都有明确的规定。同时,随着驰名商标淡化侵权现象的大规模出现,驰名商标的反淡化制度也成为了驰名商标保护的重要内容之一。我国对反淡化保护制度有相关的法律规定,但存在不足和需要完善之处,主要可从建立防御商标系统、明确商标淡化属侵权行为、制定和完善相关立法等几方面进行。     

论驰名商标的反淡化保护理论

商标的反淡化保护是商标权的一种扩张,这种扩张可以说是对驰名商标本身所具有的特点的一种反映。本文欲从驰名商标淡化的形式分析反淡化保护的理论,并试图找出隐藏在驰名商标反淡化理论背后的利益,然后本文通过分析各相关利益方之间的关系来说明驰名商标反淡化进行完善需要注意的问题。     

我国反不正当竞争法对商业秘密保护的完善

随着信息社会的到来,商业秘密具有越来越大的商业价值。特别是在激烈的市场竞争中,很多经营者常将不择手段侵犯他人商业秘密作为实现其利益最大化的一条捷径。此种行为不但直接损害了其他竞争者的合法权益,而且公平的市场竞争秩序遭到破坏,诚实守信的市场道德观念也会受到质疑。所以,有必要对商业秘密进行法律保护。     

以知识产权与反不正当竞争法关系为视角谈未注册商标的保护

我国采用商标权注册取得模式,注册是取得商标权的唯一途径,同时我国又采取商标自愿注册原则,只对少数商品规定了强制注册原则,这样便导致了现实中大量未注册商标的存在。实践中对于未注册商标的保护是极其有限的,本文通过对知识产权与反不正当竞争之间关系的探讨,探寻未注册商标的保护之路。     

论知识产权法与反不正当竞争法的关系

反不正当竞争法产生的一个目的就是对知识产权的补充保护,使对知识产权的保护更加全面,更好地维护权利人利益,鼓励科技创新。知识产权法与反不正当竞争法有着很大的联系,本文从分析两者的关系出发,探讨反不正当竞争法在保护知识产权方面存在的缺陷,最后提出完善的对策。     

反垄断法与反不正当竞争法异同探析

本文通过对反垄断法与反不正当竞争法内容之概述,个性及共性之分析.揭示两者之间的关系,二法之共性大于个性.二者之间并不存在不可克服的矛盾,而是反映了市场经济制度下相互关联、相辅相成的两项要求.反不正当竞争法与反垄断法一起构成竞争法这个统一的整体秩序,共同承担着维护自由竞争和正当竞争正常运作的任务.     

《反不正当竞争法》适用主体的探讨

在《反不正当竞争法》适用主体即经营者的界定问题上,学界颇有争议。本文由此入手,分析其他国家和地区法律制度的基础上,对我国《反不正当竞争法》适用主体提出建议,无论是从现实角度,还是从理论层面看,合理的做法是排除主体因素而径直以行为角度确定。     

论我国反不正当竞争法的缺陷与完善

我国《反不正当竞争法》已经施行近十七年,该法对维护公平的市场秩序、促进社会主义市场经济的健康发展起了重大作用。但是,该法制定之时我国还处于社会主义市场经济初期,很多问题没有显现。近年来,随着经济的发展,诸多不正当竞争行为充分暴露出来,并且出现很多新形式的不正当竞争行为,《反不正当竞争法》已经很难适应与经济发展的需求,其缺陷日趋明显,亟待完善。目前,《反垄断法》已经颁布,加紧修改《反不正当竞争法》,是立法机关的急迫任务。     

商业数据反不正当竞争法保护的模式选择与规则优化北大核心

商业数据是数字中国建设过程中的战略性资源。实践中,涉及商业数据侵权纠纷裁判的适用依据主要为:《反不正当竞争法》第2条(一般条款)抑或第12条(互联网专条)。这其中不乏因援引法条的高度抽象性而导致司法适用标准的不统一以及法院自由裁量权的增扩化。缘此,在辨析我国商业数据《反不正当竞争法》保护的诸多理论模式基础上,应采用限定性数据权益保护模式,设置《反不正当竞争法》数据专条保护,确立限定性数据权益保护的构成要件、明晰商业数据侵权行为的认定标准、划界商业数据保护请求权人的范围,以促进数字经济的高质量发展。     

论我国《反不正当竞争法》的一般条款

随着我国市场经济进一步地深入发展以及在全球经济一体化的影响下,市场竞争日益激烈,市场领域的诸多不正当竞争行为日渐充分地暴露出来,而《反不正当竞争法》自身的缺陷——特别是缺少一条明确的一般条款的弊端越来越明显,使得我国市场经济进一步良好发展存在一定隐患,完善《反不正当竞争法》迫在眉睫。     

创新国际标准 培育世界知名品牌

2014清洁发展国际融资论坛暨十大绿色创新企业颁奖典礼在北京金融资产交易所举行,此次论坛的主题是”技术与金融创新驱动,促产业结构优化升级”。在此次论坛上,全国政协委员、中国品牌建设促进会理事长刘平均发表了题为“创新国际标准培育世界知名品牌”的演讲,指出：近年来,中国环保,低能耗．高新技术产业快速发展．但是,缺少自主知识产权的关键技术;缺少国际知名品牌。他强调：中国经济发展,中国经济由大变强,需要培育、打造一批国际知名品牌.     

网上银行的品牌竞争战略

随着信息技术的突飞猛进,网上银行近几年超常规发展,客户保有量增长迅猛,综合业务量也节节攀升。以招商银行为例,目前招商银行超过50%的对私业务和约15%的对公业务实现非柜台操作,网上企业银行每月完成的结算量占招商银行对公结算总量的22%(按金额)和15%(按笔数)。依托技术创新和体制创新,特别是网上银行的推波助澜,招商银行在2000年初至2003年初的3年间对公业务交易量达29229亿元,交易笔数518万笔,收益高达10360万元鸦个人业务交易量高达1239亿元,交易笔数达714万元,收益达6500万元,每年的综合成长率高达16%～30%。招商银行是网上银行竞争…     

Strategic IPOs and product market competition

We examine firms' incentives to go public in the presence of product market competition. As a result of their greater ability to diversify idiosyncratic risk in the capital market, public firms' owners tolerate higher profit variability than owners of private firms. Consequently, public firms adopt riskier and more aggressive output market strategies than private firms, which improves the competitive position of the former vis-à-vis the latter. This strategic benefit of being public, and thus, the proportion of public firms in an industry, is shown to be positively related to the degree of competitive interaction among firms in the output market, to demand uncertainty, and to the idiosyncratic portion of this uncertainty. Additional empirical predictions concern the effect of a firm's initial public offering on its market share and on its rivals' valuations. We test the model's predictions and find empirical support for most of them.     

Industry product market competition and managerial incentives

While some studies suggest that industry product market competition can substitute for managerial incentives, other studies suggest a complementary relation. The underlying assumption behind these studies is that competition can be uni-dimensionally proxied for by industry concentration. However, recent studies suggest that competition can reflect several dimensions: product substitutability, market size, and entry costs, given the level of industry concentration. Using these determinants of competition, this study contributes to the literature by showing that (a) firms provide stronger incentives when industry competition is greater, (b) competition is multi-dimensional in its relation to incentives; and (c) industry characteristics play a major role in influencing incentives.     

Common ownership and competition in product markets

We investigate the relation between common institutional ownership of the firms in an industry and product market competition. We find that common ownership is neither robustly positively related with industry profitability or output prices nor is it robustly negatively related with measures of nonprice competition, as would be expected if common ownership reduces competition. This conclusion holds regardless of industry classification choice, common ownership measure, profitability measure, nonprice competition proxy, or model specification. Our point estimates are close to zero with tight bounds, rejecting even modestly sized economic effects. We conclude that antitrust restrictions seeking to limit intra-industry common ownership are not currently warranted.     

Local product market competition and bank loans

We investigate the influences of local product market competition on the cost of private debt. Our evidence suggests that the cost of bank loans is significantly higher for firms headquartered in states with greater local product market competition measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for resident industries. To establish causality, we examine the recognition of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and firm relocations to identify exogenous shocks to local product market competition. We find that the cost of bank loans is lower for firms facing less intense local product market competition after the adoption of IDD and higher for firms relocated to states with more competitive product markets. The results imply that banks value the characteristics of a firm's local product market when approving loan contracts.     

Search,product market competition and CEO pay

We develop a market equilibrium model to show how search frictions in the CEO market, agency conflicts and product market characteristics interact to affect CEO market tightness, firm size and CEO incentive pay. The theory generates novel implications that link firms' product markets with CEO markets. Different determinants of competition—the entry cost, product substitutability, and market size—have contrasting effects on CEO market tightness, CEO pay and firm size. We also derive new predictions for the impact of product market risk on firm size and CEO incentive compensation. We show empirical support for several cross-sectional hypotheses derived from the theory for how CEO pay, CEO incentives, firm size and market tightness vary with product market characteristics.     

Estimating product market competition: Methodology and application

In oligopolies, firms behave strategically and commit to actions that elicit favorable responses from rivals. Firm actions consequently are a function of the nature of these strategic interactions. In this paper, we develop a methodology for the empirical estimation of strategic interactions in product markets. We then apply our measure of strategic interactions to CEO compensation. We use quarterly data on profits and sales from Compustat to estimate the slope of firm’s reaction function. When the slope is negative and marginal profits decrease with an increase in the rival’s actions the firm is classified as a strategic substitute. When the slope is positive and marginal profits increase with an increase in the rival’s actions the firm is classified as a strategic complement. As predicted by theory, we find significant evidence that strategic substitutes decrease the pay for performance incentives of their CEOs. On the other hand, strategic complements significantly increase CEO pay for performance incentives. The empirical measure developed can be used to test a wide variety of strategic models.     

The impact of product market competition on earnings quality

The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of product market competition on earnings quality. Based on a sample from the US manufacturing sector for the period 1996–2005, we find consistent evidence showing a positive relation between product market competition and earnings quality. Additional tests also confirm a positive relation between product market competition and the precision of public and private information held by investors and analysts. We also provide evidence that firms competing in concentrated and heterogeneous industries are associated with a number of earnings attributes and information quality not shared by those competing in concentrated but homogeneous industries. These findings are consistent with the intuition that firms enjoying a monopolistic advantage tend to avoid the attention of their competitors and politicians by creating a more opaque information environment.