Regular Distributive Social Systems

I consider abstract social systems where individual owners make gifts according to their preferences on the distribution of wealth in the context of a noncooperative equilibrium. I define a condition of regularity and a condition of strong regularity of these social systems. I prove notably that: regularity is generic, and implies the local uniqueness of equilibrium and the uniqueness of status quo equilibrium; strong regularity is nongeneric, implies that an equilibrium exists for all initial distributions of wealth, whenever an equilibrium exists for one of them, and implies the connectedness of the range of the equilibrium correspondence. These properties have strong implications for distributive theory and policy, summarized in a general hypothesis of perfect substitutability of private and public transfers. The formulation and discussion of this hypothesis lead to a general assessment of the explanatory power of the theory.     

Modern Money Theory and Distributive Justice

Modern money theory is a conjecture concerning fiscal spending and the nature of money. I show that modern money theory provides two interesting insights into distributive justice that have not been addressed in the recent Anglo-American distributive justice literature: (i) that the nature of a sovereign fiat currency allows for some distributive conflicts to be avoided; and (ii) that recent Anglo-American distributive justice theories assume that the economy is at capacity. Based on this, I consider whether the policy results of modern money theory can help foster a sense of justice.     

Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization

This paper studies the choice between centralization and decentralization of fiscal policy in a political economy setting. With centralization, regional delegates vote over agendas comprising sets of region–specific projects. The outcome is inefficient because the choice of projects is insufficiently sensitive to within–region benefits. The number of projects funded may be non–monotonic in the strength of project externalities. The efficiency gains from decentralization, and the performance of "constitutional rules" (such as majority voting) which may be used to choose between decentralization and centralization, are then discussed in this framework. Weaker externalities and more heterogeneity between regions need not increase the efficiency gain from decentralization.     

Cost effectiveness of paliperidone palmitate versus oral antipsychotics in patients with schizophrenia and a history of criminal justice involvement

Abstract

Objective:

Conduct a cost effectiveness analysis for the Paliperidone palmitate Research In Demonstrating Effectiveness (PRIDE) trial.     

Transitional justice and authoritarian backsliding

Constitutional Political Economy - Can a lack of transitional justice contribute to democratic backsliding? This paper uses the case of Poland to argue that selective enforcement of transitional...     

Macroeconomic stability and economic justice

This article presents a proposal to broaden the right to acquire capital with the earnings of capital as a means of promoting sustainable economic recovery and growth. It would open the markets for real and financial capital acquisition more fully and competitively to poor and working people (1) to distribute more broadly the earnings of capital and (2) to profitably employ more capital and labor. Both the recession and the strategies advanced to promote economic recovery may be viewed as responses to the prospect of inadequate present and future earning capacity of both consumers and producers (1) to purchase what can physically be produced and (2) to repay existent and anticipated debt obligations. To increase the prospects of sufficient, sustainable earning capacity, the proposal advanced in this article would extend to all people the same protections and benefits presently provided by government that facilitate market transactions whereby capital is acquired with the earnings of capital primarily for well-capitalized people. Although in theory, all people in a market economy are able to acquire capital with the earnings of capital, reliable empirical data reveal that as a practical matter, the major determinant of the ability of individuals to acquire capital with the earnings of capital is the existing distribution of capital ownership. The theory of “binary” economic growth underlying this proposal holds that the market return on capital is positively related to the distribution of capital acquisition with the earnings of capital. The prospect of a broader distribution of capital acquisition with the earnings of capital carries with it the prospect of more broadly distributed earning capacity in future years, which in turn will provide the market incentives to profitably employ more capital and labor in earlier years. The idea that the broader distribution of capital acquisition with the earnings of capital will promote growth is not found in any of the widely accepted theories and models of economic growth such as those proposed by Schumpeter, Solow, Roemer, and Lucas. By opening to all people the institutions of corporate finance, banking, insurance, government loans and guaranties, and monetary policy (the very institutions presently relied upon by the Federal Government to stimulate the economy) the practical ability to acquire capital with the earnings of capital can be more broadly extended to all people with the result that greatly enhanced prospects for greater and more broadly distributed earning capacity and growth can be reasonably expected and realized by all.     

Distributive and Additive Costsharing of an Homogeneous Good

Individual users demand different quantities of a homogeneous good produced under variable returns. We describe the family of costsharing methods that allocate costs in proportion to demands when returns are constant, and commute with the additivity and composition of cost functions. Two simple such methods are average cost pricing and incremental costsharing. All other methods in the family combine elements of the average cost and incremental ones. Serial costsharing stands out prominently in the family, whereas the Shapley–Shubik method, and all values from the associated stand alone cooperative game, are excluded.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D63, C71.     

Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory

The Suppes–Sen dominance relation is a weak criterion of impartiality in distributive justice. I propose its application to Nash bargaining theory. The Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) is characterized by replacing the controversial Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom with an axiom embodying the Suppes–Sen principle. This allows a clear interpretation of the NBS as a fair arbitration scheme. In addition, the proposed characterization is more robust than the standard one with respect to variations in the domain of bargaining problems.     

论分配正义的本质特征及内在要求

分配正义作为一种社会价值观念,其实质就是人们基于特定社会物质生活条件,对分配主体物质利益关系的整合。实现分配正义,必须明确分配主体的基本权利和义务,保障分配主体的地位平等;规范分配程序,实现分配主体的机会平等;坚持合理的分配原则,促进分配结果公平。     

Power, Distributive Conflicts, and Multiple Growth Paths

This article shows that multiple growth paths may occurin a politico-economic model of endogenous growth. This multiplicityis characterized by the coexistence of the low-tax, low-capital-flightequilibrium and a high-tax, high-capital-flight equilibrium.The likelihood of multiplicity is crucially related to the structureof power in society—namely, it is necessary that the politicallydecisive agents have a greater access to international capitalmarkets than the average in the economy.     

The Effectiveness of Distributive Policy in a Competitive Economy

I consider an abstract social system made of individual owners endowed with nonpaternalistic interdependent preferences, who interact by means of individual gifts and by exchanges on competitive markets. The existence of equilibrium is established. I identify the set of allocations that are decentralizable in the sense that they are general equilibria for some vectors of market prices and initial endowments. This set is characterized in a simple way from the social endowment and individual market and distributive preferences. Decentralizable allocations are all accessible to distributive policy, unless public transfers are confined to some neighborhood of 0. In the latter case, distributive policy remains free to perform local redistributions of wealth across the components of the graph of equilibrium gifts.     

Hot spots regulation and environmental justice

This paper analyzes whether regulating “hot spots” of toxic air pollution by increasing the spatial resolution of regulation could address environmental justice (EJ) concerns. To examine this question, this paper develops a decision model of a regulator choosing emission controls within a net cost minimizing framework. An empirical application of the model using air toxic emission data for Escambia and Santa Rosa Counties in Florida estimates the emission standards and spatial distribution of risks at a coarse and a finer spatial resolutions. Implications for EJ are analyzed by combining the simulated spatial risk distributions at the two resolutions with the demographic data. Results indicate that different measures of EJ point to different conclusions regarding the question of whether finer resolution regulation alleviates EJ concerns. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications for EJ policy.     

Distributive politics and economic growth: the Markovian Stackelberg solution

Summary. We generalize the result of Alesina and Rodrik (1994) by showing that their static solution is also a time consistent Stackelberg solution of a differential game between the government and the median voter.Received: 11 June 2001, Revised: 7 February 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: O15, O40, E61, C73.We would like to thank Claus Peter Ortlieb, Nikolaus A. Siegfried, and two anonymous referees for useful comments. The first version of this work was written while Holger Strulik was Marie Curie Research Fellow at the Department of Applied Economics, University of Cambridge, U.K. A research grant of the European Commission is gratefully acknowledged. Correspondence to: H. Strulik     

柏拉图的分配正义思想及其对农民的现实意义

柏拉图认为,由于物质构成、灵魂构成及对知识的把握不同,社会被分为统治者、辅助者和生产者三个阶层。正义的分配就要以个人禀赋为标准,并以此维护城邦整体的利益,最终实现权利和义务在社会的分配。其丰富的分配正义思想包含的教育以经济为基础、追求物质利益的合理性及政治权利的公平分配,对中国农民的发展有着重要的现实意义。     

Reexamination of Economic Growth, Tax Policy, and Distributive Politics

The paper examines the relationship between economic growth, tax policy, and distribution of capital and labor ownership in a one‐sector political‐economy model of endogenous growth with productive government spending financed by a proportional tax on capital income. The analysis shows that inequality in wealth and income can be positively or negatively related to the optimal tax rate. In either environment, higher inequality leads to a lower after‐tax return to capital, thereby reducing the economy's growth rate.     

Issues in environmental justice within the European Union

This paper surveys pressing issues facing current and future social policies in the European Union (EU) at the juncture of social justice demands and environmental concerns. European policy-makers have in fact only recently acknowledged the notions of environmental justice and environmental inequalities, which have been part of the US policy arsenal for almost two decades. Yet, challenges to equality and fairness in the environmental domain are many and growing within the European Union. After having defined environmental justice and environmental inequalities in the European context, the paper addresses two contemporary dimensions of those challenges for EU social policies: vulnerability and exposure to environmental disaster and risk; and fairness in environmental taxation and the related issue of fuel poverty.