CORPORATE CAPITAL COSTS: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE

Central to modern finance theory is an understanding of the cost of capital—the minimum required rate of return that is used by companies and investors for both valuation and ongoing performance measurement. This paper provides new insights into the market risk premium for U.S. equities, as well as better methods for measuring and quantifying a company's systematic risk. In so doing, it furnishes evidence that stock market investors now expect a 5% return premium over 30-year government bonds—a decline from the 6–8% premiums suggested by the Ibbotson-Sinquefeld data that extends from 1926 to the present. The author argues that, because of structural changes in the global economy and capital markets, only the most recent 40 or 50 years of data are relevant for estimating current risk premiums. Like the article that precedes it, this article also notes that the 30-year Treasury bond has an increasing component of systematic risk, and the author provides a method of applying the CAPM that removes that risk component from the "risk-free" rate and shifts it to the market risk premium.     

The Equity Market Risk Premium and the Valuation of Overseas Investments

There is little agreement among academics or practitioners about how to measure the size of the equity market risk premium, particularly when it relates to investments in emerging markets. Using monthly equity returns for 22 developed and 24 emerging markets covering the period 1976–2006, the authors find that developed capital markets have experienced significant increases in their degree of integration with the U.S. and world market indexes, while emerging markets remain at least partly segmented from those of the U.S. and the world. For countries that are reasonably well integrated into global capital markets, the authors suggest using the U.S.—based equity market risk premium. But when valuing investments in emerging markets, they recommend use of the Capital Asset Pricing Model adjusted for political risk and a measure of co‐movement between the foreign and U.S. stock markets. The authors also remind readers that the equity market risk premium is supposed to be a forward‐looking measure, and that the common practice of inferring the future from the past can be misleading, particularly in the case of rapidly developing emerging markets.     

Buyout Activity: The Impact of Aggregate Discount Rates

Buyout booms form in response to declines in the aggregate risk premium. We document that the equity risk premium is the primary determinant of buyout activity rather than credit‐specific conditions. We articulate a simple explanation for this phenomenon: a low risk premium increases the present value of performance gains and decreases the cost of holding an illiquid investment. A panel of U.S. buyouts confirms this view. The risk premium shapes changes in buyout characteristics over the cycle, including their riskiness, leverage, and performance. Our results underscore the importance of the risk premium in corporate finance decisions.     

GOLBALIZATION, CORPORATE FINANCE, AND THE COST OF CAPITAL

International financial markets are progressively becoming one huge, integrated, global capital market—a development that is contributing to higher stock prices in developed as well as developing economies. For companies that are large and visible enough to attract global investors, having a global shareholder base means having a lower cost of capital and hence a greater equity value for two main reasons: First, because the risks of equity are shared among more investors with different portfolio exposures and hence a different “appetite” for bearing certain risks, equity market risk premiums should fall for all companies in countries with access to global markets. Although the largest reductions in cost of capital resulting from globalization will be experienced by companies in liberalizing economies that are gaining access to the global markets for the first time, risk premiums can also be expected to fall for firms in long-integrated markets as well. Second, when firms in countries with less-developed capital markets raise capital in the public markets of countries (like the U.S.) with highly developed markets, they get more than lower-cost capital; they also import at least aspects of the corporate governance systems that prevail in those markets. For companies accustomed to less-developed markets, raising capital overseas is likely to mean that more sophisticated investors, armed with more advanced technologies, will participate in monitoring their performance and management. And, in a virtuous cycle, more effective monitoring increases investor confidence in the future performance of those companies and so improves the terms on which they raise capital. Besides reducing market risk premiums and improving corporate governance, globalization also affects the systematic risk, or “beta,” of individual companies. In global markets, the beta of a firm's equity depends on how the stock contributes to the volatility not of the home market portfolio, but of the world market portfolio. For companies with access to global capital markets whose profitability is tied more closely to the local than to the global economy, use of the traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) will overstate the cost of capital because risks that are not diversifiable within a national economy can be diversified by holding a global portfolio. Thus, to reflect the new reality of a globally determined cost of capital, all companies with access to global markets should consider using a global CAPM that views a company as part of the global portfolio of stocks. In making this argument, the article reviews the growing body of academic studies that provide evidence of the predictive power of the global CAPM as well as the reduction in world risk premiums.     

Risk and Return: A Revisit Using Expected Returns

This paper uses direct estimates of expected returns to examine the link between standard measures of financial risk and investor return requirements. The results show that systematic risk commands a significant positive risk premium, much larger than found using historical returns as proxies for expectations. Furthermore, there are nonlinearities in the relationship between risk and return. Finally, we show that expected returns and risk premiums in the equity markets change over time and that these changes are related to changes in interest rates on U.S. government obligations.     

The Effects of Inverted Yield Curves on Asset Returns

Between 1954 and 1991, U.S. stocks, long-term government bonds, and corporate bonds show negative risk premiums during periods preceded by inverted yield curves. Intermediate-term government bonds do not. Going from safer to riskier asset classes, the negative risk premiums increase in absolute value and statistical significance. The consumption CAPM offers a possible explanation for the negative risk premiums. A negative covariance between the growth rate of consumption and the premium on the risky assets will result in a negative risk premium. Empirical tests of the conditional covariance show that the consumption CAPM does not explain the phenomena.     

iShares Australia: a clinical study in international behavioral finance

Using iShares Australia returns as a proxy for the influence of overseas investors in the Australian market, we found that U.S.-based investors in the Australian market overreact to contemporaneous and lagged returns of the U.S. equity market, the U.S.-Australian dollar exchange rate, and past iShares Australia returns. In response to changing conditional risk, however, investors behave rationally: increasing (decreasing) expected risk is associated with falling (rising) prices. In light of these findings, we hypothesize that behavioral finance might explain the observed correlations between international equity markets.     

Can a stock exchange improve corporate behavior? Evidence from firms' migration to premium listings in Brazil

Because Brazil's legal system lacked protection for minority shareholders and trading of Brazilian shares flowed to U.S. exchanges, in 2001 the São Paulo Stock Exchange, Bovespa, created three premium exchange listings that require more stringent shareholder protections. This paper examines the effects of a commitment to improved corporate disclosure and governance by firms' voluntary migration to these premium listings. Our analysis finds that a firm's migration brings positive abnormal returns to its shareholders, particularly when its shares did not have a prior cross-listing on a U.S. exchange and also when the firm chooses a premium listing with the highest standards. Migration to a premium listing also leads to a significant increase in the trading volume of non-voting shares. Firms that choose a premium listing tend to have growth opportunities that they finance with subsequent seasoned equity offerings. These results suggest that a premium listing is a mechanism for bonding to improved corporate behavior that can be less costly than cross-listing on a U.S. exchange.     

Equity Premia as Low as Three Percent? Evidence from Analysts' Earnings Forecasts for Domestic and International Stock Markets

The returns earned by U.S. equities since 1926 exceed estimates derived from theory, from other periods and markets, and from surveys of institutional investors. Rather than examine historic experience, we estimate the equity premium from the discount rate that equates market valuations with prevailing expectations of future flows. The accounting flows we project are isomorphic to projected dividends but use more available information and narrow the range of reasonable growth rates. For each year between 1985 and 1998, we find that the equity premium is around three percent (or less) in the United States and five other markets.     

AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF EQUITY COSTS AND RISK PREMIUMS IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY: 1971–1985

This paper develops a varying parameter econometric model that estimates the cost of equity of individual utility firms from 1971 to 1985. The equity costs estimated in this framework can be analyzed in terms of their statistical precision. The paper also examines, theoretically and empirically, the relationship between the econometric estimates of the equity risk premiums and the risk-free interest rates. The data do not support the hypothesis that risk premiums are independent of interest rates. Also, the relationship appears to vary over time. These results invalidate the risk premium approach in which equity costs are estimated by adding a constant, historical average risk premium to the prevailing interest rates.     

Estimating the Equity Risk Premium and Expected Equity Rates of Return: The Case of Canada

It is common to use the average excess return of equities over bonds estimated over long time periods as an expected equity risk premium on the grounds that going back far enough covers most possible economic scenarios. But although this data is useful in guiding the exercise of judgment, it cannot substitute for judgment. Adding more years of data to the near century of Canadian stock and bond returns that inform today's estimate of the equity risk premium will not produce a “random walk” for a simple reason: the historic bond series is the result of a specific historic monetary policy. This is particularly true of and important for the case of Canada, where today's very low current bond yields reflect the emergence of the Canadian dollar as a reserve currency as well as the impact of unconventional monetary policy elsewhere. After analyzing the historic record of the Canadian equity risk premium and noting the need for adjustments when this premium is applied to the current anomalously low Canadian long‐term bond yields, the author reaches the following conclusions:

• The historic Canadian equity risk premium is approximately 5.0% (based on arithmetic returns), which is slightly lower than the roughly 6.0% value for the U.S.
• The historic equity risk premium has not been constant because of obvious changes in the Canadian bond market. To some extent, the huge cycle in which bond yields began their increase from the 4.0% level starting in 1957, when markets were liberalized, and then fell back to the 4.0% level in 2007‐2008 completed an adjustment to changes in fiscal versus monetary policy. However, in 2016, average long Canada bond yields dropped to an anomalously low 1.8%, which is below the long‐term inflation target of the Bank of Canada, and have barely recovered since. It is difficult to view this as an equilibrium rate determined by private investors.
• Of the drop in bond yields, about 0.50% is unique to Government of Canada bonds as they became attractive to sovereign investors as a rare AAA‐rated issuer.
• Using an indicator variable for the post‐2010 years, a simple regression analysis indicates that current long Canada bond yields should be about 2.75% higher but for the recent changes. And for 2018, this means that the 2.35% average long Canada bond yield should have been about 5.0%. Apart from the impact of higher government deficits, this is consistent with average yields before the 2008 financial crisis.
• Adding an adjusted 5.0% long Canada bond yield to the historic equity risk premium in Canada of 4.50% gives 9.50% for the cost of the overall equity market or, given the Bank of Canada's target inflation rate of 2.0%, a real equity return of 7.5%, both slightly higher than the long‐run averages.

In sum, the conventional practice of adding a historic market risk premium to the current low Canada long bond yields would impart a sharp downward bias to current equity cost estimates; use of this method would not be appropriate until long Canada bond yields increase to at least the 4.0% level.     

An introduction to security returns

The equity premium - the difference between the return achievable from investment in the equity market (R_M ) and the risk-free rate of return (R_F )- plays an important part in corporate finance. The expression equity premium (sometimes referred to as the equity risk premium) is used to denote the ex ante expectation of investors. The term excess return refers to the ex post achievement of stock returns over and above the risk-free return. If we compare US and UK returns, we find that total returns, real returns and the value of (R_M - R_F ) are all marginally higher for the UK. Summarized evidence appears in Table 1 and Table 6. Such greater returns may be due to an increased risk premium related to increasing unexpected inflation. Particularly important in estimating the equity risk premium is whether excess returns are measured using a geometric or an arithmetic mean return. To a significant extent, this question revolves around mean reversion in stock returns. Evidence of mean reversion is substantial, although it cannot be proved unequivocally. Given the weight of evidence of mean reversion, there may be a strong case for the use of a geometric mean with an equity premium of between 3% and 5% - or even less.     

Entrepreneurial risk aversion,net worth effects and real fluctuations

This paper examines the combined effect of asymmetric information and private entrepreneurial risk aversion on investment decisions. The standard optimal debt contract becomes modified by the introduction of insurance and a risk premium that entrepreneurs demand due to the uncertainty of their investment returns: the private equity premium. In general equilibrium, the private equity premium may become a mechanism that magnifies the effects of shocks. A structural estimation of the model's parameters using Chilean and U.S. data shows that the entrepreneurial risk aversion assumption has more empirical relevance in an economy where smaller privately-held businesses are relatively more prevalent than where the corporate sector predominates, like the U.S.     

Taxes, Leverage, and the Cost of Equity Capital

We examine the associations among leverage, corporate and investor level taxes, and the firm's implied cost of equity capital. Expanding on Modigliani and Miller [1958, 1963] , the cost of equity capital can be expressed as a function of leverage and corporate and investor level taxes. Based on this expression, we predict that the cost of equity is increasing in leverage, and that corporate taxes mitigate this leverage‐related risk premium, while the personal tax disadvantage of debt increases this premium. We empirically test these predictions using implied cost of equity estimates and proxies for the firm's corporate tax rate and the personal tax disadvantage of debt. Our results suggest that the equity risk premium associated with leverage is decreasing in the corporate tax benefit from debt. We find some evidence that the equity risk premium from leverage is increasing in the personal tax penalty associated with debt.     

Inflation ambiguity and the term structure of U.S. Government bonds

Variations in trend inflation are the main driver for variations in the nominal yield curve. According to empirical data, investors observe a set of empirical models that could all have generated the time-series for trend inflation. This set has been large and volatile during the 1970s and early 1980s and small during the 1990s. I show that log utility together with Knightian uncertainty about trend inflation can explain the term premium in U.S. Treasury bonds. The equilibrium has two inflation premiums, an inflation risk premium and a Knightian inflation ambiguity premium.     

CREATING VALUE IN PENSION PLANS (OR, GENTLEMEN PREFER BONDS)

Pension funds are typically one-half to two-thirds invested in equities because equities are expected to outperform other financial assets over the long term, and the long-term nature of pension fund liabilities seems well suited to absorbing any short-term return volatility. What's more, U.S. GAAP currently makes it possible to take credit in advance for the higher anticipated earnings on equity investments without acknowledging their inherent risk. But by allowing the higher expected returns from stocks to reduce a company's current pension expenses, the accounting treatment conflicts with some very basic principles of finance (in particular, the idea that investors must earn higher returns on riskier investments just to "break even"), conceals systematic biases in the actuarial analysis, and gives managers considerable latitude to manipulate the bottom line.
The authors suggest a startlingly different approach. They argue that pension assets should be invested entirely in duration-matched debt instruments for two reasons: (1) to capture the full tax benefits of pre-funding their pension obligations and (2) to improve overall corporate risk profiles by converting general stock market risk into firm-specific operating risk, where corporate managers should have a comparative advantage and can generate real value. Investing exclusively in bonds would take better advantage of the tax-exempt status of pension plans and greatly reduce fund management costs, while at the same time helping o shore up fund quality and sharpening corporate executives' focus on their real operating assets.     

Baylor University Roundtable on The Corporate Mission, CEO Pay, and Improving the Dialogue with Investors

A small group of academics and practitioners discusses four major controversies in the theory and practice of corporate finance:

• • What is the social purpose of the public corporation? Should corporate managements aim to maximize the profitability and value of their companies, or should they instead try to balance the interests of their shareholders against those of “stakeholder” groups, such as employees, customers, and local communities?
• • Should corporate executives consider ending the common practice of earnings guidance? Are there other ways of shifting the focus of the public dialogue between management and investors away from near-term earnings and toward longer-run corporate strategies, policies, and goals? And can companies influence the kinds of investors who buy their shares?
• • Are U.S. CEOs overpaid? What role have equity ownership and financial incentives played in the past performance of U.S. companies? And are there ways of improving the design of U.S. executive pay?
• • Can the principles of corporate governance and financial management at the core of the private equity model—notably, equity incentives, high leverage, and active participation by large investors—be used to increase the values of U.S. public companies?

     

The impact of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 repo ‘safe harbor’ provisions on investors

ABSTRACT

The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005 significantly expanded the exemptions from the normal workings of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Using a large sample of U.S. banks, we study investors’ reaction to news about the promulgation of the BAPCPA repo ‘safe harbor’ provisions and the influence extending such exemptions to repos collateralized by riskier collateral had on equity market information asymmetry. We find a negative market reaction to news events about the promulgation of BAPCPA, which subsequent cross-sectional analysis suggests is at least partly driven by repo exposure. This finding suggests that investors perceived the increase in finance risk from the extension of the ‘safe harbor’ provisions as dominating the perceived gain from accessing cheaper finance. Further, we find that the promulgation of BAPCPA gave rise to increased information asymmetry for banks with repo exposure.     

The Equity Premium: Consistent with GDP Growth and Portfolio Insurance

We find that the long‐term equity premium is consistent with both GDP growth and portfolio insurance. We use a supply‐side growth model and demonstrate that the arithmetic average stock market return and the returns on corporate assets and debt depend on GDP per capita growth. The implied equity premium matches the U.S. historical average over 1926–2001. Separately, we find that the equity premium tracks the value of a put option on the S&P 500. Our theory predicts a smaller equity premium in the future, assuming that the recent regime shifts in dividend policies, interest rates, and tax rates are permanent.     

Loss aversion,asymmetric market comovements,and the home bias

Loss aversion has been used to explain why a high equity premium might be consistent with plausible levels of risk aversion. The intuition is that the first-order-different utility impact of wealth gains and losses leads loss-averse investors to behave similarly to investors with high risk aversion. But if so, should those agents not perceive larger gains from international diversification than standard expected-utility investors with plausible levels of risk aversion? They might not, because comovements in international stock markets are asymmetric: correlations are higher in market downturns than in upturns. This asymmetry dampens the gains from diversification relatively more for loss-averse investors. We analyze the portfolio problem of such an investor who has to choose between home and foreign equities in the presence of asymmetric comovement in returns. Perhaps surprisingly, in the context of the home bias puzzle we find that loss-averse investors behave similarly to those with standard expected-utility preferences and plausible levels of risk aversion. We argue that preference specifications that appear to perform well with respect to the equity premium puzzle should be subjected to this “test”.