Financial integration, capital mobility, and income convergence

Recent studies have found that capital moves 'uphill' from poor to rich countries, and brings little or no growth dividend when it does flow into poor economies. We show that Europe does not conform to this paradigm. In the European experience of financial integration, capital has flown from rich to poor countries, and such inflows have been associated with significant acceleration of income convergence. Analysing broader samples of countries, we find that 'downhill' capital flows tend to be observed above certain thresholds in institutional quality and financial integration. But Europe remains different even when allowing for such threshold effects, and its experience is similar to that of interstate flows within the United States. Our findings are consistent with the notion that financial diversification reduces countries' incentives to save in order to self-insure against specific shocks.
— Abdul Abiad, Daniel Leigh and Ashoka Mody     

Eastern economies towards european union: Statistical measures of perspective evaluation

The main goal of presented taxonomy methods is to make the integration criteria of countries which are candidates for the European Union (EU) more objective. One of the basic issues in the process of their program construction is to perform suitable numbers and types of measures and coefficients. In this paper, similarity and distance measures between countries are proposed. Some of them are able to estimate the integration program realization, while others could signal possible current corrections to the program being realized. The methods described in this paper could also be useful for countries' program evaluations based on the experiences of the EU members, especially such countries whose processes of integration with the EU are characterized by similar processes and indices of economic development.     

欧债危机成因与前景的制度分析

希腊等欧元区国家的主权债务危机可以说是欧洲区域一体化建设中的独特现象,其折射的是欧元区所存在的一个结构性问题：奉行单一货币政策和各国分散的财政政策,集中暴露出了欧洲货币一体化与欧洲福利资本主义的不相容、以及统一货币运行所要求的财政紧缩与欧元成员国经济增长和福利制度之间的矛盾与冲突;欧元不会就此瓦解,但欧债问题的最终解决困难重重;欧元的未来取决于自由与市场的回归欧洲,取决于欧盟的制度完善与欧式福利资本主义改革的成功与否。     

Are duty drawbacks on exports worth the hassle?

Abstract.  Many countries use duty drawbacks on exports, yet there is no consensus whether countries should embrace or abandon them. The answer depends on countries' development priorities and economic conditions. An increase in the drawback has a positive impact on export competitiveness, but the welfare effect is ambiguous. A welfare increase is more likely if the economy is small with high input tariffs, low initial drawback, low administrative costs and tariff leakages. In China duty drawback removal after meeting its WTO commitments improves welfare, but hurts economic efficiency, export competitiveness, and real incomes. Further liberalization can mitigate these negative effects.     

The Transnational Challenge to the Corporate State

Income inequality is not persistent as far as the Netherlands is concerned. Dutch income inequality diminished with the rise of the welfare state. One of the explanatory factors of the development of income inequality is the corporatist model applied to socio-economic negotiations.

The Dutch case endorses the view that corporatist institutions are significant for income distribution. Corporatism also may positively influence productivity. Therefore, the integration of the successful corporatist countries into the European Union does not imply that they have to converge to the socio-economic governance structure of the other countries. It is likely that European countries, such as the Netherlands, can continue their approach to income equality.     

东亚消费风险分担的度量及潜在福利分析

文章利用1970-2004年的相关数据,度量了东亚13个经济体的消费风险分担的程度以及东亚地区在实现完全风险分担后带来的潜在福利收益.实证结果表明:东亚区域资本市场在平滑GDP冲击方面的作用非常小,对区域借贷市场虽有一定的作用,但较为有限,这说明东亚的消费风险分担程度还相当低;相比OECD国家和欧盟国家,东亚各经济体风险分担的福利收益是比较高的.     

Trade policies, concentration, growth and welfare

The aim of this paper is to analyse, through a theoretical model, the effects that the trade integration of two countries may have on industrial location, growth and welfare.The conclusions reached finally depend both on whether the import or the export costs are affected by the trade policies on which the integration process is based and on whether the rich or the poor country introduces them. In general, when integration leads to an increase of industrial concentration in the rich country, the growth rate increases and welfare improves in both countries. If integration means that industry moves to the poor country, the growth rate decreases; in spite of this, in this case the poor country can also improve its welfare.     

Welfare implications of strategic economic policy in eastern Europe

This paper evaluates the welfare effects in a block of selected eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Romania, former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and former Yugoslavia) emerging from the possibility to participate in the European integration process and to act as strategic players in dynamic games. The results of the cooperative and noncooperative dynamic game scenarios are compared with fixed policy solutions. The McKibbin-Sachs global model (MSG2 model), which incorporates rational expectations, is used as a framework. A global supply-side shock and a fixed exchange rate regime are considered under the alternative policy layouts. It is shown that international economic cooperation may be advantageous over noncooperation. For the anchor currency of the European Monetary Union (EMU), fixing the eastern European block currencies to the EMU may lead to significant destabilization.     

A sequential approach to regional integration: The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe

This paper develops a theory of optimal sequencing of regional integration and applies it to the specific question of Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) and the EU. We show that the timing of transition and integration has implications for the long-term trade structure of Europe. In this model the interest to integrate the CEECs comes from harmonization of policies to attract industries. Without integration, European countries will try to inefficiently protect their industries. Because of the transfers implied by the CAP and the Structural Policies, the EU delays enlargement until the CEECs have sufficiently converged. CEECs might at this point prefer to stay outside the EU and attract industries by offering them more generous protection than the EU. Such timing may be inefficient ex ante for all countries because it may prevent full European integration in the long run, inducing firms to relocate outside of the EU and governments in the EU and the CEECs to inefficiently protect industry. During the transition, all countries benefit from regional integration among the CEECs.     

An Incumbent Country View on Eastern Enlargement of the EU Part I: A General Treatment

An eastern enlargement of the EU, from an incumbent country point of view,involves a fiscal burden from extending Union agricultural and cohesion policiesto new members, coupled with potential gains as well as adjustment problemsderiving from an extended customs union and a larger single market. Enlargementis controversial, because the net effect is unclear, a priori, and will certainly vary across individual countries. Our two-part contribution tries to do shed light on this controversy. In this first part, we present a general treatment of the likely effects on different incumbent countries, while a subsequent companion paper will take a closer look at the specific case of Austria. The general view of part I, in turn, first focuses on various empirical measures highlighting crucial differences between incumbents, pertaining to the fiscal burden on the one hand, and integration gains on the other. We then argue that a proper evaluation must rely on an explicit welfare criterion, and we use a general model of economic integration in order to identify the principalchannels through which aggregate welfare of an incumbent country is affected by an enlargement of the EU. We address traditional effects of trade creation and trade diversion, as well as growth effects arising from an abolition of trade barriers. In addition, we ask how enlargement affects foreign direct investmentand labor migration, and what this implies in welfare terms for an incumbent western European country. Taken together, these effects generate a certain presumption of integration gains, which need to be set against the fiscal burden. However, a final judgement requires a case-by-case approach, based on empirical implementations of enriched and parameterized models for specific countries. The companion paper, therefore, uses a suitably specified, calibrated dynamic equilibrium model, in order to take a closer look at the Austrian case.     

Trade-creation and trade-diversion effects of regional trade arrangements: low-income countries

Although the number of regional trade arrangements (RTAs) among the lowest-income developing countries is surging, the literature on their welfare effects is still scarce, and the few that exist fail to provide conclusive results. Furthermore, these RTAs are dominated by countries with a small share of total exports destined for intraregional trade flows. Our study focuses on the welfare effects of RTAs (pertaining to trade creation and trade diversion) among this group of countries. We use a theoretically justified gravity model to estimate welfare effects, focusing on trade creation and trade diversion and deviating from the norm in related studies, accounting for heterogeneity in third countries. Using ECOWAS as a sample, we estimate welfare effects on 1992–2012 annual bilateral imports for 14 countries from 169 countries. Contrary to conventional expectations in the literature, we find that economic integration among small and relatively low-income countries that have a small share of total trade with each other is welfare-improving for the members as a group, for the majority of the individual member countries, and for some third countries. Accounting for heterogeneity in third countries reveals that an RTA among low-income countries has a particularly robust trade-creation effect.     

Who gains from capital market integration? Tax competition between unionized and non‐unionized countries

The welfare effects of capital market integration are examined under a model of tax competition with two asymmetric countries. The asymmetry is expressed through the labour market: one country has a perfect labour market whereas the other country's labour market is unionized. Our results indicate that the welfare effects of capital market integration differ depending on whether governments are active or passive in attracting capital. In the absence of active governments, capital market integration benefits the country with a competitive labour market whereas it harms the unionized country. Capital market integration benefits both countries if governments are active and compete for mobile capital using taxes/subsidies.     

欧洲福利国家危机的政治经济学分析

20世纪70年代以来,福利国家的危机日益加剧,凯恩斯主义在欧洲各国不同程度地被新自由主义所取代.新自由主义从意识形态、全球化与竞争力、不平等、经济与社会政策、公共财政等方面对福利国家发起了攻击,其目的 不是取消福利国家,而是改变福利国家的内涵,使之服务于新自由主义,其核心利益关切点不再是社会大众,而是金融资本.在这一背...     

Parallel trade,product quality,and welfare

We study the welfare effects of parallel trade (PT) considering investment in quality. We thus revisit the case for PT in research-intensive industries. We find that PT may raise quality, depending on how preferences for quality differ across countries. Conditional on quality, consumer surplus may rise (fall) in the PT-source (PT-recipient) country. While PT reduces ex post welfare, improving quality is a necessary condition for PT to increase welfare ex ante.     

Labour market implications of EU product market integration

European labour markets are in a state of flux due to the changing market situation induced by international integration. This process affects wage formation through more fierce product market competition and increased mobility of jobs. This development is by some observers taken to enforce labour market flexibility, while for others it signals an erosion of social standards and in turn possibly the welfare society. Since labour is not very mobile in Europe, the effects of international integration on labour markets are mostly indirect via product market integration. We review the channels through which product market integration affects labour markets and perform an empirical analysis of the convergence and interdependencies in wage formation among EU countries. We find that integration is changing labour market structures and inducing wage convergences as well as stronger wage interdependencies, but it is a gradual process. Moreover, the present study does not support the view that international integration will lead to a 'race to the bottom' and rapidly erode domestic labour markets standards, nor that it will relieve politicians of the need to consider labour market reforms to improve labour market performance.     

欧债危机与资本主义福利国家新变化

欧债危机爆发后,有一种观点认为危机的原因是高福利。通过分析希腊债务危机与本国福利制度的关系,对比南北欧在危机中的不同表现,可以看出高福利制度只是债务危机的直接推手,欧债危机的发生还有其他原因。本文通过对北欧福利国家改革的历史考察以及这次债务危机中各国财政紧缩和福利改革措施的分析,探讨福利国家改革的走向和趋势。     

EU Enlargement, Migration and the New Constitution

The paper deals with the effects of migration resulting fromEU Eastern enlargement on the welfare states of Western Europe.Although migration is good in principle, as it yields gainsfrom trade and specialization for all countries involved, itdoes so only if it meets with flexible labour markets and ifit is not artificially induced by gifts of the welfare state.This is not the present state of affairs in Western Europe.In addition to measures that make labour markets more flexible,the introduction of delayed integration of working migrantsand the home country principle for nonworking migrants is arational reaction of the state. The proposed new EU constitution,which contains far-reaching rules for a European social union,should be amended accordingly. (JEL E2, F2, H0, J3, J6)     

Comparison of deep integration in the Melitz,Krugman and Armington models: The case of The Philippines in RCEP

We estimate the welfare effects of a modern mega-preferential trade agreement--the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership--with three versions of market structure: (i) perfect competition, Armington style; (ii) monopolistic competition based on Krugman (1980); and (iii) monopolistic competition in the style of Melitz (2003). We develop a new numerical model of foreign direct investment (FDI) with heterogeneous firms and extension of the Krugman model that allows small countries to impact the number of varieties. We hold both the trade and FDI responses constant across the three market structures. We find that in all three market structures, there are substantial gains from deep integration, but virtually no gains from preferential tariff reduction. Both our Krugman and Melitz style models produce significantly larger welfare gains than the Armington structure, especially if third countries benefit at least partially from the deep integration reforms via either spillovers or wider liberalization.     

Redistribution, Fiscal Competition, and the Politics of Economic Integration

The paper examines the consequences of the economic integration of factor markets in a model with two countries that redistribute income among their residents. The social benefits in each country are financed by a source based tax on capital which is democratically chosen by its inhabitants. If either capital or labour is internationally mobile, the countries engage in fiscal competition and the partial integration of capital or labour markets is detrimental to the countries' redistributive ability. A move from partial to full integration, however, may alleviate rather than intensify fiscal competition, particularly, if the two countries face sufficiently similar economic and political conditions. In such a situation, for example, tax competition for mobile capital is softened as the labour market becomes more integrated and even vanishes if both factors are fully mobile. As a result, there is more redistribution in equilibrium and a majority of the population in each country is strictly better off.     

Privatization and entries of foreign enterprises in a differentiated industry

We investigate whether or not privatization is beneficial from the viewpoint of social welfare in a monopolistic competition model. We discuss the relationship between the welfare effects of privatization and the degree of foreign direct investment in the private sector, which is an important problem in developing countries and in transition economies such as China and Central and Eastern European countries. We find that, in the long run, privatization of a public firm is more likely to improve welfare when the country depends on foreign capital in the private sector, whereas the opposite tendency exists in the short run.