United we stand: on the macroeconomics of a Fiscal union

In this paper, we apply dynamic tracking games to macroeconomic policy making in a monetary union. We use a small stylized nonlinear two-country macroeconomic model of a monetary union for analyzing the interactions between two fiscal (governments: “core” and “periphery”) and one monetary (central bank) policy makers, assuming different objective functions of these decision makers. Using the OPTGAME algorithm, we calculate numerical solutions for cooperative (Pareto optimal) and non-cooperative games (feedback Nash). We show how the policy makers react to adverse demand shocks. We investigate the consequences of three scenarios: decentralized fiscal policies controlled by independent governments (the present situation), centralized fiscal policy (a fiscal union) with an independent central bank (pure fiscal union), and a fully centralized monetary and fiscal union. For the latter two scenarios, we demonstrate the importance of different assumptions about the joint objective function corresponding to different weights for the two governments in the design of the common fiscal policy. We show that a fiscal union with weights corresponding to the number of states in each of the blocs gives better results than non-cooperative policy making. When one bloc dominates the fiscal union, decentralized policies yield lower overall losses than the pure fiscal union and the monetary and fiscal union.     

“Core” and “Periphery” in a Monetary Union: A Macroeconomic Policy Game

We develop a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union to study strategic interactions between macroeconomic policy makers, namely the central bank and governments. In this union, the governments of participating countries pursue national goals when deciding on fiscal policies, whereas the common central bank’s monetary policy aims at union-wide objective variables. The union considered is asymmetric, consisting of a core, with lower initial public debt, and a periphery, with higher initial public debt. For a symmetric demand shock, we derive numerical solutions of the dynamic game between the governments and the central bank using the OPTGAME algorithm. We show that mildly active cooperative countercyclical policies dominate noncooperative solutions and a scenario of no policy intervention. Optimal policies call for a brief expansionary action to bolster the effects on output and a return to a small fiscal primary surplus as soon as the crisis is over until the targeted level of public debt is reached.     

Stock market response to monetary and fiscal policy shocks: Multi-country evidence

A Structural VAR model is employed to investigate the effects of monetary and fiscal policy shocks on stock market performance in Germany, UK and the US. A significant number of past studies have concentrated their attention on the relationship between monetary policy and stock market performance, yet only few on the effects of fiscal policy on stock markets. Even more we know little, if any, on the effects of fiscal and monetary policies on stock market performance when the two policies interact. This study aims to fill this void. Our results show that both fiscal and monetary policies influence the stock market, via either direct or indirect channels. More importantly, we find evidence that the interaction between the two policies is very important in explaining stock market developments. Thus, investors and analysts in their effort to understand the relationship between macroeconomic policies and stock market performance should consider fiscal and monetary policies in tandem rather than in isolation.     

The identification of fiscal and monetary policy in a structural VAR

Good economic management depends on understanding shocks from monetary policy, fiscal policy and other sources affecting the economy and their subsequent interactions. This paper presents a new methodology to disentangle such shocks in a structural VAR framework. The method combines identification via sign restrictions, cointegration and traditional exclusion restrictions within a system which explicitly models stationary and non-stationary variables and accounts for both permanent and temporary shocks. The usefulness of the approach is demonstrated on a small open economy where policy makers are actively considering the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies.     

The relative importance of monetary and fiscal policies in selected African countries

This paper examines the relative importance of monetary and fiscal policies in ten African countries using a trivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) model. The analysis is undertaken with annual data from 1960 to 1990 in logarithms first difference form. In five of the ten countries, our empirical results support the monetarist position that monetary policy is more important than fiscal policy. On the other hand, the Keynesian position that fiscal policy is more important than monetary policy is confirmed in the other five countries of the sample. The results of this study suggest that a particular economic philosophy cannot be generalized for African countries. These results may therefore prove useful not only to policy-makers but also to those interested in building macroeconomic models which may have implications for aggregate-demand management.     

Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions in the Euro Area

The problem of monetary and fiscal policy interactions is an important issue for the euro area, since the individual member states of the EMU are responsible for their fiscal policies but monetary policy is pursued by a single monetary authority, the ECB. This paper is concerned with empirical evidence on monetary and fiscal policy interactions in the euro area. We first explore fiscal regimes with a VAR model and find empirical evidence that a non-Ricardian fiscal policy has been pursued in both France and Germany. As an example, we then study how one member state of the EMU, namely, Italy, is responding to the common monetary policy with its fiscal policy and find that Italian fiscal policy seemed to be counteractive to the common monetary policy between 1979 and 1998. In order to study monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a more general way, we explore time-varying interactions by estimating a State-Space model with Markov-switching for some Euro-area countries. There appear to be some regime changes in monetary and fiscal policy interactions in France and Germany, but the interactions between the two policies are not strong. Moreover, the two policies have not been accommodative but counteractive to each other. Finally we explore forward-looking behavior in policy interactions and find that expectations do not seem to have played an important role in the policy designs.     

Macroeconomic Policy and Ownership Structure in a Mixed Transition Economy

Both state and non-state sectors have important roles in the Chinese economy. A dynamic model to analyze capital accumulation in state and non-state sectors is constructed and the fiscal and monetary policy requirements for the coexistence of a state sector and a non-state sector are derived. Our findings suggest that the effects of fiscal and monetary policies on ownership structure depend on which government subsidization policy is implemented. The results indicate that lowering tax rates and tightening the money supply can speed up the transition pace, but these policies do not necessarily contribute to developing an economy with a greater share for the non-state sector.J. Comp. Econom., December 2000, 28(4), pp. 762–785. College of Economics, Osaka Prefecture University, 1-1, Gakuen-Cho, Sakai, Osaka 599-8531, Japan.     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions: Evidence from emerging European economies

This paper examines the interactions between fiscal and monetary policy for some former transition, emerging European economies over the 1995Q1–2010Q4 period by using a Markov regime-switching model. We consider the monetary policy rule proposed by Taylor (1993) and the fiscal policy rule suggested by Davig and Leeper (2007) in accounting for monetary and fiscal policy interactions. Empirical results suggest that monetary and fiscal policy rules exhibit switching properties between active and passive regimes and all countries followed both active and passive monetary policies. As for fiscal policy, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Slovenia seem to have alternated between active and passive fiscal regimes while fiscal policies of Poland and the Slovak Republic can be characterized by a single fiscal regime. Although the policy mix and the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy point a diverse picture in our sample countries, the monetary policy seems to be passive in all countries after 2000. This finding is consistent with the constraints imposed by European Union enlargement on monetary policy.     

CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND THE MONETARY INSTRUMENT PROBLEM

We study the monetary instrument problem in a dynamic noncooperative game between separate, discretionary, fiscal and monetary policy makers. We show that monetary instruments are equivalent only if the policy makers' objectives are perfectly aligned; otherwise an instrument problem exists. When the central bank is benevolent while the fiscal authority is short‐sighted relative to the private sector, excessive public spending and debt emerge under a money growth policy but not under an interest rate policy. Despite this property, the interest rate is not necessarily the optimal instrument.     

Monetary and Fiscal Management, Finance, and Growth

This paper addresses three related aspects of monetary and fiscal management in Europe and elsewhere. First, I discuss the implications of economic integration for monetary and fiscal policy, especially the narrow focus on low inflation as the main objective of monetary policy. I argue that because inflation springs from several sources, monetary authorities held responsible by law for maintaining low inflation need to exercise their newfound independence by reserving the right to address all sources of inflation. In this context, I also ponder the question as to whether the increased independence of fiscal policy from short-term political interference would be desirable. Second, I present new empirical evidence of the relationship between inflation, finance, and economic growth across countries, arguing that long-run growth considerations provide an important additional justification for why price stability ought to remain a priority of independent policy makers. Third, I review some further aspects of the relationship between fiscal policy and economic growth, emphasizing the traditional three-pronged role of fiscal management: stabilization, allocation, and distribution, all of which can be conducive to growth. The argument leads to the conclusion that only the stabilization function of fiscal policy and, perhaps, some aspects of the allocation function as well could be usefully delegated in an attempt to immunize them from shortsighted and socially counter-productive political interference, but not the distribution function.     

The liberalization of trade and foreign direct investment: a political economy analysis

Abstract

In theory, the IMF could influence fiscal and monetary policy via several channels, among them advice to policy makers, conditionality, and the moral hazard it induces with the borrowers. This article tries to disentangle those effects empirically. Using panel data for 98 countries over the period 1975–2000 it analyzes whether IMF involvement indeed influences fiscal and monetary policy in program countries. There is evidence that participation in IMF Standby and Extended Fund Facility arrangements improves economic policy. Money disbursed and the degree to which a program is implemented does not have any systematic influence. The same is true for future availability of resources as measured by exhaustion of a country’s quota with the Fund. The final section discusses policy implications.     

Can a comparative capitalism approach explain fiscal policy activism?

This study investigates the implications of models of capitalism for the responsiveness of countries’ fiscal policies during business cycles using new data for member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and China. We expand the literature by adding the category of East Asian nonliberal capitalism to the established distinction of liberal market economies and nonliberal coordinated market economies. These three differ substantially not just in their fiscal policies, but also in monetary policies, degree of financial market orientation, exchange rate regime, and labor market organization. As in previous studies, we find that governments of liberal economies adopt more countercyclical fiscal policies. Departing from existing studies, however, among the nonliberal models of capitalism, (East Asian) state-led models have more countercyclical fiscal policies than (European) coordinated market economies, perhaps as countercyclical as liberal economies, both historically and during the 2007–9 crisis. This is due to less independent central banks, managed float of exchange rates, and limited financial market orientation and financial openness in East Asia, which allow for more active fiscal policy. Among political factors, left-of-center governments, fractionalized party systems, and election years are associated weakly with countercyclical fiscal policy, as expected. Labor market coordination and welfare generosity have unclear roles in regard to fiscal policy, a topic for future research.     

财政政策与货币政策的动态调控效应——基于时变参数向量自回归模型的检验

本文廓清了财政政策与货币政策搭配动态调控宏观经济的机理,揭示了两者协调影响经济的“黑箱”机制及其在经济不同阶段的搭配方式;运用中国2004—2019年的经济季度数据,构建TVP SV VAR模型探究两类政策对宏观经济的调控效应。研究发现：财政政策与货币政策共同把控流动性“闸门”实现互动协调;财政政策搭配货币政策具有时变性,在整体上“同向发力”推动经济发展;两类政策对产出的影响并非始终如理论一致,在结构层面仍有优化靶向性操作的余地。     

CONTROLLING INFLATION WITH TIMID MONETARY–FISCAL REGIME CHANGES

Can monetary policy control inflation when both monetary and fiscal policies change over time? When monetary policy is active, a long-run fiscal principle entails flexibility in fiscal policy that preserves determinacy even when deviating from passive fiscal, substantially for brief periods or timidly for prolonged periods. In order to guarantee a unique equilibrium, monetary and fiscal policies must coordinate not only within but also across regimes, and not simply on being active or passive, but also on their extent. The amplitude of deviations from the active monetary/passive fiscal benchmark determines whether a regime is Ricardian: Timid deviations do not imply wealth effects.     

MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY EFFICIENCY AND COORDINATION IN A MULTI‐SECTOR OPEN‐ECONOMY GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL

The paper analyzes monetary and fiscal stabilization and coordination in a multi‐sector stochastic new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM) model. It first aims to assess the capacity of fiscal and monetary policy to reduce or eliminate the negative welfare effects of an unanticipated productivity shock affecting some or all of the sectors in each country. Second, it evaluates the possible gains from international monetary cooperation as well as the impact of active fiscal policy on the welfare performance of monetary policy. The setup also allows for international asymmetry concerning the uncertainty over the shocks. The results show that monetary and fiscal policies are efficient tools of stabilization and under several conditions they can replicate the flexible‐price equilibrium. However, their welfare performance is not necessarily increased when both monetary and fiscal policies react to shocks at the national level. The existence of bilateral gains from monetary cooperation depends on the degree of asymmetry concerning the uncertainty over the shocks.     

The effects of economic policy uncertainty on China’s economy: evidence from time-varying parameter FAVAR

ABSTRACT

This article explores the effects of China’s economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on its fiscal policy, monetary policy and a wide range of macro-economic variables using a time-varying parameter FAVAR model. Based on monthly data from 07/2003 to 08/2017, the time-varying structure of the model allows us to capture the time-varying characteristics of the macro-economic variables and which channel is relevant. Empirical results reveal that the reaction of monetary and fiscal policies to EPU is highly asymmetric across macro-economic circumstances. Loose monetary and fiscal policies are adopted in response to EPU shocks during the financial crisis, while policies are moderately tightened after the crisis. The China Interbank Offered Rate (Chibor) responds more sensitively and severely than M2 to EPU shocks. Additionally, EPU shocks have a significant and negative impact on economic growth, consumption, exchange rates, bonds and the stock market, but showing a positive impact on credit, real estate and fixed asset investment (which might be due to China’s special economic market environment and the high investment return). The results indicate that EPU shocks significantly affect macroeconomic fundamentals through precautionary savings and financial market channels but lose their effectiveness through a ‘real options’ effect.     

MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND ELECTIONS IN OECD DEMOCRACIES*

The purpose of this paper is to test for evidence of opportunistic “political business cycles” in a large sample of 18 OECD economies. Our results can be summarized as follows: 1) We find very little evidence of pre-electoral effects on economic outcomes, in particular, on GDP growth and unemployment; 2) We see some evidence of “political monetary cycles,” that is, expansionary monetary policy in election years; 3) We also observe indications of “political budget cycles,” or “loose” fiscal policy prior to elections; 4) Inflation exhibits a post-electoral jump, which could be explained by either the pre-electoral “loose” monetary and fiscal policies and/or by an opportunistic timing of increases in publicly controlled prices, or indirect taxes.     

货币政策与财政政策的区域产业结构调整效应比较

本文运用1978—2007年东、中、西部的面板数据分析。货币政策和财政政策是否具有区域产业结构调整效应结果显示:第一,财政政策具有产业结构调整效应,而货币政策的产业结构调整效应并不明显。第二,货币政策在对第一和第三产业的效应方面强于财政政策,而财政政策则在对第二产业的效应方面具有优势。第三,货币政策和财政政策对三次产业的效应都存在比较明显的区域效应。第四,在东部地区货币政策和财政政策对第一产业和第二产业的效应相差非常悬殊,而对第三产业的效应则集中在高位;在中部地区货币政策和财政政策对第二产业的效应集中在高位;在西部地区货币政策对第一产业的效应集中在高位,而财政政策对第一产业的效应则集中在低位。     

Fiscal expansion, monetary policy, interest rate risk premia, and wage reactions

We examine the macroeconomic implications of fiscal policy in a small open economy, with emphasis on the interactions between fiscal, monetary and labour market policies. The paper uses the NBNZ-DEMONZ macroeconometric model. Novel features of the model are that it includes an endogenous interest rate risk premium (IRRP), and forward-looking monetary and fiscal policy reaction functions which capture the essence of New Zealand's Reserve Bank and Fiscal Responsibility Acts. The most important empirical result is that the postulated IRRP, proxying financial market mechanisms, can contribute at least as much as the monetary policy reaction function to maintaining price stability. Also of significance are that an income tax cuts package shows more damped real GDP and underlying inflation paths than does an expenditure increases equivalent; and that the inflationary and real sector impacts of a personal income tax cut package depend heavily on how the cut is `shared' between firms and workers. The nature and interdependence of monetary and fiscal policies and labour market conditions are therefore crucial to the macroeconomic outcomes.     

HETEROGENEITY IN A CURRENCY UNION WITH SOCIAL MARKET OBJECTIVES

In this paper, we explore whether heterogeneity among union members could threaten the stability of the European Monetary Union. The types of heterogeneity we consider are (1) asymmetries in the transmission of monetary and fiscal policies, and (2) differences in national preferences for price stability, output growth, and income redistribution. Our results show that the costs of membership can be significant for countries whose transmissions, structure, or preferences deviate from those underlying the common monetary policy. In part, these costs arise because monetary policy imposed by an independent central bank automatically constrains the use of fiscal policy by national governments.