A Decade of EC Merger Control

The introduction of the EC Merger Control Regulation in September 1990 plugged a serious gap in European competition policy. This paper examines aspects of its record over the first ten years. These include the changing scope of the policy and the much higher level of activity than originally anticipated. Developments in the appraisal of mergers are assessed with particular reference to oligopoly, the treatment of non-competition effects and dynamic competition, especially in high tech industries. The risks of an increasing tendency towards remedial settlements are also discussed and some future challenges highlighted .     

Unilateral Effects in Merger Analysis: Models,Merits, and Merger Policy

This paper models the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) unilateral effects merger policy using a sample of 192 investigations undertaken between 1993 and 2010. Statistical analysis shows that the number of significant rivals represents a reasonable structural proxy for the FTC’s merger challenge decision, although other variables, such as impediments to entry, fringe share, clear evidence of head-to-head competition between the merging firms, competitive effects’ evidence, and efficiency-related proxies, also affect the decision to challenge a merger. Some of these variables suggest that the innovations in the 2010 Merger Guidelines had already been applied in FTC merger analysis.     

The Duration of the EC Merger Control Process: Determinants and the Impact of the 2004 Merger Regulation Reform

The duration of merger proceedings held by competition authorities is an important determinant of the efficiency of the entire merger control process. A data set of 2953 Phase I and 92 Phase II investigations completed by the European Commission (EC) between 1999 and 2008 is used to examine the key determinants of their duration. Differentiating between authority- and case-related drivers, the findings show that while the duration of Phase I investigations largely depends on the type of decision and use of simplified procedure, the duration of Phase II investigations is driven by factors such as industry knowledge, the duration of the preceding Phase I investigation, the origin of the notifying firm, or the number of identified relevant markets. Evidence is also provided that the significant increase in average duration identified after the 2004 merger regulation reform does not imply a decrease in administrative efficiency, as the probability of in-depth investigations was correspondingly reduced.     

Differentiation and Cost Asymmetry: Solving the Merger Paradox

This paper investigates the impact of product differentiation and of cost asymmetry on the merger paradox using a Cournot framework. It finds that when all firms share the same costs, two-firm mergers in an n firm market generate at least no profit loss when goods are sufficiently differentiated. This result contrasts with that of Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) where mergers of strategic substitutes are rarely profitable, and Deneckere and Davidson (1985 Deneckere, Raymond, and Carl Davidson. 1985. Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition. The RAND Journal of Economics 16 (4): 473–486.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) where competition among strategic complements yields profitable mergers. Critically, when costs are asymmetric, a merger between an efficient and inefficient firm, with differentiated products, can be more profitable to participants than to excluded rivals. Following this merger, welfare is shown to increase given that the cost asymmetry between insiders is large enough.     

控制权私利下并购成功悖论形成机制研究

并购成功悖论一直困绕着企业并购理论与实务界。本文从控制权私利视角研究了成功悖论形成机制,得到三点结论:一是无论激励为主还是自利为主的控制权私利均有利于控制权人,因而,控制人控制的企业会积极实施并购;二是在自利为主的控制权私利下,并购必然不利于中小股东利益,因而主并方并购绩效为负值;三是以激励为主的控制权私利下,并购并不必然有利于中小股东,提升大小股东共有收益,并保证中小股东得到应有收益份额才有利于改善并购绩效。主并方并购绩效多为零或负值说明制度上重新设计以保障提升共有收益更符合控制权人利益是必要的。     

Horizontal Agreements and R&D Complementarities: Merger versus RJV

We study the decision of two firms within an oligopoly concerning whether to enter into a horizontal agreement to exploit complementarities between their R&D activities and if so, whether to merge or form a research joint venture (RJV). In contrast to horizontal merger and motivated by real-world evidence, we incorporate a probability that an RJV contract will fail to enforce R&D sharing. We find that a horizontal agreement always arises in equilibrium, which is consistent with empirical findings that R&D complementarities between firms positively influence the formation of horizontal agreements. The insiders’ merger/RJV choice involves a trade-off: While merger offers certainty that R&D complementarities will be exploited, it leads to a profit-reducing reaction by outsiders on the product market, where competition is Cournot. Greater contract enforceability (quality) and R&D investment costs both favour RJV. Interestingly, the insiders may choose to merge even when RJV contracts are always enforceable, and they may opt to form an RJV even when the likelihood of enforceability is negligible. We also explore the welfare implications of the firms’ merger/RJV choice.     

空间竞争、房价收入比与房价

本文通过构建一个房地产市场空间竞争模型,分别就Cournot竞争和价格合谋情形,探讨了开发商的位置及其密度如何影响均衡开发量、房价和社会福利.本文的基本结论是:空间竞争决定了房价,而非房价收入比;市场决定的价格不一定为合理性价格;房价与市中心距离和开发商密度成反比;空间垄断是房价刚性的根本原因.因此,要将刚性房价降下来,政府一方面应将大项目拆分为小项目,促进竞争,另一方面应对空间垄断进行管制.     

From Research to Policy: Lessons from Individual Development Accounts

There goes in the world a notion that the scholar should be a recluse, a valetudinarian…. As far as this is true of the studious classes, it is not just and wise. Action is with the scholar subordinate, but it is essential…. Without it, thought can never ripen into truth… (Ralph Waldo Emerson).     

Impact of Horizontal Mergers on Research & Development and Patenting: Evidence from Merger Challenges in the U.S.

This paper contributes further empirical evidence on the effects of mergers on innovation using company level data. Evidence on this issue has implications for the relationship between innovation and market concentration. Our departure from previous work is that we focus on a sample of horizontal mergers whose market concentration impacts were flagged by U.S. antitrust authorities as potentially posing a problem for antitrust law compliance. We employ propensity score matching and difference-in-differences estimation to compare the innovation activities of challenged and non-challenged merger firms to a control group of non-merged firms. We use R&D, patent grants, and citation-weighted patent grants to measure the innovation activities of firms before and after a merger. Our results indicate that the post-merger innovation outcomes of firms whose mergers were challenged are lower than they would have been had the firms not merged. But for non-challenged mergers, or mergers that do not raise concerns about market concentration, post-merger innovation outcomes are not significantly different from what they would have been without a merger.     

美国银行并购的反垄断规制及对中国的启示

1963年拉开了美国银行并购的反垄断规制的序幕。到目前为止,美国已建立起了较为完善的银行并购的反垄断规制体系。文章通过分析美国银行并购的反垄断规制的缘起、方法与其特征,指出中国应借鉴美国的经验,构建自身的银行并购的反垄断规制体系,包括：（1）以＂合理原则＂为反垄断分析的核心原则;（2）民族金融竞争力的提高作为银行并购的反垄断目标;（3）高效的组织管理体系和合作有序的管制协调机制;（4）制订《银行并购法》作为银行并购的指引;（5）科学合理的对竞争效果的经济分析体系;（6）激励性和约束性相容的反垄断规制政策;（7）规制政策应具有前瞻性和灵活性。     

我国企业技术寻求导向的连续并购战略研究

我国企业的并购活动日益突出技术寻求导向和连续性特征。本文首先分析企业连续并购的技术链补强战略、技术匹配战略和跨文化整合战略,在对连续并购活动中存在的跨文化整合、相关者利益协调等关键问题进行分析的基础上提出相应的建议。本文对以技术寻求为导向的我国企业连续并购活动具有一定的指导意义。     

Effect of R&D and Market Concentration on Merger Outcomes – An Event Study of US Horizontal Mergers

This study examines the pattern of abnormal returns for merging companies and rivals, to determine investor expectations regarding the impact of horizontal mergers challenged by the government. Prior studies have indicated that the government may have challenged efficiency-enhancing mergers, as evidenced by the pattern of abnormal returns to rivals during merger events. This study uses a two-stage regression approach to examine those patterns, using challenged mergers from 1997 to 2007, and finds evidence of potential price effects from approved mergers. The results also show the mergers to have differential effects depending on the level of R&D, market concentration, and product sales.     

跨国并购中的相互传导机制研究

本文以跨国并购的动因理论和跨国并购相互传导机制的相互依赖理论为基础,分析了抢占市场型、寻求资源型、寻求效率型等跨国并购的相互传导机制类型。基于发达国家与发达国家、发达国家与发展中国家两个层面分析了跨国并购的传导效应及跨国并购对发展中国家的寡占传导机制。并从技术进步、东道国的后续扩张、跨国公司跟随三个方面分析了跨国并购的持续性。     

并购企业文化整合研究

企业并购的成功与否并不在于并购本身,而在于并购后的整合,企业文化的整合是保证企业并购顺利实施的最重要因素。分析并购企业文化冲突的表现与原因,得出并购企业文化的整合具有明显的路径依赖型,并提出文化整合的具体路径。     

预售模式下酒店客房定价及最优超售量确定的研究

创新驱动战略下国内服务业的发展取得了长足进步．为服务业提供了完善的预订制度且高效的预订系统,酒店业是一个采用预订系统销售自身产品的典型服务业,其预订流程非常完善。分析了在预售期内带有预订取消现象且预订未取消的旅客随机到达的情况下．构建数学模型就预售期内服务产品的定价及产品最优超售量问题进行了研究。     

由"积极"转向"中性":财政政策经历艰难抉择 --关于近期财政政策取向问题的讨论

随着宏观经济环境由冷趋热的变化,财政政策由"积极"转向"中性"势在必行.不过,在经历了6年之久的积极财政实践之后,加上一系列体制性缺陷的约束,财政政策的转向操作异常艰难.但在现实的条件下,它的作为空间相当狭小.实行中性的财政政策须经历一个渐进的过程.在当前,可实施的中性财政政策的若干举措有:在支持重大改革举措出台中追求"中性"、在结构优化中控制或压缩支出规模、迅速启动新一轮税制改革、立足于做好货币政策的"配角"和进一步加强税收征管.     

外资银行在华并购的反垄断规制政策研究

中国目前既缺乏专门的法律来规范外资银行的并购行为,也没有专门的管制权威机构去评估审查其行为可能带来的反竞争效应,因此迫切需要加强对外资银行在华并购行为的反垄断规制。应从合理原则和国家金融安全与金融竞争力目标,高效的组织管理体系和合作有序的管制协调机制,统一的《银行并购法》,科学合理的对竞争效果的经济分析体系,激励性和约束性相容的反垄断规制政策,专业化、国际化的人才培养与激励机制等几方面进行政策设计。     

知情选择导入计划生育公共政策实证研究－以河北唐山、承德为例

以河北省唐山和承德地区作为调查和观察基地,认为实行知情选择政策体现以下特点:它在降低整个社会生育率的同时,增进个人健康,特别是有利于增强妇女的主体意识;它与以往的计划生育管理工作在相融的基础上有提高;它渐进推行,稳妥安全。结论:将知情选择导入计划生育公共政策必要而有意义。