Term structure and forward guidance as instruments of monetary policy

This paper studies a simple monetary model with a Ricardian fiscal policy in which equilibria are indeterminate if monetary policy consists solely of a rule for fixing the short-term interest rate. We introduce explicitly into the model the agents’ expectations of inflation which create the indeterminacy and show that there are two types of policies—a term structure rule or a forward guidance rule for the short rate—which lead to determinacy. The first consists in fixing the interest rates on a family of bonds of different maturities as function of realized inflation; the second consists in fixing the short-term interest rate and the expected values of the short-term interest rate for a sequence of periods into the future as a function of realized inflation. If the monetary authority chooses an inflation process that satisfies conditions derived in the paper and applies one of these rules, it anchors agents’ expectations to this process, in the sense that it is the unique inflation process compatible with equilibrium when the interest rates or expected future values of the short rate are those specified by the term structure or forward guidance rule.     

Parameter uncertainty and inflation dynamics in a model with asymmetric central bank preferences

This paper builds on the Lucas' (1973) signal extraction model to study the time-varying effect of uncertainty in the output-inflation trade-off on inflation, using a monetary model with asymmetric central bank preferences whereby deviations of output (relative to target) from above are weighted differently from deviations from below. The model is investigated empirically using data from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). We show that the implication of the uncertainty element is to cause the authority to change its indirect control, output by less (and hence change it direct control, interest rate by less) whenever inflation is below or above the target, in line with Brainard's attenuation principle. We also find that SARB's asymmetric output stabilization explains inflation movements significantly, and that the monetary authority seems to be more averse to business cycle recessions than expansions, hence more keen to avoid recessions than expansions. Overall, a more transparent and committed monetary policy practice that would reduce uncertainty over the output-inflation trade-off would be helpful for economic stability.     

Financial market imperfections and monetary policy strategy

In a model with imperfect money, credit and reserve markets, we examine if an inflation-targeting central bank applying the funds rate operating procedure to indirectly control market interest rates also needs a monetary aggregate as policy instrument. We show that if private agents use information extracted from money and financial markets to form inflation expectations and if interest rate pass-through is incomplete, the central bank can use a narrow monetary aggregate and the discount interest rate as independent and complementary policy instruments to reinforce the credibility of its announcements and the role of inflation target as a nominal anchor for inflation expectations. This study shows how a monetary policy strategy combining inflation targeting and monetary targeting can be conceived to guarantee macroeconomic stability and the credibility of monetary policy. Friedman's k-percent money growth rule, which can generate dynamic instability, and two alternative stabilizing feedback monetary targeting rules are examined.     

Monetary–fiscal policy interactions and commitment versus discretion in a monetary union

We consider monetary–fiscal policy interactions in a monetary union. If monetary and fiscal authorities have different ideal output and inflation targets, the Nash equilibrium output or inflation or both are beyond the ideal points of all authorities. Leadership of either authority is better. Fiscal discretion entirely negates the advantage of monetary commitment: The optimal monetary rule is equivalent to discretionary leadership of monetary over fiscal policy. Agreement about ideal output and inflation creates a monetary–fiscal symbiosis, yielding the ideal point despite disagreement about the relative weights of the two objectives, for any order of moves, without fiscal co-ordination, and without monetary commitment.     

Monetary policy reactions and the exchange rate: a regime-switching structural VAR for Canada

The objective of this study is to identify monetary policy reactions in a nonlinear, structural vector autoregression (VAR) framework, with regime-switching contemporaneous policy responses in a small open economy. The key finding is that monetary policy in Canada responds contemporaneously to disturbances in the real exchange rate, as well as the output gap and inflation. The Bank of Canada is found to have much larger responses to exchange rate fluctuations during volatile periods than more stable periods. However, the Bank is found statistically to have a relatively linear reaction function with symmetric responses to output and inflation shocks across interest rate regimes. The estimates for the contemporaneous responses to the output gap in both regimes are found to be virtually identical to the 0.5 weights in the original Taylor rule for the United States, while the responses to inflation surprises are slightly smaller. Overall, the Bank of Canada is found to have operated within the range of optimal responses suggested by small-scale structural models in the normative literature on monetary policy rules.     

The Implications of Uncertainty for Monetary Policy

This paper uses a simple model of the Australian economy to empirically examine the consequences of parameter uncertainty for optimal monetary policy. Optimal policy responses are derived for a monetary authority that targets inflation and output stability. Parameter uncertainty is characterised by the estimated distribution of the model coefficient estimates. Learning is ruled out, so the monetary authority can commit to its ex ante policy response. For certain shocks, taking account of parameter uncertainty can recommend more, rather than less, activist use of the policy instrument. While this finding is specific to the model specification, parameter estimates and the shocks analysed, it contrasts with the widely held belief that the generic implication of parameter uncertainty is more conservative policy.     

Monetary policy and fiscal limits with no-default

This paper discusses monetary and fiscal policy interactions that stabilize government debt. Two distortions prevail in the model economy: income taxes and liquidity constraints. Possible obstructions to fiscal policy include a ceiling on the equilibrium debt-to-GDP ratio, zero or negative elasticity of tax revenues, and a political intolerance of raising tax rates. At the fiscal limit two mechanisms restore solvency: fiscal inflation, which reduces the real value of nominal debt, and open market operations, which diminish the size of government debt held by the private sector. Three regimes achieve this goal. In all regimes monetary policy is passive. In all regimes a muted tax response to government debt is consistent with equilibrium. The propensity of a fiscal authority to smooth output is found to determine what is an acceptable response (in the form of tax rate changes) to the level of government debt, while monetary policy determines the timing and magnitude of fiscal inflation. Impulse responses show that the inflation and tax hikes needed to offset a permanent shock to transfers are lowest under nominal interest rate pegs. In this regime, most of the reduction in the real value of government debt comes from open market purchases.     

零利率下限、货币政策与金融稳定?

文章通过构建包含零利率下限约束的D SGE 模型,系统探讨了存在零利率下限时外生不利冲击对经济的影响。研究结果表明：(1)当名义利率触及零利率下限时,宏观经济和金融体系的不稳定性和脆弱性会显著增加,外生不利冲击对产出、通胀、信贷等经济变量的影响也会明显放大。(2)当存在零利率下限时,传统泰勒规则已无法有效稳定经济,最优的货币政策规则不仅应盯住产出缺口和通胀缺口,还应对资产价格和信贷给予重点关注并做出适度反应。(3)货币政策更适于保持产出缺口和通胀缺口的稳定,但难以有效减缓房价和信贷的波动。只有将逆周期监管的宏观审慎政策和货币政策有效搭配,才能保证经济系统和金融系统的全面稳定。为了应对不利冲击,我国应进一步完善宏观审慎监管框架,并将其与货币政策有效搭配以保持宏观经济的全面稳定。     

DEBT NONNEUTRALITY,POLICY INTERACTIONS,AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY*

We study the consequences of nonneutrality of government debt for macroeconomic stabilization policy in a sticky‐price model. Ricardian equivalence fails because debt has a negative impact on its rate of return and on private savings, which is induced by assuming transaction services of bonds. Under aggressive monetary policy regimes, macroeconomic fluctuations tend to be stabilized if nominal budget deficits are low. A smooth debt path limits inflation expectations, such that inflation variances can be reduced. Under a balanced budget policy, the central bank's output gap–inflation volatility trade‐off is improved relative to an environment where debt is neutral.     

ADAPTIVE LEARNING AND MONETARY POLICY IN AN OPEN ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM JAPAN

Abstract. Motivated by Japan's economic experiences in recent decades, we incorporate adaptive learning into an open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to examine the volatility and welfare impact of alternative monetary policies. Comparing four Taylor‐styled policy rules that reflect Japan's monetary policy debates, we first show that imperfect knowledge and the associated learning process induce higher volatility in the economy and that explicit exchange rate stabilization is unwarranted. Moreover, contrary to results under the rational expectation paradigm, we find that while tight inflation controls raise output volatility, they can improve overall welfare under learning by smoothing inflation fluctuations.     

An inventory of simple monetary policy rules in a New Keynesian macroeconomic model

We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for simple monetary policy rules that guarantee equilibrium determinacy in the New Keynesian monetary model. Our modeling framework is derived from a fully specified optimization model that is amenable to analytical characterisation. The monetary rules analyzed are variants of the basic Taylor rules ranging from simple inflation targeting (current, forward, backward) to canonical Taylor rules with and without inertial nominal interest rates. We establish that determinacy obtains for a wide range of policy parameters, especially when the monetary authority targets output and smoothes interest rates. Contrary to other results in the literature, we do not find a case for super-inertial interest rate policy.     

Inflation targeting and exchange rate volatility smoothing: A two-target,two-instrument approach

This paper introduces a strategy to model a small open economy, whose central bank has established two simultaneous policy objectives: an inflation target, and a maximum limit for nominal exchange rate volatility. In line with the Tinbergen–Aoki condition, the monetary authority establishes two policy instruments, one for accomplishing each target: the monetary policy rate, and the stock of foreign exchange reserves. Monetary policy analysis is built around a non-microfounded augmented New Keynesian DSGE model estimated through Bayesian techniques for the Guatemalan economy. It is found that each instrument is efficient in accomplishing its own target. Nevertheless, a coordinated effort is required for central bank policymakers before employing both instruments simultaneously, in order to avoid sending mixed signals to economic agents about its monetary policy stance, and endanger the achievement of its inflation target.     

The role of labor markets for euro area monetary policy

In this paper, we explore the role of labor markets for monetary policy in the euro area in a New Keynesian model in which labor markets are characterized by search and matching frictions. We first investigate to which extent a more flexible labor market would alter the business cycle behavior and the transmission of monetary policy. We find that while a lower degree of wage rigidity makes monetary policy more effective, i.e. a monetary policy shock transmits faster onto inflation, the importance of other labor market rigidities for the transmission of shocks is rather limited. Second, having estimated the model by Bayesian techniques we analyze to which extent labor market shocks, such as disturbances in the vacancy posting process, shocks to the separation rate and variations in bargaining power are important determinants of business cycle fluctuations. Our results point primarily towards disturbances in the bargaining process as a significant contributor to inflation and output fluctuations. In sum, the paper supports current central bank practice which appears to put considerable effort into monitoring euro area wage dynamics and which appears to treat some of the other labor market information as less important for monetary policy.     

基于资产价格影响的货币政策非对称性效应研究

利用NK-SVAR模型就我国货币政策的非对称性效应进行研究,结果表明,紧缩性货币政策的效果比较明显,而扩张性货币政策效果较弱.货币冲击的紧缩效应强于扩张效应,这表明抑制经济的过快增长时紧缩性的货币政策效果显著,但扩张性货币政策无法摆脱经济的恶性衰退.     

Monetary transmission mechanisms in a small open economy: a Bayesian structural VAR approach

Abstract This paper develops a Bayesian structural VAR model for Canada in order to estimate the effects of monetary policy shocks, using the overnight rate target as the policy instrument. I allow the policy variable and other home and foreign variables to interact with each other contemporaneously. The key finding is that monetary policy affects the real economy through both the market interest rate and the exchange rate. I also find that the Bank of Canada responds to any home and foreign variables that embodies information about future inflation and that external shocks are an important source of output fluctuations.     

Monetary policy responses to the exchange rate: Empirical evidence from the ECB

The exchange rate is an important part of the transmission mechanism in the determination of monetary policy because movements in the exchange rate have significant effect on the macroeconomy. It can be difficult to measure the reaction of monetary policy to the movements of the exchange rate, due to the simultaneous response of monetary policy to the exchange rate and the possibility that both variables respond to several other variables. This study addresses these problems by using an identification method based on the heteroscedasticity in the high-frequency data. The results in this paper suggest that the ECB systematically responds to exchange rate movements but that quantitative effects are small. Such a significant but small reaction coefficient seems consistent with the hypothesis that the central banks do not target the fluctuations in the exchange rate but consider them only to the extent they impact on the expected inflation and output path.     

Does monetary policy credibility mitigate the fear of floating?

Based on the argument that monetary policy credibility can reduce the fear of floating, we analyze this hypothesis for a set of 47 countries (of which, 32 are developing countries, 26 are Inflation Targeting countries and 16 are Inflation Targeting developing countries). Our study is the first to empirically assess the impact of monetary policy credibility (defined as the central bank's ability to anchor inflation expectations to the target) on the central banks' reaction through the basic interest rate due to exchange rate fluctuations (fear of floating). Based on panel data methodology applied to different samples, the most important result of this paper is that monetary policy credibility is able to mitigate the fear of floating. However, this effect is weaker after the crisis. Our estimates also reveal that Inflation Targeting developing countries present stronger fear of floating, which is justified by the fear of inflation in these countries.     

Trade Openness and Monetary Policy in Ghana

The study employed a Structural VAR model, using monthly time series data from 2002 to 2017 to assess the relationship between trade openness and effectiveness of monetary policy in Ghana. The empirical results revealed that as the degree of trade openness increases, monetary policy becomes more effective in reducing the rate of inflation. However, monetary policy is less effective to reduce the output gap. Therefore, the results suggest that monetary policy authorities must take into account the level of trade openness whenever they are formulating monetary policy.     

The inequality channel of monetary transmission

We examine optimal monetary policy in the presence of inequality by introducing unskilled agents with no access to the financial system into a DSGE model with sticky prices. Our main results are: (i) a contractionary interest rate shock increases inequality, while inflation and the output gap fall; (ii) the welfare-based objective of monetary policy includes inequality stabilization; (iii) as the proportion of unskilled agents increases, welfare decreases; and (iv) under scarcity of skilled agents, monetary policy is weakened, while fiscal policy produces a more relevant impact on the economy.     

Monetary policy,fiscal policy and cross signal jamming

This paper considers the issue of rule versus discretion when the central bank and the government share private information but have different preferences over inflation and output. We demonstrate that if the monetary policy is rule-based, Intuitive Criterion selects the unique separating equilibrium in which the central bank signals a low supply shock by a low interest rate. Interestingly, discretion may be better than the rule for the central bank, contrary to the case of complete information. Also, we examine the effect of information asymmetry on the monetary and fiscal policy mix. We show that cross signal jamming whereby the monetary authority and the fiscal authority successfully jams an unfavorable signal of each other does not occur in equilibrium.