封闭式基金折价与管理绩效的实证研究

本文基于管理绩效理论,对我国封闭式基金折价现象进行实证研究。管理绩效理论认为,封闭式基金折价反映了投资者对于基金未来过低的管理能力的理性预期,未来管理绩效越差,折价越大。本文使用了多种基金绩效度量模型,分别采用引入时间哑变量和除去时间均值混合OLS回归方法以及Fama-Macbeth横截面回归方法,验证了折价率和未来管理绩效之间的关系。结果显示,封闭式基金折价和溢价反映了市场对于基金未来管理绩效的预期;当期折价率和未来管理绩效之间存在显著的正向关系,尤其在未来一个季度的时间内;这种关系不受非同步性交易效应和基金异质性的影响。本文同时发现,折价率对于未来管理绩效的解释能力强于过去的管理绩效对于未来管理绩效的解释能力。     

A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLOSED-END FUND DISCOUNTS AND EXPENSES

In this paper the role of expenses in explaining closed-end fund discounts is re-examined. A present value model is developed to illustrate the relationship between expenses and discounts. Earlier studies find that discounts are not related to management fees. In this paper, using a larger sample over a longer and different period and a better specification of the expense variable consistent with the model developed, discounts are found to be significantly related to expenses. The relationship between expenses and discounts holds in the presence of other control variables.     

Do corporate governance mechanisms matter for cash holdings and firm value?

This paper examines the relationships between firm-level corporate governance mechanisms and cash holdings; along with their combined effects on firm value for a sample of firms listed in Singapore and Malaysia. Firms with less effective governance attributes are found to be more inclined to accumulate cash than those with more effective governance. The results support the flexibility hypothesis in that an increase in agency conflicts between managers and minority shareholders leads to entrenched managers having more discretion to hoard cash reserves. In addition, the incremental value of holding excess cash is shown to be negative for firms with a single leadership structure, firms with a pyramidal ownership structure, as well as family-controlled firms. The discounts associated with these firms may reflect investors’ recognition of the possibility of managerial entrenchment.     

Managerial ability and goodwill impairment

This study examines the relationship between managerial ability and goodwill impairment. I predict a negative relationship because prior studies suggest that more-able managers better prevent or reduce goodwill impairment, relative to less-able managers. Regression analysis reveals a significant and negative relationship between managerial ability and goodwill impairment measured as the likelihood of goodwill impairment and the magnitude of goodwill impairment losses. Overall, evidence suggests that managers with greater ability play an important role in preventing or reducing goodwill impairment.     

Managerial Ownership, Information Content of Earnings, and Discretionary Accruals in a Non–US Setting

This study employs Danish data to examine the empirical relationship between the proportion of managerial ownership and two characteristics of accounting earnings: the information content of earnings and the magnitude of discretionary accruals. In previous research concerning American firms, Warfield et al. (1995) document a positive relationship between managerial ownership and the information content of earnings, and a negative relationship between managerial ownership and discretionary accruals. We question the generality of the Warfield et al. result, as the ownership structure found in most other countries, including Denmark, deviates from the US ownership configuration. In fact, Danish data indicate that the information content of earnings is inversely related to managerial ownership.     

The Impact of Managerial Entrenchment on Agency Costs: An Empirical Investigation Using UK Panel Data

This paper empirically investigates the relationship between managerial entrenchment and agency costs for a large sample of UK firms over the period 1999–2005. To measure managerial entrenchment, we use detailed information on ownership and board structures and managerial compensation. We develop a managerial entrenchment index, which captures the extent to which managers have the ability and incentives to expropriate wealth from shareholders. Our findings, which are based on a dynamic panel data analysis, show that there is a strong negative relationship between managerial entrenchment and our inverse proxy for agency costs, namely asset turnover ratio. There is also evidence that short‐term debt and dividend payments work as effective corporate governance devices for UK firms. Finally, our findings reveal that agency costs are persistent over time. The results are robust to a number of alternative specifications, including varying measures of managerial entrenchment and agency costs.     

The effects of anti-takeover measures on Japanese corporations

This study examines 130 Japanese firms that announced and adopted pre-warning anti-takeover measures between 2005 and 2007. Consistent with the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, the announcement-associated abnormal returns are negative and statistically significant. An examination of the relationship between the abnormal returns and the firm’s ownership structure also supports the signaling hypothesis. The abnormal returns are positively related to the managerial shareholding variable as the managerial shareholding variable ranges from near-zero to an intermediate level; however, the relationship becomes negative as managerial shareholding increases past intermediate levels. Nevertheless, further examination of the post-adoption operating performance shows no significant trend towards deterioration as is predicted by the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. The results primarily support the signaling hypothesis: Japanese managers adopt anti-takeover measures mainly to deter hostile takeovers, and the anti-takeover measures, per se, do not fundamentally affect managerial behaviors.     

Capital Structure, Compensation and Incentives

This article illustrates an incentive-aligning role of debtin the presence of optimal compensation contracts. Owing toinformation asymmetry, value-maximizing compensation contractsallow managerial rents following high investment outcomes. Themanager has an incentive to increase these rents by choosinginvestments that generate greater information asymmetry. Anaptly chosen debt level mitigates this incentive, because investmentsthat generate greater information asymmetry have more volatileoutcomes. The greater volatility would make the debt risky,causing the shareholders to focus on high outcomes and thereforecompensation contracts that reduce managerial rents. At theoptimum, the manager avoids opportunistic investments, and theshareholders offer value-maximizing compensation contracts.Empirically, the analysis predicts a negative relationship betweenleverage and market-to-book that is reversed at extreme market-to-bookratios, a negative relationship between leverage and profitability,a negative relationship between leverage and pay-for-performance,and a positive relationship between pay-for-performance andinvestment opportunities.     

Managerial power, compensation gap and firm performance — Evidence from Chinese public listed companies

We study the relationship between compensation gap and firm performance in the Chinese market. Extant studies have shown that, for the publicly traded companies in China, compensation gap between senior executives plays a tournament role and motivates managers to achieve higher level of performance. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results confirm the above result. However, simultaneous regression results indicate that the tournament effect is more significant in firms with high managerial powers. Our finding suggests that previous findings using OLS might be incomplete. We also show that firms with better performance and greater managerial power tend to have greater compensation gap. Meanwhile, the relationship between managerial power and firm performance is, on average, negative.     

Decentralisation as a Moderating Factor in the Budgetary Participation-Performance Relationship: Some Hong Kong Evidence

This study tests the contingency or ‘fit’ hypothesis that the effects of budgetary participation on managerial performance will be positive in decentralised organisations and negative in centralised organisations. The responses of 37 managers from a cross-section of Hong Kong manufacturing companies to a questionnaire survey designed to measure the variables were analysed by examining the interaction term in a multiple regression equation. The results supported the interaction hypothesis and found that at high levels of decentralisation there is a positive relationship between budgetary participation and managerial performance but at low levels of decentralisation this relationship is negative. These findings have implications for the design of effective control subsystems.     

Price informativeness and stock return synchronicity: Evidence from the pricing of seasoned equity offerings

We investigate what stock return synchronicity reflects in terms of price informativeness by examining its effect on the pricing of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Based on 5,087 SEOs from 1984 to 2007, we find a significantly negative relation between stock return synchronicity (estimated as the logit transformation of the R-squared statistic from a two-factor regression) and SEO discounts (the percentage differences between pre-offer day closing prices and offer prices). The negative relation is strongest when there is no analyst coverage, and it declines as analyst coverage increases. This shows that stock price is more informative when stock return synchronicity is higher and also that information asymmetry can be mitigated by analyst coverage. We further decompose stock return synchronicity into the market comovement and industry comovement components and find that both components are equally important in affecting SEO discounts.     

Tax avoidance, cost of debt and shareholder activism: Evidence from Korea

This paper examines the impact of tax avoidance on the cost of debt and its interaction effect with shareholder activism. Using Korean firms, I find a negative relationship between tax avoidance and the cost of debt, supporting the trade-off theory. Further tests reveal that the negative relationship becomes stronger when the level of institutional ownership is high. It becomes even stronger after 1998, when the shareholder rights of institutional investors were strengthened. It suggests that the managerial opportunism theory has an additional explanation for tax avoidance activities. My findings indicate that tax avoidance reduces the cost of debt through trade-offs and creates a managerial rent diversion, which is mitigated in firms with larger institutional holdings.     

经理管理防御、媒体监督与会计信息透明度基于中国上市企业不同产权性质的研究

以2008-2014年中国上市企业为样本,考察不同产权性质下经理管理防御对会计信息透明度的影响,并进一步分析媒体监督对二者关系的调节作用.研究发现:在国有企业中,经理管理防御对会计信息透明度具有负向影响;而在民营企业中,经理管理防御显著提高了会计信息透明度.进一步发现,在国有企业中,媒体监督能显著抑制经理管理防御与会计信息透明度之间的负向关系;而在民营企业中,媒体监督不具有显著的调节效应.     

Corporate performance, managerial ownership and endogeneity: A simultaneous equations analysis for the Athens stock exchange

This paper investigates the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance by considering the endogenous nature of the ownership variables. We conducted our analysis by applying a simultaneous equations framework. We empirically controlled the direction and significance of this relationship, using a panel comprised of 146 firms quoted on the Athens Stock Exchange between 2000 and 2004. The main findings of our analysis indicated that when managerial ownership is treated as endogenous, there is a positive impact on corporate value. Given the particularly high degree of managerial ownership that is observed in the firms listed in the Athens Stock Exchange, we argue that the estimated positive relationship can be mainly explained by the existing high levels of managerial ownership.     

Disentangling Sentiment from Cyclicality in Firm Capital Structure

This study examines the relationship between capital structure choices and investor and managerial sentiment, finding that periods of positive sentiment are associated with reduced leverage within firms. We focus on the cyclicality of leverage using non-orthogonalized sentiment indices and find a strong negative relationship. Leverage, therefore, appears countercyclical, implying that the decision to take on debt is a consequence of either Admati et al.'s (2018) ratchet effect or a managerial attempt to time the market. Our findings lead us to question some fundamental capital structure theories, namely, trade-off (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973), and Hackbarth's (2008) managerial traits theory. Instead, we favour the idea that leverage is a consequence of countercyclical market timing behaviour.     

Managerial accounting systems and organizational control: A role perspective

This paper proposes a new way of viewing the relationship between managerial accounting systems and organizational control. This is done to provide a structure around which control processes may be observed and research conducted. In the context of role theory several propositions are advanced in order to explain the relationship. Namely, it is noted that managerial accounting systems are useful in communicating role expectations, are important to motivation, and are useful in communicating organizational climate. Also, several factors concerning managerial style and social context were seen to influence the operativeness of these propositions.     

The Interrelationship Between Managerial Ownership and Board Structure

Abstract:  The paper tests the hypothesis that high managerial ownership entrenches managers by allowing the CEO to create a board that is unlikely to monitor. The results show a strong negative relationship between the level of managerial ownership and corporate governance factors, such as, the split of the roles of the CEO and the Chairman, the proportion of non-executive directors, and the appointment of a non-executive director as a Chairman. I also find that companies with low managerial ownership are more likely to change their board structure to comply with the Cadbury (1992) recommendations. The results suggest that managers, through their high ownership, choose a board that is unlikely to monitor. Overall, the findings cast doubt on the effectiveness of the board as an internal corporate governance mechanism when managerial ownership is high.     

Past Returns and Investment Trust Discounts

Abstract:   The relationship between past net asset value returns and the current discount on investment trusts is investigated. The relationship is weaker for the component that is common to all trusts in the same sector, and is significantly stronger for more liquid trusts. The time lag before returns have their full impact on discounts is consistent with the requirements of distinguishing 'skill' from noise. Although discounts vary widely even within the same sector, the range of variation appears to be consistent with an arbitrage equilibrium, in which the profits of exploiting apparent pricing anomalies are just insufficient to invite arbitrage trades.     

CEO Ownership,Stock Market Performance,and Managerial Discretion

We examine the relationship between CEO ownership and stock market performance. A strategy based on public information about managerial ownership delivers annual abnormal returns of 4% to 10%. The effect is strongest among firms with weak external governance, weak product market competition, and large managerial discretion, suggesting that CEO ownership can reverse the negative impact of weak governance. Furthermore, owner‐CEOs are value increasing: they reduce empire building and run their firms more efficiently. Overall, our findings indicate that the market does not correctly price the incentive effects of managerial ownership, suggesting interesting feedback effects between corporate finance and asset pricing.     

Economic Order Quantities, Volume Discounts, and Wealth Maximization

This study challenges the generally accepted managerial decision to accept a quantity discount if total, perperiod inventory and acquisition costs are reduced. In this paper, the economic order quantity model is reformulated within an explicit wealth maximization framework, and the reformulated model is then utilized to analyze inventory decisions when volume discounts are available. The results of the study indicate that the traditional method of analyszing volume discount opportunities may invoke wealth decreasing decisions.