TIMING OF LUMPY INVESTMENT,PRICING AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS

In equipment‐intensive sectors – such as water utilities, power generation, and gas – billions of dollars are spent in capital equipment. The nature of the investment is often lumpy: at some point a plant has to be replaced and a large investment is required. We characterize the dynamic optimal investment policy of profit‐maximizing and welfare‐maximizing firms. We first show that, when there is no technical progress, the duration of the plant is longer for a profit‐maximizing firm. We then consider technical progress leading to either capacity expansion or to operating costs reduction. We show that duration tends to increase when the installed capacity increases over time, while it tends to decrease when technical progress reduces operating costs, both for profit‐maximizing and welfare‐maximizing firms. Under some conditions, when capacity expands over time the duration of the plant is longer for a profit‐maximizing firm than for a welfare‐maximizing firm.     

Optimality and Natural Selection in Markets

We ask if natural selection in markets favors profit-maximizing firms and, if so, is there a difference between the predictions of models which assume all firms are profit maximizers and the predictions of models which explicitly take account of population dynamics in the market. We show that market selection favors profit maximizing firms, but we also show that the long-run behavior of evolutionary market models is nonetheless not consistent with equilibrium models based on the profit-maximization hypothesis. Dynamic equilibrium paths with market selection are not Pareto optimal, nor even asymptotically optimal. The discrepancy arises because the dynamics created by firm evolution causes prices to vary over time and the resulting dynamical system need not have stable steady states.     

On the labor-managed firm in a competitive environment

A risk-neutral median voter in a labor-managed firm (LMF) facing an increase in the demand for its product will prefer to maintain employment and secure his job to the prospect of a higher dividend accompanied by the risk of unemployment. It is argued that LMFs with fixed employment and output will lose out in competition with flexible-output profit maximizing firms. Partnerships with a small membership in high-human-capital industries will be most likely to survive in a competitive environment.     

The merger paradox in a mixed oligopoly

This paper examines the set of surplus maximizing mergers in a model of mixed oligopoly. The presence of a welfare maximizing public firm reduces the set of mergers for which two private firms can profitably merge. When a public firm and private firm merge, the changes in welfare and profit depend on the resulting extent of private ownership in the newly merged firm. When the government sets that share to maximize post merger welfare as assumed in the privatization literature, the merger paradox will often remain and the merger will not take place. Yet, we show there always exists scope for mergers that increase profit and increase (if not maximize) welfare. Interestingly, these mergers often include complete privatization.     

A dynamic profit function with adjustment costs for outputs

It is well known that there are adjustment costs associated with many input factors, which delays firms response to changes in relative prices. Although adjustment costs are implicitly acknowledged when a cost rather than profit function is used, little attention has been given to adjustment costs for outputs. However, in many cases there will also be adjustment costs associated with changes in the product mix for multioutput firms. In this paper we formulate a firm’s optimization problem in a profit maximizing set up that allows adjustment costs for all netputs from which it follows that adjustment cost for some factors affect the adjustment of both inputs and outputs. We also show that one can test whether a factor is quasi-fixed or fully fixed.      

Asymmetric Capital Tax Competition with Profit Shifting

This paper analyses capital tax competition between jurisdictions of different size when multinational firms can shift some fraction of their tax base between them. For the case of revenue maximizing governments, we show that introducing profit shifting will not generally increase downward pressure on tax rates. We find that profit shifting decreases the tax-base sensitivity of the low tax jurisdiction while increasing the sensitivity of the high tax jurisdiction. Tax rates will converge as a result of additional profit shifting opportunities. This will be the case even though in general equilibrium tax rates in both jurisdictions may decrease or increase.     

Endogenous market structure and the cooperative firm

When the threat of entry by followers includes cooperative firms, the maximum fixed cost that a profit maximizing leader can endure is endogenous. The aggressive strategy required for entry-deterrence curtails the leader’s expected profit and can discourage its initial entry. In such circumstances a cooperative firm may yet be viable, despite having a cost handicap and no first-mover advantage.     

INSUFFICIENT ENTRY OF EMPLOYEE‐CONTROLLED FIRMS IN A FREE‐ENTRY OLIGOPOLY

This study is a theoretical examination of whether employee‐controlled firms (ECFs) enter a free‐entry oligopolistic market excessively or insufficiently, from the viewpoint of welfare maximization. The excess entry theorem is well known in oligopoly theory. According to this theorem, a greater number of profit‐maximizing firms enter a free‐entry oligopolistic market than is optimal for welfare maximization. We demonstrate the possibility that insufficient entry arises when ECFs compete in a free‐entry market. In particular, we show that if both the demand and cost functions are convex, insufficient ECF entry necessarily occurs. Our results suggest that competition among firms seeking purposes other than profit might lead to insufficient entry because differences in competing firms’ objectives affect the intensity of market competition.     

Certification of corporate social responsibility activities in oligopolistic markets

Abstract We investigate the impact of alternative certifying institutions on firms’ incentives to engage in costly Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities as well as their relative market and societal implications. We find that the CSR certification standard is the lowest under for‐profit private certifiers and the highest under a Non Governmental Organization (NGO), with the standard of a welfare‐maximizing public certifier lying in between. Yet, regarding industry output, this ranking is reversed. Certification of CSR activities is welfare enhancing for consumers and firms and should be encouraged. Finally, the market and societal outcomes of CSR certification depend crucially on whether certification takes place before or after firms’ CSR activities.     

On the Uniqueness of the Welfare–maximizing Number of Firms Under Cournot Oligopoly

Under Cournot oligopoly with a homogeneous product, we present a sufficient condition that guarantees the uniqueness of the welfare–maximizing number of firms to attain the global maximum level of welfare by implementation of a piecemeal policy changing the number of firms gradually. We adopt Selten's (1973) 'fitting–in function' method, which relates an individual firm's output to an industry's output. When the number of firms is unique, then introducing a lump–sum profit tax (subsidy) can attain the optimal level of welfare. Indirect entry regulation is superior to direct entry regulation from the standpoint of welfare if each entrant engages in rent–seeking activities.     

COOPERATIVE FIRMS AND THE CRISIS: EVIDENCE FROM SOME ITALIAN MIXED OLIGOPOLIES

We investigate how cooperative firms reacted to the current crisis. This allows us to compare the behaviour of cooperative and conventional firms facing exogenous shifts in demand. After a short survey of a stream of theoretical literature, we analyze a large group of Italian production cooperatives in the periods 2003–2010 and 1994–2011 and we contrast co‐ops behaviour with the overall trend in the industries in which they operate. Our sample's evidence suggests that the cooperative's behaviour has a stabilizing effect on employment with respect to shocks in output demand. Unlike profit‐maximizers, cooperative firms seem to be adjusting pay more than employment when facing shocks. Production co‐ops look better equipped than their profit‐maximizing counterparts in tackling the long recession also because they have been very cautious in their profit policies over time. Unlike conventional firms, they have significantly increased their own equity during ‘good’ years instead of distributing large dividends to their members.     

On the price discriminating labour cooperative

This paper considers labor cooperatives selling in a competitive international product market and a monopolistic domestic market simultaneously. It is shown that output of the cooperative is smaller than that of a profit maximizing firm. Both firms have the same domestic sales. Output will decrease if domestic demand rises but it may rise or fall when foreign demand increases. These contrast with the single market comparative statics of Ward.     

Monopolistic competition,aggregation of competitive information,and the amount of product differentiation

Consider an industry with a large number of homogeneous firms. Each firm's profits are a function of its own strategy and the strategies the other firms select. Suppose other firms' strategies enter into each firm's profit function only through one or more statistics. For example, average price in the market may parameterize every firm's profit function. We prove that, as a general rule, the industry's firms will in equilibrium follow at most M + 1 distinct strategies, where M is the number of statistics by which competitors' strategies affect each firm's profits.     

The stability of generalised stackelberg equilibria in heterogeneous oligopoly

Conclusions In this paper we have derived sufficient conditions for the stability of the G. S. E. These conditions follow from the condition on the stability of the G. C. E., given by Okuguchi (1978).When the conditions for asymptotic stability are fulfilled, the existence of the G. S. E. may be demonstrated in the same way as the existence of the G. C. E. has been demonstrated by Okuguchi (1978), that is: the G. S. E. is the fixpoint of a contracting mapping. In the case of linear demand functions and quadratic cost functions we have found the rather strong result that the sufficient conditions for (asymptotic) stability of the G. C. E. imply the (asymptotic) stability of the G. S. E. as well.This conclusion may be surprising to followers of Stackelberg. Mostly the outcome of a Stackelberg oligopoly is considered as adisequilibrium.In this paper we have made clear that a firm maximizing expected profit and using a generalised Stackelberg strategy, like a firm using a generalised Cournot strategy, only correctly predicts inequilibrium the price of the other firms. (See also on this point Heertje and Furth (1979)).When the outcome of a G. S. E. gives one or more firms less profit than in a G. C. E. then they expect, any price change, under-taken by them, will lower their expected profit even more.I would like to thank Prof. Dr. A. Heertje and an anonymous referee for their useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper and D. Weatherall for his remarks on the english of the text.     

The welfare effects of FDI: A quantitative analysis

Foreign direct investment (FDI) can increase productivity and wages. However, it is also often accompanied by primary income deficits as foreign-owned firms repatriate their profits. The welfare effects of FDI are thus ambiguous. A particularly illustrative example of this phenomenon are the Visegrád 4 (V4) countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia). This paper investigates whether FDI can be beneficial in the presence of profit repatriation using a general equilibrium model calibrated to the V4 economies. Counterfactual simulations suggest that the benefits of FDI outweigh the costs for these countries. On average, a 1% increase in the share of foreign firms is associated with a 0.17% increase in welfare. However, incentivising foreign firms to reinvest more of their profits domestically is, ceteris paribus, welfare-improving. A 10-percentage-point increase in the profit repatriation rate is associated with a 1.06% welfare gain on average.     

Theory of the firm in relation to exchange rates,import substitution and export

Neoclassical theory deals with the profit maximizing beheviour of the firm in a closed economy. Once an open-economy condition is introduced, the impact of the exchange rate on the cost and price parameters of the firm and, consequently, its import substitution and export decisions becomes relevant. A model is presented with case studies in which, given the exchange rate, the firm seeks to determine the optimal level of import substitution, output and export with the objective of maximizing its profit. In today's competitive world when countries are liberalizing and moving towards an open trade regime, the influence of exchange rates on the decision-making processes of firms is bound to be significant. An approach which provides them with a methodology for spelling out their options and making optimal choices is, therefore, of considerable practical interest.     

Composition of R&D expenditures and firm performance

ABSTRACT

The explosion of research and development (R&D) expenditures in China brings a puzzling fact that the proportion of research in R&D is extremely small, and thus the proportion of development is large. This article distinguishes research from development in R&D and investigates the heterogeneous effects of the two components on the performance of Chinese listed firms. Using a generalized propensity score matching approach with continuous treatments, we present non-linear relationships between R&D composition and firm performance. While development-oriented firms benefit more from an increase in profit than a growth in productivity, orientation toward research contributes more to productivity gains than to profitability. Research and development activities are found to be complementary in promoting firm performance. The results suggest the existence of optimal proportions of the components of R&D for maximizing firm performance.     

Market power of firms and exchange-rate fluctuations

This paper explores the potential of firms to restrict industry outputs (market power) in oligopolistically organized markets where domestic firms compete with foreign ones. Within a stochastic price-setting supergame framework, market power is shown to be lower in general with flexible exchange rates for the following reasons. (i) The conditions that the fully collusive outcome—oligopolists maximizing joint profits — is sustainable in equilibrium become stronger if the exchange rate fluctuates, provided that fluctuations are sufficiently small. (ii) Even if full collusion can be sustained, industry outputs will be higher on the average with flexible than with fixed exchange rates.     

Profit Maximization and the Market Selection Hypothesis

We examine the proposition that competitive firms must behave as if they were maximizing profits; otherwise they would go bankrupt, or even fail to be financed in a competitive capital market. We investigate a model in which an entrepreneur raises funds for a risky enterprise on a competitive capital market, by offering a "dividend policy" based on the realized (stochastic) flow of earnings. We show that an entrepreneur who maximizes the expected sum of discounted dividends is sure to fail in finite time. On the other hand, many other behaviours yield positive expected profits and are able to attract investment funds, and yet result in a positive probability of surviving forever. As a consequence, if new firms have sufficiently diverse behaviours, then even if there is a constant stream of new entrants, after a long time practically all of the surviving firms will not have been maximizing profits.     

The scope for collusion under fractional defections

This paper examines the scope for firms to collude in an oligopoly supergame, when firms defect by producing a fraction of their best response outputs. Such deviations from the collusive equilibrium are termed fractional defections. We show that the joint profit maximizing output level cannot be sustained under fractional defections and identify the most collusive output level. The paper also investigates the ability of firms to collude as both demand and the number of firms in the industry vary. The results reveal that the degree of collusion is inversely related to the level of demand and that high levels of concentration may in fact be inimical to collusion.