A counterexample to the folk theorem with discounting

The ‘folk theorem’ formalizes the theme that ‘repetition leads to cooperation’. We present an example showing that, even with perfect monitoring, the set of Nash equilibria of the discounted games does not have to converge to the feasible, individually rational set, i.e., this version of the ‘folk theorem’ can break down.     

Finite-dimensional utilities

Summary. Sufficient axioms are identified for the existence of a finite- dimensional quasilinear utility function whose lexicographically ordered vectors preserve a decision maker's preference order on a mixture set . It is shown that those axioms are also necessary for the linear lexicographic representation when the underlying set is a mixture space. Received: August 20, 1998; revised version: December 14, 1998     

Decoupling in electric utilities

Distributing electricity to users has been covered through the charge per kilowatt-hour for electricity used. Conservation advocates have promoted policies that “decouple” distribution revenues or profits from the amount of electricity delivered, claiming that usage-based pricing leads utilities to encourage use and discourage conservation. Because decoupling separates profits from conduct, it runs against the dominant finding in regulatory economics in the last 20 years—that incentive-based regulation outperforms rate-of-return profit guarantees. Even if distribution costs are independent of use, some usage charges can be efficient. Price-cap regulation may distort incentives to inform consumers about energy efficiency—getting more performance from less electricity. Utilities will subsidize efficiency investments, but only when prices are too low. If consumers fail to adopt energy efficiency measures that would be individually beneficial, decoupling can increase welfare, but only if all energy revenues are separated from use, not just those associated with distribution.     

A case for water utilities as cooperatives and the UK experience

This article explores the creation of consumer cooperatives as a means of privatizing water utilities. The first section examines the structure of ownership and sets out Hansmann's theoretical basis for determining which category of persons is most efficiently assigned ownership. The section extends the discussion of market contracting costs by considering the externalities and social costs associated with a water utility. The heart of the paper is the second section which applies the theory of efficiently assigned ownership to the case of water utilities. The third section briefly reviews the literature on the relative efficiency of private and public utilities and also succinctly applies the theory of the firm to the question of vertical integration in the case of water utilities. The fourth section discusses the UK's experience with water utilities. The final section draws together the paper's conclusions.   The application of Hansmann's general theoretical scheme for assigning ownership leads to the conclusion that water utilities should be consumer cooperatives. Consumer-owned utilities would confront lower market contracting and ownership costs, than would investor-owned utilities. Additionally, the social costs and externalities that are particular to water are better left to consumers who are more prone to take them into account in their decisions.     

Optimal privatization of vertical public utilities

Abstract We examine restructuring, divestiture, and deregulation of a vertically integrated public utility, (e.g., electricity), from a public finance perspective. How an optimal restructuring plan for the utility depends on the cost of public funds and on the X‐efficiency gains from privatization, how the optimal degree of competition in the upstream and downstream segments are connected, and implications of privatization for consumer prices are examined. The higher the cost of public funds, the more likely the post‐privatization price will exceed the regulated public utility price. The greater the X‐efficiency gains from privatization, the more likely the post‐privatization price will fall.     

Optimal depreciation schedules for regulated utilities

This paper+ derives the combined effect of depreciation schedules and regulatory lag on a firm's choice of input mix. It shows that a schedule called the real constant (RC) schedule induces efficient capital-labor proportions. More (less) accelerated schedules cause undercapitalization (overcapitalization). Since most typically used schedules are accelerated relative to the RC schedule, they lead to undercapitalization. Testable predictions are derived by showing that these distortions become more severe as the inflation rate increases and as the lag length decreases.     

Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities

In most of microeconomic theory, consumers are assumed to exhibit decreasing marginal utilities. This paper considers combinatorial auctions among such submodular buyers. The valuations of such buyers are placed within a hierarchy of valuations that exhibit no complementarities, a hierarchy that includes also OR and XOR combinations of singleton valuations, and valuations satisfying the gross substitutes property. Those last valuations are shown to form a zero-measure subset of the submodular valuations that have positive measure. While we show that the allocation problem among submodular valuations is NP-hard, we present an efficient greedy 2-approximation algorithm for this case and generalize it to the case of limited complementarities. No such approximation algorithm exists in a setting allowing for arbitrary complementarities. Some results about strategic aspects of combinatorial auctions among players with decreasing marginal utilities are also presented.     

Unique solutions for stochastic recursive utilities

We study unique and globally attracting solutions of a general nonlinear stochastic equation, widely used in Finance and Macroeconomics and closely related to stochastic Koopmans equations. The equation is specified by a temporal aggregator W and a certainty equivalent operator M. The main contribution of the paper is the introduction of the new class of Thompson aggregators. Other contributions of the paper are: (i) a detailed analysis of quasi-arithmetic operators M that generalize those of Kreps and Porteus (1978) [18]; (ii) a clarification of the nature and properties of the stochastic recursive preferences that underlie Koopmans equations.     

International benchmarking of electricity distribution utilities

Benchmarking by means of applying the DEA model is appearing as an interesting alternative for regulators under the new regimes for electricity distributors. A sample of large electricity distribution utilities from Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and The Netherlands for the year 1997 is studied by assuming a common production frontier for all countries. The peers supporting the benchmark frontier are from all countries. New indices describing cross-country connections at the level of individual peers and their inefficient units as well as between countries are developed, and novel applications of Malmquist productivity indices comparing units from different countries are performed.     

The effect of deregulation on environmental research by electric utilities

This paper analyzes the impact of deregulation and restructuring on public-interest environmental research conducted by electric utilities in the US from 1990 to 2001. I find that deregulation has had a substantial negative impact on such expenditures, which have declined by 40%. However, restructuring has had no significant impact. In addition, the 1990 Clear Air Act Amendments have adversely affected such expenditures, contrary to the positive impact these regulations had on pollution abatement R&D as shown in the literature. Results also suggest that state and firm characteristics and regulator preferences play a strong role in the conduct of such research.      

The impact of regulation on the riskiness of electric utilities

The impact of regulation on public utility riskiness has been investigated using common stock systematic risk (stock beta). We show that the stock beta confounds the relevant risk arising out of regulation with the riskiness because of other factors. Our illustration with a sample of electric utilities underscores the importance of this distinction and, contrary to the literature, does not support Stigler's capture theory view of regulation.     

Existence of Nash equilibria in finite extensive form games with imperfect recall: A counterexample

This paper provides an example showing that for finite extensive form games without perfect recall existence of Nash equilibria in behaviour strategies is not guaranteed in general.     

Quality adjusted life years as expected utilities

Abstract. This article is intended to systematicaly show all the conditions that the Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) must satisfy so that it can be interpreted as a von Newman-Morgenstern utility. Such conditions cover two cases. When health states are chronic, we shall be referring to the conditions inferred by Pliskin, Shepard and Weinstein (1980). Likewise, we will devote our attention to commenting on the characterization of Bleichrodt (1996), pointing out that its condition 0 is a bit artificial. In turn, for temporary health states, we will remark that the characterization of Bleichrodt (1995) appears to be incomplete. We shall provide a complete derivation of QALYs. In this way, QALYs can be derived from an individual's preference relation that satisfies the von Newman-Morgenstern axioms by imposing additive independence, absence of contradictory trade-offs and partial symmetry. Moreover, the two last conditions conditions can be replaced by a single condition that we call general symmetry.     

Social welfare orderings for ratio-scale measurable utilities

Summary. This article characterizes all of the continuous social welfare orderings which satisfy the Weak (resp. Strong) Pareto principle when utilities are ratio-scale measurable. With Weak Pareto, on both the nonnegative and positive orthants the social welfare ordering must be representable by a weakly increasing Cobb-Douglas social welfare function while on the whole Euclidean space the social welfare ordering must be strongly dictatorial. With Strong Pareto, on the positive orthant the social welfare ordering must be representable by a strictly increasing Cobb-Douglas social welfare function but on the other two domains an impossibility theorem is obtained. Received: July 31, 1995; revised version August 7, 1996     

Productivity throughout regulatory cycles in gas utilities

This paper examines productivity patterns in price cap regulated utilities around price reviews. We specify a variable cost function that we estimate using alternative specifications of technical change. Results show that the pattern of pure technical change differs within and between regulatory cycles. They also provide evidence that exogenous investment reduces the ratchet-problem, that strategic cost cutting behavior is reduced when regulatory cycles are short and that, absent these two features, industry productivity is consistent with strategic cost cutting behavior.