Offshoring and Reshoring: The Roles of Incomplete Contracts and Relative Bargaining Power

This paper demonstrates that an increase in bargaining power of Northern firms relative to that of their Southern contractors can trigger reshoring if the North-South wage differential is moderate, such that only industries with a high share of unskilled labor find outsourcing profitable. However, such an increase in Northern bargaining power can increase offshoring if the wage differential is so high that even industries with a low share of unskilled labor also offshore.     

The role of contracts and intellectual property rights in open innovation

Our exploratory empirical study, based on interviews and a survey of firms, addresses a number of questions on the role of formal contracts and intellectual property rights (IPR) in the context of firm-to-firm open innovation (OI). We find that firms active in OI have a very strong preference for the governance of their OI relationships with other firms through formal contracts. Also, despite the open nature of OI, firms still see IPR as highly relevant to the protection of their innovative capabilities. We find the degree of openness of firms, their formal legal attitude, and the competitive dynamics of their product market environment to be related to the preference of OI firms for IPR. Furthermore, the strength of firms’ internal R&D capabilities increases the positive relationship between openness and the preference for IPR.     

Costly Coasean Bargaining and Property Right Security

This paper examines how transaction costs affect Coasean bargaining with secure and insecure property rights in the lab. Consistent with the theory that secure property rights lowers the cost of non-cooperation, we find that bargaining efficiency is inversely related to property right security. Less secure property rights increased economic efficiency twofold. Property owners with secure rights are more likely to opt for their riskless outside option rather than pay the costs of bargaining.     

Community–Industry Contracting over Natural Resource use in a Context of Weak Property Rights: The Case of Indonesia

Decentralization in Indonesia has resulted in an increased influence of local communities over the terms of logging agreements with timber companies. The outcomes of such community–company negotiations vary significantly across communities. What are the conditions that cause this variation, and how can the outcomes be more effectively and efficiently influenced by third-party actors such as the local government or NGOs? This paper addresses these questions by developing a game-theoretic model to illustrate the strategic interactions between communities and companies. The model allows for endogeneity of de facto property rights and bargaining positions. We show that third-party actions to improve the community’s bargaining position by raising its reservation utility may result in an increase in the area logged and thereby harm the environment. Our results indicate that the strategy of intervention matters. In particular, strategies that raise the sensitivity of interventions to local logging threats are likely to be more cost-effective in supporting communities and reducing forest degradation than more indiscriminatory strategies. The model will be relevant to other situations where communities negotiate contracts over natural resource use with outside actors in a context of weak property rights, a situation increasingly observed in other developing countries.     

Intergenerational Transfer Schemes as Incomplete Social Contracts

Intergenerational transfers are often viewed as emerging from social contracts that specify the terms of trade for some pattern of exchange among generations. Here it is argued that such a view should incorporate contractual incompleteness and the impossibility to ex ante rule out the renegotiation of the social contract. In the present setting, such issues preclude that social contracts implement first-best decisions. Yet, a situation with an incomplete and renegotiable social contract is superior to various other scenarios, including the no-contract solution.     

A NOTE ON THE PROPERTY RIGHTS THEORY AND THE EX ANTE VALUE OF INFORMATION

This paper examines the ex ante value of information in the property rights model where the possibility exists that an investing agent can be provided with relevant information before investments are undertaken. When contracts are incomplete, from an ex ante perspective, informing the investing agent does not necessarily increase the expected surplus resulting from a relationship between two economic agents. The paper highlights the fact that the second‐best nature of the problem that arises from contractual incompleteness can ensure this.     

Strategic Innovation with Complete and Incomplete Labour Market Contracts

In a model of strategic R&D competition between two firms that negotiate with independent unions we show that: (i) incomplete labour market contracts may Pareto-dominate complete labour market contracts (ii) even when complete contracts Pareto-dominate incomplete contracts, economies can get stuck in the incomplete contract equilibrium. These conclusions provide additional strategic reasons why complete labour market contracts may not be used—even if they were feasible. We propose two testable predictions to discriminate between complete and incomplete contracts: (i) the variance of wages is lower with complete contracts; (ii) the variance of employment is higher under complete contracts.     

Holdup and Innovation

This paper examines the incentive to oppose innovation (or to delay agreement) when: there are multiple periods; previous outcomes affect the subsequent distribution of surplus; contracts are incomplete; and the parties are wealth constrained. Current agreements affect the parties, claim on future surplus either by altering their default payoffs (historical bargaining/contractual positions) or by changing their relative contemporaneous bargaining strengths. Delay will occur at different times depending on which assumption applies.     

对国防知识产权归属制度的思考

在我国国防知识产权领域长期存在着权益和责任不清的问题。这不利于调动承担国防科研项目单位或个人进行技术创新和成果转化的积极性,也不利于国防自主知识产权的形成。分析了我国国防知识产权归属制度的现状和国外的实践,对国防知识产权相关各方的利益进行了权衡,提出在国防科技领域必须在国家、单位、个人之间建立一种有效的利益均衡机制。     

Status Quo Bias in Bargaining: An Extension of the Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem with an Application to the Coase Theorem

We generalize the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem to study inefficiencies in bilateral bargaining over a divisible good, with two-sided private information on the valuations. For concave quasi-linear preferences, the ex ante most efficient Bayes equilibrium of any mechanism always exhibits a bias toward the status quo. If utility functions are quadratic every Bayes equilibrium is ex post inefficient, with the expected amount of trade biased toward the disagreement point. In other words, for the class of preferences we study, there is a strategic advantage to property rights in the Coase bargaining setup in the presence of incomplete information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D23, D62, D82.     

Asset Specificity and Vertical Integration

Asset specificity is usually considered to be an argument for vertical integration. The main idea is that specificity induces opportunistic behavior, and that vertical integration reduces the cost of preventing opportunism. In this paper I show that asset specificity can be an argument for non‐integration. In a repeated‐game model of self‐enforcing relational contracts, it is shown that when parties are non‐integrated, increasing degrees of asset specificity make it possible to design relational contracts with higher‐powered incentives.     

Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation

Recent evidence highlights the importance of social norms in many economic relations. However, many of these relationships are long term and provide repeated game incentives for performance. We experimentally investigate interaction effects of reciprocity and repeated game incentives in two treatments (one-shot and repeated) of a gift-exchange game. In both treatments we observe reciprocity, which is strengthened in the repeated game. A detailed analysis shows that, in the repeated game, some subjects imitate reciprocity. Thus, reciprocity and repeated game incentives reinforce each other. Observed behaviour is robust against experience. We conclude that long-term interaction is a "reciprocity-compatible" contract enforcement device.
JEL classification : J 30; C 91     

A New Variant of the Winner's Curse in a Coasian Contracting Game

We examine behavior in a Coasian contracting game with incomplete information. Experimental subjects propose contracts, while automaton property right holders or robot players with uncertain preferences respond to those proposals. The most common pattern of proposals observed in these games results in too many agreements and, in some games, payoffs that are stochastically dominated by those resulting from rational proposals (which imply fewer agreements). In this sense, we observe a winner's curse similar to that observed in bidding games under incomplete information, such as the common value auction (Kagel, J.H. and Levin, D. (1986) American Economic Review. 76, 894–920) and the takeover game (Samuelson, W. and Bazerman, M.H. (1985) In Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 3. JAI Press, Greenwich, pp. 105–137; Ball, S.B., Bazerman, M.H., and Carroll, J.S. (1990) Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 48, 1–22; Holt, C. and Sherman, R. (1994) American Economic Review. 84, 642–652). While the naïve model of behavior nicely predicts the winner's curse in those previous bidding games, it does not do so here. Instead, an alternative model we call the guarantor model explains the anomalous behavior best. Hence, we suggest this is a new variant of the winner's curse.     

The Ambiguity of Joint Asset Ownership: Cautionary Tales From Uganda and South Africa

ABSTRACT

This study uses individual-level survey data from women and men in Uganda and South Africa to examine coupled women's joint ownership of land and housing. It compares women's control over and benefits from jointly held land and housing with those of coupled women not owning land or housing at all and coupled women owning them solely. The lack of a clear and consistent advantage of joint ownership potentially arises from frequent disagreement within couples about whether the land or house is jointly owned. The study serves as a reminder of the complexities of joint ownership in practice, particularly within families, that need to be considered in order for coupled women to benefit from joint asset ownership. Efforts promoting joint ownership, for example, joint titling and marital property laws supporting joint ownership, should not only consider these complexities but also establish and communicate clear and enforceable rules for joint ownership.     

我国商业银行效率的影响因素:产权制度还是市场结构

采用自由分布法(DFA),利用似不相关回归估计测算了我国商业银行的X-成本效率状况,并分析了产权制度与市场竞争程度对我国商业银行效率的影响。实证检验发现,我国国有银行和股份制银行的X-成本效率存在结构性差别,产权制度是造成这种差异的关键原因,市场竞争程度对银行效率也产生了非常重要的影响;且两者对银行效率的影响是一种互补关系而不是替代关系。可供选择的政策建议包括:推进产权制度改革,完善银行的法人治理结构;优化银行业市场结构,促进银行体系效率的提高;国有银行要适当收缩规模,正确配置资源;股份制银行要尽快充实资本金,扩大规模,增强竞争力。     

On the Relation Between Asset Ownership and Specific Investments

Experimental results are presented for a simplified version of Hart's (1995) theory of the firm. Theory predicts that investment levels remain constant when investors' no-trade pay-offs increase, if these pay-offs are threat points. While they may decrease when no-trade pay-offs are outside options. Our results support these predictions in a relative sense. Average investment levels exceed the predicted level. Actual investment behaviour is consistent with the outcomes of the bargaining stage. The play of the game is supported by a reciprocity mechanism in which non-investors consider higher investment levels as fair behaviour which deserves a reward. Investors anticipate this.     

人力资本产权的引入与国有企业的制度创新

当国有企业引入人力资本产权、把国有企业看成一个人力资本和物质资本的特别合约时，国有企业的产权制度、法人治理结构和企业文化也进行了制度创新，从而大大节约了国有企业内部的交易费用，进而指明了未来国企改革的新方向。     

生态产权制度建设与我国生态环境保护

文章认为,我国生态资源效率低下根源于＂公＂权,但提高其效率的出路未必就在于＂私＂权化。因此,在我国生态产权制度改革中,既要引入激励性机制,建立市场化的生态环境公共产权规制,又要打破传统＂公有＂—＂公用＂—＂公营＂中的＂公用＂、＂公营＂生态资源运行范式,把使用权和经营权按生态资源公共性、外部性做技术性分离,明确使用权和经营权各自的权能,引入民营企业、外资企业等非国有企业参与生态产权的经营和竞争,使国有企业从部分生态资源的经营领域退出,形成多元化、市场化的生态资源经营制度和生态产权混合型管理模式,实现我国生态环境的有效保护。     

投资管理人最优报酬合同三题

资产管理行业的发展是近年来我国金融系统最重要的结构性变化之一,而如何签订与投资管理人的报酬合同是关键问题。本文从委托——代理关系的视角,分析委托资产管理的特殊性,就最优报酬合同是否应该含有比较基准、是否应该是线性的以及业绩报酬是否应该是隐性的进行了探讨,指出投资管理人的最优报酬合同不应照搬一般的委托代理合同。     

Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm

The standard property rights approach is focused on ex ante investment incentives, while there are no transaction costs that might restrain ex post negotiations. We explore the implications of such transaction costs. Prominent conclusions of the property rights theory may be overturned: A party may have stronger investment incentives when a non-investing party is the owner, and joint ownership can be the uniquely optimal ownership structure. Intuitively, an ownership structure that is unattractive in the standard model may now be desirable, because it implies large gains from trade, such that the parties are more inclined to incur the transaction costs.