Business Formation and Aggregate Investment

The paper proposes an intertemporal equilibrium model of vintage capital and monopolistic competition. Reflecting a tradeoff between the number and capacity of new machines, investment may be extensive or intensive. External gains from specialization and rationalization result in distorted investment decisions. The paper compares the effectiveness of a general investment tax credit with a start-up subsidy that shifts the direction of investment towards a more extensive form. An optimal policy of investment promotion is derived.     

IS AN EXPORT SUBSIDY A ROBUST TRADE POLICY RECOMMENDATION TOWARD A UNIONIZED DUOPOLY?

Brander and Spencer (1988) and Bandyopadhyay et al. (2000) imply that the robust trade policy recommendation toward a unionized duopoly is an export subsidy. In this paper, we show that we cannot get such a result even in the linear case if the opportunity cost of public funds is sufficiently high. However, if we consider the case where the domestic firm and the trade union lobby the government to set favorable trade policies by giving the government political contributions, then the result of robustness will be restored if the government cares about political contributions sufficiently relative to national welfare.     

政府补助、企业创新对投资者投资决策的信号传递效应

基于信号理论,从内外部信号视角出发,以2012-2018年中国上市科技型中小企业动态面板数据为研究样本,构建聚类稳健双向固定效应计量模型,实证分析政府补助、企业创新以及两者交互作用对外部投资者投资决策的影响机理。结果表明：政府补助向外部投资者传递积极信号,能够给科技型中小企业带来更多的外部投资;高风险的企业创新会抑制外部投资者的投资行为,向外部投资者传递消极信号。政府补助与企业创新的交互作用方面：政府直接补助一定程度上削弱了企业创新对投资者投资决策带来的消极影响,而间接补助则正向调节企业创新产出向投资者传递的消极信号。最后,提出缓解科技型中小企业融资约束的对策建议。     

出口退税是一项稳健的贸易政策吗?

出口退税作为一项被WTO允许的政策工具,为许多国家的政府所使用。本文在一个国际多市场寡头模型之中,研究出口退税的稳健性。主要结论如下:(1)如果本国政府的目标是最大化国家福利,那么,出口退税不是一项稳健的贸易政策;(2)如果本国政府关心收入分配,对于国家福利的不同组成部分赋予不同的权重,那么,如果政府过于关注本国企业利润,而不是本国消费者剩余和出口退税成本,出口退税就会成为一项稳健的贸易政策;(3)本国政府过于关注本国企业利润的一个可能原因是,本国企业可以通过政治捐献去游说政府,制定对于自己有利的政策。那么,如果相对于国家福利而言,政府过于关注政治捐献,出口退税就会成为一项稳健的贸易政策。     

On the Use of Competition Policy to Enhance the Effectiveness of Industrial Policy

Motivated by the observation that many countries with an active industrial policy also have a lax competition policy, this paper argues that restricting firm numbers may be a means of rendering industrial policy more effective. A simple model is set up in which a subsidy is desirable to correct a general externality but may induce over-entry. Restricting the number of firms then renders the subsidy policy more effective in correcting the externality problem.     

Industrial heterogeneity and international product cycles

We analyze the superiority of the specific, demand and cost ad valorem subsidies in industrial and export policies. The criterion employed to measure the ranking of the superiority of the subsidy policies in this paper is that, given an identical total output, the smaller the amount of the subsidy, the superior the subsidy policy. We show that the demand ad valorem subsidy is the least efficient policy, regardless of whether it is measured in regard to the industrial or export subsidy policies. The superiority related to the specific and cost ad valorem subsidies hinges upon the production technology. We can thus provide a theoretical explanation to the real world phenomenon as to why governments usually offer a specific or cost ad valorem subsidy policy to agricultural products and exports.     

投资驱动型产业政策、地方固定资产投资与农村人力资本积累——基于中国家庭追踪调查(CFPS)的实证分析

基于中国家庭追踪调查（CFPS）2018年数据与笔者收集的数据,本文采用跨地区和出生队列的变异构造双重差分模型（Cohort DID）分析了地方政府投资驱动型产业政策对农村人力资本积累的影响。研究发现,2008年之后地方政府投资驱动型产业政策引致的大规模传统基础设施投资与农村适龄青年完成高中教育的可能性之间存在显著负相关关系。使用工具变量的检验结果表明,上述研究结论具有较强的稳健性。此外,本文还尝试性地探究了上述效应的作用机制：投资驱动型产业政策引致的传统基础设施投资大幅攀升,一方面增加了建筑业及相关低技能工作的机会,提升了投资教育的机会成本;另一方面带来了低技能劳动力工资的提升,导致了不同教育水平劳动力工资趋同、技能溢价下跌,降低了预期教育回报。本文的研究结论可以为“十四五”时期中国全面构建与创新驱动型经济发展模式相匹配的产业政策体系提供参考。     

Competing back for foreign direct investment

This paper studies policy competition for foreign direct investment between host and home countries. Three results have been obtained. First, policy competition does not change the attractiveness of any country as a location for investment. Second, as a result, policy competition does not change regional welfare. Lastly, the equilibrium policy could be either a subsidy or a tax.     

Sustainability Policy and Environmental Policy

A theoretical, representative‐agent economy with a depletable resource stock, polluting emissions and productive capital is used to contrast environmental policy, which internalises externalised environmental values, with sustainability policy, which achieves some form of intergenerational equity. The obvious environmental policy comprises an emissions tax and a resource stock subsidy, each equal to the respective external cost or benefit. Sustainability policy comprises an incentive affecting the choice between consumption and investment, and can be a consumption tax, capital subsidy or investment subsidy, or a combination thereof. Environmental policy can reduce the strength of the sustainability policy needed. More specialised results are derived in a small open economy with no environmental effects on utility.     

Incentives for Technology Adoption Under Environmental Policy Uncertainty: Implications for Green Payment Programs

Water quality protection policy in the UnitedStates has been based on the provision offinancial incentives to farmers for adoptingimproved nutrient management practices.Increasing reliance on subsidy programs couldresult in expectations for such programs in thefuture. Using an option-value model thatindicates uncertainty can lead to a delay ininvestment, this paper analyzes the extent towhich uncertainty about cost-share subsidypolicies would impact adoption decision.Application of the model to adoption ofsite-specific technologies indicates thatuncertainty about subsidy policies has thepotential to impact the investment decision.When there is currently no cost-share subsidy,an increase in the probability of an expectedpolicy delays adoption. If the policy is ineffect, an increase in the probability of awithdrawal of the program encouragesinvestment. Cost-share subsidy policy is mosteffective when it is immediately offered andguaranteed that it will be removed soon.     

扶持我国出口导向企业实施RRC战略的理论依据

文章探讨本国企业与外国企业在以产量竞争的方式争夺出口市场的情况下,本国政府对本国企业实施提高竞争对手成本(RRC)战略的投资进行补贴的理论依据。通过两次运用两阶段博弈,文章对由补贴政策、企业RRC投资、产量和利润水平决定构成的三阶段博弈进行了因果关系的比较静态分析,认为在一般情况下,对本国企业RRC投资补贴有利于本国企业在国际市场中产量、市场份额和利润的增加,也有利于本国社会总福利水平的增加,对外国企业产量、利润和社会福利则形成负面影响。由于RRC战略较之掠夺性定价温和且更易实施,这一政策对于保持我国出口稳定增长具有一定积极意义。     

Informational externalities,strategic delay,and optimal investment subsidies

Abstract This paper examines optimal government policy when private investment generates information, but investors cannot internalize the informational value their actions have to others. Equilibrium exhibits inefficient delay, as investors adopt a wait‐and‐see approach. The government can alter incentives via an investment subsidy, but complications arise, since future subsidies may induce investors to disregard current policy initiatives. The paper shows that the government achieves its desired outcome only when the the investment subsidy is financed by a non‐distortionary, lump‐sum tax. When taxation is distortionary, the government faces a time inconsistency problem that may prevent effective policy.     

The effect of risk-sharing government subsidy on corporate R&D investment: Empirical evidence from Korea

Despite the wide belief that the high social rates of returns to R&D investment justify government subsidy policy in advanced countries, there are only limited studies about whether the R&D subsidy as a means of risk-sharing stimulates R&D investment of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in developing countries. This paper empirically investigates the issue, using a unique data set on government subsidy for new technology development of Korean manufacturing firms, listed and non-listed, for the period from 2000 to 2007. The paper employs the DID estimation procedure and controls for simultaneity of the subsidy for new technology development using 2SLS and two step Tobit procedure. Our empirical results show that there is no solid evidence for crowding-out effects of the government subsidy. These results suggest that government subsidies could help SMEs to overcome the barriers to risky R&D projects through sharing R&D failure risk with government and by reducing capital costs to undertake new technology development projects, and thus the subsidy policy for new technology development seems to be partly successful in promoting the R&D investment of the Korean SMEs.     

Brotherhood of competition: Foreign Direct Investment and domestic mergers

We examine the effects of mergers on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and on shaping national policies regarding FDI. In this work we develop a partial equilibrium model of an oligopolistic industry in which a number of domestic and foreign firms compete in the market for a homogeneous good in a host country. It is assumed that the number of foreign firms is endogenous and can be affected by the government policy in the host country. The government sets the policy (subsidies) to maximise social welfare. We allow domestic mergers. Our main results suggest that when the host country government imposes discriminatory lump-sum subsidy in favor of foreign firms, a merger of domestic firms will increase the number of FDI if the subsidy level is exogenous. With an endogenous level of subsidy, a merger of domestic firms will decrease (increase) the welfare if the domestic firms are more (less) efficient.     

Tuition Fees for Higher Education and Intergenerational Mobility in China

This paper studies the impact of an increase in higher education tuition on intergenerational mobility in China. We develop a theoretical model for the parental decision about the investment on education of children to illustrate the impact from the perspective of borrowing constraint. We consider the Chinese college tuition and subsidy reform around 1986 as a quasi-natural experiment for identifying the policy effect of the reform on intergenerational educational mobility by using the data from the census of 2000 and the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS). We find that an increase in the education burden induced by the reform of college tuition has reduced intergenerational educational mobility, and it is more noticeable in regions with a relatively higher increment in the tuition fee. Our results are robust with consideration of the co-residence bias, government investment in elementary education, and the higher education expansion.     

产业政策对企业间工资差距的影响—来自中国工业企业的经验证据

中国产业政策的执行对企业间工资差距有何影响?文章首先考虑加入了产业政策因素的异质性企业模型,从理论上将产业政策对企业工资影响分解为补贴转移效应与竞争效应两种机制,并提出如下假说:企业将部分政策补助用于生产,此时支付的更多工资等同于财政的直接补贴;同时,企业工资水平也取决于企业的生产效率,产业政策通过促进或抑制行业竞争改变企业效率,从而对企业的工资水平产生一种间接影响,即竞争效应.使用1998?2007年中国工业规模以上企业数据对理论假说进行实证检验,可以发现:"中国式"产业政策抑制企业效率带来的负向竞争效应超过了正向的补贴转移效应,最终造成了企业工资水平下降;然而,一旦产业政策的施行促进了行业竞争,竞争效应则为正,那么企业的工资水平也会随之提高.文章研究的结论有助于理解经济改革过程中产业政策对企业工资的影响,对推进企业工资体制改革也具有启示意义.     

政策“目标—工具”视角下政府创新补贴对企业研发投入的影响

军民融合企业发展对制度环境具有高度依赖性，政府支持和引导对企业创新行为具有重要作用。政策目标是政策工具实施效果的评判基准，并且导致政策工具发挥不同作用。利用国泰安数据库213家军民融合板块上市公司2008—2016年非平衡面板数据，对产业扶持和技术创新型创新补贴政策对企业研发投入的影响进行理论分析和实证检验。研究发现，产业扶持型补贴对于国有企业的研发投入具有显著促进作用；技术创新型补贴政策对国有及非国有军工企业研发活动均具有显著激励作用，且对非国有企业研发活动的激励作用更明显。     

SHORT‐RUN POLICY COMMITMENT WHEN INVESTMENT TIMING IS ENDOGENOUS: ‘MORE HARM THAN GOOD?’

In our model, firms choose when to set cost‐reducing investment and the government, which only has short‐run commitment power, sets an output subsidy. We show that firms that delay investment without government intervention have an incentive to invest early under policy activism, strategically underinvesting or overinvesting to obtain larger subsidies. The policy scheme thus creates a new, potentially more harmful, distortion. Under oligopoly, a firm has a weaker incentive to manipulate policy than under monopoly, which makes policy intervention less harmful. We investigate when the government may do better by adhering to laissez‐faire than by engaging in active policy intervention.     

Attracting private investment: Tax reduction,investment subsidy,or both?

This paper uses a real-option model to examine the net benefit to a government from using tax cut and/or investment subsidy as incentives to induce immediate investment. Although earlier papers generally concluded that investment subsidy dominates tax cut, it is observed that many governments use a combination of subsidy and tax cut. We show that, when the government uses a different discount rate from private firms, and when it has to borrow money to provide an investment subsidy, it is possible to get an internal optimum; that is, it might be optimal for the government to provide an investment subsidy as well as charge a positive tax rate on the profits from the project. Thus, we provide an explanation for the puzzling fact that many governments provide an investment subsidy to a firm while simultaneously taxing its profits.     

Types of patents and driving forces behind the patent growth in China

As a developing economy, China's unprecedented patenting surge is puzzling. We study China's patent surge and its driving forces using a novel and comprehensive merged dataset on patent applications filed by Chinese firms. We find that R&D investment, FDI, and patent subsidy have different effects on different types of patents. First, R&D investment has a positive and significant impact on patenting activities for all types of patents under different model specifications. Second, the stimulating effect of foreign direct investment on patent applications is only robust for utility model patents and design patents. Third, the patent subsidy only has a positive impact on design patents. The results imply that FDI and patent subsidy may disproportionately spur low-quality patents.