Do International Roaming Alliances Harm Consumers?

This paper develops a model of international roaming in which mobile network operators (MNO's) compete both on the wholesale market to sell roaming services to foreign operators and on the retail market for subscribers. To allow their subscribers to place or receive calls abroad, they have to buy roaming services provided by foreign MNO's. In the absence of international alliances, competition between foreign operators would drive wholesale unit prices down to marginal costs. However, international alliances are endogenously formed since they serve as a commitment device to soften competition on the retail market, leading to excessively high roaming per‐call prices.     

Regulation of international roaming in the European Union—Lessons learned

This paper analyzes the evolution of prices and competition in intra-EU international roaming markets. It addresses three main research questions: (i) to what extent have market forces by themselves brought competition to retail roaming markets? (ii) Has the evolution of market dynamics in wholesale roaming improved competition? (iii) Is wholesale regulation sufficient to lead to a reduction in retail roaming prices? Data show that there has been little price-based competition both at wholesale and retail levels, despite prices being well above costs and the significant margins allowed by regulation. Available data from the period preceding the entry into force of the first EU roaming regulation also point to the same conclusion. Lack of competitive pressure in retail roaming markets and inelastic demand give little incentives for retail roaming service providers to lower prices. Wholesale international roaming markets have complex competition dynamics. They are characterized by the reciprocity of wholesale roaming agreements and traffic internalization inside transnational groups. These circumstances limit price competition at the wholesale level. The traditional regulatory approach applied to electronic communication markets has been primarily focused on wholesale regulation. However, empirical evidence shows that even if wholesale charges are reduced, retail roaming markets continue to operate at very high retail margins (for example, more than 200% retail mark-up over wholesale charges for data roaming services and incoming calls). This proves that in international roaming markets wholesale charge reductions are not necessarily passed on to retail prices. It can thus be inferred that wholesale price regulation alone is in most cases not sufficient to ensure that benefits are passed through to end users.     

Impact of roaming regulation on revenues and prices of mobile operators in the EU

We use a difference-in-differences approach to assess the impact of the EU roaming regulation on mobile operators’ average revenues per user (ARPU) and the retail prices of mobile services. Our results suggest that due to the regulation the ARPU of EU mobile operators decreased since 2007 on average by 9.1%. When considering purchasing power parities, the decline of ARPU is estimated on average at 5.8%, but in this case we cannot reject that there was no decrease at all. We also find that the impact of the regulation on ARPU depends on traffic imbalances, which may be related to tourism flows, and has a stronger negative impact on operators from countries with a surplus in tourism traffic. There is however no difference in the impact of the regulation on cross-country and national operators. Moreover, our results suggest that the Roam Like at Home (RLAH) regulation implemented in June 2017 had no impact on the tariffs of national mobile plans.     

Impacts of mobile Internet use intensity on the demand for SMS and voice services of mobile network operators: An empirical multi-method study of German mobile Internet customers

Scholarly and business publications alike convey the message that past and future strong growth in mobile Internet (MI) access and service demand has solely positive commercial implications for mobile network operators (MNOs). This position neglects the possibility that increasing MI use intensity may lead to demand decreases for the highly profitable short messaging service (SMS) and mobile voice telephony. The extant literature provides few insights on relations between MI use intensity, on the one hand, and SMS as well as mobile voice call use intensities, on the other hand. This study developed hypotheses concerning the presence or absence of impacts of MI use intensity and circumstances of MI use (e.g., device type, tariff scheme) on the demand for SMS and mobile voice telephony at the individual customer level. The hypotheses were tested by analyzing actual use behaviors of 304 MI adopters in Germany, for whom objective use intensity data were extracted from the billing system of an MNO. These non-reactive measures were combined with responses collected from the adopters through a telephone survey. Multivariate regression results suggest that though MI use intensity significantly negatively affected both number of SMS sent and received, these effects were so small that their practical relevance is highly doubtful. Further, customers who used MI more intensively did not generate lower volumes of outgoing or incoming mobile voice connection minutes. Conclusions are drawn for MNO, telecommunications sector regulators and scholarly researchers seeking to explain the acceptance of mobile communications services.     

Network modeling approaches for calculating wholesale NGA prices: A full comparison based on the Greek fixed broadband market

According to the European Commission Recommendation for setting copper and fiber wholesale prices where cost orientation is imposed as a remedy, National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) should adopt a Bottom-UP Long-Run Incremental Cost Plus (BU LRIC+) costing methodology that estimates the current cost that a hypothetical efficient operator would incur to build a modern efficient Next Generation Access (NGA) network. The starting point of modeling an efficient operator investing in NGA networks is the network modeling approach. In this paper, we compare the most widely adopted network modeling approaches in terms of wholesale fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) prices. In particular, the modified scorched node approach is compared to the extreme cases of the scorched node and the scorched earth approaches. The comparison between the aforementioned scenarios sheds light on the impact of each approach on the wholesale FTTH prices. The main finding of this paper is that the scorched earth approach leads to a maximum of 10% reduction in the short-term access prices compared to the most inefficient scorched node approach, whereas further extending its optimizations by optimizing the number of central offices, both the short-term and long-term wholesale price reductions are quite significant (more than 20%) regardless of service speeds. Consequently, NRAs should consider a geographically differentiated modeling approach when regulating the wholesale market by adjusting the level of scorching in each area and network segment according to the investment plans of telecom operators. An appropriate variation of the modeled network operator's efficiency is expected to more accurately represent the costs of a reasonably efficient operator based on the real market conditions and a forward-looking perspective. These findings provide valuable information to both network operators and telecom regulators.     

Me and you and everyone we know: An empirical analysis of local network effects in mobile communications

This paper investigates the importance that consumers assign to local network effects, i.e. the extent to which they take account of their contacts’ mobile operators when choosing a provider for themselves. The authors identify individual characteristics that affect the importance consumers attach to local network effects. The study relies on a survey of 193 Italian students. The results show that consumers are highly heterogeneous with respect to the importance they give to the operators chosen by their friends/family members in choosing which provider to use. This heterogeneity is associated with individual innovativeness and patterns of mobile phone usage. For instance, consumers who are more interested in local network effects are typically more-aware users, who use voice services quite intensively. These consumers, who pay attention to local network effects, spend comparatively little proportional to the intensity of their mobile usage.     

电信重组引发五大悬念

重组的具体过程依然会显得漫长而艰辛,并充满各种不确定性和悬念。在经过了几年的猜谜游戏之后,中国电信行业第三次重组方案终于尘埃落定。5月24日14:00,工业和信息化部、国家发改委以及财政部联合发布中国电信业重组公告:基于电信行业现状,为实现改革目标,鼓励中国电信收购中国联通CDMA网(包括资产和用户),中国联通与中     

How disruptive is 5G?

The hypothesis is put forward that, after three decades of stability, there is now the prospect of significant change in the vertical and horizontal structure of the mobile market place. On the supply side, significant factors are, first, the availability of a new and very powerful form of mobile connectivity in the shape of 5G, and second, software defined networking, which allows a single network to provide a variety of heterogeneous services or ‘slices’. On the demand side, the digital transformation of the whole economy (and not just the communications sector) creates the need for diverse communications functions operating in a universe with a much wider set of digitally transformed services.Mobile operators will find themselves contesting customer relationship with firms or other organisations providing these services in an integrated fashion, and thus risk replacing their direct link with end users with becoming the wholesale supplier of an expanded but ‘commoditised’ communications product. We may also observe fewer radio access networks; more competitive backhaul; and the (partial) vertical disintegration of mobile network operators. The regulatory changes implied may include heavier regulation of fewer RANs, and the need for market analyses to confront situations in which network operators sell more and more of their services to a variety of heterogeneous content and application providers – some of them exercising substantial levels of market power.     

Effective competition and ineffective mobile industry regulation in South Africa

The most striking feature of South Africa’s mobile market is the skewed allocation of spectrum and a seemingly endless sequence of failed attempts to hold an auction for it. A shortage of spectrum (or the inefficient assignment of it) is blamed, among other things, for South Africa’s relatively slow LTE 4G speeds. Through historical accident, the country has two mobile data networks in addition to the four licensed mobile operators. The response of operators has been to innovate using roaming and network sharing agreements; as we explore in this paper, these have become the de facto spectrum allocation process.This paper looks at how the de facto industry structure has been moulded by spectrum holdings and sharing arrangements and asks how spectrum management could be improved. We observe that, although the number of mobile operators has effectively been reduced to 3 (a number which would raise concern in some circles), there exist a variety of arrangements between those three and other spectrum and network operators. The smallest of the current three mobile operators is still not able to offer a nationwide mobile service without a roaming agreement but, at the same time, the two larger operators depend critically on spectrum and roaming agreements themselves, mainly with the two physical data network operators that function as wholesale providers.The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) was established as a consequence of a new constitution that was adopted in 1996 and it helped to create new institutional arrangements for the burgeoning mobile industry. The authority has nevertheless continued to be hampered, as we shall demonstrate, by political imperatives. This has been pointed out by other authors over the past twenty years and we add to this body of evidence by considering the spectrum auction planned (again) for 2021.The “2021” auction is in fact an iteration of the auction originally announced in May 2010 and then abandoned (Song, 2011). The same thing happened again in 2016 (Paelo & Robb, 2020). Late in 2020, the regulator again announced an auction, due to take place during 2021 but by the second quarter of the year, two of the four national operators had already obtained a court injunction to stop it. The process is intertwined with a political imperative to establish a public wireless open-access network, which we discuss in detail.We describe how the industry has navigated around policy and regulatory dysfunction and how competitive interaction among the South African operators has managed to prevail. Following Hausman & Taylor’s (2013) lead in their work on the United States, in this paper we provide a commentary on apparently perverse outcomes from significant regulatory, judicial and legislative actions (or, perhaps more accurately, inactions) governing the South African mobile telecommunications industry from the commencement of the current constitutional arrangements in 1996 to the present.     

Competition in wholesale markets: Do MNOs compete to host MVNOs?

This paper extends previous research examining wholesale market shares of mobile network operators (MNOs). This study demonstrates that wholesale market concentration has decreased over time because of the increase of competition of MNOs for hosting mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs). However, differences in wholesale market shares between MNOs have not disappeared. We propose that those operators that are late entrants in a market and belong to an international group with a proactive attitude towards hosting virtual operators positively influences wholesale market shares of MNOs. The empirical analysis is based on a panel data from 2000 to 2010 corresponding to MNOs and virtual operators in five European countries with high development of the virtual mobile industry. By closely examining KPN we show how being an international mobile group specialising in the wholesale market across Europe has enabled it to exploit complementarities that exist between traditional and virtual businesses.     

Cost allocation of WCDMA and wholesale pricing for mVoIP and data services

This study estimates cost-based prices for wholesale voice and data services provided to 3G (WCDMA) MVNOs according to their distinct types. For estimation, 3G MVNOs are classified into different types, and the overall cost of WCDMA facilities are separated into voice and data components based on their subscriber rates, actual traffic rates, as well as efficiency consideration of traffic rates. The study then calculates cost-based wholesale prices of voice and data services for each of the 3G MVNO types. The result of this study shows that a cost-plus pricing scheme can help achieve the policy goals of the regulator, namely, lowering telecommunications tariffs and facilitating the introduction of new convergent-type services, far more effectively than the current retail-minus pricing scheme. The findings of this study may assist firms in developing business models based on 3G networks and telecom regulators in designing policies related to interconnection, mVoIP, prepaid calls, wholesale services, and network neutrality.     

The need for a new approach to regulating fixed networks

The increasing danger of excess capacity in the regulated fixed networks calls into question the established long-standing pricing standards for wholesale services based on forward-looking long-run incremental costs (FL-LRAIC). Within the EU “Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications and Services”, the FL-LRAIC standard has worked quite well in expanding markets, although even there price-squeeze problems have appeared. In contracting markets the price-squeeze issue, however, becomes paramount and lower prices both at the wholesale and retail levels would be efficient. Because both expansion and contraction could be relevant in the future, this paper suggests an optional approach based on the wholesale price formula p=min{FL-LRAIC, Retail-Minus} with an optional replacement of per-minute charges by capacity-based access charges (CBC). This will generally protect alternative competitors against price-squeeze while at the same time allowing the fixed-network incumbent full downward price flexibility. It also protects alternative competitors and end users against excessively high prices.     

Link between termination rates and retail prices in Namibia,Kenya and South Africa

This paper analyses the link between mobile termination rate reductions and retail prices. It draws on in-depth case studies of South Africa, Namibia and Kenya where regulators have reduced termination rates towards the cost of an efficient operator. To varying degrees these have all led to lower retail prices and significant market expansion. While retail prices in both Namibia and Kenya dropped following substantial termination rate reductions, the South African case demonstrates that termination rate reductions are not always passed on to consumers as is hoped by such regulatory interventions. In South Africa, it was only after the second reduction in March 2012 that smaller operators were able to reduce their off-net prices to a level that could tempt the subscribers to dominant operators to switch. All the case studies confirm nevertheless that retail prices do not go up in response to termination rates going down as contended by dominant mobile operators around the world. This is in contrast to a body of literature stating that termination rates and mobile retail prices constitute a two-sided market and that termination rate reductions will lead to a so-called “waterbed effect”.     

Quality-adjusted international price comparisons of mobile telecommunications services

Many countries' policymakers have conducted international price comparisons of mobile telecommunications services to prevent service operators from overcharging subscribers. However, those comparisons have become more complicated because of the escalation in service usage and telecommunications expenditures spurred by the proliferation of smartphones and broadband LTE wireless internet service networks. The basket-based methodologies that have been widely used for international price comparisons are also limited—first, because the baskets for comparison may not be representative of actual service usage patterns in some countries; second, because they are difficult to apply to highly differentiated service plans due to the significant increase in wireless internet service usage and widely used plans with unlimited voice call service and SMS/MMS; and third, because they cannot consider the quality of service, such as upload and download speed in various service environments, at all. As an alternative, this paper proposes a hedonic pricing model that accounts for service quality and its variation in potentially disruptive environments, as well as fixed charge for a mobile phone additional to the price of service plans. The model was used to derive quality-adjusted price indices of mobile telecommunications services for twelve cities in ten countries with broadband LTE wireless internet service. The empirical results confirmed that the price index of each city varied significantly across the specifications,—both within the United States and internationally—depending on whether the model was constructed to reflect service quality and its variation on roads, in buildings, and in subways. The price index of each city also varied depending on whether the subsidized price of a mobile phone was considered part of the monthly price of a service plan. These results have important implications for policymakers seeking to understand the ultimate level of mobile telecommunication service prices for their country in a global context.     

Are OTT messaging and mobile telecommunication an interrelated market? An empirical analysis

OTT messengers such as Facebook and WhatsApp have gained wide popularity among mobile users while the traffic of text messaging is in strong decline. As such, there is a debate over whether both services are interrelated and constitute a joint product market, which has important implications for the current wave of mergers in the mobile industry and regulation policy. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to provide an empirical analysis of how the consumption of OTT messengers affects demand for text messaging and mobile voice services. We make use of an innovative dataset which includes very detailed information on smartphone usage in Norway and consider a novel approach to address this question which is embedded in the complexity of two-sided markets. Interestingly, our findings suggest that OTT messengers complement demand for traditional mobile telecommunication services for this context. Consequently, both markets are interrelated but do not constitute a joint market from the perspective of competition policy in Norway. Moreover, we find an explanation for why reductions of text messaging usage have been so drastic in some countries and an analogous development for mobile voice is rather unlikely. Finally, our empirical results provide a new perspective on the modelling of consumer utility in communication networks in the theoretical literature.     

Roaming and investments in the mobile internet market

This model discusses mobile network operators' (MNOs) incentives to invest in their network facilities such as new 4G networks under various regimes of data roaming charge regulation. Given an induced externality of investments (spillovers) due to the roaming agreements it will be shown that MNOs, competing on investments, widely set higher investments for below cost regulation of roaming charges. Otherwise, if MNOs are free to collaborate on investments, they set higher investment levels for above cost roaming charges. Both below and above cost charges may be preferred from a welfare perspective. Furthermore, the paper discusses effects of the roaming charge regulation on roaming quality and MNOs' coverage.     

Private labels in marketplaces

Regulators are concerned that by introducing their own private labels, dominant online marketplace operators distort competition in their own favor. This paper addresses this concern by studying how online marketplaces differ from classic retailers with a wholesale arrangement. In online marketplaces individual sellers set their own consumer prices, while the marketplace operator collects fees from their sales. I show that when introducing a private label, the marketplace operator does not have an incentive to distort competition and foreclose the outside seller. On the contrary, when introducing a private label, there is an incentive to decrease the fee charged to the outside seller and to vertically differentiate its own product in order to protect the seller’s channel. However, relative to the wholesale model of classic retailers, online marketplace operators offer a lower quality with higher consumer prices, leading to less improvement in consumer surplus and potentially less harm to the outside seller.     

MARKET POWER,VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND THE WHOLESALE PRICE OF GASOLINE*

This paper examines empirically the relationship between vertical integration and wholesale gasoline prices. We use discrete and differential changes in the extent of vertical integration generated by mergers in West Coast gasoline refining and retailing markets to test for incentives to raise rivals' costs. The research design allows us to test for a relationship between vertical integration and wholesale prices, controlling for horizontal market structure, cost shocks and trends. We find evidence consistent with the strategic incentive to raise competitors' input costs. This suggests that vertical integration can have a significant impact on wholesale prices.