Cultural Integration and Its Discontents

A community's culture is defined by the preferences and equilibrium behaviours of its members. Contacts among communities alter individual cultures through two interrelated mechanisms: behavioural adaptations driven by pay-offs to coordination, and preference changes shaped by socialization and self-persuasion. This paper explores the workings of these mechanisms through a model of cultural integration in which preferences and behaviours vary continuously. It identifies a broad set of conditions under which cross-cultural contacts promote cultural hybridization. The analysis suggests that policies to support social integration serve to homogenize preferences across communities, thereby undermining a key objective of multiculturalism. Yielding fresh insights into strategies pursued to influence cultural trends, it also shows that communities benefit from having other communities adjust their behaviours.     

On the determinants of household debt maturity choice

This article jointly analyses a behavioural and a cultural concept to explain household debt portfolio choice. The behavioural approach explores the role of time preferences on household debt maturity in a theoretical model and a numerical analysis. We derive a positive relationship between the long-term discount factor δ and the optimal maturity of household loans. The cultural approach examines whether national culture is a reasonable predictor for household debt maturity. We show that culture is an important factor for households’ borrowing decisions and has even more predictive power than time preferences. Countries with higher scores on the Hofstede dimension of long-term orientation tend to have shorter household debt maturity. Time preferences incur a primarily mediating role, because the effect of national culture on the borrowing decision is reduced, as the long-term discount factor δ increases.     

Variety‐Controlling Public Policy Under Addiction and Saturation

This paper constructs a tractable general equilibrium model for investigating the dissimilar effects of addiction and saturation on consumption and public policy. By introducing an industry‐specific intertemporal consumption externality, we provide clear analytical results that a lump‐sum subsidy for firms can increase welfare in the presence of a negative externality (saturation). A tax can accomplish the same given a positive externality (addiction). Unlike existing studies of cultural goods, these results are not based on assumptions concerning exogenous different preferences across groups, but rather on conventional monopolistic competition and consumption habit formation models in macroeconomics.     

The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics

We use a mechanism design approach to study the organization of interest groups in an informational model of lobbying. Interest groups influence the legislature only by communicating private information on their preferences and not by means of monetary transfers. Interest groups have private information on their ideal points in a one-dimensional policy space and may either compete or adopt more collusive behaviors. Optimal policies result from a trade-off between imposing rules which are non-responsive to the groups' preferences and flexibility that pleases groups better. Within a strong coalition, interest groups credibly share information which facilitates communication of their joint interests, helps screening by the legislature and induces flexible policies responsive to the groups' joint interests (an informativeness effect). Competing interest groups better transmit information on their individual preferences (a screening effect). The socially and privately optimal organization of lobbying favors competition between groups only when their preferences are not too congruent with those of the legislature. With more congruence, a strong coalition is preferred. Finally, within a weak coalition, interest groups must design incentive compatible collusive mechanisms to share information. Such weak coalitions are always inefficient.     

Culture in Preferences for Income Equality and Safety Nets

Economic and social policies vary across countries, reflecting their cultures and shaping them. People in some countries are more loss averse than in others. People in some countries express stronger preferences for income equality than do people in others, and some countries offer stronger safety nets than others do. The cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance expresses the degree to which people in a country feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and the way a country deals with the fact that the future can never be known. The author finds that uncertainty avoidance is associated with loss aversion. People are more loss averse in the domains of both portfolios and jobs in countries where uncertainty avoidance is high. Moreover, people in countries where uncertainty avoidance is high express stronger preferences for income equality, and social spending in such countries is high. The cultural dimension of power distance expresses the degree to which the less powerful members of a society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. The author finds that people in countries where power distance is high express weaker preference for income equality, and social spending in such countries is low.     

The structure of consumer preferences,Federal Republic of Germany, 1950–1973

Summary The objective of this paper is to analyze the structure of consumer preferences and changes in preferences over time. Consumer preferences are represented by an indirect translog utility function with time-varying preferences that is quadratic in the logarithms of its arguments. We consider a system of demand functions associated with parameter restrictions consistent with the theory. We characterize groupwise separability and groupwise homotheticity of preferences and derive for each set of restrictions on preferences parametric restrictions on the corresponding system of demand functions. Empirical results of the tests, based on time series data for FRG consumption expenditures on three commodity groups — durables, non-durables, and energy — are presented.     

Achievement Bias in the Evolution of Preferences

Currently, economists' models of the evolutionary selection of utility function parameters are generally based on two assumptions. First, it is assumed that utility parameters must serve Darwinian fitness, in the sense that individuals who maximize utility are also maximizing their biological survivability. Second, it is assumed that utility parameters accurately reflect well-being, in the sense that individuals who maximize utility also maximize their happiness. However, there is a large literature in anthropology, biology, and psychology suggesting that these two assumptions may not be warranted. Focusing on utility and happiness, the paper uses models of cultural selection to show that there is no guarantee that our evolved preference must be the preferences that maximize our happiness. Instead, there are plausible mechanisms of cultural selection that will allow immiserating preferences to persist in steady state equilibrium. These mechanisms are generally related to the concept of social achievement: those who achieve more in society will have a greater influence on the utility parameters of the next generation, and this influence is independent of the achievers' well-being. Thus, a preference is more likely to survive if it satisfies some mix of achievement goals and happiness goals, rather than just happiness goals alone. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Redistributive preferences in Europe and Central Asia, 2006–2016*

This paper analyses support for reducing inequality and for redistribution to specific groups in Europe and Central Asia. Using the Life in Transition Surveys, it examines differences in redistributive preferences across countries and time, as well as determinants of individual preferences, testing for motivations such as self‐interest, past and expected future social mobility, beliefs about fairness, as well as ideology and risk preferences. The extent to which different groups are perceived as deserving of government support is found to vary considerably, with the disabled, the elderly and families with children being the most favoured groups. The motives for redistribution towards different groups are also not uniform – self‐interest appears to be a basis for assistance to the elderly and families with children, whereas values and beliefs are associated with support for the working poor and the unemployed.     

Testing, hold up and the dynamics of preferences

This paper presents an overlapping generations model with cultural transmission of preferences in an economy in which players face a hold up problem. One of the players, the firm, can use a testing technology which allows him to imperfectly monitor his partner's behaviour. This technology is completely useless with homogeneous preferences. We obtain that in the stable steady state of the economy there is a mixed distribution of preferences where both selfish and other-regarding preferences are present in the population. Moreover, with a good testing technology, the steady state is characterized by the first-best result in the investment decisions. JEL Classification: C78, D23, D63 The authors acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology project SEC2001-2763. This paper has also benefited from comments of participants in the XXVIII Spanish Symposium of Economic Analysis in Seville (Spain), in the International Workshop on Social and Behavioral Economics in Valencia (Spain), in the 2nd World Congress of the Game Theory Society in Marseille and in the VI Spanish Meeting on Game Theory and Practice in Elche (Spain).     

Culture matters: what cultural values influence budget transparency?

This article empirically examines whether cultural values significantly influence budget transparency. We employ data for budget transparency from the Open Budget Index, and data for national culture from Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, the Global Leadership and Behavioral Effectiveness Research Project and the World Values Survey to explore this question. We find evidence that individualism positively influences budget transparency. We also find that stronger preferences for institutional collectivism, masculinity and authoritarian rule lower budget transparency. These results suggest that national culture shapes preferences for budget transparency and influences the possibility of success for attempts to improve budget transparency across countries.     

Effects of Islamic religiosity on bilateral trust in trade: The case of Turkish exports

Using a rich firm level data set for Turkish manufacturing, we test whether sharing similar religious beliefs with potential contracting parties drives a firm’s first time entry into export markets. We exploit variation in the practice of Islam across Turkish NUTS3 regions and we find that firms located in regions characterised by stronger religiousness are more likely to enter export destinations with a higher share of Muslims among their population. This result is robust to the control for past trade, common language, cultural and migration ties as well as for selective trade policy in favour of politically connected religious business groups. In particular, religious proximity eases export entry for producers of “trust intensive” goods, it favours subsequent foreign market entries and reduces the export exit probability. All in all, our evidence supports an export enhancing effect of religious proximity working through export sunk costs reduction rather than through similarity in preferences.     

Advocacy and political convergence under preference uncertainty

We study the formation of advocacy groups and how they can impact policy outcomes by revealing information about voters׳ preferences to uninformed political candidates. We conduct a laboratory experiment based on a two-candidate spatial electoral competition setting where the policy preferences of voters are (initially) unknown and change over time. In the control treatment candidates learn about the preferred policy of the median voter through the voting outcome of elections. In the advocacy treatments, voters can organize themselves into advocacy groups in order to reveal their policy preferences. We find that voters often overcome the collective action problem of forming an advocacy group. In fact, we observe the formation of both informative advocacy groups, which convey new information, and uninformative advocacy groups, which do not. Overall, advocacy groups significantly speed up the convergence to the preferred policy of the median voter. However, advocacy does not lead to higher earnings as the gains from faster convergence are offset by the costs of group formation.     

Immigration and income redistribution in welfare states

This paper sets out a political economy model where median voters who benefit from local income redistribution are affected by the fiscal burden of welfare payments to immigrants. The median voters also have cultural preferences. Immigrants are influenced in their relocation decision by welfare benefits in host countries. Uncoordinated, coordinated and leader–follower domestic welfare policies are compared. In the last case, the median voter in the follower country is better off than the median voter in the leader country because of a less generous welfare system and hence fewer immigrants.     

Made for the job or by the job? A lab-in-the-field experiment with firefighters

A large body of evidence supports a negative association between risk aversion of workers and the level of risk they face in their occupations. This relationship could be explained by the self-selection of workers into jobs according to their risk preferences or by the effect on risk attitudes of occupations in which people face or witness dangerous situations. We use incentivized experiments to measure risk preferences among three different groups: experienced firefighters, novice firefighters, and students. We find that experienced firefighters are less risk-averse than novice firefighters, and these in turn are less risk-averse than students. The effects remain significant even after controlling for other relevant differences between these groups. Our findings suggest that the observed relationship between risk aversion and high-risk occupations is not only a result of self-selection but also of people’s preferences being shaped by their work lives.     

Socialization and altruism

An important problem in theoretical biology is to explain how altruism can have positive selection value. We model socialization as a costly public good that raises altruism and we study evolution equations for altruistic preferences. Stable cultural (social) equilibria exist in which socialization is supplied privately and property rights exist without civil government. In equilibrium, agents are altruistic in ways not explained by traditional biological theories. The theory essentially formalizes the story in Adam Smith'sTheory of Moral Sentiments.     

Qualitative valuation of environmental criteria through a group consensus based on stochastic dominance

This paper introduces a qualitative valuation method to elicit stakeholders' intensities of preferences for a complex environmental issue and multiple social groups. Environmental valuation studies have shown that in any complex environment with a diversity of environmental services, stakeholders have difficulties using a monetary valuation to make trade-offs between different environmental services. Stated preference methods such as the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) have been criticised for their individualistic format and assumptions of commensurability between environmental criteria. To alleviate both of these criticisms, we propose a qualitative valuation method. The method contains a discursive step to allow stakeholders to discuss and construct a list of environmental criteria and alternative plans. The list of criteria and plans is subsequently used by a group of experts to formulate an Impact Matrix (IM), which is to be used in the succeeding individualistic steps of the methodology. The first individualistic step consists of asking the stakeholders to rank Alternative Impacts (AIs) in the IM for each single criterion. The stakeholders are then asked to express intensities of their preferences through pairwise comparisons between the AIs of the constructed rank order on each single criterion. These intensities are expressed on a qualitative scale. Subsequently, to provide social intensities of preferences, a social preference (social rank order) is first determined for each single criterion. We propose to use the median value among the intensities of preferences as the social intensity of preference by assuming interpersonal comparability and taking into account stochastic monotonocity. This is a pre-processing step, which allows us to reach social intensities of preferences in the Lar rangeland (Iran), where several social groups have conflicting interests on rangeland services, leading to conflicting preferences on environmental criteria.     

A Two-Country Dynamic Trade Model with Multiple Groups

The paper addresses a dynamic interdependence between economic growth and trade patterns within a multi-group framework. The labor force of each country is classified into two groups, according to human capital and preferences. We show how difference in preferences and human capital of the four groups affect trade patterns and the world economy. [F11, 041].     

弱势群体公共文化服务体系建设研究——基于残疾人公共文化消费状况的调查

满足广大弱势群体的公共文化需求是时下加强和创新社会管理的核心要义之一。文章在对东、中、西部三个城市的残疾人公共文化消费进行调查分析的基础之上,揭示了当前弱势群体在文化权利上面临的困境。研究表明,既有的公共文化服务体系还没有惠及广大弱势群体,当前弱势群体的公共文化消费水平十分低下。其中,个体地位结构因素、区域经济发展水平、社会政策倾斜性配置水平以及无障碍环境是制约残疾人这类弱势群体公共文化消费水平的显著因素。文章认为,要确保弱势群体的文化权利,政府必须加大公共文化服务资源向弱势群体倾斜性配置,构建专业化、社会化的服务供给模式,坚持服务为本的逻辑,构建弱势群体的参与机制,并试点向弱势群体发放文化消费补贴。     

Assessing information provision and respondent involvement effects on preferences

We develop a test of the effect of information and respondent involvement on preferences for passive-use values using three treatments. Individuals from a rural community participated in one of three groups, each with a different level of involvement in the valuation assessment. The first group was highly involved, attending three meetings which allowed for information acquisition and preference construction. The second group was involved in a single meeting, and the third group was minimally involved through telephone contact and the completion of a mail administered survey. The hypothesis examined was that the degree of involvement in the exercise would affect the magnitude and consistency of preferences across the groups. The hypothesis that the preferences differ was not accepted. Furthermore, the hypothesis that variances in preferences would be higher in less involved groups was also rejected. While the analysis is based on relatively small samples the findings suggest caution in claiming that increasing degrees of respondent involvement improve economic measures of trade-offs.     

Intergenerational transmission of preferences

We propose a perfect empathy model of cultural transmission to capture the evolution of preferences in a population. Unlike existing imperfect empathy models, focusing on stable interior equilibria, we demonstrate that a corner outcome will eventuate. However, which corner outcome emerges is unknown, and depends on the interplay of “history” and “expectations”.