Financial instruments in non-financial firms: what do we know?

Accounting for financial instruments is one of the most controversial standard setting issues. Attempts by standard setters to expand the scope of fair value measurement provoked fierce opposition from preparers, in particular from the financial industry but also, albeit less frequently and less scathingly, from non-financial firms. Academic research could help to bring the discussion onto a more objective level. Most of the existing research focuses on the financial industry and uses US disclosure data from the 1990s. More recent papers use recognition and measurement data from IFRS financial statements, again primarily from the financial industry. This paper provides novel evidence on the relevance of financial instruments for non-financial firms of the STOXX Europe 600 Index. The results in particular refute the myths that fair value measurement of financial instruments is pervasive and that many fair value measurements are of the problematic ‘level 3’ quality. The empirical evidence forms the background for a survey of the small body of existing research on the effects of accounting standards relating to financial instruments on non-financial firms. This survey covers research on the effects on risk management, on the volatility of cash flows and earnings, on earnings management and on the effects on user decisions. Both in the empirical sections and in the survey sections, I identify a number of areas for further research to overcome the poor current state of knowledge.     

Fintech and banking: What do we know?

This paper is a review of the literature on fintech and its interaction with banking. Included in fintech are innovations in payment systems (including cryptocurrencies), credit markets (including P2P lending), and insurance, with Blockchain-assisted smart contracts playing a role. The paper provides a definition of fintech, examines some statistics and stylized facts, and then reviews the theoretical and empirical literature. The review is organized around four main research questions. The paper summarizes our knowledge on these questions and concludes with questions for future research.     

Risk-risk tradeoffs: what should we do in Europe?

Risk-risk tradeoffs occur when a regulator focuses on decreasing one particular risk in one area which leads to another risk appearing elsewhere which was not originally considered. These risk-risk tradeoffs abound all around us and are frequently ignored by regulators. In this article we firstly, examine why risk-risk tradeoffs are often ignored. Secondly we summarize some of the criticisms to the use of risk-risk tradeoffs and then we look at the phenomenon via a number of European based case studies. In the final section of the paper we put forward a series of recommendations to help regulators to be better equipped in dealing with risk-risk tradeoffs.     

Credit risk and the business cycle: What do we know?

We perform a meta-regression analysis to characterize the relationship between ex post credit risk, measured through non-performing loans and real GDP growth. Although the prior empirical literature reveals a statistically significant inverse association, the precise effect of growth performance to credit quality diverges and remains subject to several qualifications. Using estimates from 56 studies and applying a Bayesian meta-regression analysis we explore the systematic patterns of the heterogeneity in the reported estimates. According to our evidence, the specification form as well as features related to the type of data, and the sample period are factors that systematically influence the estimated results.     

Why do companies issue sukuk?

This paper investigates the determinants for firms to choose sukuk over conventional bond. We investigate the potential impact of information asymmetries through moral hazard and adverse selection to explain why firms prefer using sukuk. We perform logit regressions of the choice of debt type to determine which characteristics lead a firm to issue a sukuk rather than a bond. We use a dataset of sukuk and conventional bond issuances in Malaysia from 2004 to 2013. We find evidence of the influence of information asymmetries and adverse selection on the choice of the sukuk market.     

What do we know about the second moment of financial markets?

Recent research shows that the vast majority of scientific studies published in leading finance journals fails scientific replication (Hou, Xue, and Zhang, 2020; Harvey, Liu, and Zhu; 2016). This study argues that p-hacking, publication pressure and the selection bias from leading finance journals are perhaps not the underlying root cause for this issue. This study shows that standard methodologies often used in finance research are inevitably sample-specific due to the very nature of financial markets. While the consensus of earlier research postulates a rejection of the time-honored Levy hypothesis, the results of this study strongly indicate that the variance of variance does not exist in any of the financial key markets that are considered. An unexpected finding of this study is that the variance process governing the U.S. dollar foreign exchange rate market is generating more extreme events than the Bitcoin market. The results cast doubts on the validity of methodologies currently used in finance research.     

Implementing statistical criteria to select return forecasting models: what do we learn?

Statisticl model selection criteria provide an informed choiceof the model with best external (i.e., out-of-sample) validity.Therefore they guard against overfitting ('data snooping').We implement several model selection criteria in order to verifyrecent evidence of predictability in excess stock returns andto determine which variables are valuable predictors. We confirmthe presence of in-sample predictability in an internationalstock market dataset, but discover that even the best predictionmodels have no out-of-sample forecasting power. The failureto detect out-of-sample predictability is not due to lack ofpower.     

Why do private firms adopt IFRS?

Do private firms voluntarily adopt IFRS? If so, why? Answers to these questions have been very limited so far, mainly due to the absence of financial data on private firms. In this paper, I exploit the German setting where the financial statements of private firms are widely available. I estimate multi-period logit regressions on the choice between national GAAP and IFRS for the consolidated financial statements of nearly 3000 German private firms with more than 14,000 firm-years in the period 1998–2010. My results suggest that the expected net benefits of IFRS adoption vary substantially across the group of private firms, depending on their financing needs, governance system, and organizational and informational complexity. Specifically, I find that private firms using IFRS have more growth opportunities, are more leveraged, are externally rated, seek to raise external capital by issuing public bonds or equity, are registered as a stock corporation, are characterized by private equity (PE) involvement, have more international sales and operations, and have a Big Five auditor. These insights should be of great interest to both preparers and regulators in the current debate about the future of financial reporting in private firms.     

How do public companies adjust their board structures?

We show that public companies frequently changed their board structures before implementation of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, with two-thirds of firms changing board size or independence during an average two-year period. Board changes were associated with changes in firm-specific fundamentals, but the rate of change toward predicted structures was negatively associated with the level of CEO influence. Companies changed board structures in either direction as underlying firm fundamentals changed, consistent with the pursuit of economically efficient board structures. However, board changes have become less frequent since the Sarbanes–Oxley Act was enacted. We provide some evidence that companies became less likely to decrease board independence when changes in fundamentals suggested they should, which may reflect a loss of economic efficiency.     

Why do bank holding companies purchase bank-owned life insurance?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Bank-owned life insurance (BOLI) is life insurance purchased by bank holding companies (BHCs) for key employees, whose proceeds can be shared by the...     

Why do companies delist voluntarily from the stock market?

We analyse the motives and market valuation of voluntarily delisting from the London Stock Exchange. We show that firms that delist voluntarily are likely to have come to the market to rebalance their leverage rather than to finance their growth opportunities. During their quotation life, their leverage and insider ownership remained very high, they did not raise equity capital, and their profitability, growth opportunities, and trading volume declined substantially. They also generate negative pre-event and announcement date excess returns. These results hold even after controlling for agency, asymmetric information, and liquidity effects, and suggest that firms delist voluntarily when they fail to benefit from listing. Overall, these firms destroyed shareholder value and they should not have come to the market.     

Why do investment banks buy put options from companies?

Companies have collected billions in premiums from privately sold put options written on their own stock. It is puzzling that counterparties, investment banks, would agree to make such transactions with better-informed companies which have extraordinary ability to time the market as documented by Jenter et al. (2011). To resolve this puzzle, we develop a model that shows that investment banks, by offering to buy put options from better-informed parties, receive private information about issuing companies. Our model also incorporates the practice of firms (such as Microsoft) of sometimes repurchasing their own put options and thus providing additional private information to investment banks. Empirically, we find support for our theory from an abnormal 9% increase in the stock prices and a 40% increase in the trading volumes around the put sales. Examination of 13D filings reveals that trading by upper management insiders cannot completely account for the change in volume.     

What do private firms do after losing political capital? Evidence from China

This paper studies the real effects of losing political capital by exploiting exogenous shocks from the sudden deaths of politically connected independent directors in Chinese firms. Using difference-in-differences estimation, we find that upon losing political capital, a firm boosts its physical capital expenditures by 28%, or 2.93 percentage points, which is an order of magnitude larger than estimates from the United States. The loss of political capital leads to a decrease in the economic benefits a firm can obtain, in terms of bank loans, tax benefits, and government subsidies, and an increase in its production costs. Our evidence suggests that private firms use physical capital investment as a substitute for political capital.     

Endowment spending in volatile markets: what should fiduciaries do?

Spending rules often guide institutions in determining the annual expenditures from their endowments. A typical rule is five percent of some measure of the value of the endowment. That many institutions utilize the same type of spending rule suggests that these institutions set their spending rules independent of their investment strategy. This paper argues that for many institutions the spending rule and the investment strategy need to be determined simultaneously. The key to understanding this simultaneity is the institution’s willingness to reduce its endowment expenditures when the endowment drops in value. As an institution becomes more reluctant to reduce its expenditures in bad times, the need to set both its spending rule and investment strategy simultaneously increases. One practical implication is that even if an institution believes, for instance, that the returns of a particular class of assets, like equities, will be greater over the long run than the returns of other assets, that institution may still choose to hold some of these other assets if the resulting portfolio has smaller short-term volatility—despite the smaller long-run return.     

How do sovereign credit rating changes affect private investment?

Sovereign credit rating changes have an influence on real private investment of re-rated countries. We find significant increases in private investment growth following upgrades in sovereign ratings. These increases, however, are transitory. We also find significant, temporary declines in private investment growth following sovereign rating downgrades. The results hold after accounting for re-rated countries’ growth opportunities, endogeneity, and other factors that could affect private investment. The irreversible nature of investment may be the explanation for the temporary changes in the growth rates of physical capital investment associated with revisions in sovereign credit ratings.     

What do we know about the role of financial reporting in debt contracting and debt covenants?

The paper examines the role of financial reporting in debt contracting and in particular focuses on the definition, measurement, and monitoring of accounting-based covenants used to manage agency relationships arising from borrowing by firms. The paper also reviews research in areas of financial reporting where the presence of accounting-based covenants provides incentives to managers, notably choice of accounting method, lobbying on standard setters' proposals, and accounting earnings management. Although US dominated and latterly increasingly focused on large datasets and quantitative and analytical methods, relevant research is available from a range of methodologies and countries and the paper reflects this variety and identifies both inter-jurisdictional differences and inter-temporal changes in debt contracting practices. Despite the extensive research which is reviewed important areas for new research remain.     

Do auditors constrain intertemporal income shifting in private companies?*

This study investigates the association between private company auditing and intertemporal income shifting. Using a large reduction in the Finnish corporate tax rate as a strong incentive for income shifting and financial statement data coupled with proprietary information from the tax authorities, we analyse accruals and cost stickiness of small private companies. Our results reveal significant differences in accrual income shifting between audited and unaudited companies, but only among companies that on average could anticipate the tax reduction the most. Further, we find auditors to restrict sticky selling, general, and administrative cost behaviour that we hypothesise is associated with illegal actions. Additional tests expose a nontrivial number of incorrectly unaudited companies which are the ones mostly associated with income shifting. Taken together, our study highlights the effects of audit exemption and the importance of enforcement while also suggesting that the audit process is value adding for the tax authorities.