Communities as a risk in mining: managing community legitimacy

Abstract

Using three cases from mining multinational enterprises (MNEs) in Armenia, this article conceptualises community risk, providing an alternative framework to conventional risk management approaches when managing local community relations. These approaches have been struggling to capture the increasingly complex risks originating from communities – both those who are directly affected by mining activities and the ones who have a vested interest in mining. The article defines two types of community relations which mining companies manage: communities of place (CofP), who live near the mine and are directly affected by its operations, and communities of interest (CofI), who are outside interest groups either opposing or supporting a given project. Community risks arise when CofPs create meaning about the legitimacy of the changes introduced into their physical and social environment, leading them to take action that affects the MNEs’ risk exposure to political, cultural or financial risks. The CofP can present these types of risks by acting alone or in cooperation with the CofI, who often have the resources and knowhow to affect corporate decision-making. The article contributes by defining community risk as an increasingly salient source of uncertainty for mining companies and MNEs in particular. Conceptualising community risk as the lack of legitimacy with these important stakeholder groups enables MNEs to strategise and adopt practices which are adapted to the local context. At the same time it assures investors, political and cultural stakeholders that the communities who have a specific interest in the project accept its impact.     

Political–security risk in the oil and gas industry: the impact of terrorism on risk management and mitigation

Oil and gas companies are experiencing an increase in terrorist attacks. The industry became a legitimate target for terrorist groups in the 1990s and the number of attacks have increased yearly, with a spike after the 9/11 attacks. In today’s interconnected world, political risk is not only about the relationship between the host government and the company. Oil and gas companies may experience risks on a transnational, national and human security level. The success of new investments often depends on the successful utilization of risk management strategies. This study focuses on the importance of political–security risk in the oil and gas industry. In January 2013, the oil and gas industry experienced one of its deadliest attacks at the In Amenas gas facility in Algeria, forcing firms to reconsider its focus on security management. Statoil undertook a thorough analysis of security at the site as well as of the company′s corporate security risk management. The report revealed a lack of focus on political–security risk. This study argues that political–security risk has not been used to its full potential in the oil and gas industry. The oil and gas industry has always focused on site security, but a broader more holistic approach to risk management has been lacking. As a result of the In Amenas incident, the industry has become more willing to have a new discussion on security and this has resulted in changes in the way companies operate.     

Risk perceptions across the current political spectrum in Finland: a study of party members

Political party member perceptions of risk continue to attract a great deal of attention in current public discourse and media coverage, yet little research exists in terms of a comparative analysis of Finnish political parties’ views on the issue. Party members are in many ways a highly significant social group, one that exercises a great deal of decision-making power in modern civil societies. This article provides a novel and up-to-date look into the key areas of perceived risk held by the members of Finland’s political parties, in addition to a comparison of inter-party differences and similarities. The analysis is based on a unique survey data-set of the members of Finland’s six major political parties (N = 12,427). Included are the Finns Party, Centre Party, Left Alliance, Social Democratic Party, Green League and National Coalition Party. Together, these represent the political spectrum in Finland. Risk factors included primary categories dealing with various national, institutional, cultural and economic issues. Also included in the analysis was a look into whether length of party membership affects risk concern for the included issues. Findings showed that national and external risks were more of a concern for the Finns Party, while the Left and the Social Democrats considered economic issues a greater risk than did others. Furthermore, economic risk was most concerning to the left while external risks were generally viewed in line with the current centre-right administration. Some notable differences between old and new party members were also found. Findings emphasize the importance of understanding how political party members differ in their views of various societal risks while providing new points of comparison between those parties toward improved clarity of the national political landscape.     

政治系统与法律系统对于技术风险的决策观察

德国社会学家尼古拉斯·卢曼的社会系统论和二阶观察理论所提供的社会建构论框架,有助于我们从技术、时间、知识、决策等维度厘清技术风险形成的复杂社会机制,促进我们对政治系统和法律系统中的技术风险管制活动进行反思性观察。政治系统通过政策性决策活动规划和控制技术风险的努力,本身也会导致决策风险,政治系统因此发展出令规制失灵而被社会遗忘的应对能力;法律系统内部发展出来的风险预防原则,其功能不在于增加社会的安全水平,而是作为一种程序性反应机制,吸收因科学技术后果的不确定性所导致的环境复杂性。     

Neglected and overemphasized risks: the opinions of risk professionals

Research on risks has mainly been devoted to detailed analyses of such risks that are subject to public debate and policy decision making. However, many if not most of the risks that are now the subject of regulation were once neglected. Experts in conjunction with regulators have a crucial role in putting risks on the policy agenda. But what views do experts have on the matter of attention to risks? In order to answer this question risk assessment experts were asked to list the risks they considered to be over‐emphasized, respectively neglected. Radiation risks constituted the largest category of risks reported to be over‐emphasized. Other risks often reported to be over‐emphasized included BSE, GMOs, amalgam, and air traffic. Lifestyle risks were the largest category of risks reported to be neglected. Other risks often listed as neglected included radon (as an exception within the radiation category), road traffic, socio‐economic risks, energy production excluding nuclear power, and local accidents (including fires and workplace accidents). Risks mentioned about equally often as neglected and over‐emphasized included chemicals and crime. There was a correlation between perceived risk and neglect: risks considered to be neglected were also judged as larger. For a comparison, the topics of articles in the journal Risk Analysis from 1991–2000 were categorized into the same risk categories that were used for the questionnaire. The risks most commonly treated in the journal (chemicals and cancer) coincided with the risks which experts in our survey considered to be overemphasized rather than neglected.     

The politics of urban climate risks: theoretical and empirical lessons from Ulrich Beck’s methodological cosmopolitanism

Abstract

In the face of global climate risks, world cities increasingly figure in academic and policy discourse as strategic spaces for harnessing the expertise and governance capacity needed to steer societies toward more sustainable and low-carbon futures. This article reviews existing approaches to the study of urban climate politics, by way of asking what contribution Ulrich Beck’s theory of world risk society – and principles of methodological cosmopolitanism – make to such epochal conversations? Three main analytical frameworks stand out: low-carbon transition literature highlight generic processes of socio-technical ‘greening’ of urban infrastructures; urban policy mobility work documents growing intercity networks around climate and sustainability; and actor–network theory-informed takes on urban controversies engage the localized politics of specific city-based ‘riskscapes’. While each framework makes valuable contributions, this article suggests that all of them remain under-theorized from the point of view of the specific dynamics of local–global interdependencies in urban climate risk politics. In response, the article draws on Beck in outlining the contours of new urban–cosmopolitan risk communities. To this effect, empirical studies into large-scale East Asian and European port cities is used to illustrate how a shared transnational risk imaginary (e.g. of future sea-level rises) may help spur collective action and new forms of trans-boundary solidarity. Reflecting on such research practices, the article ends by pointing to the need for reworking methods of (multi-sited) ethnography and comparison as central parts of realizing Ulrich Beck’s cosmopolitan sociology in the domain of urban climate risks.     

An Actuarial Index of the Right-Tail Risk

Abstract

A common characteristic for many insurance risks is the right-tail risk, representing low-frequency, large-loss events. In this paper I propose a measure of the right-tail risk by defining the right-tail deviation and the right-tail index. I explain how the right-tail deviation measures the right-tail risk and compare it to traditional measures such as standard deviation, the Gini mean, and the expected policyholder deficit. The right-tail index is applied to some common parametric families of loss distributions.     

Utilitarianism and risk

Abstract

In day-to-day life, we are continuously exposed to different kinds of risk. Unfortunately, avoiding risk can often come at societal or individual costs. Hence, an important task within risk management is deciding how much it can be justified to expose members of society to risk x in order to avoid societal and individual costs y – and vice versa. We can refer to this as the task of setting an acceptable risk threshold. Judging whether a risk threshold is justified requires normative reasoning about what levels of risk exposure that are permissible. One such prominent normative theory is utilitarianism. According to utilitarians, the preferred risk threshold is the one that yields more utility for the most people compared to alternative risk thresholds. In this paper, I investigate whether and the extent to which utilitarian theory can be used to normatively ground a particular risk threshold in this way. In particular, I argue that there are (at least) seven different utilitarian approaches to setting an acceptable risk threshold. I discuss each of these approaches in turn and argue that neither can satisfactorily ground an acceptable risk threshold.     

Correlation and the pricing of risks

Given a pricing kernel we investigate the class of risks that are not priced by this kernel. Risks are random payoffs written on underlying uncertainties that may themselves either be random variables, processes, events or information filtrations. A risk is said to be not priced by a kernel if all derivatives on this risk always earn a zero excess return, or equivalently the derivatives may be priced without a change of measure. We say that such risks are not kernel priced. It is shown that reliance on direct correlation between the risk and the pricing kernel as an indicator for the kernel pricing of a risk can be misleading. Examples are given of risks that are uncorrelated with the pricing kernel but are kernel priced. These examples lead to new definitions for risks that are not kernel priced in correlation terms. Additionally we show that the pricing kernel itself viewed as a random variable is strongly negatively kernel priced implying in particular that all monotone increasing functions of the kernel receive a negative risk premium. Moreover the equivalence class of the kernel under increasing monotone transformations is unique in possessing this property.      

Cosmopolitan risk community in a bowl: a case study of China’s good food movement

Abstract

Ulrich Beck fundamentally transformed our way of thinking about human interdependence through his three core theses on risk, individualisation and cosmopolitanisation. However, two commonly observed deficiencies in Beck’s grand theory were its Eurocentric orientation and a lack of empirical grounding. Based on 5 focus groups and 14 interviews with participants of the emerging Clean Food Movement in China, this paper extends the Beckian discussion outside Europe. Through examining how individuals understand both ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ risks associated with contemporary food consumption, this paper demonstrates that in the face of unpredictable and incalculable harms, risks are not seen as a ‘thing’, but are translated into ‘causal relations’. Subsequently, for Chinese stakeholders, the best way to safeguard food risks is to enact more visible and functioning interdependent relations in the food system. This in turn has given rise to new forms of communities which cut across conventional geographic, socio-economic and political boundaries. The paper deepens a Beckian theorisation in two ways. First, it demonstrates that the ‘enabling’ effect of risk towards a cosmopolitan society is not limited to obvious global crises, such as climate catastrophes and financial meltdown. In fact, the mundane yet intimate concern of putting ‘good’ food in one’s dinner bowl already presses actors to form new social solidarities that are cosmopolitan in nature. Second, it goes beyond Beck’s assertion that the risk society has culminated in a cosmopolitan moment, and explores how a performative cosmopolitan community reshapes the ‘relations of definition’ to mitigate risks on the ground.     

What role for social scientists in risk expertise?

When it comes to risks – health and environmental risks, like those linked to the use of nanotechnologies, pesticides, etc. – three main groups of actors are easily identified, brought together through boundary organisations such as environmental and sanitary risk agencies: the natural and technical scientists, who provide their expertise to assess risks (especially toxicologists, epidemiologists and microbiologists); the policy makers, who take decisions regarding risk management and risk regulation; the lay public, who are more and more involved in participatory frameworks. Sometimes three other groups of actors are added: the ‘economists’ who can for instance conduct cost–benefit assessments or multi-criteria analyses (especially ecological economists, public economists, political economists and social economists); the ‘philosophers’/‘ethicists’ who can use ethics to highlight moral choices and responsibilities in face of risks; and the ‘jurists’/‘legal experts’ who can justify authorisation or interdiction according to law. Inversely, there is a group of actors which is not clearly identified, that of social scientists, even though a considerable quantity of social science knowledge on risk has been produced. Why is there such a discrepancy? This article, based on a critical review of the literature, aims to make sense of the fuzziness surrounding the involvement of social scientists when it comes to risk expertise. The article shows that one reason for this puzzling situation is to be found in the gap between what social scientists often want to do when they are called in as risk experts and what natural scientists and public policy makers actually expect from them.     

Credibilistic risk aversion

In the probabilistic risk aversion approach, risks are presumed as random variables with known probability distributions. However, in some practical cases, for example, due to the absence of historical data, the inherent uncertain characteristic of risks or different subject judgements from the decision-makers, risks may be hard or not appropriate to be estimated with probability distributions. Therefore, the traditional probabilistic risk aversion theory is ineffective. Thus, in order to deal with these cases, we suggest measuring these kinds of risks as fuzzy variables, and accordingly to present an alternative risk aversion approach by employing credibility theory. In the present paper, first, the definition of credibilistic risk premium proposed by Georgescu and Kinnunen [Fuzzy Inf. Eng., 2013, 5, 399–416] is revised by taking the initial wealth into consideration, and then a general method to compute the credibilistic risk premium is provided. Secondly, regarding the risks represented with the commonly used LR fuzzy intervals, a simple calculation formula of the local credibilistic risk premium is put forward. Finally, in a global sense, several equivalent propositions for comparative risk aversion under the credibility measurement are provided. Illustrated examples are presented to show the applicability of the theoretical findings.     

The world price of liquidity risk

This paper empirically tests the liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model of Acharya and Pedersen (2005) on a global level. Consistent with the model, I find evidence that liquidity risks are priced independently of market risk in international financial markets. That is, a security’s required rate of return depends on the covariance of its own liquidity with aggregate local market liquidity, as well as the covariance of its own liquidity with local and global market returns. I also show that the US market is an important driving force of global liquidity risk. Furthermore, I find that the pricing of liquidity risk varies across countries according to geographic, economic, and political environments. The findings show that the systematic dimension of liquidity provides implications for international portfolio diversification.     

Supply chain risk: empirical research in the automotive industry

Supply chain risk management (SCRM) has become a popular topic over the past decade. It is not a surprise that the automotive industry has been a motivating arena for research within this field; however, the few existing empirical studies reveal that SCRM practices within this industry are still in their infancy. Because the identification of risks can be viewed as the trigger for SCRM, attempts to develop a risk profile for this industry that could serve as a guide to start the SCRM process are needed. This research identifies the main risks along the automotive supply chain by investigating their manifestation in three supply chains in Brazil and offers an initial risk profile for the Brazilian automotive industry. Although the importance of SCRM has been recognised by all analysed companies, the research findings underline the lack of preparedness regarding either identifying risk or considering risk-mitigation strategies and risk assessment. In this context, this study identifies the main risk in which a supply chain can be exposed, through the analysis of real-life manifested risks along different supply chains, as a way to help the supply chain start a SCRM process.     

Sociology,risk and the environment: a material-semiotic approach

Abstract

Sociology has made significant contributions to the conceptualisation of risk and critique of technical risk analysis. It has, however, unintentionally reinforced the division of labour between the natural/technical and social sciences in risk analysis. This paper argues that the problem with conceptualisations of risk is not a misplaced emphasis on calculation. Rather, it is that we have not adequately dealt with ontological distinctions implicit in both sociological and technical work on risk between material or objective risks and our socially mediated understandings and interpretations of those risks. While acknowledging that risks are simultaneously social and technical, sociologists have not, in practice, provided the conceptual and methodological tools to apprehend risk in a less dualistic manner. This limits our ability both to analyse actors and processes outside the social domain and to explore the recursive relationships between risk calculus, social action and the material outcomes of risk. In response, this paper develops a material-semiotic conceptualisation of risk and provides an assessment of its relevance to more sociologically informed risk governance. It introduces the ideas of co-constitution, emergent entities and enactment as instruments for reconciling the material and social worlds in a sociological study of risk. It further illustrates the application of a material-semiotic approach using these concepts in the nuclear industry. In deconstructing social–material dualisms in the sociology of risk, this paper argues that a material-semiotic conceptualisation of risk enables both technical and social perspectives on risk not only to coexist but to collaborate, widening the scope for interdisciplinary research.     

The end of risk communication as we know it

According to the US National Research Council, risk communication ought to be viewed as a dialogue among people conducted to help facilitate a more accurate understanding of risks and, related, the decisions they may make to manage them. But, in spite of this widely accepted perspective on risk communication, there is often a disconnect between how it is defined and how it is practiced. Rather than focusing on a true dialogue aimed at improving risk assessments and risk management decisions, risk communication is often viewed as means of simply educating people about existing risk assessments so that, on their own, they might make (or contribute to) better risk management decisions. More worrisome, risk communication is still often seen as a means of ‘correcting’ misconceptions about, or perceptions of, risk; in other words, risk communication is used as a vehicle for attempting to align lay perceptions with their expertly assessed severity. In this paper, I argue that risk communication must become more decision-focused if it is to meet the objectives set forth – in 1989 – by the US National Research Council.     

Contracts,governance, and country risk in project finance: Theory and evidence

Project finance links financial structure to the operational characteristics of the project to optimize the allocations of various project risks. We develop a model in which concession grants and offtake agreements benefit both public and private sponsors in the presence of political risk. The public can use these contracts to incentivize the private sponsor to undertake an otherwise unacceptable project while benefiting from delegating the process of financing, building, and operating the project to the private sponsor. For the private sponsor, the government concession grant, while improving financial returns, entails political influence. We develop hypotheses connecting these contract choices to the public–private partnership governance structure of project finance and provide supporting evidence. Our findings suggest that a country's political and financial risks have significant impacts on the contract choice as well as the public–private governance structure in project finance. Projects in greater political risk countries tend to be structured with less government involvement in order to avoid political influence of the local government. Projects with the private finance initiative end up with more government involvement and control in order to protect the public interest.     

Beck’s creative challenge to class analysis: from the rejection of class to the discovery of risk-class

Abstract

Beck’s rejection of the relevance of class in Risk Society has had an immense impact on both the fields of class analysis and the sociology of risk. In outlining a novel theory of the systemic importance of risks as side-effects and in making bold claims about how the production and distribution of risks are undermining class inequalities, Beck posed a highly influential challenge to both risk and class studies. Beck’s impact on class analysis however has not been mainly due to widespread acceptance of his original claims about risk and class; rather, it has been research building upon Beck’s work so as to critically depart from his conclusions through which Beck has made his contributions to the study of class. In seeking to identify the impact of Beck’s work on the study of risk and class, this paper, firstly, outlines Beck’s challenge to class analysis. It then proceeds to identify three key areas of research whose development was motivated by their critical engagement with Beck’s work: the literature on risk and the continuity of class; the critical theory of the individualization of class inequality; and the political economy of risk-class. This paper then concludes by critically evaluating Beck’s more recent, partial acknowledgement of risk inequalities by arguing that there are significant limitations in his account of class, but that his work continues to offer a valuable opportunity to inspire future work on class and inequality.     

Assessing the utility of risk management theory in the governance of new states: lessons from South Sudan

Abstract

South Sudan was born amid great hope for a country that boasted vast natural wealth. Inheriting a virtually lunar political and economic landscape, this hope quickly gave way under kleptocratic governance and corruption, a volatile political environment with recent horrendous violence, and the ensuing loss of oil revenues and cuts in foreign investment and aid. These current crises were based on a historical lack of effective and legitimate power: South Sudan, in reality, has historically existed as a geographical appellation, with a bare minimum of cohesive society and functional nation-state, but with far more potent of trans-historical interethnic antipathies among its fractious communities and competing regions. To date, the reasons for South Sudan’s quick failure are rooted in either the vague problems of newness (fragility) and/or missteps by its elites (risk). This article assesses the relevance of political risk management literature for guiding the governance of nascent states and seeks to establish some criteria for distinguishing generic weakness from the risky behavior of political elites in engendering state failure. It asks whether the political elites of South Sudan were thinking about risk prior to the crisis, and why this risk management was so flawed – if it existed in the first place. The challenge is not only in disciplining, codifying, and containering the future through law-like regulations – but in managing the hazardscapes and complex risk milieu, such as, triggers that activate blowups. Always politicians – and especially in South Sudan – do not think through these concepts, and if they do, things might go better.     

The meta‐governance of risk and new technologies: GM crops and mobile telephones

The stylistic shift from government to governance in the regulation of risks associated with new technologies is often portrayed as an attempt to reach a deeper consensus over public controversies and to avoid future risk management failures. Stakeholder involvement in decision‐making through more inclusive and learning styles is seen as increasingly necessary in order to correct the steering deficit of the state, to rebuild trust in state institutions, and to obviate problems caused by uncertainty and different value perspectives in risk assessments. In this paper we scrutinise this model of risk and governance in the light of recent developments in the UK, focusing in particular on the regulation of genetically modified crops and mobile telecommunications technology. We conclude that the shift to governance is best understood in terms of the accommodative response of the state to a number of new challenges: primarily posed by the changing role of the private sector; by pressures on government to engender public trust in the face of shifting social values; and by the related difficulty in taking decisions with confidence and legitimacy. There is a perceived need within government for a more deliberative approach to regulation and standard‐setting, achieved by a creative combination of managed scientific order and the establishment of deliberative cooperative institutions. However the creation of deliberative mechanisms and institutions is not an easy passage, especially if it is accelerated by uncontrollable political events. Indeed, we caution against romantic interpretations of governance as indicating a uniform popular trend towards the democratisation of state decision‐making, despite the very real opportunities for reform that it affords. Rather, we suggest that a more plausible account is provided by seeing governance as a form of adaptive management necessitated by a series of interlocking economic and social changes, and responses to successive risk management crises.