Multi-attribute procurement auctions with risk averse suppliers

We analyze multi-attribute procurement auctions with risk-averse suppliers. As the number of suppliers increases or the suppliers become more risk-averse, the equilibrium bidding price decreases under the first-score auction but remains the same under the second-score auction. A buyer prefers the first-score auction.     

Privatization, strategic foreign direct investment and host-country welfare

Recent evidence shows that developing countries and transition economies are increasingly privatizing their public firms and at the same time experiencing rapid growth of inward foreign direct investment (FDI). We show that there is a two-way causality between privatization and greenfield FDI. Privatization increases the incentive for FDI, which, in turn, increases the incentive for privatization compared to the situation of no FDI. The optimal degree of privatization depends on the cost difference of the firms, and on the foreign firm's mode of entry.     

In-house competition, organizational slack, and the business cycle

Multiplant firms pit their facilities against each other for production assignments. The present paper studies the consequences of this practice in a model where production is limited by capacity constraints and asymmetric information allows facilities to accumulate slack. It shows the amount of slack per unit of output to be pro-cyclical. Indeed, as capacity constraints become more acute in economic booms, the power of in-house competition for quota assignments is reduced and slack per unit of output increases, while the opposite is true in downturns. Moreover, in downturns firms may use higher cost facilities even when lower cost plants are not running at capacity since this boosts X-efficiency in low-cost plants.     

Public procurement in times of crisis: The bundling decision reconsidered

The government wants two tasks to be performed. In each task, unobservable effort can be exerted by a wealth-constrained private contractor. If the government faces no binding budget constraints, it is optimal to bundle the tasks. The contractor in charge of both tasks then gets a bonus payment if and only if both tasks are successful. Yet, if the government has only a limited budget, it may be optimal to separate the tasks, so that there are two contractors each in charge of one task. In this case, high efforts in both tasks can be implemented with smaller bonus payments.     

Procurement favouritism and technology adoption

It is well known that the design of cost minimizing procurement rules for the selection of a contractor among distinct technological groups requires the favouritism of inefficient firms. In this paper, I show that, if technology adoption is non-contractible, these policies will also provide optimal incentives for the inefficient firms to adopt more efficient technologies.     

The better you are the stronger it makes you: Evidence on the asymmetric impact of liberalization

This paper shows how trade liberalization can have an asymmetric effect on heterogeneous firms. It develops a neo-Schumpeterian growth model predicting that the impact of liberalization on economic performance is positive “on average”, but more advanced firms benefit more. These predictions are tested using Mexican plant-level data confirming that, under NAFTA, the liberalization spurred productivity growth on average. However, the empirical analysis goes beyond estimating the average effect of liberalization and shows that more advanced firms benefited disproportionately more from the liberalization. Focusing on the mechanisms explaining these results, the paper shows that the results are not just driven by an increase in input usage and investments, but rather by innovative and managerial efforts as they are significantly stronger in those sectors where the scope for innovative activities is larger.     

Snow removal auctions in Montreal: costs, informational rents, and procurement management

Abstract.  Using semi-parametric and non-parametric estimation techniques, we infer cost distributions and informational rents from 457 bids for snow removal contracts offered for tender by the City of Montreal between 1990 and 1998. Bids and costs have decreased over the sample period, while rents remained relatively constant. The City deserves credit for these results, as it has succeeded in exploiting economies of scale and triggering innovations while maintaining competition. Further, it has been successful in adjusting its reserve prices to keep up with the decreasing cost of snow removal.     

The impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions

A number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information regarding the seller's valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively. This widely accepted result in auction theory remains largely untested in the empirical literature. Recent theoretical work has also shown that this effect can be more pronounced in auctions with larger common cost uncertainty. We examine the impact of a policy change by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation that led to the release of the state's internal estimate of the costs to complete highway construction projects. We perform a differences-in-differences analysis comparing bidding in Texas, a state that had a uniform policy of revealing the same information all throughout the period of analysis, to bidding in Oklahoma. Our results show that, in comparison to Texas auctions, the average bid in Oklahoma fell after the change in engineers’ cost estimate (ECE) policy. This decline in bids was even larger for projects where the common uncertainty in costs is greater. Moreover, the within-auction standard deviation of bids fell after the change in ECE policy with the most significant decline observed again in projects with greater common cost uncertainty.     

Reexamination of Strategic Public Policies

This paper attempts to reinterpret the familiar approach to strategic public policies from the viewpoint of inefficiencies involved in oligopoly where firms engage in Cournot competition. To this end, we introduce tools called “quasi‐reaction functions” and “quasi‐supply curves”. These tools allow us to conduct analyses through use of the standard partial‐equilibrium diagram, i.e. the quantity‐price plane. We can find the relationship between prices and quantities directly and, hence, deal with inefficiencies easily and also suggest policies to correct such inefficiencies. Specifically, we reexamine public policies related to mixed‐oligopoly, excess entry, technology choices with free entry and exit, and foreign oligopoly.     

STRATEGIC TRADE AND DELEGATED COMPETITION WITH ENDOGENOUS QUALITY CHOICE: IS EXPORT POLICY NEEDED?

This paper introduces the relative‐performance contract into a vertically differentiated product market and examines how the optimal trade policy and quality choice respond to the incentive mechanism. We find that the high quality firm makes better use of the delegation than the low quality firm in a cross‐border decentralized model. The main difference between the present paper and the strategic trade theory literature is that in this paper the optimal policy is free trade, which does not depend on whether firms compete by prices or quantities, and on whether the goods are substitutes or full complements.     

The effects of labour unions on international capital tax competition

Abstract We analyze the impact of labour market rigidities on tax competition between two imperfectly integrated countries. Following a shift from a competitive to a unionized labour market in both countries, the capital tax can be adjusted upward in the country with the less rigid labour market, whereas the capital tax is always adjusted downward in the other country. Moreover, by reducing the labour cost differential between countries, trade liberalization gives rise to tax and welfare convergences. Finally, when a country adopts a flexible labour market, the unionized country may attract the majority of capital.     

On tariff and quality innovation in a market with discrete preferences

In a market for a quality-differentiated good with heterogeneous set of consumers and a local firm facing competitive imports from abroad, we examine private and social incentives for quality innovation. For differential tariff regime, we show that both the private and social gains increase with the tariff protection for the low-quality segment of the domestic market for any given tariff on high-quality imports. But for some very high costs of innovation, the local firm may not undertake a socially desirable innovation. The pro-competitive effect, on the other hand, ensures that quality-distortion-at-the-bottom occurs only for very high levels of tariffs.     

The effects of periodic quotas limiting the stock of imports of durables

Analyses of trade quotas typically assume that the quota restricts the flow of some nondurable good. Many real-world quotas, however, restrict the stock of durable imports. We consider the cases where (1) anyone is free to export against such quotas and where (2) only those allocated portions of the total quota are free to export against such quotas. Recent econometric investigations of such quotas have focused on the price of the durable as an indicator of tightness induced by the quota. We show why this is an inappropriate indicator and suggest alternatives.     

The second Engel law: Is it a paradox?

The second Engel law says that the Engel curve for food moves out as family size increases, thus showing a decrease in welfare. What is puzzling, though, is that this regularity does not hold for equivalent income functions expressed in per capita terms. Deaton and Paxon [1998. Economies of scale, household size, and the demand for food. Journal of Political Economy 106 (5), 897-930] show that holding per capita total household expenditure constant, per capita expenditure on food falls with the number of heads. Deaton and Paxson's empirical evidence from developed and less developed countries seems to invalidate the claim of the second Engel's law. The main objective of this paper is to understand such paradoxical relationship between food consumption and household size. Our nonparametric empirical evidence, drawn from the Colombian 1985 urban survey, shows that the food share is negatively related to total household per capita expenditure in line with Deaton and Paxson's claim, but equivalent incomes shift to the right as theory predicts. The regularity of our nonparametric results is an indication of a problem in the parametric specification of the Engel curve modified by family size. In fact, using also the surveys of Italy, Nepal, Djibouti, and Bangladesh we show that a theoretically plausible modified Engel curve is coherent with the claim of the second Engel law and explains Deaton and Paxson's paradox.     

THE EVOLUTION OF SPATIAL ECONOMICS: FROM THÜNEN TO THE NEW ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY

This paper presents a review of the evolution of spatial economics over the past two centuries. The focus is on the evolution of what I consider to be the most fundamental theory of spatial economics, i.e., general location theory . The paper starts with a review of Thünen (1826 ), and ends with a review of the New Economic Geography initiated by Paul Krugman in the early 1990s. It is shown that the study of general location theory has been successful at shedding light on many important features of actual spatial economies.     

How do transport costs affect firms’ exports? Evidence from a vanishing bridge

In this paper we provide estimates of the effects of international transport costs on firms’ exports and disentangle the channels of these effects. In so doing, we use a unique dataset consisting of highly disaggregated transaction-level trade and transport cost data and, in order to account for endogeneity, we exploit the exogenous variation in these costs associated with the non-trade related closure of the main bridge connecting two countries.