The incentive effect of fiscal equalization transfers on tax policy

A theoretical analysis considers the impact of a typical system of redistributive “fiscal equalization” transfers on the tax effort of local jurisdictions. More specifically, it shows that the marginal contribution rate, i.e. the rate at which an increase in the tax base reduces those transfers, might be positively associated with the local tax rate while the volume of grants received is likely to be inversely related to the tax rate. These predictions are tested in an empirical analysis of the tax policy of German municipalities. In order to identify the incentive effect the analysis exploits discontinuities in the rules of the fiscal equalization system as well as policy changes. The empirical results support the existence of an incentive effect, suggesting that the high marginal contribution rates induce the municipalities to set significantly higher business tax rates compared with a situation without fiscal equalization.     

均等化转移支付与地方财政支出结构

本文通过一个均等化转移支付条件下的地方财政支出决策模型,对地方财政支出选择中的各种基本因素作了简单分析,并利用分税制改革以来的省级面板数据,检验了地方财政资金再分配地位与地方公共支出结构的关系特征。实证分析发现:我国目前的转移支付制度不仅会带来地方财政支出的粘蝇纸效应;而且地方政府的财力改善后,还可能通过调整现有的财政支出结构,偏离转移支付的基本公共服务均等化目标,即存在地方财政支出的可替换效应;分区域的分析还表明,越是经济欠发达的财政资金净流入地区,地方政府对基本建设、行政管理支出项目的诉求越强烈。本文的研究意味着在地区间财政分配制度改革过程中,不仅要规范转移支付资金的分配程序,更重要的是应强化地方财政决策的监督机制。     

Clientelism and fiscal redistribution: Evidence across countries

This article marshals empirical evidence from a cross-section of up to 87 countries to consider the impact of clientelism on fiscal redistribution in the form of direct taxes and public transfers. Clientelism may directly undermine fiscal redistribution towards poorer individuals because their political support is cheaper to buy, political patrons will limit redistribution to keep clients dependent and, moreover, will eschew fiscal policies that target broad categories of citizens based on explicit criteria, and favor instead private benefits that they can disburse to individual clients with a relatively high degree of discretion. The empirical analysis controls for a range of potentially confounding covariates, explores various transmission channels and accounts for the real possibility that more extensive redistributive programs may undermine the strength of clientelism. The results strongly suggest that clientelism is inimical to income redistribution towards the poor through taxes and transfers and, moreover, identify reduced public good provision as one indirect channel through which clientelism may undermine fiscal redistribution.     

The effects of fiscal consolidations on the composition of government spending

ABSTRACT

In response to increasing debt paths, governments often implement fiscal consolidation programs. This paper studies the impact of these programs on the composition of government spending. System-GMM estimations performed on a sample of 53 developed and emerging countries over 1980–2011 reveal that fiscal consolidations significantly reduce the government investment-to-consumption ratio, i.e. a composition effect. Robust to a wide set of tests, including when using the narrative approach to identify fiscal consolidations, this significantly stronger contraction of government investment with respect to government consumption is at work particularly when debt is high and in the low phase of the economic cycle. Therefore, in such contexts, fiscal consolidations aimed at short-run stabilization may hurt the economy in the long-run through their detrimental effect on public investment, calling for a reflection upon how they could be re-designed to allow avoiding such undesirable consequences.     

Asymmetric Decentralization,Intergovernmental Transfers,and Expenditure Policies of Local Governments

Although China’s asymmetric fiscal decentralization system has been criticized for many years, there have been few studies giving direct evidence of its negative incentives on local government spending policies. By introducing the mechanism of asymmetric decentralization and fiscal transfers to the objective function of local government, this paper studies the incentive effects of asymmetric decentralization and fiscal transfers on spending policies of local governments, and uses the provincial panel data to carry out an empirical test. The conclusion shows that the asymmetric decentralization significantly weakens the incentives of local government to increase social expenditure, and as a solution to asymmetric decentralization, fiscal transfers fail to play a good role. Due to the relatively large income effect, the financing mechanism of fiscal transfers not only significantly reduces the incentives of local government to provide social public goods, but also weakens the constraint effect of fiscal competition on expenditure policies of local governments because of the increase in the relative cost. Although the distribution mechanism of fiscal transfers has a significant positive incentive to local government in regions where the net inflow of fiscal resources is more than zero, because of common pooling effects, the comprehensive effects of fiscal transfers in the distribution of incentives of local governments to provide social public goods are negative in all regions.     

Visibility estimates of budgetary burden and benefit in European countries

Intermediate territorial levels of government in Austria, Germany, Switzerland, and Spain are different regarding their basic institutions, devolved powers, revenue and public expenditure systems, public revenue equalization mechanisms, accountability, public performance management, and financial control bodies. In spite of the complexity derived from these different characteristics, this paper presents some indicators which permit the creation of time and space fiscal visibility measurements and comparisons. It also advances systematic estimates on visibility for intermediate subsystems of public revenue and expenditure now in force in these European countries. Policy implications seem straightforward. That is, current values are low in general, and allocation improvements could be obtained by implementing changes and reforms that aim to raise both public revenue and expenditure visibility.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Forty-Seventh International Atlantic Economic Conference, Vienna, Austria, March 16–23, 1999. The author is indebted to the participants of this conference and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. The author is responsible for any errors or shortcomings.     

财政不平衡与城乡公共服务均等化：理论分析与实证检验*

本文基于中国分税财政体制下中央和地方财政不平衡这一事实分析了政府间的财政关系，并利用省级面板数据和SYS GMM方法实证研究了财政缺口、财政不平衡对城乡基本公共服务均等化的影响效应。结论表明：在分税财政体制下基层政府财政缺口的存在，并不利于缩小城乡基本公共服务均等化，而转移支付作为弥补财政缺口、均衡中央与地方财政不平衡的主要机制，对缩小城乡基本公共服务均等化产生了显著的激励效应。另外，尽管较高的转移支付筹资水平和专项补助方式有助于提高城乡基本公共服务的供给激励，但在我国中央和地方财政不平衡的分税财政体制框架内，这一供给激励机制将会大打折扣。     

财政不平衡与城乡公共服务均等化：理论分析与实证检验*

本文基于中国分税财政体制下中央和地方财政不平衡这一事实分析了政府间的财政关系，并利用省级面板数据和SYS GMM方法实证研究了财政缺口、财政不平衡对城乡基本公共服务均等化的影响效应。结论表明：在分税财政体制下基层政府财政缺口的存在，并不利于缩小城乡基本公共服务均等化，而转移支付作为弥补财政缺口、均衡中央与地方财政不平衡的主要机制，对缩小城乡基本公共服务均等化产生了显著的激励效应。另外，尽管较高的转移支付筹资水平和专项补助方式有助于提高城乡基本公共服务的供给激励，但在我国中央和地方财政不平衡的分税财政体制框架内，这一供给激励机制将会大打折扣。     

我国均衡性转移支付资金分配机制研究

财力均等化转移支付是公共服务均等化的前提条件,是落后地区提供基本公共服务的资金保障。均等化转移支付资金通常是按照一般公式分配的。本文首先通过均等化转移支付一般公式的推导和解释,明确了隐含在一般公式中的公共服务均等化理念以及资金分配原则。其后,根据一般公式的资金分配原则,实证地分析我国唯一按一般公式分配资金的均衡性转移支付。分析结果显示,仅就得到转移支付资金的省份而言,人均转移支付资金与财力水平之间呈现明显的正相关,财力越强的省份,得到转移支付资金人均值也越多。这一资金分配结果主要源于以财政供养人口为主的资金分配方式。财力较强的省份,总人口中财政供养人口比重较高,以财政供养人口为主的资金分配方式最终导致资金向财力较强的省份倾斜。资金分配过程中对少数民族省份的优待也是资金向财力较强省份发生倾斜的另一重要原因。     

财政转移支付的横向财力均等化效应

财政转移支付的横向财力均等化效应会影响到各地区财政能力均等化水平,进而影响到地区公共服务均等化实现程度。研究结果表明,从总体效应上看,转移支付起到一定的横向财力均等化效果,但各地区财力差异仍然很大;从分项转移支付效果来看,一般性转移支付的财力均等化效应最强,专项转移支付次之,税收返还效果最差。因此,可以通过调节转移支付的地区分配结构和建立均等化转移支付体系来提升转移支付的横向财力均等化水平,以促进各地区公共服务均等化。     

Achieving the Best Fiscal Outcome: What Does the Government Need to Know?

This paper examines the operation of fiscal policy under incomplete information when the central bank sets the stance of monetary policy so as to achieve a zero inflation target. The fiscal authority is assumed to aim to achieve a target level for output and a zero level of public debt. The best fiscal policy setting arises under full information and is one where output attains its full employment level and public debt is driven to zero. Deviations from full information can lead to a considerable divergence from the best fiscal setting involving substantial levels of public sector indebtedness. The results suggest that a government should invest available resources determining what outcomes are achievable and what outcomes are not. Then it should focus all its energies on trying to deliver achievable outcomes. The benefits from such a strategy can be substantial.     

Do dictatorships redistribute more?

This paper examines the effect of political institutions on fiscal redistribution for a country-level panel from 1960–2010. Using data on Gini coefficients before and after government intervention, we apply a measure of effective fiscal redistribution that reflects the effect of taxes and transfers on income inequality. Our findings clearly indicate that non-democratic regimes demonstrate significantly greater direct fiscal redistribution. Subsequently, we employ fiscal data in an attempt to enlighten this puzzling empirical finding. We find that dictatorial regimes rely more heavily on cash transfers that exhibit a direct impact on net inequality and consequently on the difference between market and net inequality (i.e., effective fiscal redistribution), whereas democratic regimes devote a larger amount of resources to public inputs (health and education) that may influence market inequality but not the difference between market and net inequality per se. We argue that the driving force behind the observed differences within the pattern on government spending and effective fiscal redistribution is that democratic institutions lead survival-oriented leaders to care more for the private market, and thus to follow policies that enhance the productivity of the whole economy.     

财政收入集权增加了基层政府公共服务支出吗?以河南省减免农业税为例

很多研究表明,中国式分权导致了地方政府财政支出结构偏重基础设施建设,忽视公共服务和人力资本投入。免征农业税和相应的转移支付降低了基层政府的财政独立性,其影响与上述政策结果相似。利用河南省108个县级单位2001—2008年的面板数据,本文对减免农业税后的财政支出进行了实证检验,发现受到免征农业税影响较大的县农业支出显著增加,对教育的投入显著下降。由于前者主要是由新农村建设等政策压力造成的,这说明财政收入集权强化了那些易于考核的政策目标的执行力度。     

Commodity tax competition between member states of a federation: equilibrium and efficiency

The purpose of this paper is to characterize the outcome of tax competition between autonomous fiscal authorities. It treats the case of a two-region economy, where an origin-based commodity tax is levied by each region on some private good to finance a local public good. A second private good is untaxed.We first describe ‘regional market equilibria’, whereupon consumers of each region allocate their purchases of private goods between domestic and nondomestic ones according to the structure of relative prices, taxes, and transportation costs. Next, regional optimal tax levels and public good quantities are derived, the tax of the other region being held constant. Fiscal competition arises from the ability of one region in choosing its tax to alter the tax base of the other.A ‘noncooperative fiscal equilibrium’ (NCFE) is then defined as the pair of fiscal choices such that each region's tax and public good supply are optimal for itself, given those of the other region. After examining the conditions for the existence of a NCFE, its efficiency properties are considered. Pareto efficient tax levels are computed and compared with the NCFE ones, showing the sources and nature of fiscal externalities. Finally, it is established that, in this model, fiscal choices that are Pareto improving with respect to a NCFE never reduce the taxes in both regions, and always increase the tax of a tax importing region.     

财政均等化:模式选择与真实度量

财政均等化一般有水平公平均等化与财政能力均等化两种模式,而中国在特殊国情约束下应选择财政能力均等化作为财政均等化的模式。以此为基础,度量中国财政均等化的真实水平,发现省际间与上下级政府间财力分配不均衡显著,主要原因是转移支付的财力均等化效果不理想。据此,提升财政均等化水平,促进公共服务均等化的政策建议为:改革现行转移支付的类型结构和地区分配结构;明确各级政府的均等化公共服务责任;构建各级政府的均等化财力分配格局。     

中国财政分权对省际基本公共卫生服务绩效的影响

构建了基本公共卫生服务绩效指数,运用2003—2010年中国省际面板数据,实证检验了中国财政分权对基本公共卫生服务绩效的影响效应。结果表明:中国省际基本公共卫生服务绩效水平存在显著差异,东部地区的基本公共卫生服务绩效明显高于中、西部地区;中国式财政分权提高了基本公共卫生服务综合绩效,特别是提高了基本公共卫生服务的投入绩效和产出绩效;将财政支出权利下放与严格的问责机制相结合能够提高基本公共服务绩效。     

地方政府财政支出的结构偏异——基于跨界公共事务的视角*

本文通过理论分析发现,我国地方政府不仅存在生产性支出偏好,还会在外部性和信息不对称等因素影响下,改变其对跨界公共事务的资金投入。在“量入为出”预算编制原则下,本文利用2010—2019年我国31个省级政府面板数据,实证分析了地方政府一般公共预算收入对跨地区民生性支出、跨地区生产性支出、地区民生性支出和地区生产性支出四类财政支出的影响。结果表明：在全国层面上,跨地区生产性支出受财政收入的影响最大,地区民生性支出次之。比较三类地区的结果发现,区域内政府竞争强度越高,地方政府对外部性的重视程度越强,因而当地用于跨界公共事务的资金会越少。从不同类型财政收入对财政支出的影响结果来看,只有间接税收入可以同时对三类地区财政支出产生显著影响。最后根据研究结论,本文提出了相应的政策建议。     

财政政策的供给效应与经济发展

本文分析了发展中国家公共投资对私人资本积累的动态响应。针对公共资本的拥挤性特征 ,同时考虑财政投资可能引起的风险。在不考虑公共投资风险的分权经济中 ,由于公共资本和私人资本都处于短缺状态 ,企业争夺拥挤性公共资本而扩张私人资本的投资行为虽然使经济超常增长 ,但是存在过度投资和过度拥挤。在集中优化模型中 ,如果考虑到公共投资的风险 ,政府通过税收方式弥补公共投资风险 ,同时将企业投资产生的拥挤效应内部化 ,就能消除企业的过度投资和过度拥挤现象 ,使经济保持合理持续的增长。对中国这样的发展中国家 ,需要重视财政的供给效应 ,在经济起飞初期保证一定数量的政府资本性支出是必要的 ,但随着经济的不断发展和政府资本性支出累积的风险增加 ,财政转型十分必要。     

Expenditure Competition

Given the temptation by government officials to use some of their budget for "perks," residents face the problem of inducing officials to reduce such "waste." The threat to vote out of office officials who perform poorly is one possible response. In this paper, we explore how the competition for residents induced by fiscal decentralization affects "waste" in government. We find that such competition reduces waste, raises the utility of residents, and increases the desired supplies of public goods (potentially above the levels that jurisdictions would choose if they could coordinate). These results are in sharp contrast to the presumed effects from "tax competition," and suggest an additional advantage of fiscal decentralization.     

中国式分权下的区域创新绩效研究---基于资源获取与资源配置视角的分析

依据资源基础理论,财政自主权作为一种有价值、稀缺、不可完全模仿、组织可利用的财政资源,是地方政府取得良好区域创新绩效的来源;使用2007—2016年中国分省(自治区、直辖市)的面板数据,实证检验了财政分权对区域创新绩效的影响。研究发现:①财政分权对区域创新绩效具有显著的正向影响,在考虑财政分权异质性、创新绩效异质性、创新强度、内生性等问题后,结果依然稳健;②地方政府在运用支出自主权为获取良好的区域创新绩效时,存在"软约束"问题,即收入分权对支出分权与区域创新绩效之间的关系具有约束作用但不显著,可能的原因在于转移支付的"公共池"效应与创新锁定效应。