Stock repurchases as an earnings management device

We investigate whether firms use stock repurchases to meet or beat analysts’ earnings per share (EPS) forecasts. We identify conditions under which repurchases increase EPS and document the frequency of accretive repurchases from 1988 to 2001. We find a disproportionately large number of accretive stock repurchases among firms that would have missed analysts’ forecasts without the repurchase. The repurchase-induced component of earnings surprises appears to be discounted by the market, and this discount is larger when the repurchase seems motivated by EPS management, although using the repurchase to avoid missing analyst forecasts appears to mitigate some of the negative stock price response.     

Stock repurchasing and corporate social responsibility

Stock repurchases are controversial. Researchers often view the positive association between free cash flow and the volume of the stock repurchases to be in the shareholders’ interest and the positive association between executive options and stock repurchases to be in the managers’ interest. Using firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) ratings as a measure of ethical culture—one that increases the cost of self-serving behavior for managers— we examine whether a firm’s CSR rating is related to its stock repurchase decisions. Although the baseline regression shows a positive association between CSR and repurchases, we find that CSR amplifies the positive association between free cash flow and stock repurchases and lessens the positive association between executive options and stock repurchases. These results indicate that ethical culture might play a role in repurchase decisions: it may encourage repurchases aligned with shareholders’ interests and discourage those primarily in managers’ interest. Furthermore, we also find that high CSR firms are associated with a greater completion rate of announced repurchase programs and receive more favorable stock market reaction to their repurchase announcements.     

The Optimal Timing of Open Market Stock Repurchases

Using a continuous-time real options approach we determine the conditions under which a value-maximizing company would conduct an open market stock repurchase to exploit the undervaluation of shares. We find the optimal timing of such repurchases as well as the optimal amount a company should repurchase and analyze how it depends on market parameters. Obtaining the announcement returns from the authorization of stock repurchases from our model allows us to derive testable empirical implications.     

The Stock Market Reaction to Significant Tender Offer Repurchases of Stock: Size and Purpose Perspective

This paper uses event methodology to examine the impact of common stock repurchases on the repurchasing firm's common stock returns, including examination of various subsamples to test the effects of size and purpose of repurchase. Although the market reacts positively to general repurchase announcements, it reacts negatively to those repurchases used to fend off takeover attempts and does not react at all to stock repurchases for employee stock option plan (ESOP) purposes.     

Executive incentives and payout policy: Empirical evidence from Europe

We investigate how corporate payout policy is influenced by executive incentives, i.e. stock and option holdings, stock option deltas and stock-based pay-performance sensitivity for 1,650 publicly listed firms from the UK, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, over the period from 2002 to 2009. Our results show that executive stock option holdings and stock option deltas are associated with lower dividend payments in our sample of European countries, where we do not observe any presence of dividend protection for executive stock options. We find that this relationship is mainly driven by exercisable stock options and by options that are in the money. Additionally, we observe that executive stock option holdings and stock option deltas have a negative impact on total payout, suggesting that executives do not substitute share repurchases for dividends. Furthermore, the fraction of share repurchases in total payout increases as executive stock option holdings and stock option deltas increase. Finally, our results show that executive share ownership and stock-based pay-performance sensitivity may mitigate agency conflicts by significantly increasing the level of total payout.     

Open‐Market Stock Repurchases by Insurance Companies and Signaling

The signaling hypothesis of share repurchases implies that management uses repurchases to signal either that their firm's future operating performance will improve or that shares of their stock are simply underpriced by the market. This study examines which of the two interpretations can better explain open‐market share repurchase programs announced by insurance companies. We find no evidence that future‐operating performance of insurers improves following the repurchase announcement. In addition, changes in future operating performance cannot explain the announcement‐period abnormal return. Instead, the stock undervaluation prior to the repurchase announcement can significantly explain the announcement‐period abnormal return, particularly for life insurers. Overall, our results suggest that the positive market reaction to insurers’ open‐market share repurchase announcements is due to the stock undervaluation by the market, but not due to positive information content about future operating performance conveyed in the repurchase announcement.     

A Theory of Stock Price Responses to Alternative Corporate Cash Disbursement Methods: Stock Repurchases and Dividends

This paper develops a model in which managers can signal their firms' true values by using either a dividend or a stock repurchase or both. The authors explain a number of stylized facts about these cash-disbursement mechanisms, particularly those concerning the relative magnitudes of stock price responses to dividends and repurchases. Most importantly, they explain why a stock repurchase elicits a significantly higher price response, on average, than a dividend announcement.     

Open-Market Stock Repurchase and Stock Price Behavior When Management Values Real Investment

This paper provides a simple explanation of open‐market stock repurchases and the stock price behavior surrounding them. There is ex ante asymmetry of information with regard to the private benefits that corporate managers can attain from real investments. In our model, open‐market repurchase announcements reveal information about the managers' private benefits when real investment opportunities are unprofitable in terms of firm values. This study differs from previous studies in that we show that announcements of open‐market repurchase programs can be believable without the restriction that the announcements are commitments. Empirically, the model simultaneously predicts that a stock price will drop prior to an open‐market repurchase announcement and will rise in response to the announcement. These predictions are consistent with stylized facts.     

Share Repurchases and Pay-Performance Sensitivity of Employee Compensation Contracts

I show that share repurchases increase pay-performance sensitivity of employee compensation and lead to greater employee effort and higher stock prices. Consistent with the model, I find that after repurchases, employees and managers receive fewer stock option and equity grants, and that the market reacts favorably to repurchase announcements when employees have many unvested stock options. Managers are more likely to initiate share repurchases when employees hold a large stake in the firm. Moreover, since employees are forced to bear more risk in firms that repurchase shares, they exercise their stock options earlier and receive higher compensation.     

Option-Based Compensation,Corporate Investment Policy,and Stock Repurchases

Abstract:

Taking account of the business life cycle, this paper investigates the impact of the proceeds associated with stock option exercises on investment expenditures and stock repurchases. The results reveal that the proceeds associated with option exercises could add internal funds to firms and contribute to investment in research and development and capital expenditures, especially in the growth stage of a firm’s life cycle. This paper also shows the positive relationship between option proceeds and stock repurchases in the stagnant stage of that cycle. The empirical results further suggest that stock repurchases may substitute for dividends. In summary, the paper empirically demonstrates that stock options not only encourage employees to work harder, but also create more funds for the firm.     

Share repurchases as a potential tool to mislead investors

A rich literature argues that stock repurchases often serve as positive economic signals beneficial to investors. Yet due to their inherent flexibility, open-market repurchase programs have long been criticized as weak signals lacking commitment. We evaluate whether some managers potentially use buyback announcements to mislead investors. We focus on cases where managers were seemingly under heavy pressure to boost stock prices and might have announced a repurchase only to convey a false signal. For suspect cases, the immediate market reaction to a buyback announcement does not differ from that generally observed. However over longer horizons, suspect firms do not enjoy the improvement in economic performance otherwise observed. Suspect firms repurchase less stock. Further, managers in suspect firms have comparatively higher exposure to stock options, a potentially endogenous result suggesting greater sensitivity to both stock valuation and to future equity dilution. Overall, the results suggest only a limited number of managers may have used buybacks in a misleading way as “cheap talk.” Yet as theory also suggests, we find no long-run economic benefit to this behavior.     

Why do stock repurchases change over time?

Recent studies have shown the time trends of firm stock repurchase behavior. We examine these time changes for stock repurchase through the lens of real activities earnings management. Managers appear more likely to manipulate earnings through stock repurchases since the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. Furthermore, suspect firms that just missed analyst earnings per share forecasts have higher incentives to manipulate earnings through stock repurchases. The results are not driven by changes in corporate governance associated with the passage of SOX. Overall, our results suggest earnings management can be a significant determinant of the dynamics of stock repurchases.     

The Differential Value Relevance of S&P's Core Earnings Versus GAAP Earnings: The Role of Stock Option Expense

In 2002, Standard & Poor's (S&P) introduced Core Earnings as a proprietary, uniform earnings metric, with the goal of improving financial reporting. The distinguishing feature of Core Earnings is its consistent treatment of seven adjustments to GAAP earnings for which there is no consensus adjustment by managers and analysts. We use stock price and return data to assess whether investors perceive Core Earnings to be more value relevant than GAAP earnings. The implementation of FASB 123R changed the calculation of GAAP and Core Earnings. This change allows us to assess the role of stock option expense in the valuation of earnings numbers by partitioning the sample into pre‐ and post‐FASB 123R periods and creating consistent measures of GAAP and Core Earnings. Our price results indicate that Core Earnings is more value relevant than GAAP earnings in the pre‐period after controlling for stock option expense, and in the post‐FASB 123R periods. The price results provide empirical evidence consistent with S&P's expectation that a uniformly calculated earnings measure is a more consistent and useful indicator of current performance and future earnings.     

Stock repurchases with legal restrictions. Evidence from Spain

This paper analyses the consequences of legal restrictions on the volume of shares firms can repurchase. Results suggest that the imposition of a limit on the volume of common stock favours the use of open market repurchases (OMRs) compared to other methods of repurchase such as tender offer repurchases (TORs) and Dutch auctions (DAs). The positive share abnormal returns around both announcements of open market buybacks and sellbacks in the full sample suggest that they are basically used to change the ownership structure of the firm in a consistent way with the convergence of interest hypothesis. The positive abnormal stock returns around open market repurchases, which are significantly different to the negative ones around sellbacks, when there are no changes in ownership structure also indicates the existence of a signalling and free cash flow effects.     

Companies' Modest Claims About the Value of CEO Stock Option Awards

This paper analyzes company disclosures of CEO stock option values in compliance with the SEC's regulations for reporting executive compensation data to stockholders. Companies appear to exploit the flexibility of the regulations to reduce the apparent value of managerial compensation. Companies shorten the expected lives of stock options and unilaterally apply discounts to the Black-Scholes formula. Theoretical support for these adjustments is often thin, and companies universally ignore reasons that the Black-Scholes formula might underestimate the value of executive stock options. The findings not only cast light upon how corporations value executive stock options, but also provide a means of forecasting compliance with controversial new FASB requirements for firms to disclose the compensation expense represented by executive stock options.     

Does Labor Power Affect the Likelihood of a Share Repurchase?

This research examines the impact of labor power on the firm's repurchase decisions. Firms facing stronger labor power repurchase fewer shares, suggesting that, on average, repurchases are against the interests of labor. However, the negative effect of labor power on repurchases is significantly reduced when repurchases benefit employees by fending off an unwanted takeover or countering the dilution effects of employee stock options. We also examine the ex post consequences of share repurchases. Repurchases are positively related to the probability of a strike. Repurchase announcement returns and the operating performance of repurchasing firms are negatively related to labor power.     

Real Investment Implications of Employee Stock Option Exercises

This paper examines a real cost of awarding employee stock options. Based on the observation that managers are extremely concerned about earnings-per-share dilution in equity related compensation, we predict and find that firms experiencing significant employee stock option (ESO) exercises shift resources away from real investments towards the repurchase of their own stocks. We further find weak evidence of a decline in subsequent firm performance (as measured by return on assets) for several years following the cut in discretionary investments as a result of stock option exercises, though this result is sensitive to the metric used to measure performance. Collectively, our findings indicate that ESO exercises potentially impose a real cost on the firm in terms of foregone investment opportunities.     

Insider trading and share repurchases: Do insiders and firms trade in the same direction?

Signaling undervaluation is often considered a primary motive for repurchasing stock, but insider trading activity by repurchasing firms is not always consistent with undervaluation. Net insider buying and selling are both more frequent in quarters when firms are repurchasing non-trivial amounts of stock, with the odds of observing a repurchase the highest in quarters with net insider selling. In multinomial logit models, share repurchases associated with net insider selling are positively related to illiquidity, option exercises by insiders, and pre-repurchase returns and negatively correlated with industry-adjusted book to market ratios when compared to other repurchases. Hence, repurchases when insiders are selling stock are more likely done to support share prices or avoid dilution and are less likely undervaluation signals. We find that insider trades either validate or mitigate the undervaluation signal of the repurchase. Abnormal returns of repurchasing firms with net insider buying versus net insider selling in a given quarter are significantly higher for the quarter immediately after the repurchase and the three subsequent years. For repurchases accompanied by net insider selling, abnormal returns are negligible after only one year.     

An IFRS 2 and FASB 123 (R) Compatible Model for the Valuation of Employee Stock Options

In this paper, we show how employee stock options can be valued under the new reporting standards IFRS 2 and FASB 123 (revised) for share-based payments. Both standards require companies to expense employee stock options at fair value. We propose a new valuation model, referred to as Enhanced American model, that complies with the new standards and produces fair values often lower than those generated by traditional models such as the Black–Scholes model or the adjusted Black–Scholes model. We also provide a sensitivity analysis of model input parameters and analyze the impact of the parameters on the fair value of the option. The valuation of employee stock options requires an accurate estimation of the exercise behavior. We show how the exercise behavior can be modeled in a binomial tree and demonstrate the relevance of the input parameters in the calibration of the model to an estimated expected life of the option. JEL Classification G13, G30     

BOND MARKET REACTION TO STOCK REPURCHASES: IS THERE A WEALTH TRANSFER EFFECT?

We reexamine the bondholder wealth impact of stock repurchases with a focus on the wealth transfer effect. We do not detect any transfer of wealth from bondholders to shareholders surrounding open market stock repurchases. For the overall sample (1994–2002), using daily data we document a significant decrease in bond yields surrounding repurchase announcements. Subsamples classified by attributes that capture wealth transfer propensity also do not reveal evidence consistent with a wealth transfer effect. Correlation analysis between bond and stockholder wealth effects similarly is not supportive of a wealth transfer effect. Contrary to the wealth transfer hypothesis, we document a greater proportion of bond rating upgrades than downgrades in the three months following a repurchase announcement. Our results are robust to alternate bond price data and event return methodology.