Emission Taxes and Tradeable Permits A Comparison of Views on Long-Run Efficiency

We compare three different views on the long runefficiencies of emission taxes which includethresholds (inframarginalexemptions), and of tradeable emission permitswhere some permits areinitially free. The differences are caused bydifferent assumptions aboutwhether thresholds and free permits should besubsidies given only to firmsthat produce, or full property rights. Treatingtax thresholds, as well asfree permits, as property rights would departfrom the conventional view,but would allow greater flexibility in makingeconomic instruments bothefficient and acceptable. Such flexibilitycould be very important inachieving efficient control of greenhouse gasemissions.     

Nuclear Power, Externalities and Non-Standard Pigouvian Taxes

The external effects arising from the use of nuclear power are, in a fundamental way, related to uncertainty. In this paper we locate these external effects and derive a dynamic Pigouvian tax in order to make the decentralized economy support the command optimum. Another interesting result is that a small constant energy tax (which we interpret as a second best policy) can take the decentralized economy reasonably close to the command optimum.     

Incentives for Investment in Advanced Pollution Abatement Technology in Emission Permit Markets with Banking

We examine the incentives that firms have to invest in cleaner abatementtechnology when the banking of permits is allowed in emission permittrading schemes. We show that under certainty permit banking can distortincentives for investment and lead to a sub-optimal amount of investmentspending. Under imperfect information, aggregate abatement costuncertainty and investment irreversibility provide arguments for allowingbanking. We generalize the model to consider these, showing that somebanking is desirable but that it need not be the case that the privatebanking solution is optimal.     

Markets for Tradeable Emission and Ambient Permits: A Dynamic Approach

This paper discusses trade mechanisms in pollutionpermit markets. Proofs are given, that sequential,bilateral trade in tradeable emissions permitsconverges to a market equilibrium with minimal totalcosts of pollution control. If ambient or depositionpermits are traded, the convergence of bilateraltransactions occurs only in the case of a singlereceptor. For multiple receptors, the proof ofconvergence for tradeable emissions and ambientpermits is given for two trade mechanisms: sequential,multilateral trade and a Walrasian auction.     

On the Efficiency of Competitive Markets for Emission Permits

It is typical for economists andpolicy makers alike to presume that competitivemarkets allocate emission permits efficiently.This paper demonstrates that competition in theemission permits market cannot assureefficiency when the product market isoligopolistic. We provide the conditions underwhich a bureaucratic mechanism is welfaresuperior to a tradeable emission permitssystem. Price-taking behaviour in the permitsmarket ensures transfer of licenses to the lessefficient in abatement firms, which then becomemore aggressive in the product market,acquiring additional permits. As a result, theless efficient firms end up with a higher thanthe welfare maximizing share of emissionpermits. If the less efficient in abatementfirms are also less efficient in production,competitive trading of permits may result inlower output and welfare.     

Tradeable Emission Permits Regulations in the Presence of Imperfectly Competitive Product Markets: Welfare Implications

In the present paper, we analyse the interaction of a competitive market for emission permits with an oligopolistic product market. It is well known that a competitive permits market achieves the cost minimizing distribution of abatement effort among the polluting firms for a given reduction in emissions. However, when the product market is oligopolistic, it may redistribute production inefficiently among firms. It has been suggested that this inefficiency can outweigh the gains obtained from using emission permits instead of command and control. Although this argument is clearly correct under full information, it is shown in the present paper that it reverses under incomplete information. In particular, it is shown that when tradeable emission permits are specified according to the standard textbook example, they yield higher social welfare than the command and control regulation.     

The Emergence of Market Power in Emission Rights Markets: The Role of Initial Permit Distribution

This paper offers an analytical model of emission permit markets in which a large number of regulated emitters participate, and derives formulae that estimate the degree of market distortion. These formulae clearly show the entire dependence of the ratio of market prices to competitive levels on the permit initial distribution as well as the existence of a threshold for effective market power. While the findings challenge a well-known conception of the Coase Theorem, they have significant policy implications vis-à-vis the Kyoto Protocol and the related policy debates on excess emission rights known as hot air.     

Hybrid Carbon Incentive Mechanisms and Political Acceptability

This paper analyses how hybrid systems of carbon taxes and tradeable permits optimize some conflicting dimensions of political acceptability related to the design of these instruments. Pure systems like taxes without exemptions or auctioned tradeable permits cause problems for political acceptability in open economies due to high overall costs (abatement cost plus payments on the tax or auctions) for current polluters. Unfortunately, pure systems based on grandfathering of emission rights across the board do not provide a feasible alternative because of monitoring and enforcement problems. In contrast, consciously designed hybrid systems employ grandfathering of emission rights together with either carbon taxes or auctioned carbon permits in order to overcome acceptability problems of pure systems, while leaving incentives to reduce emissions at the margin untouched. Moreover, monitoring and enforcement costs of the hybrid systems are less due to the lower number of participating agents compared with the pure systems, while opportunities for cost- or burden-sharing exist as well.     

Intertemporal Permit Trading for the Control of Greenhouse Gas Emissions

This paper integrates two themes in the intertemporal permitliterature through the construction of an intertemporal bankingsystem for a pollutant that creates both stock and flow damages. A permit banking system for the special case of a pollutant thatonly causes stock damages is also developed. This latter,simpler case corresponds roughly to the greenhouse gas emissionreduction regime proposed by the U.S. Department of State as ameans of fulfilling the U.S. commitment to the FrameworkConvention on Climate Change. This paper shows that environmentalregulators can achieve the socially optimal level of emissionsand output through time by setting the correct total sum ofallowable emissions, and specifying the correct intertemporaltrading ratio for banking and borrowing. For the case ofgreenhouse gases, we show that the optimal growth rate of permitprices, and therefore the optimal intertemporal trading rate, hasthe closed-form solution equal to the ratio of current marginalstock damages to the discounted future value of marginal stockdamages less the decay rate of emissions in the atmosphere. Given a non-optimal negotiated emission path we then derive apermit banking system that has the potential to lower net socialcosts by adjusting the intertemporal trading ratio taking intoaccount the behavior of private agents. We use a simplenumerical simulation model to illustrate the potential gains fromvarious possible banking systems.     

基于Internet的排污权交易平台分析与设计

利用现代信息技术进行排污权交易平台的开发是河南省排污权交易体系的一个重要组成部分,也是排污权交易发展的必然趋势。排污权交易平台的开发以排污权交易为核心,基于B/S三层体系架构,实现排污权总量控制、申购、交易、跟踪预警、信息管理、平台维护和信息发布等为一体的系统功能,为更好地实现排污权交易提供了系统性的支持平台和有力的实施保障。     

排污权有偿使用阶梯式定价研究——以化学需氧量排放为例

依据河南省2010年污染源普查数据,分析了不同行业化学需氧量排放的公平性问题,基于不同行业经济贡献与排污量之间的差异性的基础上,参考阶梯水价和电价的制定思路,提出了排污权阶梯式定价,并对其内涵与经济学特征进行了分析,最后,在恢复成本法定价的基础上制定了河南省化学需氧量有偿使用阶梯式价格。     

北部湾排污权拍卖交易建立的可行性分析

北部湾地区属于国家重点开发地区,近几年来开发的热潮始终不减,随之而来的生态环境破坏问题更是值得人们去关注,在我国虽然排污权拍卖的交易制度还尚处在萌芽阶段,但其重要性是不容忽视的,文章通过博弈模型,引进政府、排污企业、环境保护者三方,并结合北部湾地区自身特点,分析排污权拍卖交易实现的可行性及其条件,为解决北部湾在大开发过程出现的环境保护问题提供理论依据,使北部湾开发建设遵循可持续发展战略要求。     

Joint Production,Externalities, and the Regulation of Production Networks

Real production systems are often vertically integrated in thesense that one production process uses the unwanted joint product of another production process as input.This interrelationship links in a non-obvious way the different negative externalities stemming from theproduction processes. An empirical example is the sulphuric acid industry. Our model of a vertically integratedproduction system shows how internalising one currently existing externality may create another externalitywhich has thus far not been existent. We also discuss how environmental policy could deal with this problemwhen regulating integrated production systems.     

排污权交易会计国际发展评述及启示

作为环境管理的有效手段,排污权交易自上世纪70年代提出后得到迅速推广,而由排污权交易引致的会计规范问题也日益受到国际机构及各国会计准则委员会的关注,美国、欧盟及日本等西方发达国家和组织纷纷在理论规范和实务应用两个层面予以推进,排污权交易会计准则体系已逐渐形成。因此,在构建我国排污权交易会计规范体系时,应针对实际情况,首先采用非活跃市场下的无形资产法和无交易市场下的环境负债净额法,待时机成熟时再引入公允价值法,边试边做,循序渐进。     

生态效益外部性的计量思路与计量模式研究

会计概念中的生态效益外部性计量应从生态效益价值计量和生态收益计量两方面入手。生态效益价值计量将广泛运用公允价值模式,并结合生态学等学科方法,在生态效益生态因子计量基础上,分固碳释氧、涵养水源、生态防护、净化环境、生物多样性、生态游憩、保育土壤七类计量。生态收益计量基本采纳当前对收入的计量方法,分生态效益财政补偿收益计量和生态服务市场交易收益计量(后者又包括生态服务销售收入、生态服务劳务收入和生态服务合同收入)。期末对当期生态效益价值及生态收益的计量结果予以汇总,计量出当期的生态效益外部性。     

Taxesversus tradable discharge permits: A review in the light of the U.S. and European experience

The U.S. and West European environmental protection programs have incorporated different economic instruments for controlling pollution. The U.S. has made extensive use of tradable permits of several forms but has never used direct pollution taxes. The countries of the European Community have long used an array of pollution taxes but have never used tradable permits. A review and critique of these experiences and an analysis of the attributes of taxes and tradable permits seeks identify the strengths and weaknesses of each instrument and to provide guidelines for the successful implementation of each system.     

Joint Management of Emission Abatement and Technological Innovation for Stock Externalities

We investigate how emission abatement and technological innovation provide different solutions to reduce pollutant emissions. In the case of a stock externality emission abatement leads to a smooth and continuous adjustment of emissions. Conversely, technological innovation has to be interpreted as an option on a less polluted environment and can justify the use of a pollution threshold above which it is optimal to start a research and development programme for a less polluting technology. It is shown that technological innovation interferes with the traditional emission abatement approach. The optimal abatement level is logically lowered once the less polluting technology is available; nevertheless a temporary increase in emissions is optimal during the research and development period. The usual Pigouvian tax system proves to remain an efficient corrective instrument. A numerical application to the Greenhouse effect is provided.     

Timing and Commitment of Environmental Policy,Adoption of New Technology,and Repercussions on R&;D

We investigate the interplay between environmental policy, incentives to adoptnew technology, and repercussions on R&D. We study a model where a monopolistic upstream firm engages in R&D and sells advanced abatement technology to polluting downstream firms. We consider four different timing and commitment regimes of environmental tax and permit policies: ex post taxation (or issuing permits), interim commitment to a tax rate (a quota of permits) after observing R&D success but before adoption, and finally two types of ex antecommitment before R&D activity, one with a unique tax rate (quota of permits), the other one with a menu of tax rates (permit quotas). We study the second best tax and permit policies and rank these with respect to welfare. In particular, we find that commitment to a menu of tax rate dominates all other policy regimes.     

聚丁烯管材投资项目节能减排评价——以某聚丁烯管材投资项目为例

为加强固定资产投资项目节能管理,促进科学合理利用能源,从源头上杜绝能源浪费,提高能源利用效率、降低碳排放,根据节能法规、标准,选择评价模型,以我国某聚丁烯管材投资项目为例,评价该项目的能源利用是否科学合理,结果显示该项目的年单位产品产量综合能耗为0.44tce/t;项目年综合节能量为589.92tce/t;定比节能率为16%;减少CO2排放量1 474.8吨;与国内同行业单位产品能源消耗比较,该项目处于国内领先水平,但仍有拓展空间,进而提出具体的节能减排建议。     

我国节能减排进程的评价与比较

节能减排是是中国经济发展过程中应对资源紧缺和环境承载压力的必然选择,也是中国调整经济结构、实现经济增长方式转变的一个重要突破口。本文对我国节能减排的综合评价做了回顾与总结;遵照指标体系设计的原则制定出节能减排指标体系,并参照六个方面的依据,确定了各指标的目标值;采用层次分析法确定了各指标的权重,并利用功效系数法对我国2006-2008年节能减排的实现程度进行评价与比较;并就加快我国节能减排的进程进行了思考和探讨。