On platforms,incomplete contracts,and open source software

We analyze investment incentives for a firm A owning a software platform and an application and a firm B deciding whether to develop a new application for the platform. While B's entry helps the success of the platform, B fears ex post expropriation by A and is hence reluctant to enter and invest. We show that different platform governance structures prevalent in the Information and Communication Technology industry (integrated, proprietary, standardized, open source platform) serve to balance investment incentives for the platform and for the applications.     

Lender Steering in Residential Mortgage Markets

In this article, we examine the incentives for lenders to steer borrowers into piggyback loan structures to circumvent regulations requiring primary mortgage insurance (PMI) for loans with loan‐to‐value ratios (LTV) above 80%. Our empirical analysis focuses on propensity score‐matched portfolios of piggyback and single‐lien loans having the same combined LTV based on a full set of observed risk characteristics. Our results confirm that mortgages originated with the piggyback structure have much lower ex post default rates and faster prepayment speeds than corresponding PMI loans. We also find a significant causal effect of interstate banking deregulation on the growth of piggybacks in these years, confirming that the ex post performance gap is primarily driven by lender steering on the supply side and not by borrower self‐selection. We then perform a number of tests to explore different origination and execution channels of mortgage steering.     

The Economics of Retailing Formats: Competition Versus Bargaining

We set up a merger game between retailing stores to study the incentives of independent stores to form a big store when some consumers have preferences for one‐stop shopping. Such one‐stop shopping creates complementarity between products, leading in turn to lower prices after a big store is formed but may also lead to an improvement in the bargaining position vis‐à‐vis producers through the creation of an inside option that small stores do not have. We find that big stores will not be formed when the stores' ex ante bargaining power vis‐à‐vis producers is high. Otherwise, an asymmetric situation occurs with only one big store created when one‐stop shoppers are abundant.     

Information Gathering Externalities for a Multi‐Attribute Good

Most goods and services vary in numerous dimensions. Customers choose to acquire information to assess some characteristics and not others. Their choices affect firms' incentives to invest in quality and so lead to indirect externalities in consumers' choices. We characterize a model in which a monopolist invests in the quality of a product with two characteristics, and consumers are heterogeneous ex‐ante. Consumers do not internalize their influence on the firm's investment incentives when choosing which information to acquire. Cheaper information affects consumers' information gathering and thereby firm investment. This can paradoxically reduce consumer surplus, profits, and welfare.     

Incentive Redesign and Collaboration in Organizations: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Research summary : Separating the individual from the social effects of incentives has been challenging because of the possibility of synergies in team production. We observe a unique natural experiment in a South Korean e‐commerce company in which a switch from pay‐for‐performance to fixed (but different) salaries took place in a staggered and effectively random manner across employees. In this case, social and individual effects perspectives make opposing predictions, enabling a critical test. We find evidence consistent with social effects of incentives, particularly as predicted by goal framing theory. The results have implications for the design of incentives to foster collaboration, organizational learning, and organizational performance. Managerial summary : Managers often neglect the deeper hypothesis behind pay‐for‐performance schemes—that people primarily care about how much they are individually paid. An opposing school of thought contends that incentives have social effects too—that individuals care about not only what they receive but also what their peers receive. It is difficult to say whether individual or social effects would be more salient in a context, without a proper experiment with randomization. We exploit a rare opportunity provided by a company that changed its incentive system in a random order, thus unintentionally creating a natural experiment. The results strongly validate the existence of social effects of incentives, but also make the general case for the opportunity to learn from experimenting with organization design in a systematic manner. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What drives screening incentives in nonbank mortgage originators?

Nonbank mortgage originators, which operate through the originate-to-distribute (OTD) model, account for more than half of all the mortgage origination in the United States. However, less is known about which factors drive the quality of mortgage originations through nonbanks. I show that an exogenous shock that reduced collateral risk for funding intermediaries of nonbank mortgage originators led to a greater issuance of riskier mortgages that culminated in 10–30% higher ex post defaults. These results show how the quality of mortgage origination in the OTD model of nonbanks is affected by the collateral risk borne by their funding intermediaries. Overall, the results highlight funding intermediaries' monitoring incentives as one of the factors that drive the quality of mortgage originations through nonbanks.     

The role of research incentives in medical research organisations

This paper investigates the effectiveness of institutionalised financial incentive programmes designed to encourage researchers to engage in high‐impact publishing and commercialisation. Five Australian medical research institutes were analysed, three of which were offering financial incentives for high‐impact publishing and two offering financial incentives for commercialisation engagement. The perception of incentives for commercialisation and research productivity within the organisations with incentive schemes was compared with that of organisations without these schemes. We found that incentive policies are effective only if researchers already hold desirable goals with regard to their societal contracts, effectively ‘crowding in’ these behaviours. Researchers also stated that they believed that high‐impact publishing and commercialisation engagement were only possible for large groups of authors and fields. For researchers in smaller fields, the current structures of incentives were ineffective as incentives but instead acted as rewards for when these activities did occur. Alternatively, the existence of these incentives offered researchers options for salary remuneration, attracting high‐quality researchers and increasing the organisation's level of prestige as a result. It is recommended that institutional incentive programmes should concentrate on controlling field differences in order to effectively influence rather than simply reward researcher behaviour.     

开放平台与所有权平台的竞争:网络效应与策略选择

开放平台（标准）的出现给所有权平台带来很大冲击，也给经济学家提出了挑战．这种免费的资源提供的动机何在？它对创新活动有何影响？它会如何影响市场竞争的结果？本文提供了一个分析开放平台和所有权平台（双寡）竞争的理论模型，在考虑网络效应以及所有权平台拥有者的兼容策略选择等情形下。分析了不同平台的目标和均衡策略选择。在此基础上。我们还拓展分析了社会对不同产业结构（开放＋所有权VS所有权＋所有权）的选择激励．结果发现不同的参数设定会得到不同的结论。     

Unpaid crowd complementors: The platform network effect mirage

Platforms have evolved beyond just being organized as multi‐sided markets with complementors selling to users. Complementors are often unpaid, working outside of a price system and driven by heterogeneous sources of motivation—which should affect how they respond to platform growth. Does reliance on network effects and strategies to attract large numbers of complementors remain advisable in such contexts? We test hypotheses related to these issues using data from 85 online multi‐player game platforms with unpaid complementors. We find that complementor development responds to platform growth even without sales incentives, but that attracting complementors has a net zero effect on on‐going development and fails to stimulate network effects. We discuss conditions under which a strategy of using unpaid crowd complementors remains advantageous. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm‐specific human capital,organizational incentives,and agency costs: Evidence from retail banking

This paper explores conflicting implications of firm‐specific human capital (FSHC) for firm performance. Existing theory predicts a productivity effect that can be enhanced with strong incentives. We propose an offsetting agency effect: FSHC may facilitate more‐sophisticated ‘gaming’ of incentives, to the detriment of firm performance. Using a unique dataset from a multiunit retail bank, we document both effects and estimate their net impact. Managers with superior FSHC are more productive in selling loans but are also more likely to manipulate loan terms to increase incentive payouts. We find that resulting profits are two percentage points lower for high‐FSHC managers. Finally, profit losses increase more rapidly for high‐FSHC managers, indicating adverse learning. Our results suggest that FSHC can create agency costs that outweigh its productive benefits. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Equity‐based incentives and collaboration in the modern multibusiness firm

Research summary : This paper examines the role of equity‐based incentives in fostering cross‐business‐unit collaboration in multibusiness firms. We develop a formal agency model in which headquarters offers equity and profit incentives to business‐unit managers with the objective of maximizing total expected firm returns. The resulting compensation contract provides a rich mechanism for aggregating value from collaborative interactions across business units, aligning managers' efforts with the firm's growth prospects and organization structure and managing the dual risks in profits and firm market value. The inclusion of equity incentives elicits higher levels of own‐unit and collaborative efforts over the profits‐only contract. Our results suggest that equity‐based incentives are most beneficial when profitability is uncertain relative to long‐term growth prospects, in firms pursuing related diversification strategies, and in periods of rising equity markets. Managerial summary : Equity‐based compensation such as restricted stock grants and options are increasingly common, not only for CEOs and other top executives, but also for business unit managers and other non‐C‐suite employees. The paper studies the role of such “global” incentives in enabling multibusiness firms to benefit from cross‐unit collaboration. Results from our model show that managerial contracts that include appropriate levels of equity incentives, in addition to profit‐based incentives, generate higher own‐unit and collaborative efforts. We also find that equity incentives are likely to be most beneficial for large firms in high‐growth sectors, for firms pursuing a related diversification strategy, and in periods of rising stock markets. The model can also provide useful guidance on designing return‐maximizing compensation contracts for business unit managers in different firm, organizational, and industry contexts. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sustaining Complement Quality for Digital Product Platforms: A Case Study of the Philips Hue Ecosystem

Innovation in a digital world increasingly revolves around open platforms that consist of a core technology and a large variety of complementary products developed by an ecosystem of independent complementors. The platform ecosystem literature has mainly focused on indirect network effects arising from the quantity of complements, with little attention to the quality of complements, despite the importance of quality for the complementary value that drives platform ecosystems. Because digital products are malleable and dependent on the ever‐evolving ecosystem, we advance a relational and dynamic conceptualization of complement quality. Drawing on a systematic, in‐depth qualitative case study of the Philips Hue connected lighting platform and its complementary third‐party apps, we study how and why complement quality is sustained over time. By analyzing apps and their updates, we developed a process model that explains pathways through which complement quality is enhanced, maintained, or deteriorates. Changes in the platform core, changes in other ecosystem elements, and idiosyncratic connections by users result in expanding affordances, materializing glitches, and emerging obsolescence. Without further action, glitches and obsolescence lead to deteriorating quality. Joint action of complementors, platform owners, and users is needed to act upon affordances, glitches, and obsolescence, in order to maintain integrity and enhance functionality. This paper contributes to the literature on innovation in platform ecosystems by explaining the dynamic and relational nature of complement quality in a digital platform ecosystem and showing the interdependence of ecosystem members (the triad between platform owner, complementors, and users) in sustained development efforts.     

Do source of mailing and monetary incentives matter in international industrial mail surveys?

To date there has been only a handful of studies on response rates of industrial mail surveys in the international setting. These studies have essentially dealt with either source of mailing effects or monetary incentives, and not a single study has dealt with both issues. Further, the results have been equivocal. In an attempt to resolve these equivocal findings, the authors report the results of a study wherein the impact of source of mailing effects and two types of monetary incentives on industrial mail survey response rates were investigated. Specifically, the hypotheses that a monetary incentive is better than a mailing effects incentive, a prize giveaway is better than a dollar incentive, and joint effects is better than only domestic mailing effects in enhancing response rates, were tested. Six hundred randomly selected Indian companies were systematically assigned to one of four groups, with a mailing size of 150 for each group. The four groups were the dollar incentive group, the prize giveaway group, the joint effects group, and a control group. The results indicate that the prize giveaway type of monetary incentive yielded a response rate of 25% that was significantly higher than the 7% of either the joint effects or the control group. Considering that prize giveaway had the least cost per response, it clearly appears superior to the other two tactics in enhancing response rates. More importantly, because joint effects fared no better than the control group in terms of response rates, it is difficult not to conclude that any attempt to sensitize respondents to a joint, domestic and foreign, affiliation in the context of research sponsorship would likely be a wasted effort.     

Grantbacks,territorial restraints,and innovation

We analyse the effect of grantback clauses in licensing contracts. While competition authorities fear that grantback clauses might decrease the licensee's ex post incentives to innovate, a standard defence is that grantback clauses are required for the patent-owner to agree to license its technology in the first place. We examine the validity of this “but for” defence and the equilibrium effect of grantback clauses on the innovation incentives of the licensee for both non-severable and severable innovations, which roughly correspond to infringing and non-infringing innovations. We show that grantback clauses do not increase the patent-holder's incentives to license when non-severable innovations are at stake but they do when severable innovations are concerned – suggesting that the “but for” defence might be valid for severable innovations but not for non-severable ones, in direct contradiction to regulation in some jurisdictions. Moreover we show that, for severable innovations, grantback clauses can increase the range of parameters for which follow-on innovation by the licensee occurs. Our work extends the large literature on sequential innovation to an environment where information diffuses through licensing rather than through the mere act of patenting. In this different informational set up we show that Green and Scotchmer (1995)’s conclusion that the initial innovator should have a patent of infinite breadth no longer holds.     

Alliance portfolio reconfiguration following a technological discontinuity

Research summary : We study how technological discontinuities generate first‐ and second‐order effects on alliance formation and termination, leading to reconfiguration of firms' alliance portfolios. Following technological shocks, we argue that firms often seek alliances that provide new resources while also having incentives to form alliances for reinforced and challenged resources that complement the new resources. In parallel, alliance terminations, even involving resources otherwise unaffected by the discontinuity, increase due to limits in firms' alliance carrying capacity. We study biopharmaceutical firms between 1990 and 2000, which faced a technological discontinuity in 1995 in the form of combinatorial chemistry and high‐throughput screening. We improve understanding of how technological discontinuities affect the value of resources and how firms reconfigure alliance portfolios in response. Managerial summary : When firms form alliances to gain new resources during technological discontinuities that disrupt their industry, they cannot consider only the focal new partnerships. Instead, new alliances create complementarity and substitution pressures that lead to broader reconfiguration of the firms' alliance portfolios: (1) complementarity creates incentives to also form alliances for resources that the technological discontinuity reinforces or challenges in order to improve the collective value of co‐specialized assets; (2) substitution creates incentives to terminate existing alliances, even if their value is otherwise unaffected by the discontinuity, in order to create carrying capacity for new alliances. Thus, one new alliance can generate a cascade of reconfiguration that challenges the balance between the benefits of stability and the need for change in an alliance portfolio. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Upward pricing pressure in two-sided markets: Incorporating rebalancing effects

In two-sided markets it is important to consider rebalancing effects following a merger, i.e. the impact of a change in margin on one side of the market, either due to a price change or to efficiency gains, on the pricing incentives on the other side. We propose modified versions for the indices of pricing pressure (UPP and GUPPI) that take this into account. We show that in two-sided markets where the cross-group externalities are positive the upward pricing pressure will typically be overstated if the rebalancing effect is ignored. Our approach explains why competition agencies should look at both sides of the market when assessing platform mergers.     

Technology Choice and Coalition Formation in Standards Wars

We study the efficiency of the standard-setting process when standards result from competition between groups of firms sponsoring different technologies. We show that ex ante agreements may decrease welfare in the case of standards wars: Even though industry profits are larger with ex ante agreements, welfare is not necessarily larger, because the interests of firms and society may not be aligned. This result contrasts with the findings of previous works studying de jure monopoly standards. Including adopters in the standard-setting process may restore the efficiency of ex ante agreements.     

Leveraging foreign institutional logic in the adoption of stock option pay among Japanese firms

Research summary : We investigate why Japanese firms have adopted executive stock option pay, which was developed with shareholder‐oriented institutional logic that was inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented institutional logic. We argue that Japanese managers have self‐serving incentives to leverage stock ownership of foreign investors and their associated institutional logic to legitimize the adoption of stock option pay. Our empirical analyses with a large sample of Japanese firms between 1997 and 2007 show that when managers have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, and when firms experience poor sales growth, foreign ownership is more likely associated with the adoption of stock option pay. The study shows the active role of managers in facilitating the diffusion of a new governance practice embodying new institutional logic. Managerial summary : Why have Japanese firms adopted stock option pay for executives? Inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented tradition in corporate governance, such pay has been believed to prioritize managerial attention to the interests of shareholders over those of other stakeholders. However, to the extent that shareholders' interests are legitimate in the Japanese context, executives who have self‐serving incentives to adopt such pay can leverage the need to look after shareholders' interest in their firms to legitimize their decisions. In a large sample of Japanese firms, we find that foreign ownership (representing shareholders' interests) is more likely to be associated with the adoption of stock option pay when managers are motivated to receive such pay, such as when they have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, or poor sales growth. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Who does private equity buy? Evidence on the role of private equity from buyouts of divested businesses

Research Summary: We examine the role of nonventure private equity firms in the market for divested businesses, comparing targets bought by such firms to those bought by corporate acquirers. We argue that a combination of vigilant monitoring, high‐powered incentives, patient capital, and business independence makes private equity firms uniquely suited to correcting underinvestment problems in public corporations, and that they will therefore systematically target divested businesses that are outside their parents’ core area, whose rivals invest more in long‐term strategic assets than their parents, and whose parents have weak managerial incentives both overall and at the divisional level. Results from a sample of 1,711 divestments confirm these predictions. Our study contributes to our understanding of private equity ownership, highlighting its advantage as an alternate governance form. Managerial Summary: Private equity firms are often portrayed as destroyers of corporate value, raiding established companies in pursuit of short‐term gain. In contrast, we argue that private equity investors help to revitalize businesses by enabling investments in long‐term strategic resources and capabilities that they are better able to evaluate, monitor, and support than public market investors. Consistent with these arguments, we find that when acquiring businesses divested by public corporations, private equity firms are more likely to buy units outside the parent's core area, those whose peers invest more in R&D than their parents, and those whose parents have weak managerial incentives, especially at the divisional level. Thus, private equity firms systematically target those businesses that may fail to realize their full potential under public ownership.     

Alleviating managerial dilemmas in human‐capital‐intensive firms through incentives: Evidence from M&A legal advisors

Research summary: We examine how human‐capital‐intensive firms deploy their human assets and how firm‐specific human capital interacts with incentives to influence this deployment. Our empirical context is the UK M&A legal market, where micro‐data enable us to observe the allocation of lawyers to M&A mandates under different incentive regimes. We find that law firms actively equalize the workload among their lawyers to seek efficiency gains, while “stretching” lawyers with high firm‐specific capital to a greater extent. However, lawyers with high firm‐specific capital also appear to influence the staffing process in their favor, leading to unbalanced allocations and less sharing of projects and clients. Paradoxically, law firms may adopt a seniority‐based rent‐sharing system that weakens individual incentives to mitigate the impact of incentive conflicts on resource deployment. Managerial summary: The study highlights the dilemmas when professional service firms allocate their key individuals to incoming projects, and the role that monetary incentives play in aggravating or alleviating these dilemmas. In the context of UK M&A law firms, we find that partners have a tendency to be attached to too many projects and not to share enough work, which is exacerbated when individual monetary incentives are stronger. Firms adopting a seniority based incentive system (lockstep system) are able to alleviate this effect. This implies that there is a trade‐off between rewarding personal performance versus balancing workloads and fostering collaboration among professionals. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.