Synchronicity and firm interlocks in an emerging market

Stock price synchronicity has been attributed to poor corporate governance and a lack of firm-level transparency. This paper investigates the association between different kinds of firm interlocks, control groups, and synchronicity in Chile. A unique data set containing equity cross-holdings, common individual owners, and director interlocks is used to map out firm ties and control groups. While there is a correlation between synchronicity and share ownership and equity ties, synchronicity is more strongly correlated with interlocking directorates. The presence of share directors is associated with either reduced firm-level transparency or increased correlation in firm fundamentals—due, for example, to joint resource allocation across the firms.     

Bank funds management in an efficient market

This paper discusses general principles for choosing bank assets and liabilities, for deciding on when to make a loan and what interest rate to charge, for pricing funds transfer services such as the handling of checks, for establishing compensating balance requirements, and for dealing with government regulation. The discussion assumes markets are efficient and deals first with an unregulated environment and then with policies in the face of regulatory constraints. Most of the policies which would be optimal in an unregulated environment will be optimal in the regulated environment such as in the U.S. today, because it is relatively easy to get around most of the regulations that are applied to banks by the use of non-deposit liabilities, compensating balances and negative checking accounts.     

The mandatory disclosure of trades and market liquidity

Financial market regulations require various 'insiders' to disclosetheir trades after the trades are made. We show that such mandatorydisclosure rules can increase insiders' expected trading profits.This is because disclosure leads to profitable trading opportunitiesfor insiders even if they possess no private information onthe asset's value. We also show that insiders will generallynot voluntarily disclose their trades, so for disclosure tobe forthcoming, it must be mandatory. Key to the analysis isthat the market cannot observe whether an insider is tradingon private information regarding asset value of is trading forpersonal portfolio reasons.     

The complexity of price discovery in an efficient market: the stock market reaction to the Challenger crash

We provide evidence on the speed and accuracy of price discovery by studying stock returns and trading volume surrounding the crash of the space shuttle Challenger. While the event was widely observed, it took several months for an esteemed panel to determine which of the mechanical components failed during the launch. By contrast, in the period immediately following the crash, securities trading in the four main shuttle contractors seemingly singled out the firm that manufactured the faulty component. We show that price discovery occurred without large trading profits and that much of the price discovery occurred during a trading halt of the firm responsible for the faulty component. Finally, although we document what are arguably quick and accurate movements of the market, we are unable to detect the actual manner in which particular informed traders induced price discovery.     

The association between risk disclosure and firm characteristics: a meta-analysis

The empirical literature on the determinants of risk disclosures offers mixed results. This complicates efforts among stakeholders to understand the factors affecting firms’ decision to report risk information. The aim of our paper is to analyze the findings of 42 empirical studies using a meta-analysis technique. We examine whether differences in the findings are attributable to random error or due to legal and institutional systems, uncertainty avoidance, disclosure regime (mandatory vs. voluntary), industry types, and the proxies used to measure corporate characteristics. We find that all moderators affect the relationship between corporate size and risk reporting. Legal system, disclosure regime, industry types, and leverage ratio measurement moderate the association between leverage ratio and risk disclosure. Industry types and uncertainty-avoidance level affect the relationship between profitability and risk disclosure. Finally, the association between risk factor and risk disclosure is moderated by industry types. We discuss the implications of our findings and offer suggestions for future research.     

Political institutions,stock market liquidity and firm dividend policy: Some international evidence

In this cross-country study, we draw on the dividend liquidity hypothesis and the political economy literature to examine whether political institutions affect the relationship between stock market liquidity and a firm’s dividend policy. In countries with weak political institutions, we expect that investors are less able to demand higher dividends for stocks with low liquidity. Using a sample of 52 countries, we show that the negative association between stock market liquidity and dividends is more pronounced in countries with sound political institutions, consistent with the “outcome” model of dividends. These results are stronger in countries with better legal institutions and weaker for firms with financial constraints.     

Nondisclosure and adverse disclosure as signals of firm value

We present a model in which some of the firm's information ('news')can be disclosed verifiably and some information ('type') cannot,to show that some firms may voluntarily withhold good news anddisclose bad news. We describe an equilibrium in which high-typefirms withhold good news and disclose bad news, whereas low-typefirms disclose good news and withhold bad news. Under some parametervalues, this equilibrium exists when other more traditionalequilibria are ruled out by standard equilibrium refinements.The model explains some otherwise anomalous empirical evidenceconcerning stock price reactions to disclosure, provides somenew empirical predictions, and suggests that mandatory disclosurerequirements may have the undesirable consequence of makingit more difficult for firms to reveal information that cannotbe disclosed credibly.     

Family firm disclosure and accounting regulation reform in the Middle East: The case of Jordan

We examine the quality of accounting disclosures by family firms using mandatory and voluntary disclosures as proxies for the quality of disclosure. We find that family firms comply more fully with mandatory disclosure requirements than do non-family firms but they disclose significantly less voluntary information. We also document that the enhanced accounting regulation improves the strength of the association between family ownership and mandatory disclosure compliance. Another important finding is the greater disclosure, both mandatory and voluntary, for firms with high family ownership compared to firms with low family ownership.     

Information disclosure,firm growth,and the cost of capital

We study how information disclosure affects the cost of equity capital and investor welfare in a dynamic setting. We show that a firm’s cost of capital decreases (increases) in the precision of public disclosure if the firm’s growth rate is below (above) a certain threshold. The threshold growth rate is higher when the firm’s cash flows are more persistent, or when other firms in the economy are growing at low rates. While current shareholders always prefer maximum public disclosure, future shareholders’ welfare decreases (increases) in the precision of public disclosure if the firm’s growth rate is below (above) the threshold.     

Board interlocks and the diffusion of disclosure policy

We examine whether board connections through shared directors influence firm disclosure policies. To overcome endogeneity challenges, we focus on an event that represents a significant change in firm disclosure policy: the cessation of quarterly earnings guidance. Our research design allows us to exploit the timing of director interlocks and therefore differentiate the director interlock effect on disclosure policy contagion from alternative explanations, such as endogenous director-firm matching or strategic board stacking. We find that firms are more likely to stop providing quarterly earnings guidance if they share directors with previous guidance stoppers. We also find that director-specific experience from prior guidance cessations matters for disclosure policy contagion. The positive effect of interlocked directors on the likelihood of quarterly earnings guidance cessation is particularly strong for firms with interlocked directors who experienced positive outcomes from prior guidance cessation decisions. Overall, our evidence is consistent with interlocked directors serving as conduits for information sharing that leads to the spread of corporate disclosure policies.     

The interaction between corporate tax structure and disclosure policy

When socially desirable behaviors are deemed difficult to legislate, tax code is often called upon to indirectly achieve the desired ends. Adjustments to tax policy have been employed to spark investment, encourage charitable donations, and discourage tobacco consumption, to name a few examples. This paper demonstrates that tax policy may also be an effective means of encouraging welfare enhancing disclosures by firms. Further, by inducing disclosures of the right types of information while discouraging revelation of other types, tax policy proves to be a more versatile instrument than direct regulatory attempts which can mandate (but not prohibit) disclosures. The intuition behind our results is that when firms make decisions to disclose (or withhold) pieces of private information, such a decision is often made with an eye on the potential for a large payoff. In such cases, progressive taxes can dampen the appeal of big payoffs and better align the incentives of firms with those of consumers. In short, while progressive taxes may be criticized for curbing aggressiveness, it is precisely such a decrease in aggressiveness that can prompt efficient sharing of information.     

证券市场信息披露中注册会计师的法律责任

当前弥漫我国证券市场的虚假信息强烈冲击着注册会计师行业的可信度和社会地位,广大投资者通过起诉注册会计师来保护自身利益成为一种趋势,而注册会计师法律责任问题也对现行相关法律法规提出了新的挑战.本文集中讨论了虚假报告界定的法律标准、民事责任性质、归责原则及举证责任设置、虚假报告的鉴定制度等部分问题,并提出了对虚假报告的鉴定可以考虑建立独立的审计鉴定人名册制度和具体案件的鉴定人随机选任制度.     

Web disclosure and the market for charitable contributions

Nonprofit organizations face intense competition in the market for charitable contributions. Increasingly, donation decisions are made online, and organizations have responded by implementing substantive Internet disclosure and reporting regimes. We posit here that the voluntary disclosure of financial and performance information inherent in these regimes provides additional relevant information to a broad array of market participants, and thus has a positive impact on the receipt of charitable contributions. We test our hypotheses on a random sample of 400 US nonprofit organizations by building on the well established economic model of giving (Weisbrod and Dominguez, 1986), in which donations serve as the proxy for demand. Our central research question is thus: Are donors willing to “pay” for Web disclosure? Results indicate a positive relationship between the level of charitable contributions and the amount of disclosure provided by an organization on its website; however, performance and annual report disclosure are more important than financial disclosure, and performance disclosure has the biggest impact in organizations that are less reliant on donations.     

Discretionary disclosure and the market reaction to restatements

This paper presents evidence that management’s disclosure choices related to a restatement are associated with the market reaction at the time the restatement is announced. The two aspects of pre-restatement disclosure choice we examine are the amount of disclosure, hypothesized to reduce information asymmetries, and the tone of disclosure, hypothesized to exacerbate the effect of subsequently-disconfirmed market expectations. Our results provide support for both hypothesized effects, controlling for characteristics that previous research has shown to affect market reaction to restatements—financial attributes of restatements, and concurrent disclosure choices such as prominence of the announcement. We also find that concurrent and prior disclosure characteristics have equivalent and complementary power in explaining market reaction to restatements, while interactive effects indicate that pre-restatement disclosure choices reduce the marginal market impact of concurrent disclosure characteristics.     

Determinants and consequences of voluntary disclosure in an emerging market: Evidence from China

In this paper we examine empirically the determinants of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Chinese listed firms that issue both domestic and foreign shares and determine if the cost of debt capital is related to the extent of voluntary disclosure. We find the level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to the proportion of state ownership, foreign ownership, firm performance measured by return on equity, and reputation of the engaged auditor. There is no evidence, however, that companies benefit from extensive voluntary disclosure by having a lower cost of debt capital.     

The role of founder decision rights and operating and disclosure mechanisms in firm value creation

We find that founder firms use operating performance and transparency as mechanisms more effectively than non-founder firms for creating value. The greater effectiveness comes from the founders choosing their inputs strategically. Specifically, they increase the gross margin in differentiated firms that demand organizational agility and they increase asset usage efficiency in cost‑leadership firms. Founder firms exhibit higher transparency than non-founder firms in differentiated and cost leadership firms. The improvements in operational performance, transparency, and value are all greater when founders have more decision rights. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that influential founders use organizational performance and transparency to increase the firm value more effectively than managers of similar non-founder firms by providing a unified vision and a single point of control.     

The local market perception of firm risks during cross-listing events

We examine the local investors’ perceptions on the relative idiosyncratic risks around cross-listing events. We find that increases in relative firm-specific risks around the listing date are temporary and small for Level I American depositary receipts (ADRs) while Level III ADRs have the most variations. For exchange-listed ADRs from emerging markets, there is a significant decrease in the relative firm-specific risk in the year prior to listing, which increases during the cross-listing, while there are only significant increases in relative firm-specific risks for developed market firms. We interpret these as evidences of negative relationship between firm opaqueness and relative firm-specific risks.     

The use of foreign currency derivatives and firm market value

This article examines the use of foreign currency derivatives(FCDs) in a sample of 720 large U.S. nonfinancial firms between1990 and 1995 and its potential impact on firm value. UsingTobin's Q as a proxy for firm value, we find a positive relationbetween firm value and the use of FCDs. The hedging premiumis statistically and economically significant for firms withexposure to exchange rates and is on average 4.87% of firm value.We also find some evidence consistent with the hypothesis thathedging causes an increase in firm value.     

Voluntary disclosure of reasons for auditor changes and the capital market reaction to information disclosure

This study examines the association between firm attributes and management’s voluntary disclosure of the reason(s) for auditor changes and evaluates the capital market reaction to information disclosure of the auditor change events accompanied by preexisting red flag and non-red flag issues. We find that managers are more likely to disclose the reason(s) for auditor changes when those changes occurred because of benign business reasons or if the reasons do not indicate the presence of any underlying operating or financial reporting problem. On the other hand, managers are less likely to disclose the reason(s) for auditor changes when those changes are preceded by red-flag situations. Furthermore, auditor changes accompanied by preexisting red-flag situations are viewed negatively by the capital market, implying that the full disclosure of reasons for auditor changes is informative to investors. This observation is supported further by our market-based analyses, which consistently show that auditor changes accompanied by prevailing red flag issues are valued incrementally in the market above and beyond the reportable events (under FRR No. 31) and auditor-initiated changes. The study contributes to the recent policy debate related to mandating the disclosure of the reason(s) for auditor switches. Specifically, the results support the recent debates that the current voluntary disclosure regime results in selective disclosure practices that are likely to contribute to the general lack of transparency with respect to auditor changes.