An examination of the effects of management earnings forecast form and explanations on financial analyst forecast revisions

Using a sample of 978 quarterly management earnings-per-share forecasts made during the period 1993 to 1999, we document that financial analyst revisions to management earnings forecasts are a function of management forecast form. More precise forecasts (measured three different ways) lead to greater revision of financial analyst consensus EPS forecasts for a given level of unexpected earnings as predicted by Kim and Verrecchia (1991) and Bayesian adjustment models. Also, consistent with our arguments, maximum forecasts are interpreted as bad news by analysts. Our results, while consistent with theory, are inconsistent with recent experimental studies which do not reject the null hypothesis of no effect of management earnings forecast form on the association between unexpected earnings and financial analyst forecast revisions. We also re-examine Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough's (2004) finding that attributions used to explain management forecasts affect the reaction to the forecast using analyst data. Consistent with their findings using stock prices, the attribution presence (especially external attributions) increases financial analyst revisions pursuant to management forecasts.     

Earnings guidance and market uncertainty

We study the effect of disclosure on uncertainty by examining how management earnings forecasts affect stock market volatility. Using implied volatilities from exchange-traded options prices, we find that management earnings forecasts increase short-term volatility. This effect is attributable to forecasts that convey bad news, especially when firms release forecasts sporadically rather than on a routine basis. In the longer run, market uncertainty declines after earnings are announced, regardless of whether there is a preceding earnings forecast. This decline is mitigated when the firm issues a forecast that conveys negative news, implying that these forecasts are associated with increased uncertainty.     

The effects of analyst forecasts and earnings trends on perceptions of management forecast credibility

We examine whether analyst forecasts influence investors’ perceptions of the credibility of a good news management earnings forecast. We hypothesize that the effect of analyst forecasts will depend on whether the analyst forecast confirms management’s forecast and the extent to which management’s forecast is consistent with the prior earnings trend. Findings indicate that the positive effect of a confirming analyst forecast is greater when the management forecast is trend inconsistent than when it is trend consistent. The negative effect of a disconfirming analyst forecast does not differ based on management forecast trend consistency.     

Detailed management earnings forecasts: do analysts listen?

We provide archival evidence on how a particular type of supplementary information affects the credibility of management earnings forecasts. Managers often provide detailed forecasts of specific income statement line items to shed light on how they plan to achieve their bottom-line earnings targets. We assess the effect of this forecast disaggregation on the credibility of management earnings forecasts. Based on a relatively large hand-collected sample of 900 management earnings forecasts, we find that disaggregation increases analysts’ sensitivity to the news in managers’ earnings guidance, suggesting that analysts find the guidance more credible. More importantly, we identify several factors that influence this relation. First, disaggregation plays a more important role when earnings are otherwise more difficult to forecast. Second, disaggregation is more important after Regulation Fair Disclosure prohibited selective disclosure, especially for firms that were more affected because they had previously provided more private guidance. Finally, in contrast to common assertions in the prior literature, we find that, in more recent years, disaggregation matters more for guidance that conveys bad news. Managers as well as researchers should be interested in evidence suggesting that financial analysts find disaggregation especially helpful in contexts where managers’ credibility is particularly important.     

Investor sentiment and management earnings forecast bias

This study investigates whether investor sentiment is associated with behavioral bias in managers’ annual earnings forecasts that are generally issued early in the year when uncertainty is relatively high. I provide evidence that management earnings forecast optimism increases with investor sentiment. Furthermore, I find that managers’ annual earnings forecasts are more pessimistic during low‐sentiment periods than during normal‐sentiment periods. Since managers lack incentives to further deflate stock prices during a low‐sentiment period, this evidence indicates that sentiment‐related management earnings forecast bias is likely to be unintentional. In addition, I find that the relationship between management earnings forecast bias and investor sentiment is stronger for firms with higher uncertainty, consistent with investor sentiment having a greater influence on management earnings forecasts when uncertainty is higher.     

Why Do Managers Explain Their Earnings Forecasts?

Managers often explain their earnings forecasts by linking forecasted performance to their internal actions and the actions of parties external to the firm. These attributions potentially aid investors in the interpretation of management forecasts by confirming known relationships between attributions and profitability or by identifying additional causes that investors should consider when forecasting earnings. We investigate why managers choose to provide attributions with their forecasts and whether the attributions are related to security price reactions to management earnings forecasts. Using a sample of 951 management earnings forecasts issued from 1993 to 1996, we find that attributions are more likely for larger firms, less likely for firms in regulated industries, less likely for forecasts issued over longer horizons, more likely for bad news forecasts, and more likely for forecasts that are maximum type. Furthermore, attributions are associated with greater absolute price reactions to management forecasts, more negative price reactions to management forecasts (forecast news held constant), and a greater price reaction per dollar of unexpected earnings. Our findings hold after control for the aforementioned determinants of attributions and after control for other firm‐ and forecast‐specific variables that are often associated with security prices.     

Business Cycle and Management Earnings Forecasts

This study examines the effects of the economic cycle on the properties of management earnings forecasts. Although a large volume of accounting literature examines the determinants of managerial earnings forecasts, the properties of such forecasts, and the response of market participants to earnings forecasts (Cameron 1986; King et al., 1990; Hirst et al., 2008), research on management earnings forecasting incentivized by macro‐economic factors has received scant empirical investigation. We use the National Bureau of Economic Research economic cycle definition to operationalize economic recession, and consider some commonly used management earnings forecast characteristics, including forecast likelihood, forecast frequency, forecast error, forecast pessimism, and forecast precision. We find that the likelihood of providing management earnings forecasts and frequency of forecasts increases during economic recession. We also find that economic recession is positively associated with forecast error, but negatively associated with forecast precision. Our findings suggest macro‐economic factors as an important determinant of management earnings forecasts properties.     

Why Do Managers Voluntarily Issue Cash Flow Forecasts?

We study a relatively recent change in voluntary disclosure practices by management, namely, the issuance of cash flow forecasts. We predict and find that management issues cash flow forecasts to signal good news in cash flow, to meet investor demand for cash flow information, and to precommit to a certain composition of earnings in terms of cash flow versus accruals, thus reducing the degree of freedom in earnings management. Our results also suggest that management discloses good news in cash flow to mitigate the negative impact of bad news in earnings, to lend credibility to good news in earnings, and to signal economic viability when the firm is young. Our finding that management cash flow forecasts primarily convey good news is in contrast to the generally negative nature of management earnings guidance and suggests that different incentives drive firms' disclosure of different financial information.     

Voluntary Causal Disclosures: Tendencies and Capital Market Reaction

In this study, we provide empirical evidence on whether voluntarily disclosed causal attributions made in management earnings forecasts are credible by investigating the conditions under which such attributions are made and the extent to which security price responses are associated with attribution existence. We find that causal attributions are more likely to be made when forecast news is bad (relative to good), and that the type of attribution made is more likely to be external (internal) for bad (good) forecast news. Incorporating the existence and type of attribution into models that explain announcement period three-day cumulative abnormal returns yields significant effects for attribution incidence and type after controlling for unexpected earnings and forecast type (e.g., point, range, etc.). Consistent with the idea that attributions enhance the credibility or precision of management forecasts, attribution disclosure enhances price reactions per dollar of unexpected earnings conveyed in a management forecast.     

Rationalizing forecast inefficiency

We show analysts’ own earnings forecasts predict error in their own forecasts of earnings at other horizons, which we argue provides a measure of the extent to which analysts inefficiently use information. We construct our measure by exploiting two sources of variation in analysts’ incentives: (i) more recent forecasts have greater salience at the time of the earnings release so accuracy incentives are higher (lower) at shorter (longer) forecast horizons and (ii) analysts have greater incentives for optimism (pessimism) at longer (shorter) horizons. Consistent with these incentives affecting the incorporation of information into forecasts, we document (i) current year forecasts underweight (overweight) information in shorter (longer) horizon forecasts and (ii) the mis-weighting is more pronounced when recent news is negative—when analysts have greater (weaker) incentives to incorporate the news into shorter (longer) horizon forecasts. Finally, returns tests suggest that forecasts adjusted for the inefficiency we document better represent market expectations of earnings.

     

Management earnings forecasts and bank loan contracting

We find that firms tend to issue management earnings forecasts and convey good news before bank loan initiation. Issuing firms enjoy more favorable contracting terms and attract more lenders. Management forecasts issuance within a nine‐month period prior to the loan activating quarter can lower the subsequent loan spread by 14.06 basis points. Moreover, firms with larger management forecast errors are charged harsher contracting terms and attract fewer lenders. Our study suggests that firms strategically issue management earnings forecasts before entering into debt contracts and lenders incorporate the information contained in management earnings forecasts into bank loan contracting.     

The Quality of Analysts' Earnings Forecasts During the Asian Crisis: Evidence from Singapore

We bring together three disparate strands of literature to develop a comprehensive empirical framework to examine the efficiency of security analysts' earnings forecasts in Singapore. We focus specifically on how the increased uncertainty and the negative market sentiment during the period of the Asian crisis affected the quality of earnings forecasts. While we find no evidence of inefficiencies in the pre-crisis period, our results suggest that after the onset of the crisis, analysts (1) issued forecasts that were systematically upward biased; (2) did not fully incorporate the (negative) earnings-related news; and (3) predicted earnings changes which proved too extreme.     

Do UK Security Analysts Over-react?

Consensus analysts' earnings per share forecasts have become increasingly accessible in recent years and such measures have been widely adopted by academics as proxies for the market's expectations of earnings. Some US studies have suggested that analysts, in revising earnings forecasts, are prone to over-reaction. This study tests for evidence of over-reaction in revisions of the consensus earnings per share forecasts of UK companies reported by the Institutional Brokers Estimate System. For a series of periods, portfolios of companies attracting high and low revisions of earnings forecasts are constructed. We then compare the subsequent earnings forecast of the companies which attracted high revisions in the portfolio formation period with those of the companies which attracted low revisions in the portfolio formation period. We also compare actual changes in annual earnings with forecast changes in annual earnings. Both analyses suggest that UK analysts are prone to under-reaction, a finding which contrasts with the US studies which have identified over-reaction. There is little evidence that the market, in reacting to earnings forecast revisions, fails to recognise this under-reaction.     

Measuring the Impact of Corporate Investment Announcements on Share Prices: The Spanish Experience

We bring together three disparate strands of literature to develop a comprehensive empirical framework to examine the efficiency of security analysts' earnings forecasts in Singapore. We focus specifically on how the increased uncertainty and the negative market sentiment during the period of the Asian crisis affected the quality of earnings forecasts. While we find no evidence of inefficiencies in the pre-crisis period, our results suggest that after the onset of the crisis, analysts (1) issued forecasts that were systematically upward biased; (2) did not fully incorporate the (negative) earnings-related news; and (3) predicted earnings changes which proved too extreme.     

Earnings forecasts and idiosyncratic volatilities

We test the theoretical relation between idiosyncratic return volatilities and the volatilities of cash-flow news based on the expected returns on equity (ROE) for CRSP stocks over the period 1977–2008. Consistent with economic intuition, we find that using analyst forecasts of earnings is superior to using realized earnings to proxy for market expectations about future cash flow news. Our findings are consistent with a market where stock return volatilities are positively and asymmetrically related to changes in the volatilities of expectations for a fundamental driver of cash flow news (ROE). Our findings are robust after correcting for forecast biases, various fundamental variables, newly-listed and mature firms, and periods with and without earnings announcements.     

When does analyst reputation matter? Evidence from analysts’ reliance on management guidance

We investigate the joint effects of analyst reputation, uncertainty and guidance news valence on analysts’ reliance on management guidance. We find that, compared to less reputable analysts, reputable analysts rely less on guidance when they issue earnings forecasts. This analyst reputation effect is stronger when earnings and information uncertainty are higher or when the guidance contains good news. Further analysis suggests that both reputable and less reputable analysts sacrifice their forecast accuracy when they rely less on guidance; however, reputable analysts are compensated to a greater extent by the increased informativeness of their forecasts. Finally, we find that analysts’ future career advancement is enhanced when their reliance is low.     

The sensitivity of the credit default swap market to financial analysts’ forecast revisions

We examine the impact of analysts’ earnings per share (EPS) and cash flow per share (CPS) forecast revisions on the market for credit default swaps. We find that while the issuance of both EPS and CPS forecast revisions are inversely associated with changes in credit default swap (CDS) spreads, cash flow forecast revisions have a larger effect. We demonstrate that the relationship between CPS forecast revisions and CDS spreads tends to be stronger in cases of financial distress. We provide evidence that cash flow forecasts dominate earnings forecasts in some situations and that participants in the CDS market discriminate between analysts' forecast revisions and recommendation changes.     

Macro information environment change and the quality of management earnings forecasts

The 1990s were characterized by substantial increases in the performance of and investor reliance on financial analysts. Because managers possess superior private information and issue forecasts to align investors’ expectations with their own, we predict that managers increased the quality of their earnings forecasts during the 1990s in order to keep pace with the improved forward-looking information provided by financial analysts, upon which investors increasingly relied. Using a sample of 2,437 management earnings forecasts, we document an increase in management earnings forecast precision, management earnings forecast accuracy, and managers’ tendency to explain earnings forecasts in 1993–1996 relative to 1983–1986. Given that these forecast characteristics are linked to greater informativeness and credibility, we also document that the information content of management earnings forecasts, as measured by the strength of share price responses to forecast news, increased in 1993–1996 relative to 1983–1986. As expected, the increased information content of management forecasts primarily occurred for firms covered by financial analysts.

Initial public offering prospectus forecast errors and mandatory explanations: evidence from New Zealand

This paper examines management forecast errors in initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses of New Zealand firms and subsequent management explanations for earnings forecast errors in recent years. New Zealand has several unique features and recent changes that are worthy of research, including the requirement for management to make forecasts; a requirement to explain differences between forecast and actual; and a recent change that provides the voluntary opportunity to obtain a negative assurance opinion on forecasts. Using hand-collected IPO data between 1998 and 2014, we find that firms that include a negative assurance opinion on the prospective financial information in the prospectus have more accurate earnings and cash flow forecasts. We investigate the subsequent explanations for forecast errors, which are mandated by a financial reporting standard. We show that management tends to attribute negative and large forecast errors to external causes rather than their own actions. Our findings have implications for regulators and investors in New Zealand and other settings.     

Voluntary disclosure and the cost of equity capital: Evidence from management earnings forecasts

This paper examines the directional effects of management earnings forecasts on the cost of equity capital. We find that forecasters of bad news experience a significant increase in the cost of equity capital in the month after their disclosure. Conversely, the cost of equity capital for good news forecasters does not change significantly in the same period. We also indicate that the magnitude of changes in the cost of capital for good news forecasters is significantly lower than that for bad news forecasters and non-forecasters, which suggests that investors may view good news forecasts less credible. Finally, we show that the effect of the subsequent earnings announcement on the cost of equity capital is preempted by the management forecasts for bad news firms, and that the combined effects of the management earnings forecasts and the earnings announcement are not significant for both good news and bad news forecasters. Our paper contributes to the literature by adding evidence on directional effects of voluntary disclosures and on long-term economic consequences of management earnings forecasts.