我国社会保险费的征管机构选择——基于地税部门行政成本的视角

社会保险费应该由社保部门还是由地税部门征管,是一个争论已久的问题。文章从两个角度进行研究:一是社会保险费的征收机构由社保部门转向地税部门是否会明显增加地税部门的行政成本,在控制了各地经济发展水平、产业结构等因素的影响之后,多元回归模型的测算结果表明,地税部门征收社会保险费后,其行政成本并没有显著增加,甚至还是有效率的;二是比较各地的地税收入和社会保险费的单位征收成本,同样在控制了一些影响因素之后,双重倍差模型的结果表明,由地税部门征收社会保险费的省份单位征收成本与征管收入呈负相关关系,表明由地税跨部门征收社会保险费具有规模效应和协同效应,有利于降低单位税费征收成本。     

社会保险费征收主体的选择

我国社会保险费的运行，应由税务机关征收、财政部门管理、社保部门发放、审计部门监督。围绕这一目标，规范和加强社会保险费筹集机制，税务部门应该作为社保费的唯一征收主体。     

论税务部门统征社会保险费

社会保险费的征收管理，直接关系到广大人民群众的切身利益，对于促进经济社会全面发展和构建社会主义和谐社会具有重要意义。近年来，税务部门统征社会保险费虽取得了明显成效，但潜在的矛盾和固有的问题也不断得以呈现。从现实出发，完善税务部门统征社会保险费，是我国社会保险费征管体制和社会保障体系进一步改革的客观要求，其关键在于构建和完善统征社会保险费的各项制度和运行机制。     

社保费征收事权归属、信息共享与响应效率

在社会保险费征收事权全面划归税务部门负责的大背景下,税务部门对社保法规的响应效率是一个值得关注的问题。响应效率不足将会直接影响征管水平的提升,使其偏离预期中的最佳水平。文章基于《社会保险法》的出台,利用2007-2013年全国税收调查数据,比较了社保全责模式与税务代征模式响应效率的差异。文章研究发现,社保全责模式对《社会保险法》的响应效率显著优于税务代征模式,社保部门响应效率的提升主要表现在私营企业、非劳动密集型企业,反映了法律的扩围效应。进一步研究发现,社保部门与税务部门的信息化交流,可以有效弥补税务代征模式的响应效率。文章的研究表明,在税务部门负责社会保险征收事权的背景下,应提升税务部门在征收事权上的主体责任,加强社保部门与税务部门间信息化交流水平的建设,文章的研究也为推进社保费征收事权划转改革提供一定的决策参考。     

中国社会保险费征缴体制探析

社会保险费的筹集是社会保障制度的关键因素之一,而中国对社会保险费的征缴部门没有做出明确规定,这就造成了中国独特的由社保部门和地税部门两个征缴主体并行的征缴体制。中国现行的征缴体制不利于扩大中国社会保险的覆盖范围,也不利于中国社会保障事业的长足发展,因此目前完善社会保险费征缴体制是完善中国社会保险制度的迫切需要。由税务部门征缴社会统筹基金,由社会保险经办机构负责征缴个人账户基金,是现阶段中国社会保险费征缴体制的完善方向。     

对加强养老保险基金征缴的思考

及时足额征收、支付养老保险基金是《社会保险费征缴条例》的规定,它是我国三条社会保障线之一,同时也是中央“两个确保”政策的贯彻和落实。文章就养老保险基金在征收中存在的问题作了分析探讨。     

广东“社保费”征收制度评析

我国经济体制改革的目标是建立社会主义市场经济体制,发展市场经济要求建立社会保障制度,以保持社会的稳定.而建立有效的社会保障基金筹措机制,是健全社会保障制度的重要前提.为了进一步加强社保基金的征收管理,保证社保支出有稳定可靠的资金来源,中共广东省委、广东省人民政府根据国务院的有关规定,结合广东实际,决定从2000年度起将社会保险费(以下简称"社保费")由社会保障部门(以下简称"社保部门")改为地方税务机关征收.三年的实践,取得了显著成效.     

我国社会保障资金筹集改革中的问题及对策

阐述现阶段我国社会保障资金的筹集还存在的五大问题:渠道不稳定;社会保险范围小;结余资金投资运营管理效率低;社会保障财政风险不断加大;社会保险费税务征收效率低下。针对上述问题提出一些必要的措施。     

社会保险经办机构的管理现状和问题

社会保险经办机构在社会保险费征缴管理体制中存在征缴部门不统一,工作不容易协调,增加管理成本,降低运行管理效率,征缴管理和社会保险管理相脱节,参保人权益受损的问题;在基金管理和监督中存在坐收坐支、社会保险费挪用和挤占的问题;此外,尚未形成＂服务型政府＂、＂公共服务＂的工作理念,缺乏＂以人为本＂、为民服务的意识。因此,应明确社会保险经办机构作为社会保险费用征缴的唯一主体地位;普遍推行并落实＂收支两条线＂的基金管理方式,并强化监管力量,落实监管责任;并树立＂社会保险业务经办是提供公共服务＂的服务理念,实现＂以人为本＂的服务意识和服务方式。     

2005年上半年全国社保费征收达1206.99亿元

2005年上半年全国税务机关共征收各项社会保险费收入达1206·99亿元,同比增长239·04亿元,增长率达24·7%。各项社保费收入如下表所示。各项保费收入(亿元)同(亿比增元)长增(长%)率基本养老保险失业保险费基本医疗保险工伤保险生育保险888·9468·3230·9112·456·39161·3422·172005年上半年全国社保费征收达1206.99亿元@安青     

辽宁省地方财政社会保险投入效率分析——基于DEA的方法

以辽宁省作为研究对象，运用DEA方法对14个地级市的财政投入社会保险效率进行评价，计算出输入冗余和输出亏空，通过指标分析找出非DEA有效地市的问题及对此要强化社会保险基金征缴，提高征缴率，规范征缴程序和方法，杜绝协议征缴等真正建立起税务征收、财政监督、社保审核、银行发放的新型社会保障基金运行机制。     

Insurance Taxation and Insurance Fraud

It is common practice in the United States to impose a sales tax on insurance premiums. Insurance benefits are not taxed, and it is typically argued that they should not be taxed because they compensate for a loss. In this paper I present a case where the taxation of insurance benefits is preferable to the taxation of premiums. When insurance fraud is present—in the form of ex post moral hazard—a tax on insurance premiums increases the number of fraudulent claims in the economy, whereas a tax on insurance benefits may reduce fraud. More importantly, however, policyholders are made better off with a benefit tax than with a premium tax.     

WILL TAX‐BASED HEALTH INSURANCE REFORMS HELP THE SELF‐EMPLOYED STAY IN BUSINESS?

The self‐employed face a tax‐induced disadvantage relative to wage and salary workers when it comes to the payment of health insurance premiums. This paper uses a panel of individual tax return data to test whether lower health insurance premium costs because of an expanded tax incentive result in longer periods of self‐employment. The results suggest that households claiming the deduction are indeed less likely to exit self‐employment. Equalizing the treatment of health insurance premiums for the self‐employed and wage workers by allowing full deductibility from Self‐Employment Contributions Act (SECA) taxes would result in a 7% decrease in the probability of exit. (JEL H32, I18, L26)     

Tax subsidies,the rational demand for insurance and the health care crisis

An individual's optimal insurance coverage depends on balancing his gain through avoiding risk against his loss through the distortion of demand. The U.S. tax system subsidizes the purchase of excessive health insurance by excluding employer premium payments from employees' taxable incomes and by permitting the deduction of a portion of individual premiums. The current operational model of demand for health insurance shows that the tax subsidy does substantially increase insurance coverage. Since much of the rise in health care costs can be attributed to the growth of insurance, the tax subsidy is responsible for much of what is widely perceived as a health care crisis.     

Insurance development,banking activities,and regional output: evidence from China

This paper applies panel cointegration tests and panel vector error correction models to investigate the interrelationship among the banking sector, insurance market, and regional output based on the samples from 25 Chinese provinces. We first find that there is a fairly strong long-run cointegrating relationship among real GDP, banking credit, and real insurance premiums. Second, both insurance markets (life and non-life) and the banking sector have a positive effect on real output. Third, we determine that banking activities and economic growth exhibit long-run and short-run bidirectional causalities. Fourth, there is fairly strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis for the long-run bidirectional causal relationships between insurance premiums and economic growth, taking into account the critical channel of the banking sector. Finally, we provide some beneficial suggestions for investors and policy-makers.     

ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND JOB LOCK: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN TAX SUBSIDIES AND HEALTH INSURANCE REGULATIONS

This paper demonstrates that health insurance tax subsidies increase self‐employment, but that the effect differs substantially based on nongroup market regulations and health status. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, I show that households that cannot purchase health insurance because of a preexisting condition do not respond to tax subsidies in states in which they would be denied insurance, but they respond strongly in states in which they face risk‐rated premiums. Households respond similarly to tax subsidies in states with nongroup market regulations similar to those established by the Affordable Care Act, regardless of preexisting conditions. (JEL H20, I13, J30)     

开征遗产税 调节中国居民收入差距

随着中国经济的发展，开征遗产赠与税对缩小居民收入差距具有现实意义。开征遗产税，应构建科学的遗产税嗣，遗产税实行专款专用，用于农村社会保障，同时应建立相应的配套措施，以保障其顺利实施。     

Asymmetric impacts of insurance premiums on the non-oil GDP: some new empirical evidence

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we study the influence of insurance premium on the non-oil gross domestic product in Saudi Arabia. We implement the nonlinear autoregressive distributed lags. The results show that the relationships between insurance premiums and non-oil gross domestic product manifest a nonlinear behaviour. In other words, insurance premiums via positive and negative shocks lead to an increase of growth in the non-oil sector in the long term, whereas the lagged level shocks negatively affect the non-oil GDP in the short run. In addition, the examination of the multiplier effect suggests that positive cumulative changes in insurance premiums and inflation can effect much larger changes in non-oil GDP, while shocks in government spending have a symmetric effect on non-oil GDP growth.     

TAXING HEALTH INSURANCE: HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?

The Reagan administration has again proposed in 1984 to limit the tax exemption on health-insurance premiums. Objectives of the proposal are to curtail rising health costs by reducing insurance coverage—and hence medical-care use—and to raise revenues to offset the large federal deficit. The change would have little effect on either dimension. Most likely, consumer response would reduce dental, drug, and eyeglass insurance, but would leave coverage for hospital and doctor care—the most bothersome health-cost sectors—essentially unaffected. Larger tax changes which are structured differently possibly could reduce health costs dramatically and raise up to $27 billion a year in new tax revenues.