世界城市理论与我国现代化国际大都市建设

本文在归纳和梳理世界城市理论发展演化的基础上，指出值得进一步深化研究的问题以及陈述个人的倾向性意见，并结合我国现代化国际大都市建设提出一些战略性的理论思考。     

基于“脱钩”理论的城市低碳交通模式研究

本文借助“脱钩”理论进一步完善城市低碳交通的概念,分析内涵特征,初步建立起城市低碳交通的理论框架,从而实现城市交通发展和交通碳排放逐步“脱钩”,推动社会经济发展的低碳转型.     

基于人力资本价值链理论的中国城市国际人才集聚研究

城市国际人才争夺战由来已久并不断升级,但针对中国城市国际人才集聚水平、影响因素和差异化政策供给的研究鲜见。以“国际人才集聚指数-国际人才集聚影响因素-国际人才集聚政策”为研究主线,以中国36个主要城市为研究对象,创新性地通过构建人力资本“投入-过程-产出”价值链理论模型进行实证研究,结果表明：中国城市国际人才集聚指数排名分为3个差异显著的层级。其中,第二和第三层级之间无较大差距,但与由北京、上海组成的第一层级相比大幅落后。中国城市国际人才集聚影响因素分化明显,第一类城市的主要影响因素为全球城市品牌文化;第二类城市为创新型经济发展;第三类为外资传统工商业企业和产业集聚。对应地,中国城市国际人才集聚政策供给围绕外资传统工商业国际人才集聚、高端生产性服务业国际人才集聚、多样性和包容性国际人才文化氛围营造存在三大差异化选择。首次构建人力资本“投入-过程-产出”价值链模型,为从机理上深入探索中国各类城市国际人才集聚模式及提升路径奠定了基础。     

基于人力资本价值链理论的中国城市国际人才集聚研究

城市国际人才争夺战由来已久并不断升级，但针对中国城市国际人才集聚水平、影响因素和差异化政策供给的研究鲜见。以“国际人才集聚指数-国际人才集聚影响因素-国际人才集聚政策”为研究主线，以中国36个主要城市为研究对象，创新性地通过构建人力资本“投入-过程-产出”价值链理论模型进行实证研究，结果表明：中国城市国际人才集聚指数排名分为3个差异显著的层级。其中，第二和第三层级之间无较大差距，但与由北京、上海组成的第一层级相比大幅落后。中国城市国际人才集聚影响因素分化明显，第一类城市的主要影响因素为全球城市品牌文化；第二类城市为创新型经济发展；第三类为外资传统工商业企业和产业集聚。对应地，中国城市国际人才集聚政策供给围绕外资传统工商业国际人才集聚、高端生产性服务业国际人才集聚、多样性和包容性国际人才文化氛围营造存在三大差异化选择。首次构建人力资本“投入-过程-产出”价值链模型，为从机理上深入探索中国各类城市国际人才集聚模式及提升路径奠定了基础。     

“机场城市”的国际视角

一个航空港和一条机场路,就如同一个支点和一个杠杆,被认为可以很好地撬动临空经济,引发一个城市的嬗变。顺义临空经济区、武汉临空经济区、重庆空港新区、上海虹桥临空经济区、广州花都空港经济圈、成都双流临空经济区……近几年,各种临空经济区犹如雨后春笋,从全国各地纷纷冒了出来。根据《2013中国机场发展报告》显示,截至2013年6月,我国共有57个城市依托50个机场,规划了58个临空经济区。其中,年旅客吞吐量在500万人次的机场都规划了临空经济区,而年旅客吞吐量在50万人次以上的机场中,也有     

基于区位熵理论的中国资源型地区判定研究

本文运用区位熵理论,通过对我国主要省份资源型产业的研究与比较,对我国资源型地区进行了定量判定,并对各省资源型产业所占比重进行排序。资源型地区应该是指,在一定阶段,以本地区矿产、森林等自然资源的开采加工为主导产业,大规模动用和耗费资源,以牺牲环境为代价,且资源性产业长期在国民经济各方面占有举足轻重地位的地区。笔者引入区位熵指数这个指标,从该地区资源型产业的产值在区际间是否具有相对优势与资源型产业所用劳动力在区际间是否相对比重较大两个方面来测算、分析各个省份在资源产业方面的优劣。根据全国各地区的资源性产业地区生产总值区位熵S1的计算结果,归属于资源型地区的省份为：山西、黑龙江、陕西、青海和新疆五个省（区）;根据对资源性产业劳动力区住熵S2的测算,资源型地区特征明显的省份为山西与宁夏两个省份;测算全国各省份煤炭开采与洗选业的专门化指数S3的结果显示,资源型省份为山西、内蒙古和宁夏。总的来说,资源型地区的有山西、黑龙江、陕西、青海、新疆、宁夏和内蒙古等7个省份。     

基于城市首位度理论的湖北省城市体系结构研究

运用城市首位度理论对湖北省城市体系的规模等级体系结构进行了分析研究。结论指出,湖北省城市首位度属于高度首位分布,城市规模等级分布体系的不平衡程度较高。因此,有必要完善城市体系的等级规模结构,以加快湖北省的城市化进程。     

从国际经济周期理论到世界经济周期理论

来自经济体系外部的冲击,通过国际经济纽带在各国之间传导,并在市场机制作用下引起世界各国经济的大致同步波动,从而生成一轮世界经济周期,这种机制可以概括为"外部冲击—部门传导—国际传导"。     

基于声誉理论的研发外包动态激励机制研究

基于声誉理论,本文建立了企业研发外包的动态激励机制模型,研究了承包方在同一个契约里长期激励与短期激励相结合的激励模式,得出了实现声誉有效激励的条件和提高声誉激励效应的途径。研究结果表明:考虑声誉机制时,承包方在第1期、第2期的努力水平比不考虑声誉机制时提高了,承包方从第1期、第2期产出里分享的剩余份额比不考虑声誉机制时提高了。因此,与没有引入声誉机制的契约模型相比,声誉激励机制和显性激励机制相结合的最优动态契约模型可以实现帕累托改进、提高激励强度,并能起到很好的约束作用。     

国外国际研发研究述评

本文沿着国外国际研发研究的主线,述评了在国外重要学术期刊上发表的有关国际研发的研究成果,着重揭示既有研究的主题及内容,并指出未来可能的一些研究方向,包括探索影响跨国企业国际研发动机差异的制度因素、建立选址决策的整合模型、研究知识流动的测度问题、分析自治控制中的关联关系、加强中国背景下的国际研发活动研究等。     

International R&D spillovers and institutions

The empirical analysis in “International R&D Spillovers” [Coe, D., Helpman, E., 1995. International R&D Spillovers. European Economic Review, 39, 859-887] is first revisited on an expanded data set that we have constructed for the purpose of this study. The new estimates confirm the key results reported in Coe and Helpman about the impact of domestic and foreign R&D capital stocks on TFP. In addition, we show that domestic and foreign R&D capital stocks have measurable impacts on TFP even after controlling for the impact of human capital. Furthermore, we extend the analysis to include institutional variables. Our results suggest that institutional differences are important determinants of TFP and that they impact the degree of R&D spillovers. Countries where the ease of doing business and the quality of tertiary education systems are relatively high tend to benefit more from their own R&D efforts, from international R&D spillovers, and from human capital formation. Strong patent protection is associated with higher levels of total factor productivity, higher returns to domestic R&D, and larger international R&D spillovers. Finally, countries whose legal systems are based on French and, to a lesser extent, Scandinavian law benefit less from their own and foreign R&D capital than countries whose legal origins are based on English or German law.     

The impact of public R&D expenditure on business R&D*

This paper attempts to quantify the aggregate net effect of government funding on business R&D in 17 OECD Member countries over the past two decades. Grants, procurement, tax incentives and direct performance of research (in public laboratories or universities) are the major policy tools in the field. The major results of the study are the following: Direct government funding of R&D performed by firms has a positive effect on business financed R&D (except if the funding is targeted towards defence activities). Tax incentives have an immediate and positive effect on business-financed R&D; Direct funding as well as tax incentives are more effective when they are stable over time: firms do not invest in additional R&D if they are uncertain of the durability of the government support; Direct government funding and R&D tax incentives are substitutes: increased intensity of one reduces the effect of the other on business R&D; The stimulating effect of government funding varies with respect to its generosity: it increases up to a certain threshold (about 10% of business R&D) and then decreases beyond; Defence research performed in public laboratories and universities crowds out private R&D; Civilian public research is neutral for business R&D. * We thank the participants to various seminars, including the OECD Committee for Scientific and Technology Policy and the NBER 2000 Summer Institute on Productivity for helpful comments and suggestions. All opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect necessarily the views of the OECD or Université Libre de Bruxelles.     

International R&D Rivalry with Spillovers and Policy Cooperation in R&D Subsidies and Taxes

Abstract

We have investigated non-cooperative and jointly optimal R&D policies in the framework of Spencer & Brander (1983) in the presence of R&D spillovers. When R&D activities are strategic substitutes and the R&D game exhibits a positive externality, the result of Spencer & Brander (1983) reverses: the non-cooperative policy is a tax while the jointly optimal policy is a subsidy. Moreover, when R&D activities are strategic complements, the usual result of the prisoners' dilemma in the strategic subsidy game does not hold, implying that a welfare intervention is preferable over laissez-faire. When spillovers are sufficiently large, the joint welfare increases with subsidies being higher than those under non-cooperation.     

The effect of environmentally sustainable practices on firm R&D: International evidence

Using a comprehensive dataset covering 42 countries spanning 2002–2013, this paper empirically examines the effect of environmentally sustainable practices (ESP) on R&D intensity in firms. We use three separate firm-level ESP scores that distinguish between the mandatory and voluntary compliance of environmental regulations mandated within an industry and a country. Our main finding is that an increase in ESP increases R&D intensity. Therefore, ESP encourages a higher number of innovations and there is a negligible trade-off between these two factors of firm performance. Further, the positive effect of ESP is stronger in countries where institutional quality and R&D infrastructure supports are superior. Our results have important policy implications for firms, investors and national governments.     

The effectiveness of R&D subsidies

In this paper, the effectiveness of R&D subsidies is analyzed in an oligopolistic model that we apply to the cases of international R&D competition and cooperation. We find that the existence of asymmetric information among firms on whether a rival (or partner) is being subsidized or not may play a key role in explaining whether subsidies are effective or not in increasing R&D investments. In particular, it is shown that if the existence of the subsidy is made public (e.g. because strict information release regulation about R&D subsidies is enforced) and depending on the strategic relationship between the firms’ R&D efforts, an R&D subsidy could even hurt the subsidized firm.     

International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy without Government Commitment

We examine optimal industrial and trade policies in a series of dynamic oligopoly games in which a home and a foreign firm compete in R&D and output. Alternative assumptions about the timing of moves and the ability of agents to commit intertemporally are considered. We show that the home export subsidy, R&D subsidy and welfarc are higher when government commitment is credible than in the dynamically consistent equilibrium without commitment. Commitment thus yields welfare gains (though they are small) but so does unanticipated reneging, whereas reneging which is anticipated by firms yields the lowest welfare of all.     

基于主成分分析的区域R＆D活动测度研究

R＆D活动是科学发现和技术创新的核心。构建了区域R＆D活动测度指标体系和综合测度模型,并以陕西省为例,利用SPSS13.0软件,采用主成分分析法对1999-2004年陕西省区域R＆D活动进行了测度。结果表明：1998-2004年陕西省区域R＆D活动整体呈上升发展态势,处于中等水平（2004年综合得分69.81分）。最后,根据测度结果提出了政策建议。     

Infra-industry spillovers and R&D cooperation: Theory and evidence

We analyse both the theoretical and the empirical side of the issue of R&D spillovers. Each firm's R&D costs are increasing in the amount of information transmitted to other firms, and we account for the possibility that firms control spillovers. We consider both Cournot-Nash and Cournot-Stackelberg behavior. The empirical analysis suggests that (i) firms' control on spillovers is relatively low; (ii) the cost-saving effect associated to joint ventures or R&D cartels is confirmed for industries where firms rely mainly upon own R&D as a source of innovation; (iii) R&D cooperation may increase information sharing, thereby enhancing spillovers.     

Assessing the influence of differentiation strategy and R&D subsidies on R&D cooperation

This paper explores the R&D cooperation determinants of the innovative companies belonging to the Spanish manufacturing sector. Our findings suggest that the variable R&D subsidy is endogenous, significant, and has a strong positive influence on R&D cooperation. This is a clear indication that the achievement of public aid is often conditioned by the obligation for companies to cooperate in R&D. We have also found that the differentiation strategy variable is significant and has a negative influence on R&D cooperation. Companies positioned in a differentiation strategy probably own and use some different knowledge from other companies. Consequently, they will not have much interest in taking advantage of the spillovers generated by other companies. It is therefore logical that they are reluctant to establish cooperation agreements on R&D. Therefore, companies positioned in the differentiation strategy need public policies to support R&D that are not conditioned to the establishment of cooperation agreements.