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1.
Chen-Ying Huang 《Economic Theory》2002,20(2):401-412
Summary. We present a game in which n persons split a cake, where a distinction between conditional and unconditional offers is made. This distinction sheds light
on the contrasting results obtained in the previous literature of multilateral bargaining. By allowing the proposer to make
both conditional and unconditional offers, we show that the game has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome.
Received: March 14, 2000; revised version: March 13, 2001 相似文献
2.
Summary. While actual bargaining features many issues and decision making on the order in which issues are negotiated and resolved,
the typical models of bargaining do not. Instead, they have either a single issue or many issues resolved in some fixed order,
typically simultaneously. This paper shows that, when there is incomplete information, such an approach removes an important
avenue for information transmission: the bargaining agenda itself. Compared to the standard model, pooling on offers by the
informed is reduced and a signaling equilibrium arises when the agenda is determined endogenously. Signaling is carried out
by use of an issue-by-issue bargaining agenda.
Received: September 3, 1997; revised version: May 11, 1998 相似文献
3.
Klaus Nehring 《Economic Theory》2001,18(3):535-553
Summary. While the meaningfulness of the common prior assumption (CPA) under incomplete information has been established recently
by various authors, its epistemic rationale has not yet been adequately clarified. To do so, we provide a characterization
of the CPA in terms of a new condition called “Mutual Calibration”, and argue that it constitutes a more transparent and more
primitive formalization of the Harsanyi Doctrine than the existing characterizations. Our analysis unifies the understanding
of the CPA under incomplete information and clarifies the role of higher-order expectations and of the difference between
situations with only two and those with at least three agents. In the concluding section, the analysis is applied to the problem
of defining Bayesian consistency of the intertemporal beliefs of a single-agent with imperfect memory. The CPA yields a notion
of “Bayesian updating without a prior”.
Received: March 24, 2000; revised version: April 27, 2000 相似文献
4.
Sunk costs and fairness in incomplete information bargaining 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
We study a bilateral trading relationship in which one agent, the seller, can make a nonrecoverable investment in order to generate potential gains from trade. Afterwards, the seller makes a price offer that the buyer can either accept or reject. If agents are fairminded, sellers who are known by the buyer to have high investment costs are predicted to charge higher prices. If the investment cost is private information, low-cost sellers should price more aggressively and high-cost sellers less aggressively than under complete information, giving rise to disagreement and/or underinvestment. Our experiment support these predictions. 相似文献
5.
Vincent J. Vannetelbosch 《Economic Theory》1999,14(2):353-371
Summary. This paper deals with N-person sequential bargaining games with complete information. For N-person sequential bargaining
games, uniqueness of the SPE has been obtained by allowing the players to exit with partial agreements. Adopting a non-equilibrium
approach, we show that N-person sequential bargaining games with exit are solvable by a refinement of rationalizability for
multi-stage games (trembling-hand rationalizability) whatever the impatience of the players. That is, once we adopt the non-equilibrium
approach, the exit opportunity still fulfils its original aim: we achieve a unique solution by introducing the exit opportunity.
Moreover, this unique solution is the unique SPE.
Received: October 30, 1996; revised version: July 7, 1998 相似文献
6.
Mehmet Bac 《Economic Theory》2000,16(1):227-237
Summary. I study the first-round separating equilibrium of a buyer-seller bargaining game, extended to allow for asymmetric information,
strategically delayed offers and offers restricted to a portion of the good. When bargaining is over a consumption good, in
equilibrium the “strong” buyer uses a restricted offer if his optimal consumption path is conservative relative to the “weak”
buyer. A pure restricted offer may even be a costless, efficient signal. When the good is durable, a pure strategic delay
is involved in signaling a strong bargaining position if the discount factor is high.
Received: June 24, 1998; revised version: May 30, 1999 相似文献
7.
Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Hongbin Cai 《Economic Theory》2003,22(3):583-606
We study a complete-information alternating-offer bargaining game in which one “active” player bargains with each of a number
of other “passive” players one at a time. In contrast to most existing models, the order of reaching agreements is endogenously
determined, hence the active player can “play off” some passive players against others by m oving back and forth bargaining
with the passive players. We show that this model has a finite number of Markov Perfect Equilibria, some of which exhibiting
wasteful delays. Moreover, the maximum number of delay periods that can be supported in Markov Perfect Equilibria increases
in the order of the square of the number of players. We also show that these results are robust to a relaxing of the Markov
requirements and to more general surplus functions.
Received: November 19, 2001; revised version: August 20, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"This paper grew out of my dissertation submitted to Stanford University. I am deeply indebted to my advisor, Paul Milgrom,
for his insights and guidance. I would also like to thank Douglas Bernheim, Sushil Bikhchandani, Harold Demsetz, Bryan Ellickson,
Avner Greif, Peter Hammond, David Levine, Bentley Macleod, Joe Ostroy, John Pencavel, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, David Starrett,
Robert Wilson, Bill Zame and especially John Riley and Jeff Zwiebel for their helpful comments. I am grateful to an anonymous
referee for extremely constructive suggestions. 相似文献
8.
Tito Pietra 《Economic Theory》2001,18(3):649-659
Summary. I consider the set of equilibria of two-period economies with S extrinsic states of nature in the second period and I assets
with linearly independent nominal payoffs. Asset prices are variable. If the number of agents is greater than (S-I), the payoff
matrix is in general position and S 2I, the set of equilibrium allocations generically (in utility function space) contains a smooth manifold of dimension (S-1).
Moreover, the map from states o
f nature to equilibrium allocations (restricted to this manifold) is one-to-one at each equilibrium.
Received: February 23, 1998; revised version: June 1, 2000 相似文献
9.
Summary. We study the Mas-Colell bargaining set of an exchange economy with differential information and a continuum of traders. We
established the equivalence of the private bargaining set and the set of Radner competitive equilibrium allocations. As for
the weak fine bargaining set, we show that it contains the set of competitive equilibrium allocations of an associated symmetric
information economy in which each trader has the “joint information” of all the traders in the original economy, but unlike
the weak fine core and the set of fine value allocations, it may also contain allocations which are not competitive in the
associated economy.
Received: February 15, 1999; revised version: August 9, 1999 相似文献
10.
Rationalizable variable-population choice functions 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Summary. We analyze the rationalizability of variable-population social-choice functions in a welfarist framework. It is shown that
fixed-population rationalizability and a weakening of congruence together are necessary and sufficient for rational choice,
given a plausible dominance property that prevents the choice of alternatives involving low utility levels. In addition, a
class of critical-level separable choice functions is characterized. This result, which extends an earlier axiomatization
of a related class of bargaining solutions to a variable-population setting, is the first axiomatization of critical-level
principles in a general choice-theoretic model.
Received: November 30, 1999; revised version: September 11, 2000 相似文献
11.
Summary. This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of a family of so-called efficient maxmin solutions which can be seen as
generalizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution to nonconvex n-person bargaining problems. Moreover, it is shown that even though there are several efficient maxmin solutions for some
bargaining problems, there is typically a unique efficient maxmin solution.
Received: February 15, 2001; revised version: November 14, 2001 相似文献
12.
Maarten F. Cornet 《Economic Theory》2003,22(4):845-862
In the partition function bargaining problem the value of a coalition depends on the coalition structure in which it is embedded.
This paper applies the demand-making bargaining game of coalition formation to the three-player partition function bargaining
problem. The values of some embedded coalitions appear to be strategically irrelevant. The strategically relevant values constitute
a coalition function bargaining problem. A classification in terms of the associated coalition function bargaining problem
is provided. For one of the three classes that are distinguished the set of equilibrium outcomes closely relates to the core
of the associated coalitional problem. For another class of problems the equilibrium outcome corresponds to the Von Neumann-Morgenstern
outcome.
Received: February 14, 2000; revised version: December 13, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I would like to thank Harold Houba and Gerard van der Laan for valuable discussions, and an anonymous referee for helpful
comments. This research was conducted while I was at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. 相似文献
13.
Summary. We prove that locally, Walras' law and homogeneity characterize the structure of market excess demand functions when financial
markets are incomplete and assets' returns are nominal. The method of proof is substantially different from all existing arguments
as the properties of individual demand are also different. We show that this result has important implications and is part
of a more general result that excess demand is an essentially arbitrary function not just of prices, but also of the exogenous
parameters of the economy as asset returns, preferences, and endowments. Thus locally the equilibrium manifold, relating equilibrium
prices to these parameters has also no structure.
Received: September 17, 1996; revised version: November 7, 1997 相似文献
14.
Summary. The paper analyzes the properties of cores with differential information, as economies converge to complete information.
Two core concepts are investigated: the private core, in which agents' net trades are measurable with respect to agents' private
information, and the incentive compatible core, in which coalitions of agents are restricted to incentive compatible allocations.
Received: March 15, 2000; revised version: August 24, 2000 相似文献
15.
Summary. We provide a condition for ranking of information systems in agency problems. The condition has a straightforward economic
interpretation in terms of the sensitivity of a cumulative distribution with respect to the agent's effort. The criterion
is shown to be equivalent to the mean preserving spread condition on the likelihood ratio distributions.
Received: November 10, 1999; revised version: February 17, 2000 相似文献
16.
Thorsten Bayındır-Upmann 《Economic Theory》2002,20(3):629-636
Summary. We generalize the formula provided by Maurice and Ferguson (1973) for derived factor demand in a monopoly by extending it
to cross-price effects and taking into account other variables which may, within an general-equilibrium framework, affect
demand, such as income. Hopefully, both features increase the applicability of this formula in general-equilibrium analyses.
Received: April 5, 2000; revised version: June 7, 2001 相似文献
17.
Eduardo L. Giménez 《Economic Theory》2003,21(1):195-204
Summary. This paper argues that the introduction of a short-sale constraint in the Arrow-Radner framework invalidates standard definitions
of complete and incomplete markets. Two threshold values with familiar properties arise in this constrained set-up. If short
sales are not allowed on some security, then financial markets will be incomplete in the standard sense. Beyond a particular
level of the short-sale bound, financial markets are “complete”, since the short-sale constraint is not effective. For intermediate
bounds the distinction between complete and incomplete financial markets is blurred. Although some technical definitions hold,
agents can not fully transfer wealth among states. These intermediate cases, called “technically incomplete markets”, exhibit
interesting welfare properties. For instance, the resulting equilibrium allocations may not be Pareto-dominated by those of
the non-restricted complete markets equilibrium.
Received: November 28, 2000; / revised version: November 9, 2001 相似文献
18.
Summary. We consider a Lucas asset-pricing model with heterogeneous agents, exogenous labor income, and a finite number of exogenous
shocks. Although agents are infinitely lived, endowments and dividends are time-invariant functions of the exogenous shock
alone and are thus restricted to lie in a finite-dimensional space; genericity analysis can be conducted on sets of zero Lebesgue
measure. When financial markets are incomplete, that is, there are fewer financial securities than shocks, we show that generically
in individual endowments all competitive equilibria are Pareto inefficient.
Received: November 22, 1999; revised version: March 4, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We are grateful to an anonymous referee for very insightful comments on earlier drafts. 相似文献
19.
Muhamet Yildiz 《Games and Economic Behavior》2003,45(2):465-487
Given any two-person economy, consider an alternating-offer bargaining game with complete information where the proposers offer prices, and the responders either choose the amount of trade at the offered prices or reject the offer. We provide conditions under which the outcomes of all subgame-perfect equilibria converge to the Walrasian equilibrium (the price and the allocation) as the discount rates approach 1. Therefore, price-taking behavior can be achieved with only two agents. 相似文献
20.
Konstantinos Serfes 《Economic Theory》2001,18(2):333-348
Summary. We study the process of learning in a differential information economy, with a continuum of states of nature that follow
a Markov process. The economy extends over an infinite number of periods and we assume that the agents behave non-myopically,
i.e., they discount the future. We adopt a new equilibrium concept, the non-myopic core. A realized agreement in each period
generates information that changes the underlying structure in the economy. The results we obtain serve as an extension to
the results in Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1999) in a setting where agents behave non-myopically. In particular, we examine
the following two questions: 1) If we have a sequence of allocations that are in an approximate non-myopic core (we allow
for bounded rationality), is it possible to find a subsequence that converges to a non-myopic core allocation in a limit full
information economy? 2) Given a non-myopic core allocation in a limit full information economy can we find a sequence of approximate
non-myopic core allocations that converges to that allocation?
Received: May 25, 1999; revised version: August 9, 1999 相似文献