Schumpeter and the revival of evolutionary economics: an appraisal of the literature

During the last two decades we have seen a revival of interest in the works of Joseph Schumpeter and “evolutionary” ideas in economics more generally. A professional society honouring Schumpeter's name has been founded, and linked to it we have had for more than fifteen years now a professional journal devoted to this stream of thought. However, it has been argued that, despite these developments, the link between Schumpeter's own work and the more recent contributions to evolutionary economics is in fact rather weak. This paper considers this claim. Based on an analysis of Schumpeter's contribution to economics the paper presents an overview and assessment of the more recent literature in this area. It is argued that although there are important differences between Schumpeter's work and some of the more recent contributions, there nevertheless remains a strong common core that clearly distinguishes the evolutionary stream from other approaches (such as, for instance, so-called “new growth theory”). RID="*" ID="*" Many people have contributed to this paper in various ways. Jon Hekland at the Norwegian Research Council started it all by asking me to make an overview of the contribution from “evolutionary economics” to our understanding of contemporary economies. Several people helped me on the way by supplying written material, comments and suggestions, and I am indebted to all of them. Brian Arthur, Stan Metcalfe, Keith Pavitt, Erik Reinert, Paolo Saviotti and Bart Verspagen may be particularly mentioned. A preliminary version was presented at the conference “Industrial R&D and Innovation Policy Learning – Evolutionary Perspectives and New Methods for Impact Assessment” organised by the Norwegian Research Council (“SAKI”) at Leangkollen, Asker, April 18–19.2002. I wish to thank the discussant, Tor Jakob Klette, and the participants at the conference for useful feedback. Moreover I have benefited from comments and suggestions from the editors and referees of this journal. The final responsibility is mine, however. Economic support from the Norwegian Research Council (“SAKI”) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Weber, Schumpeter and Knight on entrepreneurship and economic development

This paper interprets the discussion on entrepreneurship and economic development that started off with Weber's papers on the Protestant Ethic. Weber sought the reason for the relatively rapid growth of the Occident in the rational, Calvinist attitude to life. Calvinism – in his view – exactly suited a society of free labourers, who were not tied to master and soil by extra-economic considerations as in tribal and feudal societies. Schumpeter gave an alternative explanation, emphasizing the importance of innovation and entrepreneurship. Knight, who stressed neither rationality nor innovation but uncertainty and perceptiveness as the sole source of progress and profits, followed up German language writing on this subject. Only the investor who can detect hitherto hidden qualities in people can gain. The paper demonstrates how these three authors influenced each other. The debate between these three authors has raised many issues of governance and organization that feature contemporary thinking.     

Schumpeter and Steindl on the dynamics of competition

This paper compares and contrasts the contributions of Joseph Alois Schumpeter and Josef Steindl to the competitive paradigm. Both reject the static nature of traditional profit maximizing analysis and the analytical device of a representative firm. Instead they both opt for a dynamic framework in which there is a key role for innovation. Differences emerge in terms of the characteristics of individual firms that nurture the competitive struggle and are responsible for technical change. The maturation process of a capitalist economy, whereby a natural progression will involve an increase in concentration, as prescribed by Schumpeter and Steindl is also explored, as is criticism of their analyses. Finally the holistic approach to competitive modelling, a legacy of these two economists, is expounded and challenges for the future identified.     

Economic policy making in evolutionary perspective

Economic policy making is discussed from three different angles: the political economy of actual policy making (“what policy does do”), the analysis of policy instruments for given ends (“what policy could do”), and the debate on policy goals and their legitimization (“what policy ought to do”). Center stage in the evolutionary perspective is new, positive and normative knowledge which is unfolding during the policy making process and in its aftermath. It is argued that this implies regularities and constraints which extend and modify the comparative-static interpretations of public choice theory, economic policy making theory, and social philosophy. RID="*" ID="*" The author should like to thank three anonymous referees of this journal and the editor for helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper.     

Capitalism and democracy in the 21st Century: from the managed to the entrepreneurial economy*

 This paper explains how and why the developed countries are undergoing a fundamental shift away from a managed economy and towards an entrepreneurial economy. This shift is shaping the development of western capitalism and has triggered a shift in government policies away from constraining the freedom of business to contract through regulation, public ownership and antitrust towards a new set of enabling policies which foster the creation and commercialization of new knowledge. The empirical evidence from a cross-section of countries over time suggests that those countries that have experienced a greater shift from the managed to the entrepreneurial economy have had lower levels of unemployment.     

A spectre is haunting the world – the spectre of global capitalism

Individual property rights are fruitful for economic development because they civilise self-interest by forcing it to serve the common good. The history of previous property rights “cycles,” however, shows that their ability to do this deterioriates over time because the laws of property fall under the control of those whom property is meant to discipline. Irresponsible ownership then intensifies inequality until a breaking point is reached. The present cycle is no exception, but its breaking point has been postponed by the growth of the democratically-inspired welfare state. Globalisation is now eroding the financial basis of this, because mobile capital can escape taxation, leaving labour to carry the burden. The main thrust of this movement is now found in the World Trade Organisation, whose control of intellectual property and commitment to free trade in money as well as goods, can only increase inequality between countries as well as within them. It represents individual property rights which are out of any form of social control, since there is no global mechanism for civilising self-interest. Schumpeter's sense of the impending demise of capitalism, if not of its replacement by socialism, may yet be vindicated.     

Capitalism and democracy in the 21st century: a Kaleckian interpretation of a Schumpeterian problem

The paper reinterprets Schumpeter's views on the dynamic effects of taxation, as originally expressed in Crisis of the Tax State, from a Kaleckian perspective. In light of Schumpeter's rejection of Keynesian and Marshallian approaches to taxation, the paper argues that a recently developed Kaleckian approach provides an appropriate basis from which to analyse the effects on the business cycle of balanced changes in the structure of taxation. It is shown that, under certain shifting assumptions, increases in the taxation of wages or profits will stimulate investment and attenuate the amplitude of the business cycle. Ultimately, the shifting of taxes reduces to a conflict over income shares. The changing distribution of income in the United Kingdom in recent years suggests that investment is likely to remain sluggish unless there is a significant reversal of income shares. This may give rise to increasing economic and political tensions into the 21st century.     

Where Schumpeter was nearly right – the Swedish model and Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy<--RID="*"-->

In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy Joseph A. Schumpeter concluded that socialism would eventually displace capitalism in Western democracies. This would come about as a result of the superior performance of capitalism. We extract six “stylized” propositions that are essential elements of Schumpeter's prediction about the fate of capitalism. These propositions are confronted with the development of the Swedish economy. The three main results of the analysis are: (1) The evolution of the Swedish economy closely followed Schumpeter's predictions until about 1980: Large firms became increasingly predominant in production and innovative activity, ownership of firms became more and more concentrated, individual entrepreneurship waned in importance, the general public grew increasingly hostile towards capitalism, and by the late 1970s explicit proposals for a gradual transfer of ownership of firms from private hands were launched. (2) Design of tax and industrial policies fueled a development of the economy along the lines predicted by Schumpeter. In general, the policies discouraged private wealth accumulation. In particular, the policies favored concentration of firms and concentration of private ownership. (3) The turning point away from the path to socialism coincides with real world developments that disclosed two major flaws in Schumpeter's analysis. First, the ever more obvious failure of socialism in Eastern Europe went against Schumpeter's assertion that socialism can work. Second, Schumpeter, who thought that modern technology would make the giant corporation increasingly predominant, did not foresee the revival of entrepreneurship that took place in the Western countries around 1980.     

Delegation and polarization of platforms in political competition

Summary. We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters. The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized. Received: January 10, 2002; revised version: May 8, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We thank Alberto Alesina, Levent Ko?kesen, Antonio Merlo, Ronny Razin, Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Lizzeri, and seminar participants at Alicante, Columbia, Copenhagen, and NYU for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for its useful suggestions. A good fraction of this research was conducted while Ok was a visitor in the Department of Economics at University of Alicante; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT BEC2001-0535 (Faulí-Oller) and BEC2001-0980 (Ortu?o-Ortín). Correspondence to:I. Ortu?o-Ortin     

Competitive selection, self-organisation and Joseph A. Schumpeter

Post-Schumpeterians have tended to use biological analogies to understand economic evolution, in contrast to Schumpeter himself. In this paper it is argued that the biological analogies used tend to be outdated and that Schumpeter espoused an intuitive understanding of the evolutionary economic process that is closely related to modern conceptions of self-organisation, suitably adapted for application in socioeconomic systems. Using a self-organisation approach, competition can be understood without recourse to biological analogy, in terms of general systemic principles that operate in the presence of variety. Viewing economic evolution in terms of complex adaptation in self-organising systems yields nonequilibrium and nonlinear perspectives that parallel Schumpeter's own intuitions, reinvigorating them as the basis of evolutionary economic thinking in the new Millennium.     

Schumpeter and the `Schmollerprogramm': integrating theory and history in the analysis of economic development

This essay addresses the historical and institutional aspects of Schumpeter's thought. It suggests that Schumpeter prepared a pluralist research agenda, formulated in accordance with the conceptual perspective of the German Historical School, as presented by major scholars such as Schmoller, Sombart, Spiethoff and Max Weber. Schumpeter's notion of development, with its emphasis on the correspondence of economic and socio-cultural evolution, is therefore to be viewed in the context of the comprehensive Schmollerian approach. Moreover the ethical-evolutionary components of Schmoller's ideas point at the vital role of the German Historical School in the elaboration of a modern evolutionary economics in Schumpeterian terms. The essay concludes that the Schmollerprogramm is going to inspire further developments in Schumpeterian economics, as the integration of theory and history continuously marks the research agenda of evolutionary approaches to economic development.     

What is the systems perspective to Innovation and Technology Policy(ITP) and how can we apply it to developing and newly industrialized economies?

Despite recent advances in the Evolutionary and Systems Perspectives to Economic Change (SI), confusion still exists about how to apply it to the design and implementation of Innovation & Technology Policy (ITP) in concrete settings. Since the ‘Normative’ aspects of SI are framed in terms so general to make them insufficient or inadequate as guides and tools for actual policymaking, a presumption exists that additional theoretical and conceptual knowledge is required. Thus a major objective of this paper is to contribute to the development of a realistic and ‘grounded’ theoretical framework for Technology and Innovation Policy which is particularly relevant both for the promotion of Business Sector R&D and of hi tech (especially IT) industries in Top Tier and other Industrializing Economies. A second objective is to contribute directly to the capability of successfully applying this conceptual framework in concrete policy settings. Rather than justifying ITP the paper focuses on characterising and applying “Salient Normative Principles or Themes” of the SI perspective to ITP. Several concrete examples are given and the notions of Policy Process, (Country) Program Portfolio Profile and Policy Environment are introduced.     

Democracy and capitalism: Are they compatible in the long-run?

Starting from a discussion of Schumpeter's analysis of the relationships of capitalism, socialism and democracy, it is shown that, in a complex society, democracy is only compatible with a decentralized market economy with safe property rights. But in time democracy shows a tendency to weaken the capitalist system by more and more regulations and an ever-increasing share of government (including the social security system) in GDP. This tendency is a consequence of political competition because of the development of interest groups and the presence of rationally uninformed voters. It leads to a weakening of efficiency, investment, innovation and thus to lower growth rates of GDP. But in time forces opposing this development arise. First, because of the negative consequences of growing government the welfare and regulatory state is bound to move into a crisis in the long run. Thus innovative politicians have a chance to win the support of a majority of voters for reform projects, who perceive finally the ever-increasing burden of higher taxes and regulations and realize that these burdens are not worth the benefits bestowed on them. In doing so, they may face, however, the competition of ideologies. Second, there are other states with lower taxes and less unnecessary regulations which show higher growth rates of GDP, and gain thus relative advantages in international political and military competition since they can command greater resources with the passage of time. To maintain their relative international power position, reforms are thus considered as necessary by rulers. This may be helped by pressure resulting from comparisons of the standards of living done by their citizens.     

The demand for distinction and the evolution of the prestige car

This paper studies the demand for a distinction good – the prestige car – and examines how this demand for distinction influences the evolution of the product. We focus on two very different sorts of distinction car: the Rolls Royce and the Ferrari. These two examples help us to articulate two polar approaches to the demand for distinction: distinction through antiquity and distinction through novelty. The paper sets out a model of the demand for distinction, and uses it to describe two trajectories along which the prestige car – and the demand for it – may evolve.     

Knowledge and markets

An economy is a coordinated system of distributed knowledge. Economic evolution occurs as knowledge grows and the structure of the system changes. This paper is about the role of markets in this process. Traditionally, the theory of markets has not been a central feature of evolutionary economics. This seems to be due to the orthodox view of markets as information-processing mechanisms for finding equilibria. But in economic evolution markets are actually knowledge-structuring mechanisms. What then is the relation between knowledge, information, markets and mechanisms? I argue that an evolutionary theory of markets, in the manner of Loasby (1999), requires a clear formulation of these relations. I suggest that a conception of knowledge and markets in terms of a graphical theory of complex systems furnishes precisely this.     

Modelling research and development: How do firms solve design problems?

One way of thinking about research and development is to recognise that firms are trying to solve particular design problems. We often build these design problems into our models, but are forced to oversimplify them in order to make the models solvable. The approach taken in this paper is to acknowledge that design problems are often insoluble using standard techniques and to model instead the process by which firms solve them. Two such processes are simulated in detail. The first, individual experimental search, is based on a problem-solving technique known as simulated annealing. The second, partial imitation, involves learning at a social level and is based on a problem-solving technique known as the genetic algorithm. Some economic implications of these processes are explored, including their application to stochastic learning curves, patent design and the importance of `technodiversity' in the introduction of new technology to developing countries.     

Knowledge of growth and the growth of knowledge

The central theme of this address is the complicated relationship between the growth of the economy and the growth of knowledge. This theme is explored with the help of a single concept “restless capitalism” which is used to capture the idea that capitalism in equilibrium is a contradiction in terms precisely because the growth of knowledge cannot be meaningfully formulated as the outcome of a constellation of equilibrating forces. This theme is explored through a discussion of growth accounting, the relationship between innovation, markets and institutions and, as an example, the development of innovation in the field of ophthalmology. We also discuss some pioneering contributions made by Simon Kuznets and Arthur Burns to the discussion of evolutionary growth. From this Schumpeterian perspective we see the economy as an ensemble not an aggregate entity and so see more clearly the importance of microdiversity in the relationship between growth of knowledge and growth of the economy.     

Market institutions and economic evolution

Our cognitive limitations cause us to rely on institutions to guide reasonable behaviour; market institutions reduce the costs of search, negotiation, and monitoring entailed in making single transactions. The making of markets requires an investment of immaterial capital, the major share of which typically is provided by those who expect to be very active on one side of the market. This `external organisation' provides producers with information for the development of new products; by simplifying transactions it also allows consumers greater scope for developing consumption capabilities. Thus the evolution of institutions guides the evolution of goods and services.     

The old and the new: the evolution of polymer and biomedical clusters in Ohio and Sweden

This paper examines the rapid growth of the polymer-based and biomedical clusters in Ohio and Sweden – two regions of similar size and with similar traditions undergoing similar industrial restructuring. Two issues are addressed: First, why has growth been so strong in these particular clusters, i.e., can we identify the sources of the growth and dynamics in these sectors? Second, why do these two clusters differ in Ohio and Sweden in terms of size, level and type of activity, number and composition of actors, size structure of firms and growth patterns over the last couple of decades? In particular, what is the role of public policies as well as cultural, historical, and geographic factors? Our main conclusions are (1) that there is strong path dependence in both clusters in both countries, and (2) that the key to rapid development is a high absorptive capacity combined with rapid diffusion to new potential users. Our policy discussion addresses these issues.     

Routines and incentives in group tasks*

The artificial context “Target the Two” has been used in experiments to explore some of the features of routinization and learning. Two agents must learn to coordinate their actions to achieve a common goal, without being allowed to use verbal communication. This article reports an experiment, in which we compare the degree of routinization and the performance of players in two treatments. Each treatment submits players to the same sequence of starting configurations, but differs in terms of the payoff function. In the first treatment (A), the payoff is based on the number of moves required to achieve the goal, whereas in the second treatment (B) the payoff depends on the time required for completion. We observe that (1) in treatment B subjects tend to play in a more “routinized” way and (2) treatment B reduces the time spent on play, but does not decrease the resources (the number of moves) used, relative to treatment A.