Optimal Area-Yield Crop Insurance Reconsidered

The implementability of area-yield insurance contracts in the presence of symmetric and asymmetric information about the farmer's "beta" linking his yield to the risk-pool's yield is examined. In the presence of fixed costs and symmetric information Mahul's result that optimality requires setting the slope of the indemnity schedule equal to each farmer's beta is confirmed. When there is asymmetric information between the insurer and the farmer, however, this full-insurance contract is vulnerable to adverse selection, and therefore may not be implementable for general cost structures. The optimal area-yield insurance contract under asymmetric information is characterized.     

Crop Insurance Under Catastrophic Risk

We develop a new insurance model that shows how catastrophic risk affects the nature and existence of a crop insurance market equilibrium. A reservation preference level is used to characterize long-run equilibrium when catastrophic risk makes insurance companies risk responsive. Catastrophic risk is shown to increase premiums, reduce farmer coverage levels and, under some conditions, lead to a complete breakdown of the crop insurance market. Reinsurance can help facilitate an equilibrium and/or increase participation, particularly if the reinsurance is subsidized. The analysis has important implications for the design and management of crop insurance and reinsurance programs.     

Designing Optimal Crop Revenue Insurance

When the indemnity schedule is contingent on the farmer's price and individual yield, an optimal crop revenue insurance contract depends only on the farmer's gross revenue. However, this design is not efficient if, as is the case with available contracts, the coverage function is based on imperfect estimators of individual yield and/or price. The producer's degree of prudence and the extent of basis risks have important influences on the optimal indemnity schedule. In this broader context, optimal protection is not provided by available U.S. crop insurance contracts and may include combinations of revenue insurance, yield insurance, futures, and options contracts.     

Farmers' Preferences for Crop Insurance Attributes

Utilizing survey data from corn and soybean farmers in the Midwest, this study assesses the relative importance of different features of crop insurance products. Conjoint analysis results indicate that farmers' preferences for flexibility dominate both type of insurance and coverage level. Revenue insurance demand is greater by those who are larger, younger, and farm in more separate locations. Results are significant and consistent by size, insurance usage, leverage, and risk perception. The results permit prediction of market shares of competing insurance products within specific producer segments, and thus also provide guidance for targeting specific producer groups with new product configurations.     

Factors Influencing Farmers' Crop Insurance Decisions

Farmers' decisions to purchase crop insurance and their choices among alternative products are analyzed using a two-stage estimation procedure. The influences of risk perceptions, competing risk management options, as well structural and demographic differences are evaluated. The likelihood for crop insurance usage is found to be higher for larger, older, less tenured, more highly leveraged farms, and by those with higher perceived yield risks. The marginal effects of size, age, perceived yield risk, perceived importance of risk management activities, and other structural and demographic variables are identified in terms of their influences on choices among alternative crop insurance products.     

The Economics of Crop Hail Insurance

The demand for crop hail insurance is examined in both static and dynamic models and both with and without all-risk crop insurance. Contrary to general results on optimal insurance with background risk, crop revenue uncertainty induces the farmer to decrease rather than increase coverage. The underinsurance results are strengthened when farmers are able to dynamically update their insurance portfolio as information about the value of the crop is revealed over time. When hail insurance is purchased along with all-risk crop insurance, two alternative approaches are examined and their efficiency properties compared.
Nous examinons la demande d'assurance-grêle au moyen, à lafois, de modèles statiques et de modèles dynamiques, chacun intégré ou non à une assurance tout-risque. Contrairement à ce qu'on observe généralement pour le niveau d'assurance optimal établi enprésence d'un risque sous-jacent, l'incertitude quant au rendement des cultures attendu incite l'exploitant agricole à réduire, plutôt qu'à augmenter, sa couverture. Les résultats de cette sous-assurance sont améliorés lorsque l'exploitant est capable d'actualiser régulièrement son portefeuille d'assurance à mesure que la valeur finale de la récolte se précise. Dans le cas de l'assurance-grêle achetée dans le cadre d'une assurance-récolte tout-risque, nous comparons deux options quant à leur possibilité de rendement économique.     

Crop Insurance Valuation under Alternative Yield Distributions

Considerable disagreement exists about the most appropriate characterization of farm-level yield distributions. Yet, the economic importance of alternative yield distribution specifications on crop insurance valuation has not been well documented. The results of this study demonstrate that large differences in expected payouts from popular crop insurance products can arise solely from the parameterization chosen to represent yield distributions. The results suggest that the frequently unexamined yield distribution specification may lead to economically significant errors in crop insurance policy rating and assessment of expected payouts from policies.     

Developing Experience-Based Premium Rate Discounts in Crop Insurance

This article addresses the feasibility of implementing an experience-based premium rate discount system in crop insurance. While adverse selection and moral hazard in crop insurance have been extensively studied in the past, discount systems or bonus–malus incentives have not, to our knowledge, been investigated. Our empirical analysis indicates that a crop insurance discount system could be implemented based on a measure of favorable past insurance experience. The estimated average discounts based on the rating methods developed in this study ranged from 5% to 9% (depending on the crop being considered).     

Constrained Efficient Contracts for Area Yield Crop Insurance

With area yield crop insurance, indemnification occurs when area yield falls below a yield trigger that is chosen by the producer. The maximum value for this yield trigger is generally restricted (e.g., 80% of the long term area average yield). The impact of this trigger constraint on the optimal design of an area yield insurance contract is examined. Within the constrained efficient contract, indemnities consist of both a lump sum payment and a payment that is proportional to the yield shortfall. Because lump sum payments may not be feasible to implement, efficiency-enhancing modifications to standard contracts are also proposed.     

Private Insurance Company Involvement in the U.S. Crop Insurance Program

The participation of intermediaries in either public policy or private markets can be justified on the basis of efficiency gains. With respect to private insurance companies and the crop insurance program, efficiency gains may arise from either decreased transaction costs through better established delivery channels and/or the revelation of asymmetric information. However, anecdotal evidence indicates that delivery costs are excessive and it appears that for political economy reasons, rates have and will not be adjusted in response to new information. In conclusion, the value-added of private insurance companies is questioned in light of the current political economy and thus should serve as a caution to other countries wishing to emulate the U.S. system.     

The U.S. Federal Crop Insurance Program

The US. Federal Crop Insurance Program has evolved from a government-run yield insurance program for wheat farmers to a public-private partnership that provides a variety of yield and revenue insurance products to producers of over 100 different crops. US. policy-makers continue to struggle with defining an appropriate role for the federal government in helping crop farmers manage revenue risk. New approaches using area-yield or weather-based options may hold promise for the future     

Farmers' Preferences for Alternative Crop and Health Insurance Subsidy

In addition to production risks, farmers desire to balance personal risks of health care. A theoretical framework is developed for holistic health and crop insurance products that provide the opportunity to switch a portion of existing crop insurance subsidy for greater health coverage. A random utility discrete choice experiment is used to assess farmers' stated preferences for holistic insurance products. Farmers prefer higher levels of coverage and are price sensitive. A sample of farmers did not prefer the subsidy switch. However, the subsidy switch is preferred by older farmers, those with higher health care spending, and farmers who have experienced major health problems.     

Aggregation in Area-Yield Crop Insurance: The Linear Additive Model

Previous analyses of area yield crop insurance have used a linear additive model (LAM) to express the relationship between individual and area yield. However, the theoretical foundations of the LAM are unknown. This shortcoming is addressed by establishing two conditions linking microvariables and LAM parameters. The conditions relate to the interaction of risks in individual technologies and the extent of aggregation. If systemic and individual risks are additive in individual yields, and if the law of large numbers hold, then the LAM obtains. This article also shows how departures from these conditions affect the results derived from a LAM analysis.     

Optimal Producer Behavior in the Presence of Area-Yield Crop Insurance

Optimal producer behavior in the presence of area-yield insurance is studied. The producer's optimal production and insurance choices are characterized. The effect of the provision of area-yield insurance on production patterns is studied, and sufficient conditions for the provision of area-yield insurance to increase the riskiness of the individual producer's decisions are derived. A separation result is derived for area-yield insurance contracts and stochastic technologies.     

Is There a Viable Market for Area-Based Crop Insurance?

The performance of area yield insurance and farm-level multiple peril crop insurance is analyzed for cotton and soybean production in Georgia and South Carolina. The analysis improves on many previous studies by utilizing actual farm-level yield data and by comparing the two types of insurance products not only for actuarially fair premium rates but also for actual unsubsidized and subsidized premium rates. Results suggest that, even in heterogeneous production regions, area yield insurance may be a viable alternative to farm-level insurance when premium rates for farm-level insurance contain large positive wedges.     

Actuarial Fairness of Crop Insurance Rates with Constant Rate Relativities

Increased availability and demand for low-deductible crop insurance policies have increased focus on crop insurance rating methods. Actuarial fairness cannot be achieved if constant multiplicative factors are used to determine how premiums change as coverage levels increase. A comparison of premium rates generated by the factors used by the two most popular crop insurance products with those generated by a standard yield distribution shows that the popular insurance products overcharge for low-deductible policies in most counties. This overpricing may explain why large premium subsidies were required to induce farmers to move from low-deductible to high-deductible policies beginning in 2001.     

Crop Insurance in a Political Economy: An Alternative Perspective on Agricultural Policy

Lawmakers often subsidize farmers in times of financial distress. This article models this political impulse as a constraint on government farm policy, describing how ex ante government farm insurance can deter ex post "disaster relief" and improve production incentives by countering the moral hazard that otherwise prevails. Absent ex ante government policy, ex post relief takes the form of revenue insurance, which prompts excessive entry into farm production and under-production by operating farmers. Ex ante government policy can raise economic and political welfare by buying out low productivity farmers and offering profitable farmers a combination of revenue insurance, price supports, and a program participation fee.     

Share Tenancy, Ownership Structure, and Prevented Planting Claims in Crop Insurance

A conceptual model based on opportunity cost and expected utility principles establishes linkages between the likelihood of prevented planting claims in crop insurance and existing share leasing arrangements/internal farm business structures. Results of heteroskedastic probit estimation procedures indicate that simpler internal business structures and more dominant farmer–tenant leasing position can increase the probability of submitting a prevented planting claim.     

Estimating the Prevalence and Cost of Yield-Switching Fraud in the Federal Crop Insurance Program

Producers who manipulate and switch their reported crop-yields between separately insured units can increase their insurance indemnities substantially. A statistical model that identifies potential yield switching is developed. The unrestricted statistical model is singular and is identified by imposing a mixture of system-estimable and system-nonestimable restrictions. Lower bound estimates of yield-switching fraud incidence and costs are obtained by applying the model to 207,067 multiple unit producers who purchased crop insurance in 1998.