Economic freedom, civil liberties, political rights and growth: a causality analysis

Several empirical studies have established the relationship between economic freedom, civil liberties and political rights, and economic growth. Nevertheless, few studies analyze the directions of causality. This paper studies the causality relations between the institutional dimensions mentioned above and economic growth, as well as the interrelations between them, using the Granger methodology with panel data for 187 countries and five-yearly observations for the period 1976–2000. In addition, the relations between these freedoms and investment in physical and human capital are examined, to be able to isolate the direct and indirect effects on growth. The authors acknowledge the suggestions made by the editor and the reviewers, which have improved this work with respect to its initial version.     

Foreign direct investment and civil liberties: A new perspective

The conjecture that democracy discourages foreign direct investment (FDI) has been widely refuted in empirical studies. However, we find support of this view. We distinguish between civil and political liberties and propose that multinational firms tend to invest in countries with low civil but with high political liberties. We show that the negative relationship between civil liberties and FDI is hump-shaped. A threshold level of civil liberties exists, below which repression of civil liberties is associated with more FDI. The results are explained by different economic motives for FDI in different groups of countries.     

ECONOMIC SYSTEMS, POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The paper deals with the estimation of comparable human rights ratings (defined as a composite of political rights, civil liberties and state power indices) for 154 countries, excluding territories, of the world in 1983. It then develops a theory to gauge the sensitivity of these ratings to a specific disaggregation suggested by the theory of political economy and establishes the close nexus existing between economic systems, political structures and human rights. The results indicate that increasing government intervention, whether economic or political, unequivocally tends to worsen the human rights situation. Moreover, it is seen that affluence and income distribution are significant predictors of human rights ratings across countries.     

Unbundling democracy: Political rights and civil liberties

Much recent political economy and political science literature views democracy in terms of political rights. This view, often referred to as electoral democracy, is particularly pronounced in the empirical literature. We reincorporate the role of civil liberties, which are at the core of modern democracy, in two ways. We identify four fundamental sources of potential differences in the evolution of political rights and civil liberties. We present systematic, robust and varied empirical evidence on the direct impact of two of these potential sources of differences using cross-national panel data and accounting for the modernization hypothesis. We obtain two noteworthy empirical results: civil liberties exhibit greater persistence than political rights in affecting subsequent outcomes; and, our main result, civil liberties are complementary to political rights when affecting subsequent outcomes, while the reverse is not the case. Consequently, one must incorporate civil liberties as a determinant of electoral democracy. More generally, both dimensions must be considered to understand the setbacks recently experienced by many democracies, despite their holding of free and fair elections.     

Oil rents, corruption, and state stability: Evidence from panel data regressions

We examine the effects of oil rents on corruption and state stability exploiting the exogenous within-country variation of a new measure of oil rents for a panel of 30 oil-exporting countries during the period 1992–2005. We find that an increase in oil rents significantly increases corruption, significantly deteriorates political rights while at the same time leading to a significant improvement in civil liberties. We argue that these findings can be explained by the political elite having an incentive to extend civil liberties but reduce political rights in the presence of oil windfalls to evade redistribution and conflict. We support our argument documenting that there is a significant effect of oil rents on corruption in countries with a high share of state participation in oil production while no such link exists in countries where state participation in oil production is low.     

Does democracy affect taxation and government spending? Evidence from developing countries

Focusing on developing countries in three geographical areas (South-East Asia, Latin America and European Union), we explore the relation between political variables and tax revenue, public spending and their structure. We build a new dataset for the 1990–2005 period with fiscal, political and socio-economic variables. Since democracy is a complex and multidimensional concept, we measure it using two variables, the political strength of democratic institutions, and the protection of civil liberties. We perform three sets of estimates: (i) cross-country pooled OLS regressions with region fixed effects, (ii) country fixed effects regressions and (iii) region specific regressions with country fixed effects. While the first model delivers some significant correlations between political variables and tax items, when controlling for country fixed effects we find that tax revenue and tax composition are in general not significantly correlated with the strength of democratic institutions and the protection of civil liberties. The only exceptions are indirect, trade and property taxes. A similar result applies to public spending, with the exception of defense expenditure. Overall, our findings cast some doubt on the exact public policy channels through which political institutions affect economic development.     

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM, FISCAL POLICY, AND GROWTH NEXUS: SOME EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR FIJI

This article presents an empirical analysis of the relationship between political and civil liberty, economic freedom, and growth for Fiji. Fiji's experience of two military coups in 1987, the delay to resolve the agricultural land lease issues, and the implementation of the 1990 Constitution have been major setbacks in terms of Fiji's nondemocratic political environment and uncertain economic policies, a decline in the private investment and exports, and an exodus of skilled labor. This experience severely damaged the growth prospects whereby unstable sociopolitical institutions undermined the importance of economic freedom and civil liberties of its citizens and foreign investors. Empirical results presented here support the view that democratic values and economic freedom are significant for growth. A statistical test for the endogeneity of democracy variable rejects the null, thus the reverse causality, so democratic environment and economic freedom lead to higher economic growth.     

The French Communication Industry Defined and Analyzed through the Social Fabric Matrix,the Filiere Approach,and Network Analysis

This paper examines the relative impact of economic freedom, civil liberties, and political rights on growth. A system of three simultaneous equations is used to unearth the channels through which these institutional dimensions affect economic growth. These include greater efficiency and enlarged investment in physical and human capital. The sample contains 79 countries and six periods covering the years from 1976 to 2005. The results show that the three dimensions of institutional quality are important for economic growth either through a better allocation of resources or, indirectly, through the stimulation of investment in physical and human capital.     

Culture,legal heritage and the regulation of labor

According to cross-cultural psychologists, cross-country differences in individualism vs. collectivism constitute an important dimension of cultural variation. Legal-economic theorists argue that legal philosophies such as common law and civil law have developed differently over centuries and have persistent effects. In this paper, we argue that the effects of culture and institutions should not be analyzed in isolation from each other, as this disregards their interactions. We merge the two separate literatures on cultural attributes and legal origin theories, and derive a hypothesis regarding their joint effects on labor market regulations. We hypothesize that the effect of individualism on the political determination of labor regulations should be particularly pronounced in more market-oriented economic systems (as in British common law countries) compared to more rigid and bureaucratic state-centered systems (as in French civil law countries). Market oriented economies give individual effort and ability greater room to flourish, which in individualistic cultures yields weaker labor regulations. The effect of individualism should be smaller in state centered systems. Using data on the average rigidity of labor regulations during the years 1950–2004 in 86 countries, we find that the negative effect of individualism on the rigidity of labor regulations is enhanced by the presence of a common law legal system. In fact, individualism has no effect on the rigidity of labor market regulations in civil law countries. Analogously, the negative effect of common law legal origin on labor market regulations is found to be conditional on the level of individualism. Individualism and common law legal systems are complements in the determination of labor regulations.     

Information, organization, and freedom: Explaining the great reversal

We suggest, in a Coase-Demsetz perspective, that the social demand for individual rights??or freedoms (whether civil, political or economic)??is derived from, because complementary to, the changing size of hierarchical organizations. The general downsizing and decentralization process observed worldwide after 1975 is itself the result of the information revolution and the resulting abundance of information. It follows that social demand for freedoms depends in turn??and inversely??on the cost of information (and thus on market imperfection) as well as on traditional determinants such as the distribution of resources and human capital. This implies that freedoms are adopted, implemented, or ??produced?? by various political regimes according to an objectively observable and contingent determinant. We believe this approach can shed light on the reason for the waxing and waning of freedoms in modern history.     

The effect of democracy on different categories of economic freedom

Many empirical studies conclude that democracy increases economic freedom. However, these studies use highly aggregated indices of economic freedom, which eliminates interesting information. The purpose of this paper is to study empirically how in developing countries different categories of economic freedom are affected by democracy, measured either as political rights or civil liberties. Democracy appears to have a positive effect on the economic freedom categories Government Operations and Regulations and Restraints on International Exchange, but no effect on the categories Money and Inflation and Takings and Discriminatory Taxation. That a high level of democracy would have a negative effect on economic freedom reform receives no support in this study. The robustness of the results to the model specification and extreme points is tested.     

Economic Reform and Corruption: Evidence from Panel Data

The notion that economic reform can reduce corruption remains prevalent in the policy agenda of international financial institutions, especially of the World Bank. Economic reforms have, therefore, been carried out throughout various parts of the world to improve the performance of the economies. Using data from 94 low‐ and middle‐income nations for the period 1996–2015, this study employs static and dynamic panel analysis to examine whether economic reform undertaken in accordance with the World Bank's reform programs negatively affects corruption. Our findings suggest that enhancing government effectiveness (i.e. independence of civil service from political pressure, provision of quality public services, effective policy formulation and the government's commitment to such policies) and improving public rights and civil liberties could be some of the most promising policies in terms of fighting corruption. The role of economic development and growth in real per capita income is also found to be significant in some of the specifications. However, the assertion that economic reform can reduce corruption is rejected in all the specifications. We rather find evidence that economic reforms negatively affect the ability of democracy to fight corruption, although on a slim margin. The central theme of the implications of our findings is that in combating corruption, social, institutional and legal means are far more important than economic means. The finding thus is compatible with the World Bank's effort in the later years to introduce governance and democracy as effective tool against corruption.     

A sensitivity analysis of the impact of democracy on economic growth

Often it is maintained that democracy is a luxury which comes at a price in terms of subsequent slower increases in national living standards. However, various recent cross-section studies on economic growth have found evidence that lack of civil and political liberties is negatively correlated with economic growth. Using various measures of democracy the robustness of previous research is examined. Both direct and indirect effects of lack of civil and political liberties are analysed. Our main conclusion is that the relationship between democracy and economic growth is not robust.     

Growth in fragile states in Africa: Conflict and post‐conflict capital accumulation

This article analyses the pattern of capital accumulation in Africa and its interaction with political fragility. Political fragility, defined as armed conflict or civil war, retards or reverses gains with respect to capital accumulation, slowing long‐term economic growth. Many countries experience negative rates of capital accumulation, particularly during periods of acute political instability. In post‐war periods, countries generally continue to experience capital destruction, lending support to the “war ruin hypothesis.” This has implications for long‐term economic growth in view of the strong association between capital accumulation and economic performance. The main policy implication of the analysis is that African countries and their international partners should pay more attention to capital accumulation, including capital reconstruction after periods of political instability, to lay the foundations for sustainable economic growth.     

Endogenous strength of intellectual property rights: Implications for economic development and growth

The key institution that determines sustained growth in R&D-based growth models is the strength of intellectual property rights, which are usually assumed to be exogenous. In this paper we endogenize the strength of the intellectual property rights and show how private incentives to protect these rights affect economic development and growth. Our model explains endogenous differences in intellectual property rights across countries as private incentives to invest in property rights generate multiple equilibria. We show that the resulting institutional threshold offers an explanation for why the effect of a transfer of institutions from one country to another depends on the quality of the institutions that were imported.     

Adam Smith's “tolerable administration of justice” and the Wealth of Nations

Adam Smith argues that a country’s income depends on its labor productivity, which in turn hinges on the division of labor. But why are some countries able to take advantage of the division of labor and become rich, while others fail to do so and remain poor? Smith describes how the security of property rights, through a “tolerable administration of justice,” allows investment and exchange to take place, bringing about economic progress. Recent empirical work on economic development has supported Smith’s emphasis on a country’s political “institutions,” particularly the judiciary, in determining its national income.     

The Politics of Capital Flight in the Global Economic Crisis

This paper studies the effects of economic governance and political institutions on portfolio investment during the Global Economic Crisis of 2008–2009. Leveraging a unique cross‐national dataset on portfolio flows immediately following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, it shows that countries with “better institutions” – those with more (or less) democratic, more (or less) constrained or more accountable political systems – were no less vulnerable to portfolio outflows than countries with “worse institutions.” However, countries with better governance prior to the crisis – those with better regulatory apparatuses, rule of law, property rights, and those considered less politically risky – experienced lower net portfolio capital outflows after Lehman. Governance is in fact the strongest predictor of portfolio capital flows during the global flight to liquidity, while political institutions perform poorly. The findings shed light onto the political factors that mediated how the collapse of Lehman affected national financial markets the world over, and have implications for literatures on the political economy of foreign investment, as well as for broader topics of institutions, governance, and economic performance.     

European influence and economic development

The development accounting literature identifies political institutions as fundamental development determinants. Forms of government or executive constraints are thought to shape economic institutions (e.g., property rights) that provide necessary incentives for economic growth. One strand of the literature suggests that European influence is a crucial economic development determinant, presumably through the adoption of European institutions. But how exactly did European influence in the distant past induce positive economic outcomes today? Previous approaches rely on “language,” “settler mortality,” “legal origins” or the “number of European settlers” as indirect proxies of European influence. We propose a direct and quantifiable mechanism: the adoption of European constitutional features. We construct a dataset of all constitutional dimensions from 1800–2008 for all countries and find that nations experience growth accelerations after adopting features of European constitutions. The growth effects are influenced (negatively) by periods of political turmoil, but they are independent of colonial backgrounds. These results show how European influence may have fostered growth, and they imply that countries were able to overcome adverse initial conditions over the last 200 years by adopting European constitutional features. Our constitutional dataset is sufficiently detailed to identify the specific dimensions of European constitutions that matter most for development: legislative rules and specific provisions that curtail executive powers.     

Institutions,governance and incentives in common property regimes for African rangelands

The general distinctions between open access, state property, common property and private property are now well established in the academic literature. When applied to African rangelands, however, common property admits a wide variety of resource management regimes. To formulate effective policies it is necessary to understand the structure and operations of particular regimes. In this paper we discuss three examples of common property regimes, two from the southern African nation of Lesotho and one from the west African nation of Senegal, to illustrate some of the key characteristics of common property regimes. In particular, it is important to understand the structure of governance, the types of institutions that govern behavior, and the compatibility between governance, institutions and individual incentives. A common property regime can only be effective if its institutions are compatible with the structure of governance. The extent of its effectiveness also depends upon the incentives and expectations of individuals expected to enforce the rules of the institutions or comply with their terms. At present, most African governments lack the organizational capacity and political will necessary to implement state property regimes, official regulations on resource use, or individual property rights for rangelands resources. In many cases it is more appropriate for governments to define and enforce group rights to particular resources, then help to establish conditions in which internal group dynamics yield efficient resource management outcomes.     

Some Lessons from Transaction-Cost Politics for Less-Developed Countries

Transaction-cost politics views economic policy-making as a political process constrained by asymmetric information and limited commitment possibilities. This paper examines some implications of this perspective for less-developed countries (LDCs) considering policy reform. It emphasizes that success requires reform of the rules and institutions which govern the strategic interaction of the participants in the political game, and that reforms must cope with the special interests and asymmetric information which already exist. In this light, it examines some broad issues of the design of constitutions and institutions (definition and enforcement of property rights, control of inflation, and of government expenditures, federalism, and redistribution), as well as some specific issue of the design of organizations and incentives (problems posed by the interaction of multiple tasks and multiple interests, and their interaction with the limitations on auditing and administration that exists in many LDCs).