税收激励、国际税收竞争与外国直接投资

本文要考察的是其一，决定FDI流动的主要因素是什么?其二，税收作为影响FDI流动的因素之一，其重要性如何?各种税收激励以及普遍降低法定税率，对吸引FDI流入是否有效?其三，这种主权国家单方面采取的税收行为，在一定程度上导致了国际税收竞争，这种竞争的负面后果是否会抵消主权国家对FDI进行税收激励的有效性并对资源有效配置带来不利影响?     

社会捐赠税收激励的国际经验与政策建议

社会捐赠是在政府和市场发挥作用的基础上对资源进行再分配的一种形式。受经济、历史、文化等诸因素的影响,各国的社会捐赠发展模式不尽相同。其中,美国、日本和荷兰的捐赠模式各具特点且较有代表性,本文比较了上述三国社会捐赠的税收激励政策,总结了其现有的实践经验,在此基础上提出构建我国社会捐赠税收激励体系的政策建议。     

税收征管:激励与约束

税收是国家财政收入的主要来源,其是否能够及时足额入库有赖于高效规范的税收征管。本文利用博弈论与信息经济学的理论,构建了税务机关、税务人员与纳税人三方的博弈模型,探讨了税收征管中的激励与约束问题。     

国际税收竞争对我国企业创新税收激励政策有效性的影响研究

本文以高新技术企业所得税优惠和研发费用加计扣除政策为评估对象,利用A股上市公司数据,分析国际税收竞争对我国企业创新税收激励政策有效性的影响。研究发现,国际税收竞争的存在以及东道国专利盒制度的实施将会削弱我国税收激励政策的企业创新效应。进一步地,国际税收竞争的激烈程度对我国创新激励政策效应起到调节作用,东道国税率吸引力越大、纳税便利度越高、税收征管效率越高时,我国创新税收激励政策的有效性越低。机制分析表明,融资约束和企业避税是国际税收竞争影响的主要渠道。异质性研究表明,国际税收竞争的影响主要集中在税收激进程度较高、已享受较多政府补贴的企业,而当地区知识产权保护力度较强、税收征管数字化水平较高时,将对国际税收竞争的影响起到遏制作用。     

国际税收竞争与国际税收协调之辩证观

国际税收竞争与国际税收协调是经济全球化下国际税收关系主要矛盾的外在表现形式,二者之间存在着辩证统一的关系。国际税收协调既可以缓解恶性国际税收竞争,又会产生新一轮的国际税收竞争。各国对待国际税收竞争与协调的立场会因各自利益的不同需要而发生改变,但总体而言,走“税收竞争——税收协调”之路是处理国际税收关系的必然趋势,这一趋势的发展对我国税收政策的调整也有重要启示。     

当前我国国内横向税收竞争的实证分析

目前我国理论研究的不足阻碍了对现实生活中各类税收竞争问题的有效治理。为此,着眼于我国国内横向税收竞争的实践,对其进行总结和归类,剖析其背后的体制与制度原因,评价其经济效应,并由此提出促进我国国内横向税收有序发展的政策措施是必要的。     

股权激励的税收负担分析

股权激励已成为现代化企业管理制度的重要组成部分。本文以境内上市公司实施股权激励为例,阐述了股权激励的会计确认和记录,税收负担及计量。     

韩国FDI税收优惠法律制度初探

有数据统计。自美国金融危机以来,美日欧等西方发达国家和地区对韩国的FDI持续减缓,但中国等新兴经济国家地区对韩FDI缺大幅增加。据来自官方的数据显示,20209年中国对韩国的总投资额达到1．6亿美元持续了较快的增长速度。去年,中国对韩国FDI更是达到新高,仅非金融类FDI就已达到12亿美元。直至2011年年初。中国对韩FDI总额已近10．4元。对韩投资的大幅度提高迫切需要我们加强了解韩国投资优惠制度特别是税收优惠措施。     

R&D税收激励的作用机制分析

由于R&D活动具有公共产品、外部性及不确定性等特性,使得R&D市场出现投资失灵现象。R&D活动在经济增长中起着重要的作用,这为政府的介入提供了理由。税收政策作为政府激励R&D的重要手段,主要通过降低投资成本、分担投资风险和促进人力资本投资来影响R&D活动的。     

国际税收竞争与国际税收协调

随着经济全球化的进一步加深，经济交往的日益复杂，国际税收也遇到了越来越多的问题。由于税收已构成了跨国经济活动的一项重要成本因素，为了吸引更多的资本流入，国际税收竞争日益加剧。在经济全球化的前提下，一国税收政策变动的影响常常会超出国界的范围，引起另一国采取相应行动，从而引起国家之间的税收分配关系发生变化，并有可能对其他国家造成有害的外部影响。因此，税收竞争逐渐成为国际税收的重要内容之一，有害税收竞争也随之成为人们关注的焦点。基于此，本文试图对税收竞争和有害税收竞争谈些个人的看法。     

Tax incentives for inefficient executive pay and reward for luck

I study the economic consequences of tax deductibility limits on salaries for the design of incentive contracts. The analysis is based on an agency model in which the firm’s cash flow is a function of the agent’s effort and an observable random factor beyond the agent’s control. According to my analysis, limiting the tax deductibility of fixed wages has two consequences. The principal rewards the agent on the basis of the observable random factor and adjusts the amount of performance-based pay in the optimal incentive contract. The new contract can have weaker or stronger work incentives than without the tax. The theoretical findings have implications for empirical compensation research. First, the analysis shows that reward for luck can be the optimal response to recent tax law changes, whereas earlier empirical literature has attributed this phenomenon to managerial entrenchment. Second, I demonstrate that a simple regression analysis that fails to control for separable measures of luck is likely to find an increased pay for performance sensitivity as a response to the introduction of tax deductibility limits on salaries even if the pay for performance sensitivity has actually declined.     

Tax incentives and the location of FDI: Evidence from a panel of German multinationals

Using a firm-level panel data set this paper investigates the impact of taxation on the decision of German multinationals to hold or establish a subsidiary in other European countries or abroad. Taking account of unobserved local characteristics as well as firm-specific preferences for potential locations, the results confirm significant effects of tax incentives, market size, and of labor cost on cross-border location decisions. In accordance with Devereux and Griffith (1998) we find that the marginal effective tax rate has no predictive power for location decisions. However, the results indicate a considerably weaker predictive power of the effective average tax rate as compared to the statutory tax rate. JEL Code:H25 ⋅ F23 ⋅ F21 ⋅ R38     

West meets east: Understanding managerial incentives in Chinese SOEs

State-owned enterprises (SOE) are essentially extensions of the government and are therefore responsible for multi-task objectives. The incentive system for SOE managers consists of both monetary compensation and promotion within the bureaucratic system. Political promotion is key to understanding the incentives of SOE managers. In the reform and opening up era, SOEs have been reformed and exposed to political and market forces. The design of incentive systems for SOE managers has thus become complicated and challenging. Our study provides important implications for this key issue of SOE reform.     

Status and incentives

This article introduces status as reflecting an agent's claim to recognition in her work. This is a scarce resource: increasing an agent's status requires that another agent's status be decreased. Higher‐status agents are more willing to exert effort in exchange for money; better‐paid agents would exert higher effort in exchange for improved status. The results are consistent with actual management practices: (i) egalitarianism is desirable in a static context; (ii) in a long‐term work relationship, juniors' compensation is delayed; and (iii) past performance is rewarded by pay increases along with improved status within the organization's hierarchy.     

Delegation and incentives

This article analyzes the relation between authority and incentives. It extends the standard principal‐agent model by a project selection stage in which the principal can either delegate the choice of project to the agent or keep the authority. The agent's subsequent choice of effort depends both on monetary incentives and the selected project. We find that the consideration of effort incentives makes the principal less likely to delegate the authority over projects to the agent. In fact, if the agent is protected by limited liability, delegation is never optimal.     

Deposit guarantee evaluation and incentives analysis in a mutual guarantee system

This paper analyzes how the deposit guarantee value affects the risk incentives in a mutual guarantee system. We liken the guarantee’s value to that of a European-style contingent claims portfolio. The main feature emerging from our model is that a mutual guarantee system would give banks an adverse incentive to increase riskiness. To mitigate this incentive, we introduce a regulatory provision modelled using a path-dependent contingent claim. By comparing the mutual guarantee system with a non-mutual one, we show that the former is less expensive, but implies higher adverse incentives for the banks, especially for undercapitalized institutions.     

Crowdfunding tax incentives in Europe: a comparative analysis

ABSTRACT

Some European countries offer tax incentive schemes to investors and companies in crowdfunding. On one hand, they could be seen as a tool to reduce the system’s dependence on banks and increase the availability of credit for start-ups and Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). On the other hand, there is the counterweight of disadvantages that investors may face by investing in crowdfunding (i.e. complex and incomplete laws, and weak protection). This paper is primarily intended as a primer on the use of tax incentives for crowdfunding in Europe. In this study, we first examine the implementation of tax incentive schemes in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, and Belgium. Then, we analyse and compare the characteristics of such schemes along three dimensions: the incentives structure; the business characteristics; and the type of investor. We find that tax incentive schemes for crowdfunding vary widely in their form and other features of their design. Moreover, the most used forms of tax incentives are those that provide for an up-front tax credit on the amount invested in early-stage ventures. These incentives have an immediate effect on the annual income tax of the investor. A central implication is that the more tax incentive schemes are properly designed and tailored for crowdfunders, the more investors, start-ups and other firms with low liquidity could use crowdfunding as a source of funding.     

中西方税收文化传统对比研究

中西方由于社会制度和传统文化的差异,反映在税收文化传统方面,如税收思想、征税原则、税制设计、税收征管等,也存在明显的区别。将中西方税收文化传统进行深入地对比分析,对健全我国税制、树立以法治税思想不无益处。     

中国金融税制的问题分析与立法完善

健全的金融税制是促进中国金融业稳健发展的重要条件。所以,在我国金融市场进一步开放和经济全球化的新形势下,应当将金融税制的构建放在更加突出的地位,按照税收法定原则的要求,进一步完善立法程序,努力建立公平、科学和健全的现代金融税制。     

我国税收制度与企业会计制度差异分析及协调

本文通过分析我国税收与会计制度差异产生的原因,列举了其具体表现,提出了协调我国税收与会计制度的几点建议。