浅议固定资产计价

会计计量中，资产要素计量是最首要、最基本的，处于核心地位。资产计量所采用的制度模式及具体方法，是计量其他五个要素（负债、所有者权益、收入、费用和利润）的基础。而固定资产在资产中占有极其重要的地位，因而，对固定资产计量的意义就不言而喻了。具体的讲，固定资产计价目标大致有三个；在固定资产使用年限中分配折旧费用，从而与收入配比，计算年度企业收益；反映企业固定资产价值；为收益预测和投资决策提供会计信息。一、产出价值计量不可取固定资产的计价基础有投入价值和产出价值两种。资产的投入价值是指为取得资产而支付的…     

借鉴英法两国经验，推进我国非营利组织和政府会计改革

2004年2月，我随财政部非营利组织和政府会计准则考察团对英、法两国进行考察，考察了英、法两国非营利组织和政府会计准则制定、实施和监管的情况，了解了目前两国正在进行的政府会计改革情况，并就非营利组织的界定、资产和收入确认、政府会计中的资产计价、收入确认等具体会计核算问题与两国会计同行进行了深入交流。     

浅谈公允价值、成本计价对企业会计利润的影响

新企业会计准则中对除货币资产之外的其余资产都采用了两种以上的计价方法。在允许企业根据资产取得方式不同、来源不同、使用过程不同而进行恰当的资产计价,以使资产负债表反映的资产真正符合资产内涵的同时,也给了企业更多的选择空间。这样就会因选择的资产计价方法不同而对企业会计盈利造成影响。另外,也有理论认为,资产评估是从资产计价的基础上发展起来的,即应该将两者合并看待。因此,在讨论资产计价对会计盈利的影响前,应该明确一下资产计价的界定范围以及计价方法等相关问题。     

浅析资产计价

资产计价是企业会计处理常遇到的问题之一,<企业会计制度>规定资产计价分两部分:(1)资产取得时的初始计价,(2)资产的期末计价.     

企业资产期末计价问题探讨

企业资产入账时一般以历史成本计价,由于会计年度内该资产的真实价值将处于不断变化之中,为客观反映其价值,实际操作中多采用在会计期末调整报表账面价值,即企业资产期末计价。分析资产期末计价的必要性,论述应收账款、存货、投资、固定资产、无形资产等几种主要资产形态期末计价方法及账务处理过程,讨论资产期末计价对企业当期损益的影响。     

浅析工程量清单计价

一、工程量清单计价与定额计价的区别 （一）计价依据不同1．依据不同的定额：定额计价按照政府主管部门颁发的预算定额计算各项消耗量;工程量清单报价按照企业定额计算各项消耗量,也可以选择其他合适的消耗量定额计算工料机消耗量。选择何种定额由投标人自主确定。     

浅谈银行资产负债缺口风险管理

利率是资金的价格,而金融机构是资金供给者与资金需求者的中介机构,其资产负债绝大多数透过利率来计价,当资产与负债对利率变动的敏感程度不一时,就会产生利率风险.     

初探存货审计

在形形色色的利润操纵手段中，资产造假占了很大比重，其中资产计价舞弊是资产造假的惯用手段。由于存货项目种类繁多且流动性强、计价方法多样，因而存货高估构成了资产计价舞弊的主要部分。在会计核算上，存货对应的会计账项很多，存货项目的真实和正确与否，直接影响到其他会计账项，因此存货审计的技术及技巧要求很高。笔者对存货审计中应关注的几个问题作以下粗浅分析。     

地方政府债券信用评级视角下的政府会计改革探讨

2014年起我国开展的地方政府债券自发自还，对地方政府债券的信用评级提出了要求，然而我国现有的政府会计系统无法充分满足评级机构对政府资产、负债和收支等会计信息的需求，制约了地方政府债券信用评级工作的开展。为此，本文从依据可变现性和流动性对政府资产进行确认与分类，扩大政府负债的核算范围、确认与计量政府隐性和或有负债，引入以权责发生制为基础的政府财务会计、完善地方政府收支信息，构建全面的政府财务分析指标体系等四个方面对我国政府会计改革进行了探讨，以便为我国地方政府债券信用评级提供必要的信息，促进地方政府债券市场的健康发展。     

我国会计准则与国外会计准则在价值计量方面的差异

自从我国于1993年发布《企业会计基本准则》并从1997年5月开始发布具体准则以来,我们在各项资产、负债的确认与计价以及收入、费用的确认与计量方面已与国际会计惯例实现了相当成功的接轨,不过就价值计量而言,还存在两点比较显著的差异。     

Government debt,learning and the term structure

Does a change in the public׳s holdings of government debt affect the term structure of interest rates? Empirical analysis using a VAR model indicates that a rise in these holdings of the real debt-to-GDP ratio increases both the three-month and ten-year U.S. nominal yields in a statistically significant manner. The maturity composition of debt is also found to matter: innovations in holdings of long-term debt affect the term structure, while increases in short-term debt affect inflation expectations. These effects of changes in holdings of debt on the yield curve can be derived in a general equilibrium model in which the government issues exponentially-maturing riskless debt, financed by lump-sum taxes, and the optimizing agents are adaptive learners. On calibrating the average maturity of debt in the model to match that of U.S. Treasury debt since the 1980s, I find that positive innovations in government debt lead to increases in asset yields. This is because agents do not learn the principle of Ricardian equivalence exactly, and perceive increases in holdings of government bonds as a rise in their net wealth. Imposing rational expectations on the agents eliminates this channel, and changes in holdings of government debt have no effect on yields. The learning model also implies that as the real debt-to-GDP ratio increases, and the average maturity of debt becomes longer, the agents become less likely to learn that Ricardian equivalence holds.     

Forecast in detail

The scale of fiscal support to the economy since the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, and the plunge in tax receipts triggered by action to contain the virus, have driven up public sector borrowing to wartime proportions. But with demand for UK government debt high, helped by an expansion of asset purchases by the Bank of England, financing the extra debt is taking place under very favourable conditions.     

Private debt overhang and the government spending multiplier: Evidence for the United States

Using state‐dependent local projections and historical US data, we find that government spending multipliers are considerably larger in periods of private debt overhang. In particular, while multipliers are below or close to one in low private debt states, we find significant crowding‐in of private spending in periods of debt overhang, resulting in multipliers that are much larger than one. In high private debt episodes, more government purchases even reduce the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product. These results are robust for the type of shocks, and when we control for the business cycle, financial crises, deleveraging episodes, government debt overhang, and the zero‐lower‐bound.     

基于资产专用性的企业融资决策研究

本文采用Williamson的思路,建立了资产专用性与交易成本、生产成本因素在内的综合交易成本分析模型。分析发现,相对于债务融资而言,股权融资有利于避免按市场规则强行清算带来的专用性资产价值损失,运用包络定理证明专用性程度高的资产具有削减生产成本的作用,专用性程度高的资产以股权融资为佳。     

Value at Risk in the Suburbs: Eminent Domain and the Geographical Politics of the US Foreclosure Crisis

Several US counties and local governments have recently considered a novel solution to the foreclosure crisis. They plan to use eminent domain to compel the owners of mortgage debt—and specifically of private‐label mortgage‐backed securities—to sell the debt to the government at a price reflecting the loan's market value. The government would then restructure the debt and resell it to new investors. The plans are striking because—in contrast to both development‐driven eminent domain and the federal subprime bank bailout—they would force investors to assume asset devaluation and increased long‐term risk. Notably, the plans have emerged as an instance of financialization‐focused politics in suburbs and suburban cities of color, specifically majority‐black and ‐Latino/a suburbs. Local support for the plans, we argue, is rooted in the long‐term disinvestment of these ‘suburbs of exception', which became targets of subprime lending and eventually sites where the ‘financial exception' has been localized. But these demographic shifts, fragmentation and fiscal pressures have at the same time created a suburban political terrain in which the plans have gained their strongest political support.     

“啄序理论”的资本成本视角

西方财务理论认为,由于风险和税收的原因,债权资本成本远远低于股权资本。因此,在其他因素一定的情况下,企业筹资应优先考虑债权资本。但实践中却存在着“悖论”现象:基于实证研究的“啄序理论”,留存收益排在债权筹资顺序之前。而这种“悖论”现象完全可以从资本成本的角度得到合理的阐释,是企业理财实践中的理性选择。     

Asset sale,debt restructuring,and liquidation

This paper considers a dynamic model in which shareholders of a firm in distress have a choice of whether the firm proceeds to debt restructuring or direct liquidation at an arbitrary time. In the model, we show the following results. Fewer asset sales, lower financing, debt renegotiation, and running costs, a lower premium to the debt holders, a lower cash flow volatility, and a higher initial coupon increase the shareholders׳ incentive to choose debt restructuring to avoid full liquidation. In the debt renegotiation process, the shareholders arrange the coupon reduction and use equity financing to retire a part of the debt value to the debt holders. The timing of debt restructuring always coincides with that of liquidation without debt renegotiation. Most notably, the shareholders do not prefer asset sale in debt restructuring even if they face high financing costs. The possibility of debt renegotiation in the future increases the initial leverage ratio in the optimal capital structure.     

Democratic transition and fiscal policy in the Arab world

This paper investigates the relationship between democracy and public debt in the Arab world over the period 2002–2013. The results show strong evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between democracy and public debt. This means that democratization is associated with lower debt only when a certain level of democracy is reached. In an attempt to explain these findings, we assume that the effect of democracy on public debt operates mainly through its impact on government spending and government revenue. Our results show that the inverted U-shaped relationship between democracy and public debt stems from the inverted U-shaped democracy-government spending path and the U-shaped democracy-government revenue pattern. This implies that, at the earlier stages of democratization, democracy is associated with an increase in government spending and a decrease in government revenue, which stimulates public debt. However, beyond a certain level of democracy, further democratization reduces government spending and enhances government revenue, leading to lower levels of public debt. Hence, achieving some level of democracy is a key prerequisite to improve the effectiveness of public spending, enhance tax compliance, and thereby control public debt.     

Asset specificity,unionization and the firm's use of debt

This paper considers the combined influence of asset specificity and unionization on the firm's use of debt. While previous literature tends to examine these effects separately, we find that the interaction of the two is critical. Thus, while asset specificity may reduce debt as in Williamson (1988), the presence of a strong union offsets this. Unionization increases the firm's debt as in Bronars and Deere (1991), but asset generality diminishes this effect. We model and test the interactive nature of these two effects. Using firm-specific unionization data and various proxies for asset specificity, we find support for our model. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Leverage and the price volatility of equity shares in equilibrium

The traditional valuation formulas for corporate debt, which are derived in a complete market setting and are based on the no-arbitrage principle, imply that equity prices become more volatile as leverage increases. If the asset structure is incomplete, the presence of corporate debt affects the linear subspace spanned by the payoffs of the existing assets, and the pricing of corporate debt and shares of levered firms becomes a simultaneous valuation problem. This paper characterizes the relationship between the price of corporate debt and the share price of a levered firm in an equilibrium framework where corporate debt is a non-redundant asset. While, in the absence of bankruptcy, higher leverage always implies riskier equity, it does not necessarily mean more volatile equity prices. In fact, the link between leverage and equity price volatility depends in a particular way on investors’ preferences towards risk.