TAX REVENUE-FINANCED PUBLIC ABATEMENT AND WELFARE: A CONSUMPTION TAX CASE

This paper develops a model of public abatement financed either by a pollution tax or by a consumption tax. It shows that consumption tax revenue-financed public abatement raises welfare more than pollution tax revenue-financed public abatement does when the pollution tax rate rises. This result is worthwhile for environmental protection policy makers when they are determining the revenue source of public abatement.     

A NOTE ON TRADE LIBERALIZATION, PUBLIC ABATEMENT, AND WELFARE

This paper extends Haibara (2006) in order to focus on the welfare consequences of a pollution tax and foreign aid financed for public abatement. The main finding is that environmental protection as a result of increasing a pollution tax by the aid recipient increases the optimal value of foreign aid chosen by the donor and reduces that of a tariff chosen by the recipient. This implies that international environmental cooperation is possible between the donor and the recipient.     

Environmental taxes in a differentiated mixed duopoly

Beladi and Chao (2006) and Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2006) considered the role of environmental policy on the decision whether to privatize a public firm in different market structures. This paper re-examines whether privatization improves (or deteriorates) the environment in a mixed duopolistic framework with differentiated product and pollution abatement. It is shown that, due to privatization, less attention is paid to pollution abatement by all the firms coupled with less environment taxes levied by the government in a differentiated duopoly, and the environment is more (less) damaged when the product is less (more) substitutable. When the product is highly substitutable, industry profits increase because this softens the intensity of the product market, but social welfare deteriorates accompanied with the path of privatization because the loss of consumer surplus and tax revenue exceeds the increases in profits, even if the environment is less damaged.     

Abatement R&D,market imperfections,and environmental policy in an endogenous growth model

We develop an endogenous growth model featuring environmental externalities, abatement R&D, and market imperfections. We compare the economic performances under three distinct regimes that encompass public abatement, private abatement without tax recycling, and private abatement with tax recycling. It is found that the benefit arising from private abatement will be larger if the degree of the firms’ monopoly power is greater. With a reasonably high degree of monopoly power, a mixed abatement policy by which the government recycles environmental tax revenues to subsidize the private abatement R&D is a plausible way of reaching the highest growth rate and welfare.     

Welfare improving licensing with endogenous choice of prices versus quantities

This paper investigates the endogenous choice of prices versus quantities by taking into account patent licensing where the patent holder, which is itself a producer within the industry, licenses its cost-reducing innovation to the rival firm through a two-part tariff contract. For substitute products we find that both Cournot and mixed price-quantity competition may constitute the equilibrium outcomes, depending on the innovation size. Contrary to the results in Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2002), we show that the optimal licensing contract definitely leads to an increase in social welfare. Our result reinforces the positive welfare effect of patent licensing.     

The optimal carbon tax mechanism for managing carbon emissions

Along Pigouvian lines, the carbon tax not only exceeds the carbon emission damage imposed on society, but ignores the potential cost from deliberate carbon abatement, which in turn challenges the stability and optimality of the Pigouvian solution. For correcting these distortions, this paper amends the standard Pigouvian version by using piecewise tax functions to approximate the social damage curve of carbon emissions. An optimal carbon tax mechanism is designed, where the tax is endogenously determined from social welfare maximization. With the help of a modification instrument, the carbon tax corrects emitters’ non-optimal individual decision and the social optimum is implemented efficiently. How to put the carbon tax into practice is examined under both the deterministic and stochastic modeling settings. In both cases, we demonstrate the structure and effectiveness of the carbon tax in detail. Moreover, a flexible adjustment tax scheme is proposed, which may produce the double-dividend effect that reduces carbon emissions and relieves financial burden of carbon abatement simultaneously. These may improve the application of market-based carbon-reducing tools in public management and pollution regulation.     

Non-cooperative pollution control in an inter-jurisdictional setting

This paper examines various circumstances under which decentralized pollution policies can be efficient both in federal settings and in multi-region settings with labor mobility. We consider a model in which pollution control policies are set by regional governments non-cooperatively and pollution damages are borne by the residents of all regions. We characterize the efficiency of pollution policies, and of population allocation among regions, in a variety of scenarios, including when pollution policies are enacted before interregional transfers are determined by the federal government and before migration occurs; when migration decisions are taken before policy decisions; in the absence of a central government if regional governments can make voluntary interregional transfers; when decisions over pollution control policies are followed by voluntary contributions by regions to a national public good; when regions can commit to matching the abatement efforts of each other; and when regions can commit to specific levels of abatement contingent on the emissions of other regions not exceeding some maximum level.     

非线性定价下的移动通信需求行为

本文研究多产品移动通信业务以及非线性定价条件下的消费者需求理论,并利用话单层级的用户消费数据,建立离散选择结构计量模型,并对用户资费选择行为与个人属性、资费属性和换网行为之间的关系进行研究,最后利用估计出的需求结构参数,就资费优化对企业收入和用户资费选择概率的影响进行分析。     

On revenue recycling and the welfare effects of second-best congestion pricing in a monocentric city

This paper examines congestion taxes in a monocentric city with pre-existing labor taxation. When road toll revenue is used to finance labor tax cuts, 35% of the optimal road tax in our numerical model does not reflect marginal external congestion costs, but rather functions as a Ramsey–Mirrlees tax, i.e. an efficiency enhancing mechanism allowing for an indirect spatial differentiation of the labor tax. This adds a quite different motivation to road pricing, since welfare gains can be produced even in absence of congestion. We find that the optimal road tax is non-monotonic across space, reflecting the different impacts of labor supply elasticity and marginal utility of income, which both vary over space. The relative efficiencies of some archetype second-best pricing schemes (cordon toll, flat kilometer tax) are high (84% and 70% respectively). When road toll revenue is recycled lump-sum, the optimal toll lies below its Pigouvian level. Extensions in a bimodal framework show that the optimality of using road toll revenue to subsidize public transport depends on the initial inefficiency in public transport pricing.     

Resource balance, limited information and public policy

The U.S. Federal Government through its expenditure programs is having a major impact on all forms of pollution abatement. Total expenditures on Federal environmental programs amounted to $3.3 billion in 1972. A program of this magnitude can easily lead to waste and expenditures on conflicting goals unless carefully managed.

In a recent article in the Am. Econ. Rev. William Baumol examined the theoretical justification for and attacks on the Pigouvian tax and subsidy approach to controlling externalities. He concluded that while it is theoretically possible to control externalities through Pigou's procedure, the existence of multiple equilibrium and information requirements make it impractical. He proposes an alternate approach which changes the policy goal from maximization of social welfare to generation of acceptable levels of externalities. His goals differ drastically from those of the resource balance model presented by Kneese, Ayres and D'Arge of maximization of social welfare. This paper will combine the concept of resource balance with the goal of obtaining acceptable level of externalities at minimum cost in the presentation of a theoretical model that can be operationalized.

This paper proposes a general equilibrium method, utilizing the decomposition principle of linear programming, that will permit expenditures and regulations only on non-conflicting goals and includes a feedback mechanism for determining if a program is wasteful in relation to other programs. The model has five advantages over earlier proposals: (1) it is a general equilibrium rather than partial equilibrium model; (2) it is dynamic rather than static; (3) limited information rather than complete information is required for its implementation; (4) the model is heuristic rather than optimizing in the sense that policy decisions always increase the efficiency of pollution control, but because of the existence of uncertainty, they cannot be interpreted as maximizing social welfare; (5) the model incorporates multiple rather than a single policy tool.     

State-imposed solutions to negative externalities: employment impact of pollution abatement policy

Musgrave was acutely aware that many private activities, both consumption and production, generate negative externalities. Advocates for an active government rely on this concept to justify public sector regulation of private activities. Regulations and mandates, along with penalties for non-compliance, are the primary instruments used by government to bring about the “correct” level of output whenever private output gives rise to negative externalities such as environmental pollution. This study in effect offers a case study of the Clean Air Act on employment, i.e., it empirically investigates whether pollution abatement costs have had a negative impact on manufacturing employment in the U.S. Conventional microeconomic theory suggests that there is a trade-off between environmental protection outlays and manufacturing activity, i.e., higher pollution abatement compliance costs borne by industries may contribute to plant shutdowns, lower production levels and lay-offs, and/or lack of investment, thereby leading to diminished manufacturing employment. Existing studies fail to offer a clear conclusion as to the impact of existing environmental protection measures on manufacturing activity. Using state-level data for 2001, this study finds that government-imposed pollution abatement costs have had a statistically significant negative impact on manufacturing employment in the U.S. Richard J. Cebula, Shirley and Philip Solomons Eminent Scholar.     

The environmental and macroeconomic effects of socially responsible investment

We analyze the effects of socially responsible investment and public abatement on environmental quality and the economy in a continuous-time dynamic growth model featuring optimizing households and firms. Environmental quality is modeled as a renewable resource. Consumers can invest in government bonds or firm equity. Since investors feel partly responsible for environmental pollution when holding firm equity, they require a premium on the return to equity. We show that socially responsible investment behavior by households partially offsets the positive effects on environmental quality of public abatement policies.     

DESIRABILITY AND SEQUENCE OF LIBERALIZATION AND STRUCTURAL REFORM POLICIES IN A MODEL WITH INFORMAL SECTOR

The paper develops a three-sector general equilibrium model with informal sector and examines the welfare effects of liberalization and structural reform in the presence of labor and capital market distortions. It attempts to determine a credible sequence of reforms that may be the most welfare-enhancing, since implementation of reforms in all the markets at a single stage may be neither feasible nor optimal. Foreign capital is welfare-improving only in the presence of labor market distortion, while welfare deteriorates if the capital market is distorted. While tariff and capital market reforms may be welfare-enhancing in the absence of labor market distortion, labor market reform may intensify the formal-informal wage gap and have a worsening effect on welfare in the presence of tariff distortion and capital market imperfection. One of the plausible sequences of reforms may be to initially undertake tariff reform followed by capital and labor market reforms, respectively.     

Implications of alternate policies on welfare of slum dwellers: Evidence from Pune,India

In this paper we examine how slum dwellers value location-based amenities. In most developing country cities, residents living in slums have poor-quality dwellings and limited access to basic public services and amenities. Using data from Pune, India, we estimate the residential location choices of slum dwellers, which are conditional on housing quality, neighborhood amenities, and community structure. We use these estimates to simulate the impact of alternate interventions on household welfare. We find that households derive benefits from housing quality and neighborhood amenities. While relocating households to the periphery has adverse consequences for household welfare, we show that households could be adequately compensated out of the increased tax revenue accruing from alternative uses of the vacated central land.     

Economic geography with tariff competition

A simple two-country model of economic geography is constructed in order to examine the effect of tariff competition on the spatial distribution of manufacturing activities as well as on welfare. We show that when the transport cost is small, tariff competition with firm migration leads to a core-periphery economy, where one of the two countries imposes no tariff in Nash equilibrium. We also show that when the transport cost is sufficiently large, both countries impose a positive tariff, which decreases the welfare of both countries.     

Public, Private and Nonprofit Regulation for Environmental Quality

This paper studies the welfare implications of different institutions certifying environmental quality supplied by a monopoly. The monopolist can voluntarily certify the quality of the product through an eco-label provided either by an NGO or a for-profit private certifier (PC). The NGO and the PC may use advertisement to promote the label. We compare the NGO and PC regimes with the regime where the regulator imposes a minimum quality standard. The presence of a private certifier in the market decreases the scope for public intervention. The availability of green advertisement reinforces the above result.     

Reconciling the Porter hypothesis with the traditional paradigm about environmental regulation: a nonparametric approach

This paper estimates the impact of pollution abatement investments on the production technology of firms by pursuing two new directions. First, we take advantage of recent econometric developments in productivity, efficiency analysis and nonparametric kernel regression by adopting a conditional nonparametric frontier analysis. Second, we focus not only on the average effect but also search for potential nonlinearities. We provide new results suggesting that pollution abatement capital affects with a bell-shaped fashion technological catch-up (inefficiency distribution) and does not affect technological change (shifts in the frontier). These results have relevant implications both for modeling and for the purposes of advice on environmentally friendly policy.     

Taxing air pollutants and carbon individually or jointly: results from a CGE model enriched by an emission abatement sector

We analyse the separate and collective impacts of emissions taxation to understand the internalisation effects of externalities. The analysis is carried out using a static computable general equilibrium model, with unemployment, bottom-up abatement technologies represented by a step function, and detailed emission coefficients. Environmental and health external costs are quantified using the ExternE’s Impact Pathway Approach. Emissions, as a result of environmental taxation, fall through reduced output, production factor substitution, and increased end of pipe abatement activity. The analysis shows that a full internalisation of environmental externalities can result in modest overall economic and environmental welfare gains. There are, however, differences in terms of employment and output, depending on what combination of taxes are applied, which sectors are covered, and how fiscal revenues are redistributed. Air quality benefits range from €35–75 per ton of CO₂ abated. Total environmental benefits always exceed GDP loss and the associated welfare loss.     

WHY ARE TRADE BARRIERS SO LOW?

The political economy literature suggests that tariff rates should be high because the gains to producers from protection are enormous while the welfare costs are small. This paper presents and evaluates six possible explanations for the relatively low tariffs we see today in most developed countries.