On the optimal mix of patent instruments

A special characteristic of the patent system is that it features multiple patent-policy levers that can be employed by policymakers. In this note, we develop an R&D-based growth model to analyze the optimal mix of patent instruments by considering patent breadth and the division of profit in research joint ventures. Our results are as follows. First, we analytically derive the optimal mix of patent breadth and the profit-division rule. Then, we calibrate the model to quantitatively evaluate the welfare gain from optimizing both patent instruments versus optimizing only patent breadth. We find that the welfare gain can be quantitatively significant.     

Patent replacement and welfare gains

Patents were chosen in an era when modern public finance tools were unavailable. The same innovation outcomes can be achieved with higher welfare, if patent elements are replaced by modern features. This paper constructs two theoretical models of product innovation and simulates the welfare effects of replacing patents with an intertemporal-bounty arrangement. We find that replacing patents with this alternative has the potential to increase welfare in the United States through reform of pharmaceutical patents by $43.9-$194 billion when measured in present value terms (this is 0.3-1.3% of annual GDP) based on simulations involving four selected drug sectors. The potential to increase welfare would be higher if applied to the larger sector of drugs as a whole. In principal, patents could be replaced in other sectors as well.     

Optimal Control of Heteroscedastic Macroeconomic Models

This paper analyses the implications of heteroscedasticity for optimal macroeconomic policy and welfare. We find that changes in the variance structure driven by exogenous processes like generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) affect welfare but not the optimal feedback rule. However, changes in the variance structure driven by state‐dependent processes affect both. We also derive certainty‐equivalent transformations of state‐dependent volatility models that allow standard quadratic dynamic programming algorithms to be employed to study optimal policy. These results are illustrated numerically using a reduced‐form model of the US economy in which changes in volatility are driven by a GARCH process and the rate of inflation. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Optimal monetary policy in a new Keynesian model with animal spirits and financial markets

This article presents a macro-finance-interaction model that integrates a NKM with bounded rationality and an agent-based financial market model. We derive four interactive channels between the two sectors where two channels are strictly microfounded. We analyze the impact of the different channels on economic stability and derive optimal (conventional and unconventional) monetary policy rules. We find that coefficients of optimal Taylor rules do not significantly change if financial market stabilization becomes part of the central bank׳s objective function. Additionally, we show that rule-based, backward-looking monetary policy creates huge instabilities if expectations are boundedly rational. Our model is externally validated by showing that it generates fat tailed output growth rates.     

Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of Technological Progress

In active investment climates where firms sequentially improve each other's products, a patent can terminate either because it expires or because a non-infringing innovation displaces its product in the market. We define the length of time until one of these happens as the effective patent life, and show how it depends on patent breadth. We distinguish lagging breadth, which protects against imitation, from leading breadth, which protects against new improved products. We compare two types of patent policy with leading breadth: (1) patents are finite but very broad, so that the effective life of a patent coincides with its statutory life, and (2) patents are long but narrow, so that the effective life of a patent ends when a better product replaces it. The former policy improves the diffusion of new products, but the latter has lower R&D costs.     

Input–output interactions and optimal monetary policy

This paper deals with the implications of factor demand linkages for monetary policy design in a two-sector dynamic general equilibrium model. Part of the output of each sector serves as a production input in both sectors, in accordance with a realistic input–output structure. Strategic complementarities induced by factor demand linkages significantly alter the transmission of shocks and amplify the loss of social welfare under optimal monetary policy, compared to what is observed in standard two-sector models. The distinction between value added and gross output that naturally arises in this context is of key importance to explore the welfare properties of the model economy. A flexible inflation targeting regime is close to optimal only if the central bank balances inflation and value added variability. Otherwise, targeting gross output variability entails a substantial increase in the loss of welfare.     

Getting Away with Robbery? Patenting Behavior with the Threat of Infringement

The paper examines how an innovator's ability to enforce her patent rights affects (and is affected by) her decision to patent her innovation and her patent breadth decision. Specifically, the paper shows that the innovator may find it optimal to patent her innovation even if litigation is not pursued in the event of patent imitation. The patent is valuable because it can be used to influence the entrant's location decision in a way that is profitable for the incumbent. In addition to showing that a patent need not be legally enforced to be valuable, the paper shows that the lower is the entrant's R&D cost, the smaller is the innovator's incentive to patent her product. If patenting occurs, however, the lower is the R&D cost, the greater is the patent breadth that could be chosen without triggering imitation.     

TRADE LIBERALIZATION, PUBLIC ABATEMENT, AND WELFARE

This paper discusses public abatement financed by pollution tax revenue or tariff revenue and investigates the welfare consequences of a tariff. The main result of this paper is that under certain conditions a tariff reduction results in an improvement in welfare through an increase in public abatement and a decrease in pollution. This result may guide policy for countries that wish to harmonize trade liberalization and the environmental protection demonstrated by both the private and the public sectors.     

The size distribution of innovations revisited: An application of extreme value statistics to citation and value measures of patent significance

This paper focuses on the analysis of size distributions of innovations, which are known to be highly skewed. We use patent citations as one indicator of innovation significance, constructing two large datasets from the European and US Patent Offices at a high level of aggregation, and the Trajtenberg [1990, A penny for your quotes: patent citations and the value of innovations. Rand Journal of Economics 21(1), 172–187] dataset on CT scanners at a very low one. We also study self-assessed reports of patented innovation values using two very recent patent valuation datasets from the Netherlands and the UK, as well as a small dataset of patent licence revenues of Harvard University. Statistical methods are applied to analyse the properties of the empirical size distributions, where we put special emphasis on testing for the existence of ‘heavy tails’, i.e., whether or not the probability of very large innovations declines more slowly than exponentially. While overall the distributions appear to resemble a lognormal, we argue that the tails are indeed fat. We invoke some recent results from extreme value statistics and apply the Hill [1975. A simple general approach to inference about the tails of a distribution. The Annals of Statistics 3, 1163–1174] estimator with data-driven cut-offs to determine the tail index for the right tails of all datasets except the NL and UK patent valuations. On these latter datasets we use a maximum likelihood estimator for grouped data to estimate the tail index for varying definitions of the right tail. We find significantly and consistently lower tail estimates for the returns data than the citation data (around 0.6–1 vs. 3–5). The EPO and US patent citation tail indices are roughly constant over time, but the latter estimates are significantly lower than the former. The heaviness of the tails, particularly as measured by value indicators, we argue, has significant implications for technology policy and growth theory, since the second and possibly even the first moments of these distributions may not exist.     

How R&D Competition Affects Investment Choices

We analyze firm research and development investment incentives in a framework in which only one innovation can be undertaken. We assume that the probability of discovering the innovation depends on a parameter that represents the technical difficulty of innovating. We show that patent protection is not always necessary for investments to be made. With patent protection, research and development competition leads to a symmetric equilibrium. Moreover, firms over‐invest in marginal innovation but under‐invest in difficult innovation, which explains why and how public authorities should intervene to promote specific research in certain economic sectors. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Macroeconomic conditions and investment stimuli

Based on a calibrated real options model, this paper examines a tax-subsidy program offered by a government to stimulate corporate investment under business cycles. We derive and discuss optimal incentive policies for different states of the economy. We find that it is optimal for the government to offer a combination of tax cuts and lump-sum subsidy for stimulating levered firms’ investment under business cycles. Furthermore, the government should adopt counter-cyclical tax-subsidy policy, namely a higher (lower) tax cuts and a larger (smaller) lump-sum subsidy during recessions (booms). In particular, we provide a possible explanation why many governments around the world have reduced and even implemented negative interest rates to stimulate the economy during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Finally, our conclusions also predict that the break-even tax-subsidy program always provides effective investment stimulus under business cycles.     

Monetary and fiscal policy under deep habits

Allowing habits to be formed at the level of individual goods – deep habits - can radically alter the fiscal policy transmission mechanism as the counter-cyclicality of mark-ups this implies can result in government spending crowding-in rather than crowding-out private consumption in the short run. We explore the robustness of this mechanism to the existence of price discrimination in the supply of goods to the public and private sectors. We then describe optimal monetary and fiscal policy in our New Keynesian economy subject to the additional externality of deep habits and explore the ability of simple policy rules to mimic fully optimal policy. We find that the presence of deep habits at empirically estimated levels can imply large externalities that significantly affect the conduct of monetary and tax policy. However, despite the rise in government spending multipliers implied by deep habits, government spending is barely used as a stabilisation tool under the optimal policy.     

THE APPLICABILITY OF THE TRADITIONAL THEORY OF ECONOMIC POLICY

Abstract. The traditional theory of economic policy requires targets, instruments, an empirical economic model, and a social welfare or criterion function to be specified in order to derive the optimal economic policy. Empirical studies of reaction functions suggest that economic policy is carried out in some systematic manner, subject to interference from political factors. This survey addresses the problems of specifying, estimating and applying an economic model when economic policy is following a path specified by a reaction function. Attention is paid to rational expectations, the Lucas'critique, and the policy neutrality proposition. Lack of knowledge of the policy maker's objective function poses the most serious difficulty when applying the theory of economic policy. Various methods of determining this function are reviewed, and the possibility that policy makers might be satisficing is discussed. The role played by political factors is considered in the light of the public choice literature.     

Social dumping and relocation: is there a case for imposing a social clause?

Public opinion in Europe seems worried about the relocation of production plants toward low wage countries often accused of practicing ‘social dumping’. To reduce the incentives for relocation trade unions proposed the adoption of ‘social clauses’ protecting domestic markets from commodities produced in countries where minimal labor condition are not met. We analyze the effects of the adoption of a social clause in a vertically differentiated Bertrand duopoly. We assess how such a policy affects firms’ relocation decisions in order to be able to assess its welfare implications. We also characterize the optimal social clause policy, both under domestic welfare maximization, and from an efficiency point of view. While we show that a social clause policy cannot be dismissed on domestic (or world) welfare grounds, its case is weaker the higher is the domestic wage and the lower is the foreign wage.     

Patents, Secrets, and the First-Inventor Defense

We analyze optimal patent design when innovators can rely on secrecy to protect their innovations. Secrecy has no fixed term but does not preclude accidental disclosure nor independent creation by other inventors. We derive the optimal scope of the rights conferred to such second inventors, showing that if the patent life is set optimally, second inventors should be allowed to patent and to exclude first inventors who have relied on secrecy. We then identify conditions under which it is socially desirable to increase patent life as much as is necessary to induce first inventors to patent. The circumstances in which it is preferable that they rely on secrecy seem rather limited .     

Welfare improving licensing with endogenous choice of prices versus quantities

This paper investigates the endogenous choice of prices versus quantities by taking into account patent licensing where the patent holder, which is itself a producer within the industry, licenses its cost-reducing innovation to the rival firm through a two-part tariff contract. For substitute products we find that both Cournot and mixed price-quantity competition may constitute the equilibrium outcomes, depending on the innovation size. Contrary to the results in Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2002), we show that the optimal licensing contract definitely leads to an increase in social welfare. Our result reinforces the positive welfare effect of patent licensing.     

Inflation tax in the lab: a theoretical and experimental study of competitive search equilibrium with inflation

In this paper we measure the effect of the inflation tax on economic activity and welfare within a controlled setting. To do so, we develop a model of price posting and monetary exchange with inflation and finite populations. The model, which provides a game–theoretic foundation to Rocheteau and Wright (2005)׳s competitive search monetary equilibrium, is used to derive theoretical propositions regarding the effects of inflation in this environment, which we test with a laboratory experiment that closely implements the theoretical framework. We find that the inflation tax is harmful – with cash holdings, production and welfare all falling as inflation rises – and that its effect is relatively larger at low inflation rates than at higher rates. For instance, for inflation rates between 0% and 5%, welfare in the two markets we consider (2[seller]×2[buyer] and 3×2) falls by roughly 1 percent for each percentage–point rise in inflation, compared with 0.4 percent over the range from 5% to 30%. Our findings lead us to conclude that the impact of the inflation tax should not be underestimated, even under low inflation.     

Sources of the great moderation: A time-series analysis of GDP subsectors

Recent work finds evidence that the volatility of the U.S. economy fell dramatically around the first quarter of 1984. We trace the timing of this so-called “Great Moderation” across many subsectors of the economy in order to better understand its root cause. We find that the interest rate sensitive sectors generally experience a much earlier volatility decline than other large sectors of the economy. The changes in Federal Reserve stabilization policies that occurred during the early 1980s support the view that an improved monetary policy played an important role in stabilizing real economic activity. We find only mild evidence that “good luck” was important and little evidence to support the claim that improved inventory management was important.     

Delegation in a mixed oligopoly: the case of multiple private firms

Previous research examining mixed duopolies shows that the use of an optimal incentive contract for the public firm increases welfare and that privatization reduces welfare. We demonstrate that these results do not generalize to a mixed oligopoly with multiple private firms. We derive the optimal incentive contract for a public firm that weighs both profit and welfare and show that its use may either increase or decrease welfare depending on the number of private firms and the exact nature of costs. We also identify the conditions that determine whether or not privatizing the public firm facing an optimal incentive contract reduces welfare. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Gains from interest-rate smoothing in a small open economy with zero-bound aversion

We extend the Monacelli [Monacelli, T. (2005). Monetary policy in a low pass-through environment. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 37(6), 1047–1066] model to allow for a central bank that penalizes nominal interest rate paths that are too close to the zero lower bound. We analytically derive the optimal interest-rate policy rule in each equilibrium under four policy regimes: (i) benchmark commitment to an ex-ante optimal monetary-policy plan; (ii) benchmark discretionary policy; (iii) optimal delegation to a discretionary policy maker with similar preferences to society; and (iv) optimal delegation to a discretionary policy maker with an additional taste for interest-rate smoothing. Under the commitment benchmark, the optimal interest-rate rule is proved to be intrinsically inertial, whereas this property is non-existent under discretionary policy. In the absence of commitment, there are gains to delegating policy to an interest-rate smoothing central banker. We show that while the endogenous law of one price gap in the model exacerbates the optimal policy trade-off that arises under discretionary policy, the latter feature of interest-rate smoothing acts to weaken it, by mimicking intrinsic inertia under the commitment policy.