The Structure of Payments in Technology Transfer Contracts: Evidence from Spain

This paper studies the impact of contract duration in determining scheduled payments in international transfers of technology. Analyzing a sample of contracts written by Spanish firms in 1991, the main empirical finding is a positive relationship between contract duration and the probability of the parties including variable payments in the first period of the agreement. This result suggests that the parties choose the type of payments to be made, whether fixed or variable, so as to avoid early termination of the relationship, even in the absence of opportunistic behavior or risk aversion.     

Corporate cash holdings and dividend payments: evidence from simultaneous analysis

This study explores the simultaneous relationship between corporate cash holdings and dividend policy using a large sample of around 400 non‐financial firms for the period from 1991 to 2008. The results show that cash holdings are affected by dividends, leverage, growth, size, risk, profitability, and working capital ratio. Dividend policy is affected by cash, leverage, growth, size, risk, and profit. When controlling for simultaneity, dividend payments do not appear to significantly affect cash holdings, nor do cash holdings affect dividend policy. The empirical analysis suggests that simultaneity is crucial in analyzing corporate cash holdings and dividend policy. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does the market provide sufficient employment protection?

We ask whether there is an efficiency rationale for public intervention in the form of an employment protection policy. Unlike most of the literature supporting current employment protection legislation we allow employers and workers to include severance payments in their private contracts. We focus attention on a model where firms learn over time about the value of the match. If future wage bargaining cannot be prevented, and even though severance payments may be part of the equilibrium contract, separations are too frequent (private employment protection is insufficient). Mandatory severance payments are not a remedy for this inefficiency. Instead, a Pigouvian tax/subsidy scheme will correct the inefficiency by enhancing employment protection.     

Differences Between Short‐ and Long‐Term Risk Aversion: An Optimal Asset Allocation Perspective

This paper studies the long‐term asset allocation problem of an investor with different risk aversion attitudes to the short and the long term. We characterize investor's preferences with a utility function exhibiting a regime shift in risk aversion at some point of the multiperiod investment horizon that is estimated using threshold nonlinearity methods. Our empirical results for a portfolio of cash, bonds and stocks suggest that long‐term risk aversion is higher than short‐term risk aversion and increases with the investment horizon. The exposure of the investment portfolio from stocks to bonds and cash increases with the degree of risk aversion.     

Optimal Two‐Part Pricing under Demand Uncertainty

This paper examines the pricing behavior of a risk‐averse monopolistic firm under demand uncertainty. The firm produces a single good at a constant marginal cost. To facilitate sales, the firm uses a two‐part pricing contract that includes a membership fee and a selling price per unit. The good is sold to a continuum of heterogeneous consumers who are subject to a common demand shock. We show that the global and marginal effects of risk aversion are to push the unit price closer to the constant marginal cost and to shrink the market coverage so as to limit the firm’s risk exposure to the demand uncertainty. The more risk‐averse firm as such charges a higher membership fee to consumers. We further show that an increase in the fixed cost of production induces the firm to lower (raise) the unit price, to raise (lower) the membership fee, and to shrink (enlarge) the market coverage under decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aversion. The firm’s optimal two‐part pricing contract, however, is unaffected by changes in the fixed cost under constant absolute risk aversion. Finally, we show that a mean‐preserving‐spread increase in the demand uncertainty induces the firm to lower the unit price, to raise the membership fee, and to shrink the market coverage under either decreasing or constant absolute risk aversion. The firm’s risk preferences as such play a pivotal role in determining the optimal two‐part pricing under demand uncertainty. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Costly State Verification with Varying Risk Preferences and Liability

Abstract.  In the scenario of loan contracts with costly state verification, we examine how the properties of the set of states, different risk preferences of debtors and varying liability of lenders affect the structure of optimal repayments. In particular, we show that with risk‐averse debtors, a general set of states, a constant observation cost and both unlimited and limited lender liability, the debtor is strictly better off revealing the true state of nature when his realized revenue is low, which implies that optimal debtor consumption has a downward jump around the single switch from observed to unobserved states. If the debtor can destroy revenue or if the debtor is risk neutral, this non‐monotonicity of consumption disappears. Moreover, given the loan size, there is more monitoring under debtor‐risk aversion than risk neutrality. We present simulations showing that a contract with unlimited lender liability and debtor‐risk aversion has a higher expected observation cost but a lower variance of consumption than a contract with limited lender liability. Finally, we discuss the problems of commitment to verification and contract renegotiation in this framework.     

Optimal consumption and investment under time-varying relative risk aversion

We consider the continuous time consumption-investment problem originally formalized and solved by Merton in case of constant relative risk aversion. We present a complete solution for the case where relative risk aversion with respect to consumption varies with time, having in mind an investor with age-dependent risk aversion. This provides a new motivation for life-cycle investment rules. We study the optimal consumption and investment rules, in particular in the case where the relative risk aversion with respect to consumption is increasing with age.     

Capital allocation to alternatives with a multivariate ladder gamma return distribution

This paper considers investment decision making when returns have a multivariate gamma distribution which has the particular correlation structure of Furman’s ladder gamma distribution. With an exponential utility function It is shown that there is a subset of the candidate investment opportunities to which investment should be allocated. This subset can be readily identified in a two step process that results in a list of candidate investments that is ranked in sequence of decreasing risk. The last investment opportunity on this list will be no risk cash. Investments are then selected from this list in sequence up to a cutoff point that depends on the investors capital and degree of risk aversion. If capital and degree of risk aversion are sufficiently large so that it is optimal to allocate some to no risk cash, then the capital allocated to each risky investment is a constant fraction of the total capital allocated to risky investments irrespective of how risk averse is the investor.     

Existence of optimal auctions in general environments

We provide a unified approach to the problem of existence of optimal auctions for a wide variety of auction environments. We accomplish this by first establishing a general existence result for a particular Stackelberg revelation game. By systematically specializing our revelation game to cover various types of auctions, we are able to deduce the existence of optimal Bayesian auction mechanisms for single and multiple unit auctions, as well as for contract auctions with moral hazard and adverse selection. In all cases, we allow for risk aversion and multidimensional, stochastically dependent types.     

Information content of unexpected dividends under a semi-mandatory dividend policy: An empirical study of China

We examine the information content of unexpected dividend changes under China’s unique semi-mandatory dividend policy, which requires firms to pay a minimum amount of cash dividends before they can undertake seasoned equity offerings (SEO). The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are significantly positive in response to unexpected dividend increase for non-SEO firms, but they are not significantly different from zero for SEO firms. For non-SEO firms, there is a significant positive relation between future earnings and unexpected dividend increases, but the relation is not significant for SEO firms. However, when considering additional refinancing costs for SEO firms caused by the mandatory dividend policy, higher dividend payments are associated with lower future earnings. Overall, our findings are consistent with both the dividend signaling theory and the negative effects of SEOs on a firm’s value.     

Attitude towards risk,uncertainty, and fixed investment

We explore the relevance of the risk attitude of managers to the investment-uncertainty relation. Higher moments of the distribution of net profits are used to measure the risk premium of the firm, from which we derive a proxy for the risk aversion of managers. Using an unbalanced panel of Dutch listed firms, we find that in general a low degree of risk aversion coincides with a positive impact of demand uncertainty on investment. More specifically, we find that risk-averse firms respond to demand uncertainty by cutting investment, while the investment undertaken by risk-taking firms responds to demand uncertainty positively.     

Drivers of firm formalization in Vietnam: an attention theory explanation

Informal enterprises are widely viewed as a mechanism to engage unemployed people in the economy and thereby alleviate poverty in developing economies. However, over-representation in an economy may lead to both economic growth and broader employment opportunities being sacrificed. This paper presents a process model to investigate three potential drivers for firms to formalize: the first from a desire to grow and develop the firm through innovation, the second from the wish to access government financial support and the third stimulated by the payment of unofficial payments or bribes. We use data from surveys of Vietnamese firms in 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011 to investigate these drivers of formalization. Although we find support for all three of these drivers, the results differ in significance across years and firm types. We explain these differences using attention theory to show how different situations and events can make the formalization decision more likely over time.     

The future international tax environment and European tax harmonization: a personal view

This study examines whether the decision to voluntarily (i.e. without a statutory obligation) employ two audit firms to conduct a joint audit is related to audit quality. We use separate samples and empirical designs for public and privately held companies in Sweden, where a sufficient number of companies have a joint audit on a voluntary basis. Our empirical findings suggest that companies opting to employ joint audits have a higher degree of earnings conservatism, lower abnormal accruals, better credit ratings and lower perceived risk of becoming insolvent within the next year than other firms. These findings are robust to the use of a propensity score matching technique to control for the differences in client characteristics between firms that employ joint audits and those that use single Big 4 auditors (i.e. auditor self-selection). We also find evidence that the choice of a joint audit is associated with substantial increases in the fees paid by the client firm, suggesting a higher perceived level of quality. Collectively, our analyses support the view that voluntary joint audits are positively associated with audit quality in a relatively low litigious setting both for public and private firms.     

Optimal corporate hedging using options with basis and production risk

We investigate the optimal hedging strategy for a firm using options, where the role of production and basis risk are considered. Contrary to the existing literature, we find that the exercise price which minimizes the shortfall of the hedged portfolio is primarily affected by the amount of cash spent on the hedging. Also, we decompose the effect of production and basis risk showing that the former affects hedging effectiveness while the latter drives the choice of the optimal contract. Fitting the model parameters to match a financial turmoil scenario confirms that suboptimal option moneyness leads to a non-negligible economic loss.     

Over-investment in corporate R&D,risk, and stock returns

Large-size firms which significantly increase their R&D expenditures experience subsequently three-year-long negative abnormal stock returns on the magnitude of 56 basis-points per month. We find no robust evidence of significant event-induced abnormal returns for small-size sample firms or any systematic risk changes for the small- and large- size firms. We also find that the large-size sample firms generate relatively much larger cash flows (i.e., have significantly greater over-investment discretion) and have significantly larger (over-) valuation multiples than the small-size firms. Moreover, some of their operating performance measures show signs of deterioration instead of improvement following these R&D programs. These findings are consistent with the view that investors initially underestimate the over-investment in R&D by some large-size firms that appear to be overvalued and have high cash flows at the time of the investment, only to be disappointed later.     

Cash holding dynamics and competition intensity: Evidence from UK firms

Using a quasi-natural experiment and various measures of competition intensity, we examine whether an increase in product market competition is a key driver of firm cash holdings. We find that firms increase cash holdings when competition is intense. The results suggest that the degree of increase in cash holdings is magnified among firms exposed to high predatory threat and financing friction. In addition, we examine if increasing cash holdings offers a competitive advantage in the product market. Our results indicate that firms with large cash reserves make gains in market share at the expense of their rivals. Gains in the product market are more pronounced among firms with low exposure to predatory risk and financing frictions.     

Bank capital regulation,loan contracts,and corporate investment

This paper studies the link between bank capital regulation, bank loan contracts and the allocation of corporate resources across firms’ different business lines. Credit risk is lower when firms write contracts that oblige them to invest mainly into projects with highly tangible assets. We argue that firms have an incentive to choose a contract with overly safe and thus inefficient investments when intermediation costs are increasing in banks’ capital-to-asset ratio. Imposing minimum capital adequacy for banks can eliminate this incentive by putting a lower bound on financing costs.     

Optimal investment for executive stockholders with exponential utility

The scope of this paper is to enhance the model for the own-company stockholder (Desmettre et?al. in Math Methods Oper Res 72(3):347?C378, 2010), who can voluntarily performance-link his personal wealth to his management success by acquiring stocks in the own-company whose value he can directly influence via spending work effort. The executive is thereby characterized by a parameter of risk aversion and the two work effectiveness parameters inverse work productivity and disutility stress. We extend the model to a constant absolute risk aversion framework using an exponential utility/disutility setup. A closed-form solution is given for the optimal work effort an executive will apply and we derive the optimal investment strategies of the executive. Furthermore, we determine an up-front fair cash compensation applying an indifference utility rationale. Our study shows to a large extent that the results previously obtained are robust under the choice of the utility/disutility setup.     

Revisiting Oligopolistic Reaction: Are Decisions on Foreign Direct Investment Strategic Complements?

Knickerbocker (1973) introduced the notion of oligopolistic reaction to explain why firms follow rivals into foreign markets. We develop a model that incorporates central features of Knickerbocker's story—oligopoly, uncertainty, and risk aversion—to establish the conditions required to generate follow-the-leader behavior. We find that rival foreign investment will make risk-neutral firms less inclined to move abroad once its rivals have done so. We show that Knickerbocker's prediction relies on risk aversion and derive an expression for the minimum amount of risk aversion needed to generate oligopolistic reaction.     

Priced risk and asymmetric volatility in the cross section of skewness

We investigate the sources of skewness in aggregate risk factors and the cross section of stock returns. In an ICAPM setting with conditional volatility, we find theoretical time series predictions on the relationships among volatility, returns, and skewness for priced risk factors. Market returns resemble these predictions; however, size, book-to-market, and momentum factor returns are not always consistent with our predictions. We find evidence that size and book-to-market may be priced post-crisis but not in the decade before. Momentum does not appear priced by our test. We link aggregate risk and skewness to individual stocks and find empirically that the risk aversion effect manifests in individual stock skewness. Additionally, we find several firm characteristics that explain stock skewness. Smaller firms, value firms, highly levered firms, and firms with poor credit ratings have more positive skewness.