Bad news in the Great Depression,the Great Recession,and other U.S. recessions: A comparative study

In economic recessions consumption usually drops in tandem with other aggregate quantities as output or employment. Following the permanent income hypothesis, these drops can be rationalized by the idea that consumers have pessimistic views about their long-run income. Using a standard signal-extraction model, we show that this pessimism can be due either to a persistent fall of aggregate productivity before and during the recession (signaling a future decline of income), or to other negative information unrelated to contemporaneous fundamentals, which we label “bad news”. We classify U.S. recessions (from 1919 to 2015) according to a (bad) news index reflecting this negative information. We find that both the Great Depression and the Great Recession score highest in this index. The index is such that we can rule out that this is due merely to the length or the depth of these recessions. Instead, these two recessions are similar in that both were aggravated by a wave of pessimism about future income which cannot be related to contemporaneous fundamentals.     

Predicting ordinary and severe recessions with a three-state Markov-switching dynamic factor model: An application to the German business cycle

We estimate a Markow-switching dynamic factor model with three states based on six leading business cycle indicators for Germany, preselected from a broader set using the elastic net soft-thresholding rule. The three states represent expansions, normal recessions and severe recessions. We show that a two-state model is not sensitive enough to detect relatively mild recessions reliably when the Great Recession of 2008/2009 is included in the sample. Adding a third state helps to distinguish normal and severe recessions clearly, so that the model identifies all business cycle turning points in our sample reliably. In a real-time exercise, the model detects recessions in a timely manner. Combining the estimated factor and the recession probabilities with a simple GDP forecasting model yields an accurate nowcast for the steepest decline in GDP in 2009Q1, and a correct prediction of the timing of the Great Recession and its recovery one quarter in advance.     

Financial Depth and the Asymmetric Impact of Monetary Policy

This paper investigates the importance of financial depth in evaluating the asymmetric impact of monetary policy on real output over the course of the US business cycle. We show that monetary policy has a significant impact on output growth during recessions. We also show that financial deepening plays an important role by dampening the effects of monetary policy shocks in recessions. The results are robust to the use of alternative financial depth and monetary policy shock measures as well as to two different sample periods.     

Residential investment and recession predictability

We assess the importance of residential investment for the prediction of economic recessions for an unbalanced panel of 12 OECD countries over the period 1960Q1–2014Q4. Our approach is to estimate various probit models with different leading indicators and evaluate their relative prediction accuracies using the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve as our forecasting performance metric. We document that residential investment contains information that is useful for predicting recessions both in-sample and out-of-sample. This result is robust to adding typical leading indicators, such as the term spread, stock prices, consumer confidence surveys and oil prices. It is shown that residential investment is particularly useful for the prediction of recessions for countries with high home-ownership rates. Finally, in a separate exercise for the US, we show that the predictive ability of residential investment is — in a broad sense — robust to employing real-time data.     

Time-varying cyclicality of fiscal policy: The case of the Euro area

We assess the cyclicality of fiscal policy in the 19 Euro area countries, notably during recessions, for the period 1995–2020. We use a time-varying measure of fiscal cyclicality to describe fiscal policy developments. The results suggest that during recessions discretionary fiscal policy becomes more pro-cyclical, but the overall budget balance becomes more counter-cyclical. Hence, pursuing a Ricardian fiscal regime by more indebted countries leads to higher counter-cyclicality of fiscal policy. Government size reduces counter-cyclicality, as well as trade openness, and financial development has a positive impact on counter-cyclicality.     

Information rigidity in growth forecasts: Some cross-country evidence

We document information rigidity in forecasts of real GDP growth in 46 countries over the past two decades. We also investigate: (i) whether rigidities differ across countries, particularly between advanced countries and emerging markets; (ii) whether rigidities are lower around turning points in the economy, such as in times of recessions and crises; and (iii) how quickly forecasters incorporate news about growth in other countries into their growth forecasts, with a focus on the way in which advanced countries’ growth forecasts incorporate news about emerging market growth, and vice versa.     

Stock market volatility and the business cycle

This paper investigates the joint time series behavior of monthly stock returns and growth in industrial production. We find that stock returns are well characterized by year-long episodes of high volatility, separated by longer quiet periods. Real output growth, on the other hand, is subject to abrupt changes in the mean associated with economic recessions. We study a bivariate model in which these two changes are driven by related unobserved variables, and conclude that economic recessions are the primary factor that drives fluctuations in the volatility of stock returns. This framework proves useful both for forecasting stock volatility and for identifying and forecasting economic turning points.     

Keynesian impulses versus Solow residuals: identifying sources of business cycle fluctuations

We employ a neoclassical business‐cycle model to study two sources of business‐cycle fluctuations: marginal efficiency of investment shocks, and total factor productivity shocks. The parameters of the model are estimated using a Bayesian procedure that accommodates prior uncertainty about their magnitudes; from these estimates, posterior distributions of the two shocks are obtained. The postwar US experience suggests that both shocks are important in understanding fluctuations, but that total factor productivity shocks are primarily responsible for beginning and ending recessions. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The macroeconomic effects of uncertainty shocks: The role of the financial channel

This paper studies the macroeconomic effects of uncertainty shocks with an emphasis on the interaction between elevated uncertainty and credit market conditions when the economy is in different regimes (recessions vs. non-recessions). We use a smooth-transition factor-augmented vector autoregression (ST-FAVAR) and a large monthly panel of U.S. macroeconomic and financial indicators in our estimation. Our findings are twofold. First, while an unanticipated increase in uncertainty has adverse effects on the real economy and financial markets, the effects are quantitatively larger during recessions. Second, the financial channel is important in the transmission of uncertainty shocks, with a greater role during recessions and in the short run.     

Does recession drive convergence in firms’ productivity? Evidence from Spanish manufacturing firms

This paper provides evidence on the effect of recessions and expansions on the productivity growth rate of productivity leaders and followers. We use data of a representative sample of the Spanish manufacturing sector for the period 1991 and 2005. These data allow us to estimate firm level productivity for a relatively long period of time and provide us with firm level perception of the business cycle. We find that productivity tends to converge in recessions because, in these periods, the productivity growth of followers is higher than the productivity growth of leaders. This fact is consistent with theoretical models of managerial incentives and competition. A recession can be seen as an exogenous increase in competition that reduces demand and poses a threat of liquidation. This threat is higher for followers and is high enough to create asymmetric incentives to become more productive. We test the robustness of our results to sample selection and different productivity measure.     

The Government Spending Multiplier at the Zero Lower Bound: Evidence from the United States

We estimate state‐dependent government spending multipliers for the United States. We use a factor‐augmented interacted vector autoregression (FAIVAR) model. This allows us to capture the time‐varying monetary policy characteristics including the recent zero interest rate lower bound (ZLB) state, to account for the state of the business cycle and to address the limited information problem typically inherent in VARs. We identify government spending shocks by sign restrictions and use a government spending growth forecast series to account for the effects of anticipated fiscal policy. In our baseline specification, we find that government spending multipliers in a recession range from 3.56 to 3.79 at the ZLB. Away from the ZLB, multipliers in recessions range from 2.31 to 3.05. Several robustness analyses confirm that multipliers are higher, when the interest rate is lower and that multipliers in recessions exceed multipliers in expansions. Our results are consistent with theories that predict larger multipliers at the ZLB.     

Global recessions as a cascade phenomenon with interacting agents

This paper examines global recessions as a cascade phenomenon. In other words, how recessions arising within one or more countries might percolate across a network of connected economies. An agent based model is set up in which the agents are Western economies. A country has a probability of entering recession in any given year and one of emerging from it the next. In addition, the agents have a threshold propensity, which varies across time, to import a recession from the agents most closely connected to them. The agents are connected on a network, and an agent’s neighbours at any time are either in (state 1) or out (state 0) of recession. If the weighted sum exceeds the threshold, the agent also goes into recession. Annual real GDP growth for 17 Western countries 1871–2006 is used as the data set. The model is able to replicate three key features of the statistical distribution of recessions: the distribution of the number of countries in recession in any given year, the duration of recessions within the individual countries, and the distribution of ‘wait time’ between recessions i.e. the number of years between them. The network structure is important for the interacting agents to replicate the stylised facts. The country-specific probabilities of entering and emerging from recession by themselves give results which are by no means as well matched to the actual data. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for some extremely helpful comments.     

Factor analysis of permanent and transitory dynamics of the US economy and the stock market

We analyze dynamics of the permanent and transitory components of the US economic activity and the stock market obtained by multivariate dynamic factor modeling. We capture asymmetries over the phases of economic and stock market trends and cycles using independent Markov‐switching processes. We show that both output and stock prices contain significant transitory components, while consumption and dividends are useful to identify their respective permanent components. The extracted economic trend perfectly predicts all post‐war recessions. Our results shed light on the nature of the bilateral predictability of the economy and the stock market. The transitory stock market component signals recessions with an average lead of one quarter, whereas the market trend is correlated with the economic trend with varying lead/lag times. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Government Spending Multiplier at the Zero Lower Bound: Evidence from the United States

We estimate state-dependent government spending multipliers for the United States. We use a factor-augmented interacted vector autoregression (FAIVAR) model. This allows us to capture the time-varying monetary policy characteristics including the recent zero interest rate lower bound (ZLB) state, to account for the state of the business cycle and to address the limited information problem typically inherent in VARs. We identify government spending shocks by sign restrictions and use a government spending growth forecast series to account for the effects of anticipated fiscal policy. In our baseline specification, we find that government spending multipliers in a recession range from 3.56 to 3.79 at the ZLB. Away from the ZLB, multipliers in recessions range from 2.31 to 3.05. Several robustness analyses confirm that multipliers are higher, when the interest rate is lower and that multipliers in recessions exceed multipliers in expansions. Our results are consistent with theories that predict larger multipliers at the ZLB.     

Nonlinear effects of government spending shocks in the USA: Evidence from state‐level data

This paper uses state‐level data to estimate the effect of government spending shocks during expansions and recessions. By employing a mixed‐frequency framework, we are able to include a long span of annual state‐level government spending data in our nonlinear quarterly panel VAR model. We find evidence that for the average state the fiscal multiplier is larger during recessions. However, there is substantial heterogeneity across the cross‐section. The degree of nonlinearity in the effect of spending shocks is larger in states that are subject to a higher degree of financial frictions. In contrast, states with a prevalence of manufacturing, mining and agricultural industries tend to have multipliers that are more similar across business cycle phases.     

Kernel-based calibration diagnostics for recession and inflation probability forecasts

A probabilistic forecast is the estimated probability with which a future event will occur. One interesting feature of such forecasts is their calibration, or the match between the predicted probabilities and the actual outcome probabilities. Calibration has been evaluated in the past by grouping probability forecasts into discrete categories. We show here that we can do this without discrete groupings; the kernel estimators that we use produce efficiency gains and smooth estimated curves relating the predicted and actual probabilities. We use such estimates to evaluate the empirical evidence on the calibration error in a number of economic applications, including the prediction of recessions and inflation, using both forecasts made and stored in real time and pseudo-forecasts made using the data vintage available at the forecast date. The outcomes are evaluated using both first-release outcome measures and subsequent revised data. We find substantial evidence of incorrect calibration in professional forecasts of recessions and inflation from the SPF, as well as in real-time inflation forecasts from a variety of output gap models.     

Has the Euro‐Mediterranean Partnership Affected Mediterranean Business Cycles?

We date turning points of the reference cycle for 19 Mediterranean countries and analyze their structure and interdependencies. Fluctuations are volatile and not highly correlated across countries; recessions are deep but asynchronous, the distribution of output losses in recessions spread out. Heterogeneities across countries and regions are substantial. Cyclical fluctuations are poorly related to trade and financial linkages. Mediterranean cycles are time varying but their evolution is not linked with the Euro‐Mediterranean partnership process. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Macroeconomic Effects of Precautionary Demand for Oil

We evaluate the macroeconomic effects of shocks specific to the oil market, which mainly reflect fluctuations in precautionary demand for oil driven by uncertainty about future supplies. A two‐stage identification procedure is used. First, daily changes in the futures–spot price spread proxy for precautionary demand shocks and the path of oil prices is estimated. This information is then exploited to restrict the oil price response in a vector autoregression. Impulse responses suggest that such shocks reduce output and raise prices. Historical decomposition shows that they contributed significantly to the US recessions in the 1990s and in the early 2000s, but not to the most recent slump. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Business cycles and redistribution: The role of government quality

We study how government quality mediates the relationship between business cycles and redistribution. Our key hypothesis is that the potential of income redistribution to reduce rising inequality levels after an economic crisis depends on government quality. The empirical evidence based on a panel of 46 countries over the period 1996–2016 lends strong support to this hypothesis. We find that macroeconomic recessions promote redistribution of income in high government quality contexts, but they lead to wider economic inequalities in countries with poor quality of government.     

The uncertainty multiplier and business cycles

I study a business cycle model where agents learn about the fundamentals by accumulating capital. During recessions, agents invest less, and this generates noisier estimates of macroeconomic conditions and an increase in uncertainty. The endogenous increase in aggregate uncertainty further reduces economic activity and thus gives rise to a multiplier effect that amplifies aggregate fluctuations. To discipline learning dynamics, I parametrize the model so that it matches not only standard business cycle moments but also survey data on macroeconomic forecasts. I find that the uncertainty multiplier amplifies output standard deviation by 16%.