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1.
This paper provides a theoretical analysis of an overlapping generations economy in which production decisions and input–output allocations are all carried out at the family level. I consider a single class of output allocation schemes and various degrees of knowledge about the production technology. Under complete knowledge, I show that a family organizational structure in which everyone receives his marginal contribution to output, invests less in physical capital than under a perfectly competitive equilibrium environment. Under incomplete knowledge, I analyze and compare how beliefs about the input–output relationship affect the physical capital accumulation dynamics and the long-run standards of living. 相似文献
2.
Jakob Grazzini 《Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination》2013,8(1):179-209
This paper builds an agent-based model to reproduce the results of an experimental stock market that studies how the market aggregates private information. The aim is to use experiments and agent-based modeling to analyze the trading behavior in experimental stock markets. Using the experimental environment and results, it is possible to formulate a hypothesis about the subjects’ behavior and thereby formalize (algorithmically) the trading behavior in an agent-based model. This may lead to a better understanding of how the market converges to an equilibrium and of the mechanism that allows dissemination of private information in the market. 相似文献
3.
We consider a pure exchange economy with a continuum of agents and finitely many indivisible commodities. Every commodity can be consumed only in integer amounts. Thus, agents’ preferences are locally satiated and no commodity bundle has necessarily local cheaper points. We introduce a core which is an intermediate concept between the strong core and the weak core. In our economy, this core is the most natural concept in the sense that it coincides with the set of all exactly feasible Walras allocations. 相似文献
4.
In his seminal paper on arbitrage and competitive equilibrium in unbounded exchange economies, Werner (1987) proved the existence of a competitive equilibrium, under a price no-arbitrage condition, without assuming either local or global nonsatiation. Werner’s existence result contrasts sharply with classical existence results for bounded exchange economies which require, at minimum, global nonsatiation at rational allocations. Why do unbounded exchange economies admit existence without local or global nonsatiation? This question is the focus of our paper. First, we show that in unbounded exchange economies, even if some agents’ preferences are satiated, the absence of arbitrage is sufficient for the existence of competitive equilibria, as long as each agent who is satiated has a nonempty set of useful net trades– that is, as long as agents’ preferences satisfy weak nonsatiation. Second, we provide a new approach to proving existence in unbounded exchange economies. The key step in our new approach is to transform the original economy to an economy satisfying global nonsatiation such that all equilibria of the transformed economy are equilibria of the original economy. What our approach makes clear is that it is precisely the condition of weak nonsatiation – a condition considerably weaker than local or global nonsatiation – that makes possible this transformation. 相似文献
5.
Vladimír Gazda Marek Gróf Július Horváth Matú? Kubák Tomá? Rosival 《Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination》2012,7(2):209-221
This article proposes a model of a simple economy based on a set of agent-based modeling principles. The model is based on the ??trust game?? formulated by Berg et?al. (Games Econ Behav 10:122?C142, 1995), and anticipates a random matching of partners taking in to account adaptive agent behavior. Simulation in the NetLogo programming environment, using profile distributions obtained from empirical studies, has shown the most successful agents to posses low parameters of trust in the role of Sender and high parameters of trustworthiness in the role of Receiver. 相似文献
6.
It is known that the classical theorems of Grodal [Grodal, B., 1972. A second remark on the core of an atomless economy. Econometrica 40, 581–583] and Schmeidler [Schmeidler, D., 1972. A remark on the core of an atomless economy. Econometrica 40, 579–580] on the veto power of small coalitions in finite dimensional, atomless economies can be extended (with some minor modifications) to include the case of countably many commodities. This paper presents a further extension of these results to include the case of uncountably many commodities. We also extend Vind’s [Vind, K., 1972. A third remark on the core of an atomless economy. Econometrica 40, 585–586] classical theorem on the veto power of big coalitions in finite dimensional, atomless economies to include the case of an arbitrary number of commodities. In another result, we show that in the coalitional economy defined by an atomless individualistic model, core–Walras equivalence holds even if the commodity space is non-separable. The above-mentioned results are also valid for a differential information economy with a finite state space. We also extend Kannai’s [Kannai, Y., 1970. Continuity properties of the core of a market. Econometrica 38, 791–815] theorem on the continuity of the core of a finite dimensional, large economy to include the case of an arbitrary number of commodities. All of our results are applications of a lemma, that we prove here, about the set of aggregate alternatives available to a coalition. Throughout the paper, the commodity space is assumed to be an ordered Banach space which has an interior point in its positive cone. 相似文献
7.
An agent-based model is used to determine market equilibrium with price-setting firms in an oligopoly market. The agent-based
model is designed to match the experimental rules that Brandts and Guillen (J Ind Econ 55:453–474, 2007) used with human subjects. Their model uses posted prices and advance production of a perishable good. When the marginal
cost is zero, the analytical Bertrand solution is almost perfect competition. When the marginal cost is nonzero, the game
does not have a theoretical equilibrium in pure strategies. The agent-based model results show that with one or two firms,
prices are at or near the monopoly level, which matches the human experiments. With four firms, prices are always at the perfectly
competitive level when particle swarm optimization is used. Results using a genetic algorithm, however, are noisier than those
using the particle swarm optimization, and the genetic algorithm falls short of the competitive solution. The triopoly market
changes from mostly monopoly to a price in between monopoly and perfect competition when a marginal cost is added. The computerized
agents tend to overproduce so that profits are negative in the three- and four-firm cases when production is costly. While
the prices in the simulation are close to those observed in experiments with human subjects, the inefficiency due to overproduction
is much greater in the agent-based model results. This result suggests that human agents are able to reach solutions, perhaps
through social norms, that are missed by the simple agent-based rules used here. 相似文献
8.
We complement the Sonnenschein–Mantel–Debreu results by establishing that an exchange economy, i.e., preferences and endowments, that generates a given aggregate excess demand (AED) function is close to the economy that generates a perturbation of this AED. As a consequence, genericity and determinacy results obtained by direct perturbation of an AED are as strong as results obtained by perturbing preferences and endowments. 相似文献
9.
Intertemporal recursive utility and an equilibrium asset pricing model in the presence of Lévy jumps
This paper presents an equilibrium formulation of asset pricing in an environment of mixed Poisson–Brownian information with recursive utility. The optimal portfolio choice problem is studied together with a derivation of Euler equation as necessary condition for optimality. It is further shown that the price processes governed by the Euler equation, together with the market clearing conditions, constitute the equilibrium price processes. Closed form formulas are derived for European call options and for other derivative securities in a particular parameterization of the economy. The derived option pricing formula contain many existing models as special cases, and is potentially useful in explaining the moneyness biasedness associated with Black–Scholes model. 相似文献
10.
In the spirit of Smale’s work, we consider pure exchange economies with general consumption sets. In this paper, the consumption set of each household is described in terms of a function called possibility function. The main innovation comes from the dependency of each possibility function with respect to the individual endowments. We prove that, generically in the space of endowments and possibility functions, economies are regular. A regular economy has a finite number of equilibria, which locally depend on endowments and possibility functions in a continuous manner. 相似文献
11.
The purpose of this paper is to define a new notion of local equilibrium in an exchange economy, where the consumers face lower bounds on net trades. Then, we show that the local equilibrium is unique if the lower bounds are closed enough to 0. By the way, we also provide a convergence result of local equilibrium price toward Walras equilibrium price of a suitable tangent linear economy. 相似文献
12.
In an environment in which agents have nonlinear utility and sufficiently asymmetric initial endowments, we show that efficient trading is achievable. This result is in contrast with Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), which shows efficient trading is not possible if agents have linear utility and asymmetric initial endowments. Our result is also different from Cramton et al. (1987), in which they maintain the linear utility assumption as in Myerson and Satterthwaite but assume that traders’ initial endowments are relatively symmetric. 相似文献
13.
This paper develops an agent-based model of a stylized low income region in order to study the impact of natural disasters on population displacement, income, prices, and consumption with a focus on distributions and coping strategies of low income groups. Key features of the model include the integration of decentralized markets into a full economy in a spatially explicit way and the analysis of short-run adjustment processes. The model is calibrated to a low income region of rural agrarian Pakistan that faced severe floods in 2010. Dynamic adaptation by agents in response to falling income includes migrating and running down savings. Despite these consumption smoothing strategies, some low income groups are vulnerable to starvation. The paper showcases two hypothetical policy scenarios, a cash and a food transfer program, and tracks their effects on the welfare of low income groups in the economy. 相似文献
14.
Qiming Lu G. Korniss Boleslaw K. Szymanski 《Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination》2009,4(2):221-235
We study the dynamics of the Naming Game (Baronchelli et al. in J Stat Mech Theory Exp P06014, 2006b) in empirical social
networks. This stylized agent-based model captures essential features of agreement dynamics in a network of autonomous agents,
corresponding to the development of shared classification schemes in a network of artificial agents or opinion spreading and
social dynamics in social networks. Our study focuses on the impact that communities in the underlying social graphs have
on the outcome of the agreement process. We find that networks with strong community structure hinder the system from reaching
global agreement; the evolution of the Naming Game in these networks maintains clusters of coexisting opinions indefinitely.
Further, we investigate agent-based network strategies to facilitate convergence to global consensus. 相似文献
15.
One-shot interaction and repeated interaction often co-exist in the real world. We study possible behavioral effects of this co-existence in a principal-agent setting, in which a principal simultaneously employs a permanent and a temporary agent. Our experimental results indicate that there is “discrimination” between the two agents and that the available information for agents determines the extent of this discrimination, even though the theoretical solution of the game implies equal treatment of agents. Discrimination is, thus, a consequence of reciprocity. Agents that are discriminated against react negatively by withholding effort. 相似文献
16.
This study discusses the validation of an agent-based model of emergent city systems with heterogeneous agents. To this end, it proposes a simplified version of the original agent-based model and subjects it to mathematical analysis. The proposed model is transformed into an analytically tractable discrete Markov model, and its city size distribution is examined. Its discrete nature allows the Markov model to be used to validate the algorithms of computational agent-based models. We show that the Markov chains lead to a power-law distribution when the ranges of migration options are randomly distributed across the agent population. We also identify sufficient conditions under which the Markov chains produce the Zipf׳s Law, which has never been done within a discrete framework. The conditions under which our simplified model yields the Zipf׳s Law are in agreement with, and thus validate, the configurations of the original heterogeneous agent-based model. 相似文献
17.
While most of the literature starting with Shapley and Scarf (1974) have considered a static exchange economy with indivisibilities, this paper studies the dynamics of such an economy. We find that both the dynamics generated by competitive equilibrium and the one generated by the weak dominance relation, converge to a set of allocations we define as strictly stable, which we can show to exist. Moreover, we show that even when only pairwise exchanges between two traders are allowed, the strictly stable allocations are attained eventually if traders are sufficiently farsighted. 相似文献
18.
We investigate how the financial fragility in the real economy is affected by the average level of interdependence among agents across different regions of the economy. To this end, we develop a parsimonious agent-based model of firms and banks organized in geographic regions. The model is built on the framework of an existing class of models for business fluctuations. The goal of our exercise is to clarify the effect on systemic failures of the interplay between network interconnectedness and financial acceleration. In particular, we investigate the probability of individual and systemic failures with varying levels of interconnectedness. We find that, in the absence of financial acceleration, connectivity makes the system more resilient. In contrast, in the presence of financial acceleration, the probability of both individual and systemic failures are minimized at intermediate level of diversification. 相似文献
19.
Sandeep Baliga 《Review of Economic Design》2002,7(1):17-26
Abstract. It is well-known that, when agents in an organization possess private information that is unverifiable by an outside party,
games where agents simply announce their information can have multiple equilibria that may impede the successful implementation
of the organization's objectives. We show that the introduction of a professional monitor (e.g. auditor, regulator, supervisor)
can help to destroy the “bad' equilibria when agents have private information but have incomplete info
rmation about others' information.
Received: 21 May 1998 / Accepted: 26 May 2000 相似文献
20.
In a smooth pure exchange economy with fixed total resources we investigate whether the smooth selection property holds when endowments are redistributed across consumers through a continuous (non-local) redistribution policy. We show that if the policy is regular then there exists a unique continuous path of equilibrium prices which support it. 相似文献