Pareto Density Distributions

Building on new insights into the genesis ofPareto-Distributions,(“Kopp” effect etc.) as publishedearlier in “Quality and Quantity”, the author gives at least oneauthentic/definitive Pareto-Formula. A practical example of the synthetic generation of Pareto Distributions by means of spreadsheets. A working D.I.Y-method for fine-fitting Pareto-curvesto scattergrams with spreadsheets using interalia an indirect method of the least squares of residuals is fully demonstrated. A comparative test-fit to a cumulative Pareto- Distribution example, where a simulative curve-formula evolved by Prof. B. Arnold/Ucla is used for demonstration. Easy to absorb and to retain graphical tableaux are employed to visualize the chain of descent and interconnections between normal distributions, log-normal distributions and Pareto- Distributions. A quasi-dichotomy of the Pareto-formulae is presented in tableau-form. One innovative formula for Pareto-distribution is given as: F(x)= k^*e― [((ln(Integral(In(x)))) ‐ (ln(Integral(ln(μ)))))² / 2^*(ln(Integral(ln(σ))))²} Readers e-mailed constructive opinions &/or inputs are encouraged and welcomed. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

人力资源管理中的帕累托定律

人力资源管理是组织管理中的重要内容,文章提出运用帕累托定律进行核心人力资源的管理以带动整个组织的成员,力求以最小投入得到最大产出。     

Random aggregation without the Pareto principle

Barberà-Sonnenschein (J Econ Theory 18:244–254, 1978) have shown that any binary and Paretian random social choice function can be associated with a mapping which associates a real number with each coalition of individuals. This function gives, for each coalition, the power that this group has in imposing on society, their common preference relation on a pair of alternatives. The aim of this paper is to extend this result, showing that the Pareto criterion is not a necessary condition for the existence of such a coalitional power function.     

Pareto optimality in continuous-time OLG economies

The aim of this paper is the achievement of a complete characterization of the Pareto optimality of competitive equilibria for deterministic, pure exchange, continuous-time economies with a countable number of overlapping generations, where each consumer’s life-span consists in a bounded interval of time. For such an environment, we obtain separate sufficient and necessary conditions for Pareto optimality in the form of the Cass’ criterion, that is, in terms of the equilibrium prices. However, these conditions are not equivalent in general. Therefore, in order to get that equivalence we are compelled to impose certain restrictions, either on consumers’ lifetimes, assuming that all of them have the same longevity, or on the dynamic behaviour of relative intertemporal equilibrium prices. In both cases, we are able to derive a single condition that is sufficient and necessary for efficiency, thus achieving full characterizations.     

Pareto ordering of distributions

In this paper, the state of an economy is described by a production plan and a distribution on the product space of agents' characteristics and the commodity space. An ordering on the set of states will be introduced and after a study of the structure of this ordering it will be shown that the close relationship between price equilibria and optimal states remains true in this framework.     

The Pareto optimality distribution

Pareto optimality (sometimes known as Pareto efficiency) is an important notion in social sciences and related areas, see e.g. Klaus (2006), Chun (2005), Hild (2004), Kibris (2003), Nandeibam (2003), Papai (2001), Peris and Sanchez (2001), Brams and Fishburn (2000), Denicolo (1999), Klaus et al. (1998), Peremans et al. (1997), and Vohra (1992). This notion invariably involves the comparison of the utility of one outcome versus another, i.e. the ratio of two utilities or in general the ratio of two random variables. In this note, we derive the exact distribution of the ratio X/(X + Y) when X and Y are Pareto random variables, Pareto distribution being the first and the most popular distribution used in social sciences and related areas.     

A product Pareto distribution

The Pareto distributions are becoming increasing prominent in several applied areas. In this note, a new Pareto distribution is introduced. It takes the form of the product of two Pareto probability density functions. Various structural properties of this distribution are derived, including its cumulative distribution function, moments, mean deviation about the mean, mean deviation about the median, entropy, asymptotic distribution of the extreme order statistics, method of moments estimates, maximum likelihood estimates and the Fisher information matrix. The calculations involve the use of several special functions.     

Characterizations of the Pareto and related distributions

In this note, a class of Pareto distributions is characterized based on the Shannon entropy of k-record statistics. As a consequence of that characterizations of the uniform and exponential distributions are given. Received: October 1999     

Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations

This paper considers Nash implementation and double implementation of Pareto efficient allocations for production economies. We allow production sets and preferences are unknown to the planner. We present a well-behaved mechanism that fully implements Pareto efficient allocations in Nash equilibrium. The mechanism then is modified to fully doubly implement Pareto efficient allocations in Nash and strong Nash equilibria. The mechanisms constructed in the paper have many nice properties such as feasibility and continuity. In addition, they use finite-dimensional message spaces. Furthermore, the mechanism works not only for three or more agents, but also for two-agent economies.     

On the structure of Pareto optimal cake partitions

We study Pareto optimal partitions of a “cake” among n players. Each player uses a countably additive non-atomic probability measure to evaluate the size of pieces of cake. We present two geometric pictures appropriate for this study and consider the connection between these pictures and the maximization of convex combinations of measures, which we studied in Barbanel and Zwicker [Barbanel, J.B., Zwicker, W., 1997. Two applications of a theorem of Dvoretsky, Wald, and Wolfovitz to cake division. Theory and Decision 43, 203–207].     

A social procedurial approach to the Pareto optimization problematique

This article applies a variant of game theory to the Pareto multi-value problematique, that is situations where members of a group, community or society are faced with alternative allocations, institutional arrangements, or states of the world and may collectively choose an allocation, institutional arrangement or state of the world if they can agree on it. This type of multiple value decision situation is increasingly prevalent not only on the level of societal and political issues but on the level of many enterprises, particularly those advocating corporate social responsibility. Because actors hold and apply values from different perspectives, there are potential contradictory value judgments and incompatible equilibria. In a world of contradiction, incommensurability, and disequilibrium, to what extent can conflicts be resolved and social equilibrium accomplished? Force works but it is inherently unstable. Drawing on an extension of classical game theory, generalized game theory (GGT), this article addresses the multi-value problematique in terms of collective “resolution procedures.” These regulative procedures—or social algorithms—are applied to problems of conflict and suboptimality in a multiple value world such as Pareto envisioned. This paper (the first of two) outlines key elements of GGT, defines the Pareto multi-value problematique, pointing out several of the critical weaknesses, theoretical as well as empirical, of the Pareto approach. GGT is then applied in defining and analyzing several major procedures to realize improvements in a multi-value world characterized by conflict and sub-optimality. A second article conceptualizes a complex of societal games making up a social system with 2-phase multi-level game processes; it applies the conceptualization to the different societal procedures for multi-value choice under conditions of conflict. Procedures such as democratic voting, adjudication and administrative decision-making, and multi-lateral negotiation are capable of producing outcomes that in many cases are widely accepted as legitimate and become social equilibria (at least within some range of conditions). These procedures and the conditions for their activation and implementation are modelled and explicated through a generalized game approach.     

考虑无转移支付的VMI系统Pareto改进

收益共享机制下的转移支付是影响供应商积极实施VMI的关键因素。在当前处于强势地位的下游企业不愿意提供转移支付的情况下,如何实现VMI系统的Pareto改进呢?将转移支付成本与物流供应商采用业务延伸策略为项目型企业提供终端产品所产生的成本领先优势进行比较发现,业务延伸策略下的VMI既弥补了无转移支付对供应商所造成的经济损失,又帮助项目型企业节省了实施自我服务策略时所投入的相关成本,如库存成本和加工设备成本,从而实现了VMI系统的Pareto改进。     

Pareto optimality and competitive equilibrium in infinite horizon economies

The paper presents a general model of a decentralized economy evolving over an infinite time horizon. Alternative notions of price systems, competitive equilibria, efficiency and optimality are introduced. The main results characterize conditions under which the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics are valid in such a general framework.     

Nash-implementation of the weak Pareto choice rule for indecomposable environments

A feasible mechanism is constructed which weakly Nash-implements the weak Pareto choice rule over a certain class of indecomposable pure-exchange environments, where there may be no private goods whose consumption has no external effects. Received: 30 November 1995 / Accepted: 24 June 1997