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1.
This paper investigates the relationship between patents and research and development expenditures using new longitudinal
patent data at the firm level for the U.S. manufacturing sector from 1982 to 1992. The paper also develops a new class of
count panel data models based on series expansion of the distribution of individual effects. Estimation results from various
distributed lag and dynamic multiplicative panel count data models show that the contemporaneous relationship between patenting
and R&D expenditures continues to be strong, accounting for over 60% of the total R&D elasticity. The lag effects are higher
than have previously been found for the 1970s data.
We would like to thank Chris Bollinger, Bronwyn Hall and Paula Stephan for useful comments on the previous version of the
paper. Earlier versions were presented at the 11th International Conference on Panel Data, Texas A&M University, the Midwest
Econometrics Group Meeting, and the Annual Conference of the Southern Economic Association. 相似文献
2.
The all-pay auction with complete information 总被引:11,自引:0,他引:11
Summary In a (first price) all-pay auction, bidders simultaneously submit bids for an item. All players forfeit their bids, and the high bidder receives the item. This auction is widely used in economics to model rent seeking, R&D races, political contests, and job promotion tournaments. We fully characterize equilibrium for this class of games, and show that the set of equilibria is much larger than has been recognized in the literature. When there are more than two players, for instance, we show that even when the auction is symmetric there exists a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. Moreover, for economically important configurations of valuations, there is no revenue equivalence across the equilibria; asymmetric equilibria imply higher expected revenues than the symmetric equilibrium.We are grateful to Jacques Crémer, Chuangyin Dang, Jürgen Dennert, Chaim Fershtman, Martin Hellwig, Arthur Robson, Heinrich Ursprung, Eric van Damme, Ton Vorst, and the referees for helpful comments. We benefitted from presentations at the World Congress of the Econometric Society in Barcelona, the European Meeting on the Economics of Information at Tilburg University, the Midwest Mathematical Economics Meetings at the University of Illinois, and seminars at Texas A&M University, The Pennsylvania State University, Tilburg University and the University of Montreal. Baye is grateful for support from the CentER for Economic Research at Tilburg University and the Tinbergen Institute where earlier versions of this paper were completed. Kovenock acknowledges support from Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, the Tinbergen Institute, the Center for Economic Studies at the University of Munich, the Institut d'Analisi Economica CSIC at the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, the Krannert School of Management, and the Jay N. Ross Young Faculty Scholar Award. 相似文献
3.
Summary This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in a price setting duopoly in which firms have limited capacity, and in which unit costs of production up to capacity may differ. Assuming concave revenue and efficient rationing, we show that the case of different unit costs involves a tractable generalization of the methods used to analyze the case of identical costs. However, the supports of the two firms' equilibrium price distributions need no longer be connected and need not coincide. In addition, the supports of the equilibrium price distributions need no longer be continuous in the underlying parameters of the model.As an application of our characterization, we examine the Kreps-Scheinkman model of capacity choice followed by Bertrand-Edgeworth price competition and show that, unlike in the case of identical costs, Cournot equilibrium capacity levels need not arise as subgame-perfect equilibria. The low-cost firm has greater incentive to price its rival out of the market than exists under Cournot behavior.We are grateful to Joseph Harrington, Marie Thursby, Casper de Vries and, especially, William Novshek for helpful discussions and comments. Thomas Faith and Ioannis Tournas provided valuable research assistance. This paper was presented at the Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society in December 1988, the Midwest Mathematical Economics Conference in April 1989, the Sixteenth Annual Congress of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics in August 1989, the European Meetings of the Econometric Society in September 1989, and in seminars at the Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Indiana University, INSEAD, Texas A&M University, Tilburg University, the University of Bonn and the University of Florida. Deneckere acknowledges financial support through National Science Foundation Grant SES-8619012 and the Kellogg Graduate School of Management's Beatrice/Esmark Research Chair. Kovenock acknowledges financial support through Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Purdue Research Foundation, the Ford Motor Company Fund, and an Ameritech Foundation Summer Faculty Research Grant. 相似文献
4.
The manager of a firm that is selling an illiquid asset has discretion as to the sale price: if he chooses a high (low) selling
price, early sale is unlikely (likely). If the manager has the option to default on the debt that is collateralized by the
illiquid asset, the optimal selling price depends on whether the manager acts in the interests of owners or creditors. We
model the former case. In equilibrium the owner will always offer the illiquid asset for sale at a strictly higher price than
he paid, and will default if he fails to sell. As a result, upon successful sales the illiquid asset changes hands at successively
higher prices. We also consider a generalization of the model which permits sellers to finance sales using either debt or
preferred stock, or both. This allows derivation of an optimal capital structure.
We are indebted to seminar participants at the University of California, Los Angeles; University of California, Santa Barbara;
Utah State University; University of Miami; Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta; Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City. We have received helpful comments from Tom Cooley. 相似文献
5.
Takashi Kamihigashi 《Economic Theory》1998,12(1):103-122
Summary. This paper studies conditions under which the price of an asset is uniquely determined by its fundamental value – i.e., no
bubbles can arise – in Lucas-type asset pricing models with unbounded utility. After discussing Gilles and LeRoy's (1992)
example, we construct an example of a two-period, representative agent economy to demonstrate that bubbles can arise in a
standard model if utility is unbounded below, in which case the stochastic Euler equation may be violated. In an infinite
horizon framework, we show that bubbles cannot arise if the optimal sequence of asset holdings can be lowered uniformly without
incurring an infinite utility loss. Using this result, we develop conditions for the nonexistence of bubbles. The conditions
depend exclusively on the asymptotic behavior of marginal utility at zero and infinity. They are satisfied by many unbounded
utility functions, including the entire CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) class. The Appendix provides a complete market
version of our two-period example.
Received: January 22, 1996; revised version: February 18, 1997 相似文献
6.
Current literature has largely ignored the fact that some organizations are highly selective when admitting new agents while
others are more open. In addition, some organizations audit or sort agent behavior within the organization more aggressively
than others. One might expect a priori that closed, highly selective, organizations would always be more efficient because
they screen out the worst types, which could lead to better agent behavior. We show that this is not the case. Specifically,
when agent behavior in equilibrium is uniform across organizations (i.e., when the number of agents behaving the same way
is identical), closed organizations are inefficient. However, when agent behavior varies across organizations, closed organizations
may or may not be inefficient, depending on net payoffs to the organization and the agents. Our analysis implies that organizations
should choose the open type when screening or sorting costs are high, when there is a high frequency of good agent types in
the population, when agent misbehavior does not reduce output significantly, and when penalties for misbehavior are large.
The paper has benefitted from useful comments by David Flath, Charles Knoeber, Claudio Mezzetti, two anonymous referees and
participants of the Spring 2005 Midwest Economic Theory meetings at Vanderbilt University, the 2005 meetings of the Society
for the Advancement of Economic Theory in Vigo, Spain, the 2005 conference on Research in Economic Theory and Econometrics
in Syros, Greece, and workshops at North Carolina State University, Texas A&M University and McGill University. 相似文献
7.
Do housing and equity booms significantly raise the probability at the margin of the realization of extreme outcomes in output and prices, and are the worst outcomes just as likely to occur as the good ones? This study addresses these questions for a group of eight East Asian countries. The risk of extreme outcomes occurring is measured by the probability of being in the tails of a distribution. The distributions of real output-and price level-gaps exhibit fat tails, in which the probability and size of the worst possible outcomes are higher than if the distribution were normal. Expected real output- and price level-losses from asset booms would therefore be larger than suggested by the normal distribution if asset price booms significantly raise the risk of extreme outcomes occurring. The main findings are that (i) asset price booms in housing and equity markets, but especially in housing, significantly raise the probability at the margin that real output- and price level-gaps will be in the tails of worst outcomes of their respective distributions and (ii) the risks arising from asset booms are not symmetric-only particularly bad outcomes are more likely. The implication for monetary policy is that an approach that is ex-ante more compatible with risk management may be appropriate. 相似文献
8.
Summary. This paper compares the merits of alternative exchange rate regimes in small open economies where financial intermediaries perform a real allocative function, there are multiple reserve requirements, and credit market frictions may or may not cause credit rationing. Under floating exchange rates, raising domestic inflation can increase production if credit is rationed. However, there exist inflation thresholds: increasing inflation beyond the threshold level will reduce domestic output. Endogenously arising volatility may be observed independently of the exchange rate regime. Private information - with high rates of domestic inflation - increases the scope for indeterminacy and economic fluctuations.Received: 26 March 2002, Revised: 29 October 2002JEL Classification Numbers:
E32, E44, F33.P.L. Hernandez-Verme: I would like to thank Leonardo Auernheimer, Valerie Bencivenga, Dean Corbae, Scott Freeman, Todd Keister, Beatrix Paal, and Maxwell Stinchcombe for very helpful comments and suggestions. Very special thanks are due to Bruce D. Smith. The paper also benefited from the discussions in the seminars in CIDE, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Indiana University, ITAM, Purdue University, the Second Annual Missouri Economics Conference, Texas A&M, the University of Missouri and the University of Texas at Austin. 相似文献
9.
This paper investigates the problem of obtaining Pareto efficient allocations in the presence of negative consumption externalities.
In contrast to the conventional wisdom, we show that even if consumers’ preferences are monotonically increasing in their
own consumption, one may have to dispose of resources to achieve Pareto efficiency when negative consumption externalities
exist. We provide characterization results on destruction both for pure exchange economies and for production economies. As
an application, our results provide an explanation to Easterlin’s paradox: average happiness levels do not increase as countries
grow wealthier.
We thank an anonymous referee, Xiaoyong Cao, Li Gan, and Tapan Mitra for helpful comments and suggestions that improved the
exposition of the paper. The first author thanks the National Natural Science Foundation of China and Private Enterprise Research
Center at Texas A&M University for financial support. 相似文献
10.
《Journal of Behavioral Finance》2013,14(1):24-48
Laboratory asset markets provide an experimental setting in which to observe investor behavior. Over more than a decade, numerous studies have found that participants in laboratory experiments frequently drive asset prices far above fundamental value, after which the prices crash. This bubble-and-crash behavior is robust to variations in a number of variables, including liquidity (the amount of cash available relative to the value of the assets being traded), short-selling, certainty or uncertainty of dividend payments, brokerage fees, capital gains taxes, buying on margin, and others. This paper attempts to model the behavior of asset prices in experimental settings by proposing a "momentum model" of asset price changes. The model assumes that investors follow a combination of two factors when setting prices: fundamental value, and the recent price trend. The predictions of the model, while still far from perfect, are superior to those of a rational expectations model, in which traders consider only fundamental value. In particular, the momentum model predicts that higher levels of liquidity lead to larger price bubbles, a result that is confirmed in the experiments. The similarity between laboratory results and data from field (real-world) markets suggests that the momentum model may be applicable there as well. 相似文献
11.
Julija Michailova 《Journal of Behavioral Finance》2016,17(3):280-292
This paper investigates the relationship between market overconfidence and occurrence of stock-price bubbles. Sixty participants traded stocks in 10 experimental asset markets. Markets were constructed on the basis of subjects' overconfidence: The most overconfident subjects form high overconfidence markets and the least overconfident subjects low overconfidence markets. Prices in low overconfidence markets tend to track the fundamental asset value more accurately than prices in high overconfidence markets and are significantly lower and less volatile. Additionally, we observe significantly higher bubble measures and trading volume in high overconfidence markets. Two possible explanations for these differences are analyzed: While price expectations are significantly higher in high overconfidence markets, no differences in the average degree of risk aversion were detected. 相似文献
12.
Roberto C. Raimondo 《Economic Theory》2005,25(2):265-285
Summary. We prove the existence of equilibrium in a continuous-time finance model; our results include the case of dynamically incomplete markets as well as dynamically complete markets. In addition, we derive explicitly the stochastic process describing securities prices. The price process depends on the risk-aversion characteristics of the utility function, as well as on the presence of additional sources of wealth (including endowments and other securities). With a single stock, zero endowment in the terminal period, and Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility, the price process is geometric Brownian motion; in essentially any other situation, the price process is not a geometric Brownian motion.JEL Classification Numbers:
D52.This paper is part of my Dissertation (UC Berkeley). I am very grateful to my advisor Professor Robert M. Anderson. I also would like to thank Steve Evans, Roger Purves, Jacob Sagi, Chris Shannon and the participants of the 2002 NBER General Equilibrium Conference at the University of Minnesota (Minneapolis) for very helpful discussions and comments. This work was supported by Grant SES-9710424 from the National Science Foundation. 相似文献
13.
Summary. Combining a strategy model, an inference procedure and a new experimental design, we map sequences of observed actions in repeated games to unobserved strategies that reflect decision-makers’ plans. We demonstrate the method by studying two institutional settings with distinct theoretical predictions. We find that almost all strategies inferred are best responses to one of the inferred strategies of other players, and in one of the settings almost all of the inferred strategies, which include triggers to punish non-cooperators, are consistent with equilibrium strategies. By developing a method to infer unobserved repeated-game strategies from actions, we take a step toward making game theory a more applied tool, bridging a gap between theory and observed behavior.Received: 23 December 2002, Revised: 19 April 2005, JEL Classification Numbers:
C72, C80, C90.The authors are indebted for discussions with Ray Battalio, David Cooper, Robin Dubin, John Duffy, Ellen Garbarino, Susan Helper, Margaret Meyer, John Miller, Jim Rebitzer, Mari Rege, Al Roth, and John Van Huyck. The authors also benefited from discussants at economic department seminars at Case Western Reserve, McMaster and McGill University, University of Pittsburgh, SUNY-Stony Brook, and Texas A&M, and participants at the 2002 European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society. We are grateful for the financial support provided by the Department of Economics at the University of Pittsburgh and Case Western Reserve University. 相似文献
14.
Through a finite-lived dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model comprising bubbly capital with fixed supply, one-period gestation lag, and a cash-in-advance constraint, we show that a money-accommodated but not price-accommodated technological shock can trigger excessive movement in the asset price even in a flexible-price and frictionless environment. 相似文献
15.
We construct an asset market in a finite horizon overlapping-generations environment. Subjects are tested for comprehension of their fundamental value exchange environment and then reminded during each of 25 periods of the environment's declining new value. We observe price bubbles forming when new generations enter the market with additional liquidity and bursting as old generations exit the market and withdrawing cash. The entry and exit of traders in the market creates an M shaped double bubble price path over the life of the traded asset. This finding is significant in documenting that bubbles can reoccur within one extended trading horizon and, consistent with previous cross-subject comparisons, shows how fluctuations in market liquidity influence price paths. We also find that trading experience leads to price expectations that incorporate fundamental value. 相似文献
16.
This study constructs a theoretical model to address how stochastic investor sentiment affects investor's crowdedness, and how stochastic investor sentiment and crowdedness affect asset prices. An asset pricing model incorporating stochastic investor sentiment and crowdedness is developed, which can provide efficient explanations for the deviations of asset prices from fundamentals and the maverick risk of investors. This model indicates that the optimistic (pessimistic) investor sentiment and the long (short) crowdedness caused by optimistic (pessimistic) sentimental investors can push asset price above (below) fundamental value. Also, the sentimental investors who are wrong and alone would take the maverick risk. Our results are consistent with the idea that investor sentiment and investor behavior matter for the asset prices and the deviations of asset prices from fundamentals. 相似文献
17.
We examine whether the Fama and French (1992) (F&F) model can be adapted to become a more versatile and flexible tool, capable of incorporating variations of company characteristics in a more dynamic form. For this, the risk factors are reconstructed at the end of each reading of monthly data. We argue that, over time, the evaluation of a company may change as a result of variations in its market price, size or book price, and we are aware that the F&F model does not accurately reflect these dynamics. Our results show that the adapted model is able to capture the behaviour of a greater number of stocks than the original F&F model and risk factors are more significant when building them through our procedure. In addition, we carry out these adaptations during a period of instability in financial markets. 相似文献
18.
We study simultaneous ascending auctions of two identical objects when bidders are financially constrained and their valuations
exhibit complementarities. We assume the budget constraints are known but the values for individual objects are private information,
and characterize noncollusive equilibria. Equilibrium behavior is affected by the exposure problem. Bidders with higher budgets
are more reluctant to bid, because opponents with lower budgets may end up pursuing a single object, thus preventing the realization
of complementarities. Therefore poor bidders may win both objects when they do not have the highest valuation.
We gratefully acknowledge comments by Marco Battaglini, Benny Moldovanu and participants at seminars held at Montreal, Yale,
Texas A&M, Washington St. Louis and at the Workshop on Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints held at SUNY - Stony Brook.
Sandro Brusco acknowledges financial support from the Ministerio de Educacion y Ciencias D.G.E.S., proyecto SEC2001-0445. 相似文献
19.
Abstract. Researchers have used stylized facts on asset prices and trading volume in stock markets (in particular, the mean reversion
of asset returns and the correlations between trading volume, price changes and price levels) to support theories where agents
are not rational expected utility maximizers. This paper shows that this empirical evidence is in fact consistent with a standard
infinite horizon – perfect information – expected utility economy where some agents face leverage constraints similar to those
found in todays financial markets. In addition, and in sharp contrast to the theories above, we explain some qualitative differences
that are observed in the price-volume relation on stock and on futures markets.
We consider a continuous-time economy where agents maximize the integral of their discounted utility from consumption under
both budget and leverage constraints. Building on the work by Vila and Zariphopoulou (1997), we find a closed form solution,
up to a negative constant, for the equilibrium prices and demands in the region of the state space where the constraint is
non-binding. We show that, at the equilibrium, stock holdings volatility as well as its ratio to stock price volatility are
increasing functions of the stock price and interpret this finding in terms of the price-volume relation.
We would like to thank the editor and two anonimous referees for valuable substantive comments. Our gratitude also to Franklin
Allen, Kerry Back, Domenico Cuoco, Xavier Freixas, Sanford Grossman, Michel Habib, Lutz Hendricks, Richard Kihlstrom, Fernando
Restoy, Mary Thomson, Jean-Luc Vila, participants to seminars at Birkbeck College, Carnegie-Mellon, Columbia, ESSEC, HEC,
IAE, INSEAD, London Business School, London School of Economics, McGill, Michigan, National University of Singapore, Pompeu
Fabra, North Carolina, Washington-St-Louis, Wharton, the Jornadas de Economía Financiera BBV, and the Meetings of the Society
for Economic Dynamics and Control and the American Finance Association. Special thanks are due to Süleyman Basak for his enthusiastic
support and many helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. We gratefully acknowledge the support of the BBV and Caja
de Madrid Foundations and CREF (both authors) and of the Spanish Ministry of Education under DGICYT grant no. PB93-0388 (first
author). 相似文献
20.
G. C. Lim 《Empirical Economics》2005,30(2):411-426
This paper applies a model of fundamental share prices based on a bounded dividends process, with earnings as the upper bound, to assess the deviations of actual prices for over- and under-valuations. The fundamental model extends the traditional present value of future dividends analysis to allow for the effect of an earnings-dividends trade-off effect. The simple fundamental model includes a closed form share price solution which may be calibrated to generate fundamental values from which to assess actual prices for over or under valuations. The properties of the model are explored with a simulation example. The empirical example is based on S&P data and the analysis provides evidence of persistent over-valuations since the late 1990’s. Expressed another way, the analysis highlights the role of factors, other than dividends and earnings in the determination of actual asset prices since the late 1990s. 相似文献