Profitability of mergers in food manufacturing

Two issues are examined. The statistical significance of a number of socio-economic factors that affect the level of charitable giving are evaluated. Family wealth and age of the head of household tend to be significant determinants of charitable giving, regardless of whether it is to all charities or to religious charities only. Such is not the case for the price of giving; for instance, the price of giving is an important determinant of all charitable contributions, but almost non-existent as a determinant for religious donations. Results such as this suggest that changes in marginal tax rates prompted by a switch to a tax credit as a substitute for a deduction, and hence a change in the price of giving, may have virtually no impact on contributions to religious organizations but may affect conntributions to other charitable organizations. The extent to which some socio-economic factors changed in relative importance as determinants of charitable giving from 1982 to 1986 is also reviewed.     

Market structure and corporate charitable donations: some Canadian evidence for 1976 and 1981

The business of business, not charity.

Say eleemosynary its more confusing.

Whatever, as long as we don't given 'em any cash.

Harv Antione, ‘The Buzz Words of Entrepreneurship’

in Apocryphal Northern Tales

This paper investigates the general determinants of corporate charitable donations in Canada and, in particular, the impact of imperfectly-competitive market structure. We utilize a profit-maximizing model and assume that charitable donations occur only if, by performing an advertising/public relations function, they increase revenue; or if, by acting as a fringe benefit, they result in a reduction in wage costs. In this context, because only firms in imperfect markets generate the rents from which donations can be made, we anticipate a positive relationship between donations and a measure of imperfect competition (concentration). The data is a cross-section sample of 38, 3- and 4-digit SIC manufacturing industries pooled for 1976 and 1981. The major findings are that: the results are generally compatible with the predictions of the model; concentration is a significant determinant of donations although non-linear; the cost of giving (the tax rate) is appropriately positive; and there are significant negative relationships for measures of foreign ownership and wage rates.     

An assessment of the impact of tax incentives relative to socio-economic characteristics on charitable giving in Canada

This research examines the effectiveness of the Canadian tax incentive system for charitable giving while attempting to deal with two persistent methodological problems in past research. The Heckman selection model and the ordered probit model are used to examine the Canadian tax incentive system with 2010 survey data. The results imply that the effect of the tax credit systematically increases with an increase in donation expenditure suggesting that the higher tax credit for larger donations is more effective than the lower tax credit for smaller donations. While the results suggest that the current tax policy is effective, socio-economic characteristics, such as wealth, household income, and university education, appear to have a greater impact on donations.     

Mixed feelings: Theories of and evidence on giving

This paper examines possible motives and institutional factors that impact giving. Specifically, I consider alternative theories parallel to dictator experiments that generate evidence on both allocation decisions and their effect on feelings. A number of new empirical findings as well as new interpretations for previously reported findings result. A novel test distinguishes warm glow from impure altruism and rules out the former as the sole motive for giving. Very generous donations to charities that aid the needy (with modal gifts of the entire dictator's stakes) cannot be attributed to familiarity with the charities. A charity that offers a matching grant increases its revenues by drawing donors and donations away from one that does not, although aggregate charitable donations do not rise. Additional results on emotions paint a picture of “mixed feelings:” generosity creates good feelings when the recipients are charities and bad feelings when they are fellow students. No group of dictators, however, feels better, on average, than a control group that is given no opportunity to donate. I propose a simple model that accounts for these results on allocation behavior and feelings by incorporating elements of two approaches, unconditional altruism and social preference theories, that to date have mostly evolved independently. A critical feature of this model is the social norm, and the results of the experiments corroborate the theory in the context of two norms of distributive justice that are important to real world giving: equity and need.     

The optimal treatment of tax expenditures

This paper analyzes the optimal treatment of tax expenditures. It develops an optimal tax model where individuals derive utility from spending on a “contribution” good such as charitable giving. The contribution good has also a public good effect on all individuals in the economy. The government imposes linear taxes on earnings and on the contribution good so as to maximize welfare. The government may also finance directly the contribution good out of tax revenue. Optimal tax and subsidy rates on earnings and the contribution good are expressed in terms of empirically estimable parameters and the redistributive tastes of the government. The optimal subsidy on the contribution good is increasing in the size of the price elasticity of contributions, the size of the crowding out effect of public contributions on private contributions, and the size of the public good effect of the contribution good. Numerical simulations show that the optimal subsidy on contributions is fairly sensitive to the size of these parameters but that, in most cases, it should be lower than the earnings tax rate.     

Do preferences for charitable giving help auctioneers?

Preferences for charitable giving in auctions can be modeled by assuming that bidders receive additional utility proportional to the revenue raised by an auctioneer. The theory of bidding in the presence of such preferences results in a very counterintuitive prediction which is that, in many cases, bidders having preferences for charitable giving does not lead to a substantial revenue advantage for an auctioneer. We test this theory and this prediction with a series of experiments. In one experiment we induce charitable preferences exactly as specified in the model to see if bidders respond to them as predicted. We find that they do. We then conduct a second experiment in which the revenue from the auctions is donated to actual charities to verify the robustness of the prediction when charitable preferences are generated by a more natural source and find again that the theoretical prediction holds: even strong charitable preferences do not result in substantial revenue increases to the auctioneer.     

THE IMPACT OF TAX PRICE CHANGES ON CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE NEEDY

Eliminating or reducing the federal charitable deduction can have serious impacts on the level of charitable donations. Tax price elasticity estimates from a multivariate sample selection model indicate that changing the deduction to a 12% tax credit would have reduced individual donations in 2012 by 18.9% if applied to itemizing taxpayers and by 10.5% if extended to nonitemizers. Elimination of the deduction would have led to a 35% reduction in individual charitable donations. Even if coupled with cuts in marginal tax rates, eliminating the charitable deduction will still likely result in substantial reductions given the inelastic income elasticities of charitable donations. The estimates justify the ardent opposition of many in the nonprofit sector to the more radical proposals for changing the tax treatment of charitable contributions. (JEL D34, C34)     

The geography of giving: The effect of corporate headquarters on local charities

Does the presence of corporate headquarters in a city affect the incomes of local charities? To address this question we combine data on the head office locations of publicly traded U.S. firms with information on the receipts of local charitable organizations. Cities like Houston, San Jose, and San Francisco gained significant numbers of corporate headquarters over the past two decades, while cities like Chicago and Los Angeles lost. Our analysis suggests that attracting or retaining the headquarters of a publicly traded firm yields approximately $3–10 million per year in contributions to local non-profits. Likewise, each $1000 increase in the market value of the firms headquartered in a city yields $0.60–1.60 to local non-profits. Most of the increase in charitable contributions is attributable to an effect on the number of highly-compensated individuals in a city, rather than through direct donations by the corporations themselves. The increased private sector donations from the presence of corporate headquarters do not seem to crowd out government grants to local charities.     

Subsidizing charitable contributions: a natural field experiment comparing matching and rebate subsidies

We report the results of a field experiment conducted in conjunction with a mailed fundraising campaign of a nonprofit organization. The experiment is designed to compare the response of donors to subsidies in the form of matching amounts or rebated amounts. Matching subsidies are used by many corporations as an employee benefit; the US federal tax system encourages giving using a rebate subsidy by making donations tax deductible. The design includes a control group and two levels of subsidy of each type. Our main result is that matching subsidies result in larger total donations to charities than rebate subsidies, a result that is qualitatively similar to the lab findings. The estimated price elasticities for the matching subsidy are very similar to (and insignificantly different from) the lab experiments, while rebate subsidies lead to lower contributions in the field than in the lab. Since rebates in the field involve substantial lags and additional complications as compared with the “instant rebates” of the lab, this latter difference is not unexpected. The matching results are an important step in validating lab estimates of responsiveness to subsidies of charitable giving.

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Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.      

Public goods provision and redistributive taxation

This paper studies the relationship between redistributive taxation and tax-deductible charitable contributions. Redistribution has two opposite effects on voluntary giving. The price of charitable giving decreases with the degree of redistribution, and this has a positive effect on the total amount of giving (substitution effect). However, redistribution leads to lower consumption for the contributors and therefore has a negative effect on contributions to the charity (income effect). The theoretical model developed in this paper demonstrates that, under a general class of utility functions, the substitution effect dominates the income effect. Hence, charitable giving increases with the tax rate. In purely egalitarian societies, the public good is provided efficiently and the total welfare is maximized independent of the ex-ante income inequality. However, the positive impact of taxation on charitable giving and welfare may disappear if individuals generate their income levels in anticipation of taxation and redistribution does not take into account the cost of effort.     

Are contributions of time and money substitutes or complements?

This article empirically investigates the relationship between donations of time and money using Canadian tax policy reforms that changed the tax price of charitable donations. The 1988 reform where a charitable tax deduction was converted to a credit and the 2000 reform in provincial income taxes provide tax price variations plausibly exogenous to individuals’ unobserved heterogeneity. Our estimates on cross-price effects imply that individuals make more time donations as the tax price of charitable donations increases and hence money and time donations are substitutes, as some theories would imply. This contrasts with earlier findings using cross-sectional data.     

Fiscal efficiency,redistribution and welfare

The expanding literature on fiscal decentralization (FD) emphasizes the role of institutional mechanisms for FD's welfare effects. We analyze the welfare effects of FD in case of a fiscal transfer mechanism that punishes inefficiency in tax collection and compensates for local income deficiency. In addition, a portion of transfers is earmarked for investment. Given a level of FD and these rules, the representative local government chooses its tax collection effort to maximize local utility. The solution of the model reveals that the stricter the redistributive rule, the higher are steady-state fiscal efficiency and welfare. While the effectiveness of the redistributive parameters increases with centralization of the revenue pool, it decreases with the tax rate. Both welfare and income distribution, on the other hand, improve with the degree of revenue centralization and the tax rate. Besides, fiscal efficiency and redistribution decrease with investment-earmarked transfers.     

Giving overseas and public policy

Remarkable numbers of people give to overseas development charities. The aim of this paper is to consider how such overseas giving is best modelled and the implications for public policy. Widely used theories of charitable giving, based on warm-glow or the provision of public goods, provide insight but are not fully satisfactory as explanations of giving for the specific purpose of development. Instead, an “identification” approach to individual giving is proposed here that combines the results focus of the public goods formulation with the scale of the warm-glow model. The theoretical model is used to examine the implications for public policy, including the extent to which official aid crowds out private giving and how public policy should take account of private willingness to make charitable transfers overseas.     

Can tax regulations moderate revenue diversification and reduce financial distress in nonprofit organizations?

As a result of policies to reduce public deficit, nonprofit organizations have been forced to turn to charitable donations in order to diversify their revenue structure and thus reduce their levels of financial distress. Public administrations have supported this process through tax mechanisms designed to provide a legal framework that will encourage private philanthropy. Our aim is to analyse the role of nonprofit tax regulations in moderating the influence of revenue diversification on insolvency risk. To this end, we drew a sample of 406 nonprofit organizations located in Aragon and Navarre, two European regions with different tax regulations, for the period 2008–2018. Our results reveal that some tax regime requirements, such as the organizational purpose, minimum initial endowment, engagement in commercial activity, and accountability and monitoring standards, have a positive impact on revenue diversification and the reduction of financial distress and vulnerability. However, we also detect differences between regions which suggest that tax harmonization for nonprofit organizations remains a challenge.     

Donations in a recursive dynamic model

Abstract.  This paper studies how donations respond to unexpected permanent changes in income and tax rates in a recursive dynamic model. The dynamic approach yields several interesting insights. If marginal tax rates are progressive, a permanent jump in a household's income increases its consumption and donations in the short run, but has no effect in the long run. The permanent income elasticity of current donations is likely to exceed one. If the marginal tax rate is flat, the jump in income raises consumption and donations in both the short and the long run. A permanent marginal tax rate cut raises consumption and donations in the long run if marginal tax rates are progressive, while it reduces donations in the short run if it has little direct impact on tax payments. If the marginal tax rate is flat, a tax cut has a positive effect on consumption in both the short and the long run, but has an ambiguous effect on donations.     

Does income inequality increase charitable giving?

Do households react to changes in the distribution of income in their localities by changing their charitable giving? The theoretical prediction of the effects of income inequality on giving is unclear. We study how changes in income inequality measured at the neighbourhood and municipality levels affect charitable giving by households in Canada between 1991 and 2006. We find that increases in inequality increase giving. Results are sensitive to the geographic dispersion of low‐ and high‐income households in neighbourhoods within a municipality. The effect on donations is smaller in areas with high levels of inequality at both neighbourhood and municipality levels.     

Tax evasion by tax deferment: Sham litigation with an informal credit market

We show theoretically how tax evasion is facilitated by informal credit market through tax deferment. Our model is empirically based. Using sham litigation, tax evaders earn a higher rate of return than the stipulated penalty rate for tax evasion while the government loses tax revenue. We propose an upfront part–payment of the disputed amount of tax as a solution to the form of tax evasion we describe.     

政治关联、慈善捐赠与政府补助*--来自中国亏损上市公司的经验证据

文章以2009－2012年中国亏损上市公司作为研究样本,运用社会网络理论,分析和检验了高管的政治关联对亏损企业通过慈善捐赠行为获得政府补助的影响。研究结果表明：第一,有政治关联的亏损企业比无政治关联的亏损企业更容易出于获取政府支持而进行慈善捐赠,高管的政治关联广度相对于其政治关联深度对亏损企业慈善捐赠的正向影响更大,同时高管的地方政治关联相对于其中央政治关联对亏损企业慈善捐赠的正向影响也更大;第二,基于“利益互惠”的原则以及对企业积极履行社会责任的鼓励,政府通常会倾向于对进行慈善捐赠的企业给予更多的补助;第三,相对于无政治关联的亏损企业,有政治关联的亏损企业的慈善捐赠能够帮助其获得更多的政府补助,相对于中央政治关联,地方政治关联对亏损企业通过慈善捐赠获得政府补助的“支持效应”更加明显,同时政治关联广度更宽的亏损企业也通过慈善捐赠获得了更多的政府补助。文章的研究结论深化了对中国亏损上市公司慈善捐赠的动机及其经济后果的认识,为相关部门规范企业慈善行为也提供了有益的启示。     

The (Non‐)Equivalence of Input and Output Taxes Under Monopoly

The author argues that a government taxing a polluting monopoly by means of levies on output and inputs can implement the first‐best allocation through a continuum of tax profiles. Using this degree of freedom in the tax system, the government is, in general, able to transfer income from the firm to the public sector, so that the additional tax rate acts as a non‐distorting tax on profits. This transfer – and therefore public revenue – is the higher, the lower (higher) the input taxes are, and correspondingly the higher (lower) the output tax is, provided that the production function exhibits decreasing (increasing) returns to scale.     

Fundraising and Optimal Policy Rules

This paper develops a simple spatial model of fundraising, in which charities select a target population to solicit donations. First, we show that in a competitive charity market without any intervention, the number of charities in the market and/or the overall net funds raised by charities may be suboptimal. Next, we analyze whether a social planner can prevent such shortcomings and show that a regulatory mechanism can be designed to achieve socially desirable outcomes. In contrast to the previous literature, our model does not necessarily produce monopoly as the optimal market structure. We show that if fixed costs associated with establishing charities are sufficiently low, then the optimal market structure is not a monopoly. Given the importance of the trade‐off between the volume and variety of charitable services, we argue that this result may be of particular interest to policy makers.