Do we lie in groups? An experimental evidence

We study whether there is a difference between individual and group unethical behaviour in an experimental study among adolescents. We find that on average, groups cheat more than individuals, but there are important differences across age. Younger groups cheat more than younger individuals but there is no difference between older individuals and groups. The way in which groups are formed and friendship ties among group members do not seem to matter.     

Implications of nurse-physician relations: report of a successful intervention

Given the evidence linking medical errors to ineffective communication, strategies for improving communication among health care professionals must be implemented. The purpose of this article was to examine the effect of a collaborative intervention on improving communication patterns between nurses and physicians on two study units. The intervention consisted of two nurses and two physicians (per unit) meeting together (8 hours total) to collaboratively develop a solution to communication issues on their respective units. Physicians scored significantly higher on reports of openness of communication within groups, openness between groups, accuracy between groups, and collaboration between groups. Collaboration reported among nurses and physicians improved for both professions, with significance reached for physicians (p = 0.031). Strategies must be identified to break down the barriers set by the current culture, and that expedite the development of a team-centered culture supporting collaborative relations among health care professionals.     

Conflict between groups of players in coupled socio-economic and ecological dynamics

Conflict among multiple groups is a major source of difficulty in environmental conservation. People are often divided into various groups that have different social factors, sometimes leading to differences in the degree to which they cooperate in environmental conservation. This obstructs the social consensus needed to solve the environmental problems. Here we study the coupled dynamics of human socio-economic choice and lake water pollution, and examine the magnitude of the difference in cooperation levels between two groups. In the model, many players choose between a costly but cooperative option and a selfish option. The former results in a reduced phosphorus discharge into the lake. Each player's choice is affected by an economic cost and social pressure. Social pressure is a psychological factor that promotes cooperation: it becomes stronger when more players in the society are cooperative (conformist tendency) and when the problem at hand is a greater concern to society. In the model, two groups sometimes show large differences in their cooperation levels even when both have exactly the same social factors. However, cooperation levels are more likely to differ between groups that have different social factors. Enhancement of the cross-group conformist tendency is the most effective way to minimize differences in cooperation levels and to mitigate conflict between groups.     

Who benefits from big government? A life satisfaction approach

Which impact does government size have on life satisfaction, and how do effects of bigger government differ between income groups in society? Previous studies typically employed country averages and thus neglected possibly heterogeneous happiness effects between income groups. This paper addresses empirically the effects of government spending on subjective well-being of individuals belonging to different income groups. Our analysis is based on individual data from 25 European countries participating in the European Social Survey. In contrast to most previous studies we take account of the endogeneity between relative income position and reported life satisfaction by an instrumental variable approach. Our results suggest, first, that most government spending categories, including social protection, are on average negatively related to individual well-being. Secondly, estimated marginal effects of health, education and social protection spending at different income levels show that spending increases always have a stronger negative effect on high income groups’ well-being than on low income groups’ life satisfaction. For all government spending categories, marginal happiness effects of higher public spending are clearly negative for income groups at the top.     

我国城镇居民收入分配差距的实证研究

笔者首先计算了几种度量收入分配差距的指标,从不同角度的分析得到了我国城镇居民收入分配差距不断扩大的结论;其次估计了我国城镇居民的基尼系数.通过计量经济模型,检验了高、中、低各阶层可支配收入与收入分配差距之间的关系,得出结论:增加中低收入阶层的可支配收入,遏制高收入阶层可支配收入,可以减小基尼系数,从而降低收入分配差距;进一步通过模型发现,我国发达地区的经济发展和收入分配差距呈现出倒U型规律,说明经济发展达到一定水平,收入分配差距有望缩小.     

矿区生态经济系统中的利益冲突分析

矿区作为生态经济系统的一个有机载体,存在不同的经济组织和利益群体.这些利益群体之问的利益整体水平和获取利益的能力有较大的差异,由此引发了不同利益群体之间的利益冲突.本文以经济博奕论理论为基础,运用F-H分析法构造了非量化的矿区博弈分析模型,详细分析了矿区生态经济系统中利益冲突的可能结局,并得出了维护矿区生态经济利益的关键在于矿区所在地的政府和环保执法部门执法力度的结论.     

利益集团与制度变迁的“陷阱”——兼论转型的合法性危机

文章主要讨论制度变迁过程中那些无效率的制度均衡是如何形成的.在时利益集团经济行为进行分析的基础上,主要考察了Dayis和North理论意义上的第一和第二行动集团在制度变迁中的作用.研究表明,由于利益集团自身利益与社会利益之间存在着冲突,因此即使是启动和推进制度变迁过程的第一和第二行动集团,也有可能妨碍制度变迁迭至最优点,使其掉入"陷阱"之中.     

企业与环境非政府组织联盟的风险及其防范初探

近年来,企业与环境非政府组织建立的绿色联盟大量涌现,已有研究大多对企业与非政府组织协同创造竞争优势的机理进行了深入探讨,但是对绿色联盟所蕴含的风险及其防范对策研究不足.由于企业与非政府组织在组织属性上存在根本差异,绿色联盟也给企业带来了很多潜在风险.本文分析了绿色联盟的风险,并提出相应的风险防范措施.     

Interethnic relations,informal trading networks,and social integration: imitation,habits, and social evolution

The ethnically homogeneous middleman groups (EHMGs), which are informal trading networks, are ubiquitous in less-developed economies where the legal infrastructure for contract enforcement is not well developed. This paper develops a formal model of social interaction among members of the EHMG as well as in more general situations in a multi-ethnic or multi-cultural society consisting of identifiable ethnic or linguistic groups. Behavioral patterns are transmitted between generations and altered via imitation in social contacts. The model demonstrates how different discriminatory behavioral patterns can evolve and persist over time. One result is that the trust between such groups can increase due to a higher frequency of inter-group contacts. In concluding the paper, we speculate about how the model can be expanded to include changes in legal structures, especially contract law. This could lead to an increase in the trust between the different groups.     

How Do Banks Determine Capital? Evidence from Germany

Abstract. We analyse whether the determinants of capital found in the previous literature hold for the special German banking sector comprising three characteristic banking groups including savings banks, cooperative banks and other banks, which differ regarding their ownership and their access to the capital market. Through the use of accounting data from German banks between 1992 and 2001 we find evidence in accordance with the buffer theory of capital for all German banking groups. Furthermore, we also detect some remarkable differences between the three banking groups regarding their determination of capital due to institutional characteristics.     

Organizational efficiency and monopoly power: The case of French industrial groups

In this paper, we examine the respective roles of efficiency and of market power considerations in explaining why industrial groups are the predominant form of organization in specific industries. Our econometric analysis of French industrial groups suggests that administrative and organizational efficiency is an adequate explanation for the existence of these groups and that rivalry between groups differently integrated and diversified is more likely to be the case than collusion.     

Adoption of organic farming: Are there differences between early and late adoption?

Based on the fact that not all farmers adopt a technology at the same time, it is argued in this paper that the distinction between groups is important because early, medium and late adopters respond differently to economic and non-economic factors when they consider whether to take up organic farming or not. The individual effects on adoption between the groups are identified by the use of multinomial logit analysis. The results provide evidence that there are significant differences in the characteristics between the adopter groups. The findings also reveal that the factors that affect adoption play a different role for early, medium and late adopters, particularly with regard to farming intensity, age, information gathering as well as attitudes of the farmer. More specifically, early adopters were the youngest to adopt organic farming and their decisions were found to be less profit related compared to other groups. Late adoption is constrained by risk considerations, while environmental attitudes and social learning were identified to be important determinants for all adopter groups. Overall, the findings strongly suggest, that for policy measures to be effective, the current state of diffusion has to be taken into account.     

Group play in games and the role of consent in network formation

We study games played between groups of players, where a given group decides which strategy it will play through a vote by its members. When groups consist of two voting players, our games can also be interpreted as network-formation games. In experiments on Stag Hunt games, we find a stark contrast between how groups and individuals play, with payoffs playing a primary role in equilibrium selection when individuals play, but the structure of the voting rule playing the primary role when groups play. We develop a new solution concept, robust-belief equilibrium, which explains the data that we observe. We provide results showing that this solution concept has application beyond the particular games in our experiments.     

我国产业集群国际品牌力培育研究

随着世界上诸如意大利的纺织业集群、美国硅谷的IT产业集群等的崛起，中小产业集群作为一种客观存在的经济现象，引起了越来越多的关注。产业集群作为一种介于产业和市场之间的产业空间组织形式，已经对地区经济发展产生积极的影响。因此，利用产业集群优势，打造区域品牌，培养产业集群的品牌力。成为了区域经济发展的战略性思路。     

The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics

We use a mechanism design approach to study the organization of interest groups in an informational model of lobbying. Interest groups influence the legislature only by communicating private information on their preferences and not by means of monetary transfers. Interest groups have private information on their ideal points in a one-dimensional policy space and may either compete or adopt more collusive behaviors. Optimal policies result from a trade-off between imposing rules which are non-responsive to the groups' preferences and flexibility that pleases groups better. Within a strong coalition, interest groups credibly share information which facilitates communication of their joint interests, helps screening by the legislature and induces flexible policies responsive to the groups' joint interests (an informativeness effect). Competing interest groups better transmit information on their individual preferences (a screening effect). The socially and privately optimal organization of lobbying favors competition between groups only when their preferences are not too congruent with those of the legislature. With more congruence, a strong coalition is preferred. Finally, within a weak coalition, interest groups must design incentive compatible collusive mechanisms to share information. Such weak coalitions are always inefficient.     

Schumpeter’s core works revisited

This paper organizes Schumpeter’s core books in three groups: the programmatic duology, the evolutionary economic duology, and the socioeconomic synthesis. By analysing these groups and their interconnections from the viewpoint of modern evolutionary economics, the paper summarises resolved problems and points at remaining challenges. Its analyses are based on distinctions between microevolution and macroevolution, between economic evolution and socioeconomic coevolution, and between Schumpeter’s three major evolutionary models (called Mark?I, Mark?II and Mark?SC).     

宽容：构建和谐民族关系的基础

在新的社会转型期,构建和谐的民族关系需要承认文化差异,更需要建立畅通的族际沟通渠道。个体交往需要宽容,族群交往需要宽容,各种文化之间的交流也需要宽容。宽容是理性解决冲突的策略,是各种文化繁荣兴旺的必要条件。随着市场经济的不断深化,民族交往日益频繁,在处理民族关系过程中,提倡文化宽容,已成为多民族地区构建和谐社会的迫切需要。     

Dynamic legislative decision making when interest groups control the agenda

We consider dynamic decision making in a legislature, in which in each period legislators vote between the status quo (previous period?s policy) and a new bill. However, the agenda formation process is captured by interest groups, that is, the new bill on the agenda is determined by an all-pay auction among these groups. We show that convergence to the median voter of the legislature arises if interest groups are patient enough but not necessarily otherwise. We characterize the bound on the speed of convergence in a family of stationary equilibria in which policy bounces between right-wing and left-wing policies. We also show that convergence may be faster if organized interest groups represent only one side of the policy space, e.g., when only business and not consumer interests are organized.     

Individual and Collective Choice and Voting in Common Pool Resource Problem with Heterogeneous Actors

In this paper we investigate the effects of heterogeneity in common pool resource (CPR) problems. We examine whether heterogeneity impedes or facilitates coordination on an efficient use of a CPR by proposing and voting on allocation schemes. In a full information design we compare extractions and voting behavior in heterogeneous and homogeneous groups. If the CPR is extracted individually, we find no difference in efficiency between heterogeneous and homogeneous groups. However, when groups can vote on allocation schemes, homogeneous groups are more likely to reach an efficient agreement than heterogeneous groups.     

The tragedy of the commons revisited: The importance of group decision-making

We use a laboratory experiment to compare the way groups and individuals behave in an inter-temporal common pool dilemma. The experimental design distinguishes between a non-strategic problem where players (individuals or groups of three) make decisions without interaction and a strategic part where players harvest from a common pool. This allows us to correct for differences between individuals and groups in the quality of decisions when testing for differences in competitiveness. Group decisions are either made by majority rule or unanimity. The results show that groups are less myopic than individuals (i.e., they make qualitatively better decisions) but that they are more competitive than individuals when placed in a strategic setting. The net result for groups deciding by majority rule is that they make less efficient decisions in the strategic game than individuals do. We are able to show that this is caused by the median voter departing from her original preference in early periods with a shrinking pool. When groups have to make unanimous decisions they start playing the strategic game more efficiently then individuals do, but they rapidly become more competitive with repetition of the game.