Managerial Motives and Merger Financing

We examine how managerial motives influence the choice of financing for a sample of 209 completed mergers from 1981–1988. Our evidence indicates that bidding firm management is more likely to finance mergers with cash when target firm ownership concentration is high, preventing the creation of an outside blockholder. This suggests bidding firm managers prefer to keep ownership structure widely diffused to reduce external monitoring. We also find that bidding firm management is more likely to finance mergers with stock when the variance of bidding firm's stock return is high. This suggests managers of risky firms prefer leverage‐reducing transactions to reduce their personal risk.     

External Financing and Liquidity

We explain the observed negative relation between market value of firms and their fund raising activities. Ours is not a signalling model. The firm's objective is to maximize the present value of its income. Considerations of cash availability (liquidity) and unfolding of uncertainty drive our model. Income from operations is an important source of liquidity. Low earnings are associated with low liquidity. Whether earnings are low or not is known to some extent in advance of the realization itself. External financing is pursued in anticipation of the earnings' realization in order to maintain a desired level of liquidity. Therefore, anticipated low earnings are associated with a high level of external financing. Of course, an anticipation of low earnings is also accompanied by a decrease in the firm's value. The empiricist who looks at time series of a firm's value and of its dividend/external financing announcements would then record positive correlation between value and cash distributions and negative correlation between value and external financing.     

企业管理者能力与审计收费

企业管理者是异质的,不同管理者有着差异化构建控制环境和控制风险的能力,这可能会对审计收费产生影响,但现有审计收费文献忽略了管理者及其能力的影响。本文通过追踪一段时期在两家上市公司至少有两年工作经历的管理者,构造了管理者—公司配对数据,研究发现管理者对审计收费有着经济和统计意义上的显著影响。在此基础上,本文以管理者能力为研究对象,分析管理者影响审计收费的途径,发现公司管理者能力越强,其支付的审计费用越低。这一现象主要存在于国有控股上市公司、产品市场竞争低以及企业风险低的上市公司中。本文研究不仅丰富了审计定价理论和管理者能力研究内容,而且对于规范审计收费有着指导意义。     

管理层能力与投资效率

疫情过后,我国经济高质量发展的步伐将更大。我国经济转型发展阶段,经济增长动能需从投资规模驱动转向投资效率驱动。何以提升投资效率?本文以2008-2017年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验管理层能力与企业投资效率之间的关系,研究发现随着管理层能力的提高,企业投资效率显著提升。此外,研究还发现管理层能力对企业投资效率的积极影响主要通过如下两个渠道:资金配置效率和信息透明度。研究还发现,在市场化进程较高的地区,企业内部控制较完善的情境下,管理层能力对企业投资效率的促进作用越显著。本文还进行了一系列稳健性检验,包括采用管理层能力和投资效率的不同测度方法,探究管理层能力变动对企业投资效率变动的影响,采用不同研究样本区间,考虑潜在的内生性问题,采用倾向得分匹配方法以及格兰杰因果检验等方法,研究结果依然稳健。本研究不仅丰富了管理层能力和投资效率的相关理论研究,也为企业提高投资效率提供思路和方法,更为我国经济高质量发展提供政策性建议。     

Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions

This paper examines the relationship between common stock and option holdings of managers and the choice of investment and financing decisions by firms. The authors find support for the hypothesis of a positive relationship between the security holdings of managers and the changes in firm variance and in financial leverage. This conclusion is based on samples of acquiring and divesting firms. The findings are consistent with the hypothesis that executive security holdings have a role in reducing agency problems.     

External Financing,Growth and Stock Returns

In this paper we investigate the relation of the value/growth anomaly with the anomaly on corporate financing activities. We confirm and expand earlier results that value/growth and external financing indicators are, to some degree, related predictors of stock returns in the cross section. We show that external financing indicators are incrementally informative since they pick up stock returns associated with earnings quality. Portfolios that combine information from both these indicators generate significantly higher returns than portfolios containing each individual indicator. More importantly, our analysis strongly suggests that the external financing anomaly is, to some extent, distinct from the value/growth anomaly, in that it may also reflect investors’ misunderstanding of the effects of opportunistic earnings management.     

管理者特质、负债融资与企业价值

本文基于行为金融理论和高层梯队理论,选用2008-2013年我国A股上市公司数据作为研究样本,区分企业产权性质,实证检验了拥有不同特质的管理者对负债融资行为与企业价值的影响。研究结果显示:我国上市公司的负债融资可以降低企业代理成本,对企业价值有正面的治理效应;管理者为男性、教育水平越高、任期越短、有财务相关工作经历时,越容易出现过度自信,也更偏好使用负债融资,其中管理者性别、教育水平、工作经历更是可以显著提高负债融资对企业价值的提升作用。进一步区分产权性质后发现,和国有公司相比,非国有公司负债融资对企业价值的提升效果更好;非国有公司管理者教育水平、工作经历与负债融资的正相关更强,也更能显著提高负债融资对企业价值的提升作用。本研究不仅丰富了管理者特质和企业融资研究领域的文献和经验证据,而且也表明了在研究负债融资对企业价值的治理效应时,管理者特质和公司的产权性质是重要的考量因素。     

管理层能力、长期激励与商誉减值

并购是管理层谋求企业快速发展的重要途径之一.近年来因并购而产生的商誉大量发生减值,因而受到广泛关注.本文以2008年至2018年中国A股上市公司为样本,考察了管理层能力对企业并购商誉减值的影响.研究发现,管理层能力与上市公司的商誉减值水平和商誉减值概率呈现显著的负相关关系,并且这种负向关系在管理层拥有的长期激励较高时更为显著.进一步研究表明,更高能力的管理层有助于降低并购商誉减值的内在机理在于并购时展现出更强的估值能力和并购后展现出更强的整合能力,分别表现为更低的并购溢价和更高的长期并购绩效.本文从并购决策制定者和实施者即管理层的视角研究了其对商誉减值的影响因素,丰富了企业并购商誉减值的相关文献.     

Asymmetric Information,Managerial Opportunism,Financing, and Payout Policies

We examine corporate issuance and payout policies in the presence of both adverse selection (in capital markets) and managerial opportunism. Our results establish the importance of the locus of decision control in the firm. When shareholders determine policies, debt financing is always optimal in the presence of either adverse selection or managerial opportunism. However, when both of these problems are simultaneously present, equity issuance can become an optimal signaling mechanism. Shareholders' most preferred signaling mechanism is restricting dividends, followed by equity financing, and finally underpricing securities. When managers determine policies, a reversed hierarchy may be obtained.     

法制环境、管理者能力与企业债务契约

本文从管理者能力的视角出发,选取2010-2018年沪、深A股上市公司为样本,实证分析了管理者能力对债务契约的影响及其影响路径。研究证明:管理者能力越强,企业的债务期限结构越短、债务融资成本越低。进一步研究发现,在不同的法制环境中,二者的关系存在异质性,即管理者能力对债务期限结构、债务融资成本的影响在法制环境较高的地区较为显著。本文丰富了企业债务契约的影响因素,探寻了管理者能力影响债务期限结构、债务融资成本的路径。     

Managerial Ability, Compensation, and the Closed-End Fund Discount

This paper shows that the existence of managerial ability, combined with the labor contract prevalent in the industry, implies that the closed‐end fund discount should exhibit many of the primary features documented in the literature. We evaluate the model's ability to match the quantitative features of the data, and find that it does well, although there is some observed behavior that remains to be explained.     

管理者能力与资本市场稳定

管理者能力是管理者有效率地利用企业资源创造价值的能力。本文以企业股价大幅下跌风险为切入点系统分析了管理者能力对资本市场稳定的影响。研究发现:管理者能力能够显著抑制企业未来股价大幅下跌的风险,具有市场稳定效应。这种稳定效应主要体现在管理者隐藏坏消息动机较强和隐藏坏消息空间较大(内部缺乏大股东治理和外部制度环境水平较低)的企业。进一步研究发现,管理者能力主要通过降低企业经营风险和提高企业治理水平等路径缓解企业未来股价大幅下跌的风险。本文丰富了管理者能力和股价下跌风险的研究,还对如何合理利用企业家资源维护我国资本市场平稳健康发展提供了重要的现实证据。     

信息不对称、管理者内生偏好与上市公司股权融资偏好

一般以为,上市公司的股权融资偏好是由于不合理的成本因素、有缺陷的监管制度和政策与低效的资本市场等原因造成的.本文分析认为,上市公司股权融资偏好产生的基本原因是管理者的内生融资偏好.如果公司绩效影响管理者的财富(或职位、声誉等),管理者的偏好将支配公司的融资决策;对称信息下,管理者将有充分的股权融资偏好.不对称信息下,如果管理者对公司项目(或资产)拥有私人信息,且厌恶风险,管理者将最大限度地使用股权融资,直至达到均衡.最后,本文提出,管理者对股权融资的偏好是内生的,治理目前上市公司股权融资偏好所产生危害的基本思路是"疏",而不是"堵".     

Internal versus External Financing: An Optimal Contracting Approach

We study optimal financial contracting for centralized and decentralized firms. Under centralized contracting, headquarters raises funds on behalf of multiple projects. Under decentralized contracting, each project raises funds separately on the external capital market. The benefit of centralization is that headquarters can use excess liquidity from high cash‐flow projects to buy continuation rights for low cash‐flow projects. The cost is that headquarters may pool cash flows from several projects and self‐finance follow‐up investments without having to return to the capital market. Absent any capital market discipline, it is more difficult to force headquarters to make repayments, which tightens financing constraints ex ante. Cross‐sectionally, our model implies that conglomerates should have a lower average productivity than stand‐alone firms.     

The Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure,External Financing and Financial Status

Using unique Swedish disclosure data from 2007 to 2012, this paper reports three important sets of findings with regard to the relationship between firms’ voluntary disclosure, external financing and financial status. First, financially strong firms disclose more than weaker ones. Second, firms that obtain new financing (equity or debt) disclose more than firms that do not. Third, the association between voluntary disclosure and financing events is stronger in financially weak firms. This last finding is new in the literature. Perhaps financially weak firms that obtain external funding have higher disclosure to counteract contracting and valuation problems in the financial markets.     

高管过度自信与现金股利相关性研究——基于融资约束的视角

〗以股改后2007~2011年A股上市公司为样本,考察融资约束对高管过度自信与现金股利支付关系的影响。结果发现：高管过度自信与上市公司现金股利支付之间具有负相关关系,但这种负向关系只有在非国有上市公司较为显著。进一步研究表明,高管过度自信与现金股利支付关系在不同股权性质下存在差异的主要原因来自于外源融资约束的影响,较强的外源融资约束加剧了高管过度自信对现金股利支付的降低效应,而外源融资环境的改善可以在一定程度上抑制高管过度自信对现金股利支付的降低效应。     

中小企业融资难的内因、外因及对策

本文通过挖掘造成中小企业融资困境的内部、外部因素,从加强中小企业自我强化内在管理、改革相对落后的金融体制、加强资本市场的建设与完善等方面提出了解决中小企业融资难的措施。     

货币政策、外部融资依赖与企业业绩

作为国家宏观调控重要工具之一,货币政策调整会影响企业融资行为进而影响企业经营业绩.运用我国上市企业数据研究发现,货币政策紧缩时期,企业面临较强的融资约束,银行借款减少,转而寻求商业信用.由于商业信用净额增加小于银行借款减少,货币政策紧缩导致企业融资不足使得企业业绩增长放缓,且外部融资依赖程度越高的企业受到的影响越大,但该影响只存在于非国有企业.研究结论有助于理解货币政策对企业业绩的传导机制,对处于三期叠加时期的我国企业与我国经济都具有一定的实践意义.     

超募融资、管理层权力与私有收益——基于IPO市场的经验证据

超募融资是关系到资本市场资源配置效率的重要问题,一直受到社会公众和监管部门的深切关注。以我国IPO超募融资为背景,结合管理层权力理论,本文探讨了IPO超募对高管私有收益的影响。以2006-2011年上市公司为样本,本文研究发现:(1)整体上,超募融资的上市公司其高管获得更高的货币性和非货币性私有收益;(2)区分产权性质,这一现象在国有企业和非国有企业中均显著存在;(3)结合管理层权力分析,管理层权力的增大有助于高管获取高额的货币性和非货币性私有收益,但这一关系主要存在于非国有企业;(4)市场对超募公司为高管发放超额货币性私有收益的行为,给予了负面的反应,而对于发放超额非货币性私有收益的行为没有显著反应。本文的发现拓展了超募融资、管理层权力经济后果的相关研究,并为超募融资效率的监管提供了一定的启示。     

The Cross‐Section of Managerial Ability,Incentives, and Risk Preferences

I estimate a dynamic investment model for mutual managers to study the cross‐sectional distribution of ability, incentives, and risk preferences. The manager's compensation depends on the size of the fund, which fluctuates due to fund returns and due to fund flows that respond to the fund's relative performance. The model provides an economic interpretation of time‐varying coefficients in performance regressions in terms of the structural parameters. I document that the estimates of fund alphas are precise and virtually unbiased. I find substantial heterogeneity in ability, risk preferences, and pay‐for‐performance sensitivities that relates to observable fund characteristics.