IS THERE A ROLE FOR TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS IF WE VIEW FIRMS AS COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS?

This article assesses the usefulness of transaction cost economics when we view economic organizations, such as firms, as complex adaptive systems. Modern complexity science is radically different in orientation to neoclassical economics, which deals with decision making in contexts that are presumed to be simple and, therefore, disconnected from complex reality. However, transaction cost economics can be related to aspects of modern complexity science: bounded rationality, opportunism, and asset specificity are all associated with behavioral complexity. Furthermore, the emphasis of transaction cost economics on hierarchy and organizational rather than technological considerations is also consistent with complexity science. Drawing on literature in psychological economics, this article synthesizes transaction cost economics with aspects of complexity science in a manner that offers a new research agenda, not only in the context of the organization of production but in economics generally. Such theoretical developments are vital if policy makers are to have at their disposal analytical perspectives that are coherent and applicable in complex historical settings.     

中国上市公司费用“粘性”行为研究

费用“粘性”指当费用随着业务量的变化而变化时 ,其边际变化率在不同的业务量变化方向上的不对称性。本文讨论了费用“粘性”的内容和目前对此的理论解释 :“契约观”、“效率观”和“机会主义观”。通过对 1 995年 1 2月 3 1日前上市的 2 92家公司从1 994— 2 0 0 1年的数据进行的分析 ,本文发现 :(1 )中国上市公司确实存在费用“粘性”。同美国上市公司相比 ,中国上市公司向下调整费用的速度要慢许多 ,这很可能是由于中国企业管理水平的低下和经理层代理成本的高昂。 (2 )费用“粘性”确实在以后的会计期间出现反转。在时间跨度拉长的情况下费用的“粘性”明显降低 ,这说明中国上市公司的经营管理还有一些效率 ,但是效率尚不够高。 (3 )效率观所隐含的“宏观经济增长”和契约观所隐含的“资本密集型”两个变量对费用“粘性”的增强效果不显著 ,这也许说明目前中国上市公司的经理层行为包含了“机会主义观”的因素。     

供应链的交易成本分析及供产双方的博弈

本文通过传统供应链中供应商和制造商的讨价还价模型分析,论证了交易双方的交易成本不同,造成供应商和制造商之间的相互依赖关系不同,从而双方的机会主义行为倾向也不同.制造商可以通过与高质量的供应商建立长期的诚信的战略合作伙伴关系,以减少为讨价还价消耗的交易成本,同时也减少了双方机会主义行为所造成的损害.     

基于交易成本经济学的节能服务外包决策研究

本文基于交易成本经济学对用能企业的节能服务外包决策进行研究,认为只有当用能企业预期节能服务外包后生产成本的降低大于由此而带来的交易成本时,才会选择外包这种方式。用能企业的节能服务外包决策受资产专用性、不确定性、交易频率、机会主义、业务复杂性和市场竞争性等六个因素的影响。通过对在单一外包商策略和多个外包商策略下用能企业所面临的交易成本的分析,本文提出了这两种策略的适用条件,并指出用能企业对外包商数量的选择取决于外包商的反应和双方博弈的结果。为了促进我国节能服务产业的发展,我国政府应该采取措施降低节能服务外包的交易成本。     

企业年金计划受益人的财产风险及保护问题探讨

受益人利益及其财产保护是企业年金计划的核心目标。基于信托和委托的企业年金治理结构和运作体系。既是受益人财产制度的创新，又是受益人财产风险的根源。由于利益主体目标函数的不一致和机会主义行为。会出现产权交易申的转移保留权、既得受益权、投资决定权、制衡监管权以及风险补偿权等问题，损害了受益人的利益及财产。因此，为了保护年金计划受益的利益及财产，需要界定利益主体间的权能结构关系，强化其合意行为并控制其机会主义行为，重视其间的利益捆绑机制，在信托和委托多重代理关系中寻求利益激励与约束的均衡点。     

Tax compliance and firm response to electronic sales monitoring

This paper analyzes how firms respond to an Internet of Things technology that reduces significantly the tax authorities' marginal cost of monitoring firm activity. More precisely, we analyze how mandating every restaurant of a single Canadian province to have sales recording modules (SRMs) affects restaurant sales, expenses and profits. We estimate that SRMs increase reported sales by 5.8% to 9.8% on average and that this increase is almost completely offset by an equal increase in expenses, including wages. As a result, the firms' taxable income remains mostly unchanged. Our results suggest that sales tax remittance enforcement at the firm level spills over to other firm stakeholders, such as employees and suppliers. Overall, the one-time cost of the device needed to monitor sales more efficiently is small compared with the recurring benefits for tax authorities.     

知识与跨国公司进入模式选择——一个不同于交易成本的框架

交易成本理论在分析企业进入模式的选择时,将机会主义作为关键的假设,但这种分析忽略了知识是以各种方式结合在一起的,这种结合减弱了机会主义的威胁,因此一种不同于交易成本的框架——知识为基础的框架建立起来了。这个框架将知识为基础的能力区分为建构能力和组合能力,它们影响着进入模式的选择。企业的知识战略对进入模式的选择也有直接或间接的影响。     

Transaction costs and foreign direct investment in developing countries

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been used by a number of developing countries to build a national competitive advantage in a global economy. Most of the literature on FDI in developing countries has focused on low-cost factors in these countries. But in a global economy where low cost factors are available at various locations around the globe, transaction costs related to the assumptions of "bounded rationality" and "opportunism" are becoming increasingly important in FDI decisions. These assumptions have been applied by researchers over the years to explain major changes in the organizational structure of corporations. This paper incorporates the assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism to discuss factors that a firm considers in its decision to undertake FDI. A statistical analysis was carried out to test the validity of the arguments presented in the paper.     

Dual distribution as a vertical control device

This article posits transaction costs as the reason manufacturers use dual distribution (i.e., sell to customers through both independent and company- owned distributions). The authors base their analysis on Williamson's four types of transaction costs, and identify eight explanations for dual distributions. These reasons are lifecycle considerations, lack of distributor competition, information costs, facilitation of collusion, manufacturer opportunism, price discrimination, customer service and manufacturer efficiencies. They conclude that the competitive effect of dual distribution depends on which of the above explanations is relevant. If more than one explanation is valid, it may be necessary to balance the competitive effects in both the manufacturing and retail markets to evaluate the practice.     

Are costs really sticky? Evidence from publicly listed companies in the UAE

This article measures the degree of adjustment between operating revenues and costs for publicly listed companies in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Traditional cost models assume that variable costs change proportionally in response to an upward or downward fluctuation in demand. However, in recent years, such an assumption has been questioned by a variety of papers from the economics and accounting fields. Typically, cost stickiness is defined as costs decreasing by less than 1% when sales decrease by 1%, while reacting closer to the proportion of change when sales increase. This study, unlike the vast majority of the literature, did not find cost stickiness in the UAE after using panel data regression analysis. The main explanation is that UAE has mostly expatriate labour force that does not have the typical benefits of employment protection legislation (EPL) available in other national jurisdictions. EPL is a main reason that costs adjustments during decreasing sales is curbed due to the associated costs of firing employees.     

资产专用性与交易成本节约——论企业是信用的载体

企业的功能不仅在于节约要素(中间品)交易成本,是要素的"间接定价装置",还在于节约最终产品交易成本.信息不对称的产品市场上,企业在交易中"制造"了一个重复博弈机制,这使其更关心长远利益.它用自身专用性资产--从价值和数量两个维度--来作为其产品是合格品的担保.专用性资产单位价值越大,数量越多,企业越有谋求长远利益、放弃短期机会主义行为的激励.市场上理性的买方考虑到这一点,总是认为效益越好、规模越大的企业越有可能提供合格品.企业是信用的载体,它一定程度上避免了产品市场由于信息不对称所引致的逆向选择,从而节约最终产品交易成本.我们的分析补充和完善了企业的交易成本理论.     

资产专用性理论局限性评述——兼论通用收购费舍公司案例

作为解释企业边界问题的主流分析工具,资产专用性理论不能对当前企业实践以厦经验研究的结论提供合理解释,因此需要重新审视。本文从机会主义假设、生产、资产专用性、交易成本性质、不确定性、交易分析单位六个方面详细论述了该理论的局限性,并从不同角度对通用——费舍公司并购案例进行了重新分析和解释,试图为审视企业边界问题增加一些“着眼点”。     

In or out: efficient inclusion of installations in an emissions trading scheme?

Regulators around the world are currently considering national emissions trading schemes (ETS) as cost-effective instruments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In the process, they are confronted with numerous design issues. The coverage of installations in an ETS is one such issue. While “blanket coverage” that includes all industrial emitters of greenhouse gases in an economy has some intuitive appeal, and seems equitable, it does not take into full account all the costs related to the extent of coverage. This paper shows that an alternative approach of “partial coverage” based on benefit–cost analysis can achieve the same emission reduction outcome at lower social cost. The approach is based on maximizing the benefits from inclusion of installations in an ETS at the same time as taking all relevant transaction costs into account. A broad definition of transaction costs is used, which covers the regulatory costs to the government as well as regulatory costs imposed on covered installations. We find that particularly for relatively modest emissions reduction targets the cost savings of a “partial coverage” compared to “blanket coverage” are significant.     

Improving environmental decisions: A transaction-costs story

A multidisciplinary team of researchers made efforts to influence the design and implementation of environmental policy in Australia. A focus of these efforts was the development of the Investment Framework for Environmental Resources (INFFER). In addition, the team undertook a range of communication activities, training, user support, and participation in committees and enquiries. Transaction costs were relevant to these efforts in a variety of ways. Environmental managers perceived INFFER to involve relatively high transaction costs. A balance was struck between the system having simplicity (and low transaction costs) and delivering environmental benefits. Transaction costs were factored into the planning and prioritisation processes developed. For example, public and private transaction costs are accounted for in the calculation of benefit:cost ratios and in the choice of policy mechanisms. There are diverse roles that transaction costs play in the processes of developing, implementing and influencing environmental policy programmes. A key observation is that appropriate strategic investment in transaction costs can improve decisions and increase net benefits from an environmental programme. A well-designed decision process can involve incurring transaction costs at one stage in order to save transaction costs at a later stage.     

Internal bargaining and strategic innovation in the theory of the firm

The transaction cost analysis of the firm has identified asset idiosyncrasy and the risk of ex post opportunism as key determinants of organizational form. Simultaneously, several writers have modeled the distribution of quasi-rents among input suppliers as a bargaining game. These complementary ideas are used to formalize the notion of strategic innovation, where capital and labor attempt to redistribute firm income after specialized assets are in place, through unilateral modifications in production technology. Because strategic behavior can enlarge the quasi-rent component of fifirm income, this process may persist in equilibrium. Asset idiosyncrasy therefore creates room for an autonomous theory of organizational dynamics, partially insulated from events at the market level of analysis.     

The Cost of Misaligned Governance in R&D Alliances

Transaction cost economics argues that aligning transactionswith governance structures leads to more efficient outcomes.While empirical evidence demonstrates that firms choose governanceconsistent with transaction cost predictions, the performanceimplications of governance choices are less well explored. HereI examine the cost of misaligned governance in the context ofresearch and development (R&D) alliances. Two costs of misalignmentare evaluated: excessive contracting hazards and excessive bureaucracy.Using a sample of R&D alliances in the telecom equipmentindustry, I find that alliance governance selected accordingto transaction cost arguments improves collaborative benefitssubstantially over governance not so selected. Interestingly,governance misalignments imposing excessive bureaucracy reducecollaborative benefits more than misalignments imposing excessivecontracting hazards. These results provide empirical evidenceof the cost of misaligned governance and have implications forresearch on the limits of internal organization and links betweenorganizational form and innovation.     

The Location of US States' Overseas Offices

Forty US states operated an overseas office in 2002. Treating overseas offices as sales offices, the model assumes offices facilitate exports by reducing the transaction cost of selling abroad. From theory, states operate an office if aggregate savings outweigh operating costs. Exploiting the differences in where states locate offices in the data, and controlling for aggregate characteristics, the paper estimates the impact of exports on the probability of an office existing. In addition, the average state savings from an office is 0.04–0.10% of exports, with a cut‐off threshold of US$850 million.     

MRO线上销售联盟及收益分配问题研究

以制造企业、网络平台和中间商作为工业品线上销售模式的构成主体,对其不同组合形成的三类销售联盟：单方联盟、两方联盟和三方联盟进行分析描述。运用Shapley值法及考虑实际收益权重的改进方法计算MRO线上销售联盟的收益分配问题。研究结果表明,三方联盟的附加收益大于等于任意两方联盟附加收益之和的一半,即可保证三方联盟中各方收益都达到最大值;任意两方联盟的附加收益增加都会使得第三方成员的边际收益减少。且基于实际责任、风险、成本及损失权益四个综合因素的变权计算方法,可使得线上销售联盟成员之间的收益分配更加公平合理,更加有利于工业品领域线上销售发展。     

Capacity Choice Counters the Coase Conjecture

The Coase conjecture (1972) is the proposition that a durable-goods monopolist, who sells over time and can quickly reduce prices as sales are made, will price at marginal cost. We show that an arbitrarily small deviation from Coase's assumptions—a deviation that applies in almost any practical application—results in the failure of that conjecture. In particular, we examine that conjecture in a model where there is a vanishingly small cost for production (or sales) capacity, and the seller may augment capacity in every period. In the "gap case", any positive capacity cost ensures that in the limit, as the size of the gap and the time between sales periods shrink, the monopolist obtains profits identical to those that would prevail when she could commit ex ante to a fixed capacity. Those profits are at least 29·8% of the full static monopoly optimum.