商业银行信息披露真实性监管的博弈研究

本文用博弈论方法研究分析在商业银行信息披露监管过程中存在的真实性问题,认为加强信息披露监管可以提高金融体系稳定性和效率。通过建立信息披露监管博弈模型,得出在多个监管者条件下,监管者即使接收到信号是虚假信息也认为是真实信息的概率增大的结论。针对我国银行信息披露中存在的问题,提出了完善惩戒机制、建立监管协调机制、加强市场约束和监管问责等政策建议。     

An evolutionary game theory approach to the dynamics of the labour market: A formal and informal perspective

A stylized fact of the labour market in developing countries is that it is highly segmented in informality. One of the main factors that induce workers and firms into informality is an excessive regulatory system that makes formal economy little attractive. This study aims to analyze the dynamics of workers and firms’ entrance and withdrawal of the formal and informal economy, assessing the impact of taxes by using an evolutionary game theory approach in which economic agents decide for one these markets according to the expected pay-off. Moreover, the optimal relation between regulatory and enforcement action by the government is evaluated.     

The determinants of cybersecurity risk disclosure in firms’ financial reporting: Empirical evidence

This paper examines the relationship between cybersecurity risk disclosure and financial reporting deficiencies. Using a difference-in-difference approach based on a large, matched sample of breached and non-breached US firms for the period 2006 to 2016, a differential effect is seen between cybersecurity risk disclosures in pre- and post-Breach financial reporting related to cybersecurity incidents. The association between the cybersecurity risk disclosure and subsequent reported financial deficiencies is positive and significant, providing some evidence for regulators that more firm-specific disclosure may provide increased audit quality, to which the auditor responds by increasing audit effort. The empirical findings suggest that firms with prior cybersecurity risk disclosures are more likely to experience financial reporting deficiencies. The results obtained are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks.     

信息结构、利益集团与公共政策:当前金融监管制度选择中的理论问题

本文试图确立一个分析当前金融监管政策制定格局的基本框架。文章认为 ,当前的金融机构体系呈现由少数机构垄断的特点 ,因而具备形成独立利益集团的必要条件 ;而当前的监管政策制定程序似乎昭示了这一点。文章从理论上分析了信息非对称和利益集团对金融市场和消费者利益的负面影响 ,特别指出不同集团间的竞争未必给消费者带来好处 ,提出关键在于继续推行透明度建设 ,逐步放开市场准入管制的政策建议。     

Corporate environmental disclosure, financial markets and the media: An international perspective

In this study, we analyze the information dynamics between corporate environmental disclosure, financial markets (as proxied by financial analysts' earnings forecasts) and public pressures (as proxied by a firm's media exposure). We adopt a comprehensive view of disclosure that encompasses environmental information that is both print-based as well as web-based. The sample comprises firms from both continental Europe (Belgium, France, Germany, and Netherlands) as well as North America (Canada and the United States). Relying on a system of equations that controls for endogeneity between environmental disclosure determination and financial analysts' work, we show that enhanced environmental disclosure translates into more precise earnings forecasts by analysts. Such effect is reduced for firms with extensive analyst following and in environmentally sensitive industries. However, these relationships are shown to be starker in Europe than in North America, i.e., environmental disclosure has a greater impact on analysts' forecasts but is also more greatly attenuated by analyst following and membership in an environmentally sensitive industry. Most observed relationships hold for either print- or web-based disclosure, except for North America in which web-based disclosure seems to have no impact on analysts' forecasting work.     

Regulatory compliance,information disclosure and peer effects: evidence from the Mexican gasoline market

Policy makers and regulators are increasingly interested in the use of information disclosure as a regulatory instrument to improve firms’ behavior. However, little has been done using micro-level data to investigate whether information provision may trigger peer influence among firms that affects their compliance behavior. Using station-level inspection verification data from the Mexican gasoline market, this paper examines whether gas stations react to peers’ performance to adjust their own compliance decisions. The information disclosure policy assigned each inspected gas station with green, yellow, or red colors to indicate the status of compliance, minor violation, and severe violation, respectively. We find strong evidence of peer influence triggered by information spillover. The probability of being in compliance increases as the number of “green” peers increases. We use both municipalities and postal codes as geographic boundaries to define potential peers, and find similar results. Our findings also suggest that the magnitude of peer effects varies across municipalities: the effects appear to be greater in wealthier, more educated communities.     

组织合法性理论视角下强制性与自愿性环境披露对比研究

企业的强制性和自愿性社会和环境披露在获取组织合法性层面上有不同的效果.文章基于此领域中最前沿的组织合法性理论,对强制性和自愿性披露的合法性起源、动机、载体以及规制、规范和认知的获得进行了对比,通过研究提出了对我国企业披露实践的启示.     

Organizational forms in the knowledge economy: a comparative institutional analysis

This paper provides a framework with which to analyze organizational forms in the knowledge economy. We focus on an important trade-off facing modern firms: firms can acquire the property of all the innovations developed by their employees and can greatly increase their profits, yet this type of private intellectual property rights regime can discourage the innovative effort of the very same workers. Allowing workers to carry their knowledge outside the firm eliminates this disincentive. Hence, strategic complementarities may exist between innovative partners and a disclosure driven intellectual property rights regime, and passive employees and a private intellectual property rights regime. An evolutionary game theoretic model demonstrates these strategic complementarities and shows when economies tend towards disclosure driven or private intellectual property rights regimes.     

Credit ratings and corporate disclosure behaviour: evidence from regulation fair disclosure in Korea

This article provides evidence that firms with high market expectations disclose more information to investors, utilizing the fair disclosure regulation in Korea to proxy for their disclosure choices. This finding is consistent with the argument that in order to retain their dominant positions, highly evaluated firms are more concerned about the market’s perception of them as providers of timely and detailed disclosure. We also find that the impact of market expectations on disclosure is more pronounced for chaebol firms. Combined with prior research on the relationship between firm performance and voluntary disclosure, we provide important implications for the determinants of corporate disclosure     

Assessing the Impact of Formal and Informal Regulations on Environmental and Economic Performance of Brazilian Manufacturing Firms

This study investigates the impact of formal and informal regulations on environmental and economic performance of Brazilian manufacturing firms. We adopt a dual approach where production technology is represented by a cost function, approximated by a translog form. Pollution is considered as a negative by-product that can be modified trough using either formal regulation (inspections or sanctions) or informal regulation (community pressure). A simultaneous equation model is estimated by three-stage least squares on a sample of 404 industrial establishments located in the state of S?o Paulo, Brazil. We show that pollution abatement costs for the Brazilian manufacturing sector are different from zero which suggests that pollution emissions are affected by environmental regulation. We also demonstrate that environmental performance of firms is jointly affected by formal and informal regulation. Lastly, formal regulation is largely influenced by informal regulation and more specifically by community pressure.     

Optimal Pricing and Entry Rules When a Regulated Dominant Firm Faces a Competitive Fringe

In this paper, we study optimal regulation of a dominant firm facing an unregulated competitive fringe. First, assuming the size of the fringe is fixed, we demonstrate that the usual Ramsey Rule for second-best efficient pricing remains applicable in this context. We also examine the suitability of the Laspeyres price cap and show that it retains its desirable properties. This implies that regulators should continue to apply Laspeyres price cap regulation to the dominant firm after competition has materialized. Then, assuming that price and entry control are regulatory instruments, we characterize the efficient pricing and entry rules. We demonstrate that the free entry equilibrium number of firms will be excessive relative to the efficient number of firms, thereby providing a new Excess Entry Theorem. Finally, we suggest a modification of the Laspeyres price cap that can incentivize the regulated dominant firm to support efficient entry into the fringe.     

中国近代股市监管的兴起与演变:1873-1949年

直观可以推测近代股市监管能力和效果都比较差,但是当时的真实情形究竟是怎样的呢?本文从监管机构的出现、股市监管立法、实际执法、政府对交易所的控制,以及市场危机处理这五个方面考察了这一阶段股市监管的特征与变迁。我们发现:在这70多年间,(1)各个时期的政府都能比较及时地移植外国的法律,纸面上的法律还是非常丰富、全面的,但是实际执法效果非常差;(2)专门的、中央集权的监管机构很快诞生,行政管理的力量在多层次监管体系中处于最重要的地位;(3)政府从来没有建立起完整而严格的信息披露制度,政府的有限力量被投放到了如何控制股市上,而不是提供公平的游戏规则。这种监管结构的成因或许可从一个“以毒攻毒”的制度三角形进行解释:随时可以剥夺企业财产的强势政府促成了企业在上市时藏匿各种重要信息的后果;上市公司信息披露不足又严重制约了监管执法的有效性;有效法治的缺失反过来又强化了政府的权力和对企业的任意掠夺。     

Estimating the Optimal Scale of Public Investments: The Case of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities

This paper addresses the regulatory problem of estimating the optimal scale of public capital investments, such as regional low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) disposal facilities and sports stadiums, when regulators can require information disclosures from firms. I evaluate the efficacy of the Illinois LLRW mandatory forecast disclosure rule against an estimated ARIMA model of LLRW volume disposed over the 1985–1995 period; the ARIMA model is shown to be more accurate. I conclude with an ARIMA model forecast of lifecycle volumetric capacity of a proposed LLRW disposal facility in Illinois.     

Environmental taxation,information precision,and information sharing

We analyze how environmental taxes should be optimally levied in a sequential game in which regulators and firms face costs uncertainties. First, the regulator chooses the intensity of emissions taxes to reduce externalities. Then, facing common and private information with noisy signals, firms compete in the marketplace and choose outputs. We show that, under nonuniform quality of signals across firms, the regulator may calibrate differentiated tax policy. We also show that the social impact of more precise private signals hinges largely and fundamentally on the value of the ratio of the slopes of the marginal damage and the marginal consumer surplus. Finally, we investigate information sharing between polluters and its impacts on welfare. We stress that, when there are threats of severe environmental damages under deep uncertainties, collusion is welfare reducing and may jeopardize the regulatory process. Regulators need to set an appropriate precautionary policy. Numerical simulations illustrate the results that the model delivers.     

Regulation,renegotiation and capital structure: theory and evidence from Latin American transport concessions

We examine the capital structure of regulated infrastructure firms. We develop a model showing that leverage, the ratio of liabilities to assets, is lower under high-powered regulation and that firms operating under high-powered regulation make proportionally larger reductions in leverage when the cost of debt increases. We test the predictions of the model using an original panel dataset of 124 transport concessions in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru over 1992–2011. For each concession we have data on the regulatory regime, annual financial performance and contract renegotiations. We begin by demonstrating that, although pervasive, contract renegotiations do not fundamentally alter the regulatory regime. Importantly, firms are not systematically able to renegotiate when in financial difficulty, implying that price cap contracts remain high-powered in practice. We use this result for our main empirical work, where we find broad support for our theoretical predictions: when the cost of debt increases, firms operating under high-powered regulation make proportionally larger reductions in leverage.     

Mandated disclosures under IAS 36 Impairment of Assets and IAS 38 Intangible Assets: value relevance and impact on analysts’ forecasts

Drawing on a large sample of European firms, we examine whether variant compliance levels with mandated disclosures under IAS 36 Impairment of Assets and IAS 38 Intangible Assets are value relevant and affect analysts’ forecasts. Our results indicate a mean (median) compliance level of about 84% (86%) but high variation among firms and disclosure levels regarding IAS 36 being much lower than those regarding IAS 38. In depth, analysis reveals that non-compliance relates mostly to proprietary information and information that reveals managers’ judgment and expectations. Furthermore, we find a positive (negative) relationship between average disclosure levels and market values (analysts’ forecast dispersion). Results, however, hold more specifically for disclosures related to IAS 36, and these also improve analysts’ forecast accuracy. Our findings add knowledge regarding the economic consequences of mandatory disclosures, have an appeal to regulators and financial statement preparers and reflect on the IASB’s concerns to increase the guidance and principles on presentation and disclosure.     

Lobbying and the power of multinational firms

Can multinational firms exert more power than national firms by influencing politics through lobbying? To answer this question, we analyze the extent of national environmental regulation when policy is determined in a lobbying game between a government and a firm. We compare the resulting equilibrium regulation levels, outputs and welfare in a game with a multinational firm with those in an otherwise identical game with a national firm. For low transportation costs, output and pollution of a national firm are always as least as high as for a multinational; this changes for high transportation costs and intermediate damage parameters. When there is no lobbying, welfare levels are always higher with multinationals than with national firms. However, the existence of lobbying may reverse this ordering.     

The domestic politics of financial regulation: Informal ratification games and the EU capital requirement negotiations

This paper contributes to our understanding of post-crisis financial regulation by reasserting the centrality of domestic politics in defining government preferences and explaining regulatory outcomes. It draws on Robert Putnam's two-level game approach and Foreign Policy Analysis to develop a model of a three-level informal ratification game. This adds value to existing approaches by capturing the contested nature of government preferences and delineating the causal mechanisms through which domestic groups shape international negotiations. The model is used to explain the UK's pivotal role in the reform of bank capital requirements in the European Union (EU). It demonstrates that governments are able to take advantage of a narrowing domestic ‘win-set’ by marginalising the influence of industry and building political momentum for regulatory reform. In particular, the paper shows how UK negotiators were able to exploit the increased domestic costs of agreement and synergistic strategies between negotiations to successfully oppose the maximum harmonisation of capital rules across the EU.     

“从业权取缔”型审计监管的警示效应

市场危机通常会引发标志性的监管,所谓乱世用重典。文章关注于中国审计市场标志性的"从业权取缔"型监管事件,在为该事件构建了从"舞弊警示"到"基于财务风险的市场溢酬和审计费用敏感度提升"的分析框架后,文章的检验提供了关键性的经验证据:其一,较之普通公司,财务风险高的公司表现出明显的市场溢酬;其二,警示性的市场溢酬越高,后续的审计费用对财务风险的敏感度越强。综合结果表明,实现行业协会和外部监管部门对从业权的共治,并决定其是否取缔的模式,能够通过惩罚机会主义行为影响投资者的信念和从业者的执业格局,这为新兴审计市场监管的积极意义提供了证据。     

上市公司再融资资格的确定与虚假信息披露

我们的分析揭示了 ,目前中国上市公司信息披露中“购买独立会计原则”事件发生的区间 ,是稽查概率 (p)、惩罚力度 (m与n)及证监会规定的上市公司再融资资格(t0 ,如净资产收益率要在 6 %以上 )的一个函数。并不是所有的上市公司都会愿意让中介虚报 ,也并不是所有的中介都愿意为上市公司虚报。虚报作为一种纳什均衡 ,一般发生在证监会规定的上市公司再融资资格附近的一个小区间内 ,该区间的下限由中介 (会计事务所 )来把握 ,而该区间的上限则由上市公司决定。而且 ,这个虚假的上市公司质量信号发生的区间 ,对于t0 来说 ,并不是对称的 ,在t0 (上市公司净资产收益率达 6 % )以右作假的区域大于在t0 以左作假的区域。我们还讨论了 ,在上市公司质量服从正态分布的前提下 ,若证监会按经验估计的净资产收益率的均值 μ来确定上市公司再融资资格 ,则危险很大 ,它反而会增加虚假的信息披露频率。这一结论是明显地支持调低t0 (再融资资格 )值或放松对再融资资格的监管这一改革方向的