Feedback spillover and analogy-based expectations: A multi-game experiment

We consider a multi-game interactive learning environment in which subjects sometimes only have access to the aggregate distribution of play of the opponents over the various games and sometimes are told the joint distribution of actions and games in a more or less accessible way. Our main findings are: 1) In the presence of feedback spillover, long run behaviors stabilize to an analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel, 2005). 2) Faced with the same objective feedback, the long run behaviors are sometimes better described by Nash equilibrium and sometimes they are better described by the analogy-based expectation equilibrium depending on the accessibility of the feedback.     

A test of the rational expectations hypothesis using data from a natural experiment

Data on contestants’ choices in Italian Game Show Affari Tuoi are analysed in a way that separates the effect of risk attitude (preferences) from that of beliefs concerning the amount of money that will be offered to contestants in future rounds. This separate identification is possible by virtue of the fact that, at a certain stage of the game, beliefs are not relevant, and risk attitude is the sole determinant of choice. The rational expectations hypothesis is tested by comparing the estimated belief function with the ‘true’ offer function which is estimated extraneously using data on offers actually made to contestants. We find a close correspondence, leading us to accept the rational expectations hypothesis. The importance of belief formation is confirmed by the estimation of a mixture model which establishes that the vast majority of contestants are forward looking as opposed to myopic.     

Efficiency and formation of expectations: evidence from the European investment survey

The European Commission conducts an annual survey regarding planned and realized business fixed investment across various manufacturing sectors in Euroland. In this study we investigate the predictive content of survey-based expectations on investment. In addition, we empirically test the rationality of respondents both in a time series as well as in a panel context. According to our results, based on pooling the data, efficiency is rejected since expectations are biased predictors of actual outcomes. Furthermore, expectations revisions are found to be correlated with components of the information set known at the time of decision making. Finally, our results qualify regressive expectations as the mechanism that more adequately describes the formation of expectations.     

The formation of wage expectations in the effort and quit decisions of workers

This study develops models in which workers form expectations of average wages in choosing levels of effort and on-the-job search. It is assumed that information on lagged average wages is available at a low fixed cost, whilst acquiring other information requires an additional variable cost. Under reasonable conditions, workers' expectations are at least partly adaptive, and may be a mixture of rational and adaptive expectations. Microeconomic parameters determine the degree to which expectations are adaptive and the weights placed on various lags of wages. As a result of partly adaptive expectations, nominal demand shocks may have real effects.     

Empirical evidence on the rational expectations hypothesis using reported expectations

Zusammenfassung Die Arbeit versucht die Hypothese der Rationalen Erwartungen an Hand von empirisch erhobenen Erwartungsdaten zu testen. Diese Vorgangsweise stellt eine Alternative zu den indirekten Testmethoden dar, in denen die Rationalität der Erwartungen durch den Verlauf von objektiven Daten getestet wird (durch Überprüfung einer Erklärungshypothese, in der Erwartungen eine wohl definierte Rolle zukommt). In diesem Fall kann immer nur die gemeinsame Hypothese der Richtigkeit des Modells und der Rationalität der Erwartungen verifiziert werden. Bei Verwendung empirisch gemessener Erwartungen entfällt dieses Problem, doch kommt die Frage der Glaubwürdigkeit der gemessenen Erwartungen hinzu. Eine unvollständige Auskunft darüber gibt eine Untersuchung des Erklärungsbeitrags der Erwartungen und Antizipationen in Konsum und Investitionsfunktionen.Die Hypothese der rationalen Erwartungen kann erst empirisch getest werden, wenn man eine Annahme über die vorhandene Informationsmenge trifft. Als minimaler Informations-stand wird die Kenntnis der vergangenen Entwicklung der zu prognostizierenden Zeitreihe angenommen. Unter dieser Annahme lassen sich die Merkmale Unverzerrtheit, Effizienz, Suffizienz und Konsistenz aus dem Vergleich erwarteter und tatsächlicher Entwicklungen ableiten und empirisch untersuchen.Das empirische Material umfaßt 39 Zeitreihen über die erwartete (geplante) Entwicklung von Umsätzen, investitionen und Preisen aus mehreren Ländern, wobei teilweise Unternehmensbefragungen, teils Konsumentenbefragungen und teilweise Prognosen von Experten zugrundeliegen.     

An experiment on protecting intellectual property

We conduct a laboratory experiment to explore whether the protection of intellectual property (IP) incentivizes people to create non-rivalrous knowledge goods, foregoing the production of other rivalrous goods. In the contrasting treatment with no IP protection, participants are free to resell and remake non-rivalrous knowledge goods originally created by others. We find that creators reap substantial profits when IP is protected and that rampant pirating is common when there is no IP protection, but IP protection in and of itself is neither necessary nor sufficient for generating wealth from the discovery of knowledge goods. Rather, individual entrepreneurship is the key.     

Endogenous expectation formation methods: Evidence from consumers' inflation expectations

This paper analyzes qualitative survey data on consumers' inflation expectations with the multinomial probit model. The results provide evidence that consumers' expectations depend on monetary and fiscal policy data, unemployment rates and pas inflation rates and that consumers' forecast differently during periods of low and high inflation rates. The analysis indicates that the government policy data, especially money growth rates, had a larger impact on the expectations during periods of high inflation. The paper provides support for the hypothesis that expectation formation methods depend on economic conditions.     

Rational expectations in microeconomic models: An overview

This paper is an expository introduction to several topics of current research in the general equilibrium theory of rational expectations. More specifically, we discuss the existence of exact and approximate rational expectations equilibria, the implementation of equilibria, the behavior of learning and smoothing processes by which traders construct expectations from repeated observations of the market, and the lagged use of the information revealed by prices in an intertemporal sequence of markets. The purpose of this discussion is to introduce papers on these topics appearing in the Journal of Economic Theory Symposium on Rational Expectations in Microeconomic Models.     

The formation of expectations: Some evidence from weekly money supply forecasts

This paper investigates the expectations formation process of weekly money supply forecasts derived from survey data. The evidence indicates that forecaster's expectations are modelled best as regressive. Moreover, the results are unaffected by the October 1979 change in monetary operating procedures.     

The formation of production expectations in manufacturing industry for nine industrialized countries

Using tendency surveys in the manufacturing industry for nine countries, different production expectations formation mechanisms are tested. Simple expectations hypotheses are compared by conducting nested and non-nested tests, and whether other information than that based solely on past production and expectations, is taken into consideration. It is found that expectations in most cases are formed regressively and/or follow a combined regressive and adaptive process and that information other than past production and expectations, only influence the formation of current expectations weakly. Finally, the rational expectations hypothesis is weakly rejected.I am grateful to Trevor Breusch, Robert Gregory, Paul Grimes, Raja Junankar, Wolfgang Schneider, two anonymous refereces and participants at the Advanced Studies Program in Economic Policy Research Conference at Kiel Institute of World Economics, May 1989, for helpful comments and suggestions.     

Belief formation: an experiment with outside observers

In this paper we study the belief formation processes of a group of outside observers making predictions about the actions of a player involved in a repeated game. We document four main results. First, there is substantial heterogeneity in the accuracy of our observers, with average accuracy being quite poor. Second, while there is no difference between the most and the least accurate observer in their initial beliefs, there are striking differences in their belief updating rules. The most accurate observers have a well-formulated model of player behavior, are good at best responding and quickly incorporate new information to their beliefs. The worst observers behave in an opposite manner on all three fronts. Third, when the game does not converge, subjects look beyond historical actions to make predictions and place more emphasis on forgone payoffs. Finally, we document that a “collective wisdom” emerges when our data are pooled across subjects and analyzed. Specifically, the accuracy of the group estimates becomes much higher than that of the average observer.     

An experiment on emissions trading: the effect of different allocation mechanisms

In theory, efficiency and compliance levels induced by an emission trading system should not depend on the initial allocation mechanism for permits in the absence of transaction costs. In a laboratory experiment we investigate this prediction by comparing frequent and infrequent auctioning as well as two different grandfathering schemes under market rules that closely resemble those of the European Union Emission Trading System. Our experimental results suggest that, contrary to theoretical predictions, the initial allocation procedure has the potential to affect efficiency of the final permit allocation. While we do not identify an effect of the initial allocation procedure itself (auction vs. grandfathering), we observe higher final efficiency after infrequent auctioning of permits than for frequent auctioning. Surprisingly, for a grandfathering scheme that distributes permits proportional to expected needs the high initial efficiency is substantially reduced by secondary market trading. An analysis of behavioral patterns shows that permit prices and abatement levels are initially substantially higher if permits are allocated by auction and we also find more over-banking as compared to the grandfathering treatments. Treatment differences diminish in the course of the experiment.     

Bare promises: An experiment

Is truth-value of a statement what lying aversion is all about? We propose an experimental test and find only limited support. In this context with ‘bare promises’, we also test for guilt aversion and again find only limited support.     

Error cascades in observational learning: An experiment on the Chinos game

The paper reports an experimental study based on a variant of the popular Chinos game, which is used as a simple but paradigmatic instance of observational learning. There are three players, arranged in sequence,each of which wins a fixed price if she manages to guess the total number of coins lying in everybody?s hands. Our evidence shows that, despite the remarkable frequency of equilibrium outcomes, deviations from optimal play are also significant. And when such deviations occur, we find that, for any given player position, the probability of a mistake is increasing in the probability of a mistake of her predecessors. This is what we call an error cascade, which we measure by evaluating the (heterogeneous) Quantal Response Equilibrium which better suits our data. We also check the robustness of our findings when we allow for belief heterogeneity by applying Kübler and Weizsäcker?s (2004) cognitive frame of limited depth of reasoning.     

An improved single equation estimation procedure for rational expectations models

This paper introduces a new readily programmable single-equation errors in variables estimation procedure for rational expectations models. For the illustrative example provided, this new estimator outperforms the currently available estimators.     

Uniqueness of ASM solutions in rational expectations models: An example

Using a technique recently proposed by Gourieroux, Laffont and Monfort (1979) we prove that for a process m_t asymptotically stationary in mean (ASM) the solution for the price level equation proposed in Fischer (1979) and in Blinder and Fischer (1979) is the unique ASM solution.