Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form

We model an organization as a hierarchy of managers erected on top of atechnology (here consisting of a collection of plants). In our framework,the role of a manager is to take steps to reduce the adverse consequencesof shocks that affect the plants beneath him. We argue that differentorganizational forms give rise to different information about managers'performance and therefore differ according to how effective incentives canbe in encouraging a good performance. In particular, we show that, undercertain assumptions, the M-form (multi-divisional form) is likely to providebetter incentives than the U-form (unitary form) because it promotesyardstick competition (i.e. relative performance evaluation) moreeffectively. We conclude by presenting evidence that the assumptions onwhich this comparison rests are satisfied for Chinese data.     

Why is China different from Eastern Europe? Perspectives from organization theory

We draw from recent work in organization theory to explain the differences in reform strategies between China and Eastern Europe. An experimentation approach was adopted in China whereas a big bang approach was more favored in Eastern Europe. The explanation is based on differences in the organizational structure of central planning: U-form in Eastern Europe and M-form in China. The M-form is more flexible because it makes local experiments possible, contrary to the U-form where this would give rise to major complications in coordination.     

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUSINESS DEFINITION AND CORPORATE GROWTH: THE EFFECT OF FUNCTIONAL ALIGNMENT

Abstract. In previous research, the hypothesis drawn from Theodore Levitt's idea that companies could continuously grow by ‘functional’ business definitions was statistically proved with 50 Japanese electric/electronics companies. The current research tests the hypothesis that in the case where the functions in corporate business definitions, divisional business definitions and products and services are all aligned, it will ultimately bring continuous growth to the company, through case studies and content analysis of four companies with highly functional corporate business definitions. As a result, it is proved that the company that successfully aligns the functions on every level continuously grows at a higher rate than the others.     

Entrepreneurial finance and economic growth

This paper develops a theory of the centralization of firms engaged in multi-market collusive agreements. A centralized organization (called the unitary or U-form) allows price coordination across several markets, whereas with decentralized (the multidivisional or M-form) firms the probability that the antitrust authority will find evidence of collusion on one market while investigating the other is lower. We show that the firm’s choice of internal structure depends to a large extent on product substitutability and the instruments used by the antitrust authority.     

MIXED OWNERSHIP,MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND BANK COMPETITION

We consider deposit competition between two banks, where prior to competition one bank is subjected to a nationalization decision and the other bank chooses managerial incentives. The government who maximizes a modified form of social welfare (with greater weight on profit than depositor surplus) chooses only partial nationalization, which still hurts the rival private bank. But by offering deposit‐linked managerial incentives the private bank recovers its lost profit and induces even less nationalization, leaving social welfare unchanged. However, under interest rate competition for differentiated deposits the private bank offers profit‐linked managerial incentives while the other bank may be completely nationalized.     

The profits of foreign firms in a less developed country: Ghana

Using a proxy for the rate of profit, this study does not confirm for Ghana (1970) the hypothesis that foreign firms make excessive profits as compared with other ownership groups of firms. Instead, the general tendency of the data is to rank the rates of profit for mixed private local-foreign and private local firms higher than those of wholly foreign, mixed state-foreign, and wholly state owned firms. Explanations of these observations in terms of transfer pricing through imports and differential cost-reduction incentives available to the firms are attempted.     

债务契约、控制人性质与盈余管理

前期文献基于应计项目操控对债务契约治理效应的研究认为,国有控股公司在债务契约约束下没有显著的盈余管理行为,而非国有控股公司会做大盈余。本文同时从应计项目操控和真实活动操控两个方面考察了债务契约对公司盈余管理的影响,结果发现,公司债务水平越高,两种盈余管理程度都越高。进一步研究表明,国有控股公司负债水平对应计盈余管理无显著影响,但与真实盈余管理正相关;非国有控股公司的负债水平与应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理都显著正相关。这个研究结果是对已有研究文献的一个重要补充,同时由于真实活动盈余管理会使经济活动偏离最优决策而影响公司长远利益,因此这个发现对重新认识债务契约的治理作用具有重要意义。     

管理者股权激励、内部资本市场与公司多元化

以我国多元化公司中管理者利用内部资本市场进行资金错配攫取私利行为为背景,研究管理者股权激励对多元化公司内部资本市场效率和公司价值的影响。通过建立双重委托代理模型,选取2009-2014年我国A股上市公司面板数据进行实证检验。结果发现：①多元化公司内部资本市场效率随管理者股权激励水平的提高而提高;②管理者股权激励水平提高最终导致多元化公司价值增加,内部资本市场在其中起部分中介作用;③公司多元化水平影响管理者股权激励对内部资本市场效率和公司价值的促进效应。     

Protection,distortions and investment incentives in Zaire: A quantitative analysis

This paper analyses the incidence of various trade and investment policies and their impact on the resource allocation of a small, open developing economy, Zaïre. It is based on the premise that resource pulls are better measured by the protection of profits than that of value added. The study shows that in Zaïre the incentives and disincentives provided by various policies counteract each other and partially defeat their purpose. Evidence of such contradictions is provided by comparing effective rates of protection with measures of distortional taxes and subsides, as well as a measure of total profit protection. While most of the quantitative analysis is based on data of 1970/72, effective protection is also estimated for the present time following the devaluation in 1983 and various measures of exchange liberalization.     

财务治理、投资效率与企业经营绩效

较好的财务治理能够降低委托代理成本,降低股东和债权人的信息不对称风险,从而使企业运行效率更高。研究发现,投资效率在财务治理对经营绩效的影响中起到了部分中介的作用,即财务治理能够提高企业的投资效率,从而对经营绩效产生一定程度的积极作用。而这种积极作用主要是通过财务控制和财务监督实现的,财权配置和财务激励所体现的财务治理功能效果并不明显。因此,国内公司治理的重点可能已经不是监督和控制的问题,更多的注意力应当放在利益相关者之间的财权配置和财务激励上。     

控制权与激励的冲突——兼对股权激励有效性的实证分析

控制权配置与激励安排是组织治理中的两个重要工具,本文首先从组织中委托人私人收益角度分析委托人控制权与代理人激励之间可能的冲突,进而通过上市公司数据对这一冲突关系进行经验检验。我们的研究发现,中国上市公司大股东控制权与管理层股权激励之间存在显著的冲突,而且这种冲突与股权性质、公司成长速度相关。民营控股公司中的冲突程度显著弱于其他类型公司,国资委控股公司中的冲突显著强于其他类型公司;而公司成长速度越快,大股东控制权与管理层激励之间的冲突越强。本文的研究结果能够很好地解释中国上市国有企业中股权激励效果不显著、甚至出现负效应的经验现象,并由此提出相应的政策建议。     

Stock market-driven investment: new evidence on information,financing and agency effects

This study provides a theoretical model and empirical analysis to jointly examine the information, financing and agency effects, the three channels through which the stock market can actively influence corporate investment decisions and firm performance. First, stock market affects corporate investments, and such impact varies with different market valuation measures, types of investments and firm characteristics. Second, stock market valuation affects investments through the channel of corporate financing, supporting the financing hypothesis. Third, stock market-driven investments have differential impacts on the future operating performance of firms. Investments driven by market valuation of firm-specific information have a positive effect on future performance. In contrast, investments driven by market-wide sentiment have a negative effect on future performance. Fourth, consistent with the information hypothesis, market-driven investments are value-enhancing for firms with better external monitoring by analysts and institutional investors. Lastly, consistent with the agency hypothesis, market-driven investments are value-destroying when firms lack external monitoring, proper managerial incentives and independent board of directors.     

技术董事、股权激励对企业创新效率的影响

随着知识经济时代的到来，创新在企业经营中的地位越来越高，董事、监事及高管团队对企业创新战略的方向、组织和实施具有重要影响，研究他们对企业创新的影响变得必要和迫切。以2012-2017年沪深两市上市公司为研究对象，运用DEA-Tobit两阶段模型，分析企业技术董事比例和股权激励（分为高管股权激励和核心员工股权激励两个维度）对中国上市公司技术创新效率的影响。结果显示，公司技术董事的比例越大，上市公司技术创新效率越高；对核心员工的股权激励授予比例越高，上市公司技术创新效率越高；然而，高管股权激励授予比例与上市公司技术创新效率并无显著联系。     

技术董事、股权激励对企业创新效率的影响

随着知识经济时代的到来，创新在企业经营中的地位越来越高，董事、监事及高管团队对企业创新战略的方向、组织和实施具有重要影响，研究他们对企业创新的影响变得必要和迫切。以2012-2017年沪深两市上市公司为研究对象，运用DEA-Tobit两阶段模型，分析企业技术董事比例和股权激励（分为高管股权激励和核心员工股权激励两个维度）对中国上市公司技术创新效率的影响。结果显示，公司技术董事的比例越大，上市公司技术创新效率越高；对核心员工的股权激励授予比例越高，上市公司技术创新效率越高；然而，高管股权激励授予比例与上市公司技术创新效率并无显著联系。     

The corporation as a tax shelter: Evidence from recent Israeli tax changes

Shifting of income between the corporate and the personal income tax bases in response to tax incentives is the premise of the literature on taxation and organizational form. Empirical evidence of income shifting is, however, merely circumstantial. Using a unique panel of high-frequency VAT data from Israel, we trace the footprints of income shifting through incorporation by high-income individuals who convert their labor income into less-taxed dividends. A rise in the personal income tax rates resulted in more than 4500 companies–a 5% addition to the corporate sector–being registered in the 12 months following the tax change, mainly by self-employed professionals in the industries of business activities and health services; behavioral response to taxation was found only in the top percentile of the income distribution.     

Transfer pricing rules and corporate tax competition

A multinational parent sells a non-marketed commodity to a foreign subsidiary that uses the product as an input to produce a product it then sells. The subsidiary is controlled by a local managing partner whose compensation consists of a lump-sum payment plus a share of the subsidiary's profit. The parent chooses an optimal transfer price taking into account incentives for the subsidiary's managing partner and taxes. Home and host governments impose corporate income taxes on the parent and subsidiary's respective profits subject to a transfer pricing rule (e.g. cost plus price method or comparable profit method). A Nash equilibrium is derived for effective tax rates chosen by home and host governments. We then examine harmonization and suggest that tax rates would be reduced.     

成本粘性影响管理层自愿性盈利预测了吗？--来自中国A股上市公司的证据

文章研究成本粘性与管理层自愿性盈利预测之间的关联。结果发现：成本粘性增加了管理层发布自愿性盈利预测的倾向及频率,同时,成本粘性程度与乐观盈利预测呈正相关,与悲观盈利预测呈负相关。影响机制表明,成本粘性通过提高信息不对称程度和企业经营风险从而影响了管理层自愿性盈利预测披露。进一步研究发现,政府补助加强了成本粘性与管理层自愿性盈利预测披露之间的关系,企业社会责任与经济政策不确定性削弱了两者之间的关系;然而政府补助、企业社会责任与经济政策不确定性对成本粘性与管理层自愿性盈利预测性质之间的关系没有显著影响。此外,成本粘性对管理层自愿性盈利预测的影响在非国有企业、非国际四大审计的公司中更为显著。最后,管理层自愿性盈利预测披露的增加,降低了权益资本成本,提升了企业价值。本文的发现丰富了成本粘性经济后果和自愿披露信息影响因素的研究,并提供了关于管理层的自由裁量权和管理激励在影响企业成本结构和盈利预测信息披露方面的证据。     

Incentives and managerial effort under competitive pressure: An experiment

We investigate how increased competition affects firm owners׳ incentives and managers׳ efforts in a laboratory experiment. Each owner offers a compensation scheme to his manager in two different conditions: under monopoly and under Cournot duopoly. Following acceptance of the compensation, the manager chooses an effort level to increase the probability of a cost-reduction which affects the firm׳s profit. According to standard theoretical predictions the entry of a rival firm in a monopolistic industry affects negatively both the incentive compensation and the effort level. Our experimental findings show that the entry of a rival firm has two effects on managerial effort: an internalization effect which affects positively the level of effort and an income effect which has a negative impact on effort. The combined outcome of these two effects is neutral with respect to managerial effort: we observe that when competition reduces the firm׳s profit, the owner reacts by offering lower incentives but despite the lower incentives the manager still accepts the contract offer and exerts the same level of effort than under the monopoly condition.     

公司经营者物质报酬、政治激励与经营绩效——基于国有控股上市公司的实证分析

本文选取中国国有上市公司为研究对象,重点研究国有上市公司经营者激励与公司绩效的相关性,并研究经营者升迁的决定因素对公司绩效的敏感性。研究发现在国有控股的企业中,董事长更多的关注政治激励,总经理更多的关心物质激励,当存在晋升机会时,政治激励、物质激励有一定的替代关系;年轻管理者的对公司绩效的作用往往主观地被低估,任期、政治关联、学历同晋升机会、公司绩效显著正相关,这意味着,上级对高级管理人员经营能力的判断时,应剔除高级管理人员个人特性对公司绩效的影响。     

Tax Rate Harmonization,Renegotiation, and Asymmetric Tax Competition for Profits with Repeated Interaction

This paper analyzes a model of corporate tax competition with repeated interaction and with strategic use of profit shifting within multinationals. We show that international tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the degree of asymmetry in terms of productivity differences between countries is smaller, or if concealment costs of profit shifting are larger when the tax authorities adopt grim‐trigger strategies. Allowing for renegotiation in the tax harmonization process requires more patient tax authorities to implement tax harmonization as a weakly renegotiation‐proof equilibrium. In this case, we find somewhat paradoxical situations where higher costs of profit shifting make tax harmonization less sustainable.