The necessity of delaying economic adjustment

I give an explanation for why agents react with a delay to decision and expectation parameters, by showing that imperfect agents must adjust very slowly relative to optimally adjusting agents if they begin reacting as soon as the latter agents would react. The results follow from the hypothesis of imperfect choice alone irrespective of whether there are any information, search, transaction, or other costs of adjusting decisions. The results thereby provide a general reason for observing inertially lagged behavior, and also agree with recent asset market experiments whose dynamics are governed by adaptive rather than ‘rational’ expectations.     

On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations

This paper examines a dynamic game in which each player only observes a private and imperfect signal on the actions played. Our main result is that in a repeated prisoner's dilemma where defections are irreversible (at least for a long enough period of time), patient enough players may achieve almost efficient outcomes. Dealing with models of imperfect private monitoring is difficult because (i) continuation games are games of incomplete information, hence they do not have the same structure as the original game. In particular, continuation equilibria are correlated equilibria. (ii) Players are typically uncertain about their opponents' past observations and actions, and they use their entire own private history to learn about these actions. As a result equilibrium strategies are in general nontrivial and increasingly complex functions of past observations. We bypass these difficulties by looking at correlated equilibria of the original game and find correlated equilibria in which the decision problem faced by each player remains the same over time. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72.     

What do you want to know? Information acquisition and learning in experimental Cournot games

This paper presents an experiment designed to study firms’ behavior and market dynamics, when information about the market structure and opponents’ actions is difficult to acquire and process. Our experimental software controls the information acquisition process of the subjects. Paying attention not only to what players do, but also to what they know, it is possible to better understand the cognitive processes guiding their choices and, consequently, the impact of the informational structure on their behavior. According to our results, Best-Response Dynamics is the main component of subjects’ learning process. We also find that, when subjects look at the strategies individually adopted by their competitors, they tend to imitate the most successful behavior, which drives the market towards a more competitive outcome.     

Mixing the carrots with the sticks: third party punishment and reward

While the opportunity to punish selfish and reward generous behavior coexist in many instances in daily life, in most laboratory studies, the demand for punishment and reward are studied separately from one another. This paper presents the results from an experiment measuring the demand for reward and punishment by ‘unaffected’ third parties, separately and jointly. We find that the demand for costly punishment is substantially lower when individuals are also given the ability to reward. Similarly, the demand for costly reward is lower when individuals can also punish. The evidence indicates the reason for this is that costly punishment and reward are not only used to alter the material payoff of others as assumed by recent economic models, but also as a signal of disapproval and approval of others’ actions, respectively. When the opportunity exists, subjects often choose to withhold reward as a form of costless punishment, and to withhold punishment as a form of costless reward. We conclude that restricting the available options to punishing (rewarding) only, may lead to an increase in the demand for costly punishment (reward).     

The necessity of imperfect decisions

I construct a general model which neither postulates decisions are always optimal, nor that decision errors necessarily arise when ‘real world’ agents are involved. Nevertheless, I show that agents always have a positive marginal incentive to use some information imperfectly, but never to use all potential information even if they have costless access to perfect information about how to select every action. These results imply that in order for a decision problem to be internally consistent without simply postulating the extreme limit of perfect decisions, it must explicitly incorporate the effects of both information and decision errors on behavior.     

The value of a stochastic information structure

Upon observing a signal, a Bayesian decision maker updates her probability distribution over the state space, chooses an action, and receives a payoff that depends on the state and the action taken. An information structure determines the set of possible signals and the probability of each signal given a state. For a fixed decision problem, the value of an information structure is the maximal expected utility that the decision maker can get when the observed signals are governed by this structure. Thus, every decision problem induces a preference order over information structures according to their value. We characterize preference orders that can be obtained in this way. We also characterize the functions defined over information structures that measure their value.     

Minimax regret with imperfect ex-post knowledge of the state

We consider decision problems under complete ignorance and extend the minimax regret principle to situations where, after taking an action, the decision maker does not necessarily learn the state of the world. For example, if the decision maker only learns what the outcome is, then all she knows is that the actual state is one of the (possibly several) states that yield the observed outcome under the chosen action. We refer to this situation as imperfect ex-post information. We show that, given a choice between more information and less information, the decision maker prefers the latter. We also extend the framework to encompass the possibility of less than the extreme degree of pessimism that characterizes the minimax regret criterion.     

Entrepreneurship,entrepreneurial training,and x-efficiency theory

A basic motivational component of entrepreneurship is an individual's commitment to overcome gaps and obstacles in imperfect markets. Research associated with n Achievement theory indicates the possibility of the selection and training of potential entrepreneurs, and therefore a means to increase the supply of entrepreneurs. A tendency to glorify entrepreneurship, and the use of a ‘tight’ equilibrium concept, make it difficult to integrate entrepreneurship into standard economic theory, despite the desirability of doing so. X-efficiency theory accommodates a non-heroic view of entrepreneurs, which in turn allows for the inclusion or entrepreneurial training in the model.     

Rational vs historical reconstruction – a counter-note on Signorino's note on Blaug

Heckscher's 1919 article originated the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international trade. In 1987 Carl Uhr pointed out that Heckscher in 1928 made another major contribution to economics in a German-language article on ‘intermittently free goods’, presenting ‘a theory of imperfect competition nine years ahead of that by Joan Robinson and Edward Chamberlin, and a discussion of collective goods not priced by the market’. This paper summarizes the salient ideas of Heckscher's article. It evaluates its merits, originality and significance for the history of economic thought, and how it fits into the ‘revolutionary’ developments of the theory of imperfect competition in the 1930s.     

Experimental study of cursed equilibrium in a signaling game

The laboratory experiment described in this paper provides evidence on play in signaling games in the context of electoral competition. In this game, voters must infer the preferred policy of each candidate from the candidate’s choice of whether to announce (truthfully) his preferred policy or to take no position. Bayesian voters would put high probability on a candidate having an extreme policy preference after observing him take no position, but cursed voters would not fully appreciate the informational content of the decision to take no position. Stated beliefs reveal substantial uncertainty about other players’ strategies. Based on estimates of a structural model of cursed equilibrium allowing for heterogeneity in the degree of cursedness, 32% of choices between candidates are consistent with Bayesian updating, 32% imply no inferences about others’ types after observing their actions, and the remainder indicate partial updating. Though the experiment also includes treatments with subjects in both roles, these estimates are based on interactions with programmed candidates, implying that uncertainty about others’ rationality and strategic sophistication is not driving the result. We also find that the quantal response error structure in which errors depend on payoff differences cannot explain the pattern of errors that subjects make.     

Speed and quality of collective decision making: Imperfect information processing

This paper studies efficient programmed hierarchies as introduced by Radner [The organization of decentralized information processing, Econometrica 61(5) (1993) 1109-1146] in which agents cannot process information perfectly. A group of P identical managers has to make a choice between n alternatives. In order to learn which is the best option, the alternatives have to be compared. The evaluation of an alternative takes time and managers are only able to identify the better one of two alternatives with a positive probability. The skip-level reporting tree proposed by Radner is found to be efficient in terms of the dimensions decision cost, decision delay, and decision quality.     

Keynes and probability: An assessment

Abstract

Most interpreters agree that Keynes had a wide-ranging, complex, ‘vision of the world’, which underlies his theoretical contributions. Whenever this is forgotten, as happens in the so-called neoclassical synthesis, not only the original Keynesian spirit goes lost but also, and especially, we lose substantive bricks for our theoretical constructions. The paper considers an important instance of this general rule; namely Keynes's views on the logic of probability, meant as the field concerning human behaviour in an uncertain world (hence connected to, but distinct from, the pure theory of probability, meant as a field of mathematics). The paper begins by recalling the main aspects of the classical and frequentist approaches to probability and the main criticisms they received, pertaining among other things to the limits of their applicability. We then consider Keynes's own views, stressing three aspects: the definition of probability as pertaining to the field of logic, the notion of uncertainty and of the ‘weight of the argument’, the ‘theory of groups’. We then discuss the subjective approach of de Finetti, Ramsey and Savage, and contrast it with Keynes's own views. Finally, we consider the implications of our analysis for the interpretation of Keynes's General Theory, and of his attitude towards econometrics.     

The Modus Operandi of Protection*

The theory of (tariff and exchange-rate) protection usually assumes that imports and domestic substitutes sell at the same price and that exceptions to the ‘law of one price’ are due to imperfect substitutability. This article discusses the implications for the modus operandi of protection of the divergence between the prices of imports and of their domestic substitutes. It argues that the extent of this divergence will depend on imperfect price flexibility as well as imperfect substitutability. Whereas under ‘flex-price’ conditions, protection in the first instance merely redistributes income and changes market shares, output and employment only with a lag, protection under ‘fix-price’ conditions immediately affects market shares and (subject to inventory changes) output and employment.     

A model of boundedly rational “neuro” agents

We consider a model in which each agent in a population chooses one of two options. Each agent does not know what the available options are and can choose an option only after observing another agent who has already chosen that option. In addition, the agents’ preferences over the two options are correlated. An agent can either imitate an observed agent or wait until he meets two agents who made different choices, in which case he can compare their choices and choose accordingly. A novel feature of the model is that agents observe not only the choices made by others, but also some information about the process that led them to those choices. We study two cases: In the first, an agent notes whether the observed agent imitated others or whether he actually compared the available alternatives. In the second, an agent notes whether the observed agent’s decision was hasty or not. It is shown that in equilibrium the probability of making a mistake is higher in the second case and that the existence of these nonstandard “neuro” observations systematically biases the equilibrium distribution of choices.     

Uncoupled Aspiration Adaptation Dynamics Into the Core

Dynamics for play of transferable‐utility cooperative games are proposed that require information regarding own payoff experiences and other players’ past actions, but not regarding other players’ payoffs. The proposed dynamics provide an evolutionary interpretation of the proto‐dynamic ‘blocking argument’ (Edgeworth, 1881) based on the behavioral principles of ‘aspiration adaptation’ (Sauermann and Selten, 1962) instead of best response. If the game has a non‐empty core, the dynamics are absorbed into the core in finite time with probability one. If the core is empty, the dynamics cycle infinitely through all coalitions.     

Econometric Specification and Identification of the Behavior of Economic Agents

The present study examines the combination of economic theory, structure of the econometric model, and estimation techniques to extract the maximum possible information about the behavior of economic agents from observed decisions. The analysis is set in the framework of micro economic behavior and industrial organization. The relevant theoretical structures generally assume optimization behavior of economic agents. However, optimization models do not have a unique structure and are generally difficult to identify. Consequently, a variety of second best specification and estimation methods emerged. But they entail loss of information. Hence, greater efforts devoted to the identification of optimization models will enrich our understanding of economic behavior. Progress in this direction will eventually render a vast majority of existing econometric techniques obsolete.

     

Wages in and voluntary quits from an establishment internal labour market

This paper analyses wage rates in and quit rates from two production departments in an establishment based structured internal labour market in which labour allocation between grades and the wage rate of these grades are managerially determined. First, it is assumed that management makes effective use of the ‘private’ information about individual employees collected through time, proxied by tenure, to allocate them to the most appropriate tasks. However, in an OLS regression the elasticity of the wage rate with respect to tenure, although statistically significant, is not economically important. Further, it is assumed that this labour allocation process together with the wage structure will facilitate labour retention. However, in a probit model analysing the quit probability, the probability of quitting increases with the wage rate. Both results are compatible with an internal labour market labour allocation process and wage structure that is not competitive with wage rates prevailing in the external labour market.     

A Logic for Suspicious Players: Epistemic Actions and Belief–Updates in Games

This paper introduces a notion of 'epistemic action' to describe changes in the information states of the players in a game. For this, ideas are developed from earlier contributions. The ideas are enriched to cover not just purely epistemic actions, but also fact–changing actions ('real moves', e.g. choosing a card, exchanging cards etc.) and nondeterministic actions and strategies (conditional actions having knowledge tests as conditions). The author considers natural operations with epistemic actions and uses them to describe significant aspects of the interaction between beliefs and actions in a game. A logic is used that combines in a specific way a multiagent epistemic logic with a dynamic logic of 'epistemic actions'. The author presents a complete and decidable proof system for this logic. As an application, the author analyses a specific example of a dialogue game (a version of the Muddy Children Puzzle, in which some of the children can 'cheat' by engaging in secret communication moves, while others may be punished for their credulity). Also presented is a sketch of a 'rule–based' approach to games with imperfect information (allowing 'sneaky' possibilities, such as cheating, being deceived and suspecting the others to be cheating).     

Non-consequentialist voting

Standard theory assumes that voters’ preferences over actions (voting) are induced by their preferences over electoral outcomes (policies, candidates). But voters may also have non-consequentialist (NC) motivations: they may care about how they vote even if it does not affect the outcome. When the likelihood of being pivotal is small, NC motivations can dominate voting behavior. To examine the prevalence of NC motivations, we design an experiment that exogenously varies the probability of being pivotal yet holds constant other features of the decision environment. We find a significant effect, consistent with at least 12.5 percent of subjects being motivated by NC concerns.     

Aggregate information cascades

We introduce a new model of aggregate information cascades where only one of two possible actions is observable to others. Agents make a binary decision in sequence. The order is random and agents are not aware of their own position in the sequence. When called upon, they are only informed about the total number of others who have chosen the observable action before them. This informational structure arises naturally in many applications. Our most important result is that only one type of cascade arises in equilibrium, the aggregate cascade on the observable action. A cascade on the unobservable action never arises.