Do central bank law reforms affect the term in office of central bank governors?

In this paper we confirm the hypothesis that central bank independence reforms reduce the likelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced. However, the strength of this effect depends on the rule of law and the degree of political polarization.     

Why do bank loans react with a delay to shifts in interest rates? A bank capital explanation

We advance an explanation for the delay in the response of the volume of bank loans to innovations in monetary policy. Capital requirements may effectively tie the evolution of bank credit to the evolution of bank equity. By uncovering a new mechanism by which shifts in interest rates affect the profitability of the banking sector, and in turn its equity, we find that the resulting movements in the amount of aggregate loans are consistent with the regularities observed in the data.     

Public subsidies and new ventures’ use of bank loans

Access to financial resources is crucial for young firms to strive. To foster innovation and growth in these firms, governments address financing constraints by initiating public support programs. For such financial support to be effective, it is, however, important that firms are able to augment publicly provided resources with additional means. This study examines the relationship between new ventures’ subsidy receipt and long-term bank loans. Studying new ventures founded between 2005 and 2009 in Germany, we test whether the subsidy itself facilitates use to bank financing. Applying econometric techniques that account for the endogenous nature of a subsidy receipt, we find that subsidized young firms are more likely to use bank loans and to have obtained a larger share of their financing mix from banks. We further show that this effect is stronger in highly information-opaque sectors. These results suggest that the effect may be attributed to an information value carried by the grant that is relevant to banks’ loan assessment procedures, especially when new venture value is difficult to judge.     

An analysis of commercial bank common stock returns: 1802–97

This study creates analyses for the first time a continous index of returns on commercial bank common stocks listed in a specific market. The index is constructed from a unique set of historical data and is calculated on both a weighted and unweighted basis, first including and then excluding dividends. A measure of volatility is calculated annually.

The results indicate that the dividend component of holding period returns is very important. Including dividends, average returns were 6.0% for the century; excluding dividends, average returns were 0.1%. Excess returns were calculated using two different measures of a riskless rate of return. Cumulative excess returns for the first half of the nineteenth century were negative. Real returns were calculated, and found to be generally positive over the century. The volatility of returns was quite high during certain periods.

Examining the effects of significant economic and political events on bank common stock returns, we find that the War of 1812, the Civil War, and the National Banking System had a significant impact on bank stock returns. Several economic panics, several depressions, the First and Second Banks of the United States, the Embargo of 1807, and the Suffolk Bank had no measureable impact.     

On the origin and rise of central bank independence in West Germany∗

Abstract

This paper investigates the (re-)establishment of central banking in West Germany after 1945 and the history of the Bundesbank Act of 1957. The main focus is on the early emphasis on central bank independence, which at the time represented a German peculiarity. The paper inquires whether contemporary German economic thought may have provided a theoretical case for this peculiar tradition and scrutinizes the political calculus that motivated some key actors in the play. Contrary to conventional wisdom, important contradictions between the postulate of central bank independence and Ordoliberalism are identified.

JEL Classification Codes: B22, B31, E50     

Do bank bondholders price banks’ ability to manage risk/return?

In this paper, we empirically investigate whether bank bondholders value risk management, measured as risk-return efficiency (RRE), when pricing bond spreads. Based on a sample of 2,452 bonds issued by 78 European listed banks, for the period 2001–2015, we find evidence that the ability of banks to manage risk affects bond spreads: banks with more capable managers obtain a lower cost of debt. In particular our results show that bank bondholders are even more sensitive to RRE during the crisis period, for relatively poorly rated bonds, for unsecured/subordinated debt, and for long maturity debt. Our findings highlight that bondholders’ monitoring of banks is effective and takes into account the efficiency of risk management during financial and economic downturns, but during sound periods bank bondholders should strengthen their monitoring of risk management.     

Does clarity of central bank communication affect credibility? Evidences considering governor-specific effects

Central banks have made great efforts to increase transparency and accountability to the public. Since then, studies seek empirical evidences about the effects of monetary policy communication over agent’s expectations. The recent literature on central bank communication draws attention to the importance of clarity of central bank communication. However, researches on this theme are still scarce, and there are few empirical studies with conclusive findings. Our study seeks empirical evidences on the relation between clarity of central bank communication and credibility of monetary policy. Estimates through different methods aim to identify whether clarity of central bank communication improves credibility. The study is the first to provide empirical evidence that a clearer communication can improve credibility. We also consider the differences between the two governors who ruled the Central Bank of Brazil in the period under analysis. The results indicate that a clear communication can improve credibility, but it depends on the commitment of the central banker with the goal of inflation control. Furthermore, estimates based on quantile regression indicate that the benefit brought by the clarity to the credibility depends on the commitment of the monetary authority with the goal guiding inflation expectations.     

The evolution of the Polish central bank’s views on Eurozone membership

This article analyses the reports published by the National Bank of Poland (NBP – Narodowy Bank Polski) between 2004 and 2014. These reports shed light on the evolution of official thinking on the possibility of Polish participation in the Eurozone, revealing a decline in enthusiasm over time. This change has taken place against a backdrop of a shift in general public attitudes (in Poland) towards the European Union, and a more specific shift in public opinion on the desirability of monetary integration on the supranational level caused by the economic crisis. These two factors explain the shift in conclusions and arguments contained in the official reports of the National Bank of Poland.     

How does equity capital cost affect bank performance during a financial crisis?

This article theoretically examines how equity capital cost affects return performance and safety of a bank and how this effect varies across a financial crisis comparing to a normal time when the bank manager’s performance reveals the like of higher equity return and the dislike of higher equity risk. We derive two main results. First, an increase in the bank’s equity capital cost from an increase of the interest rate of the Federal funds results in a reduced loan risk-taking at an increased optimal bank interest margin, implying better bank performance. Second, by ignoring the dislike, we find that the better performance is reinforced during a financial crisis but is reduced during a normal time. Financial crises and the dislike preference as such contribute a relatively low return and the stability of banking activities.     

Who upholds the surging gold price? The role of the central bank worldwide

Who upholds the surging gold price? Conventional wisdom suggests that the depreciation of the exchange rate, inflation and economic turmoil are the suspects. Nonetheless, while these factors cease, why does the gold price still stay around hikes? The gold market belongs to a global arena. Different from other commodities, its participants include the national central banks worldwide. However, surprisingly, the role played by these tremendous market participants’ gold holdings on the gold price has been ignored in past empirical works. This research focuses on central banks’ gold holdings to explore who upholds the surging gold price. Several interesting outcomes are derived. First, our empirical evidence shows an inverse phenomenon relative to news reports from the mass media that the gold holdings of central banks worldwide in fact continuously descend. Second, the mainstream countries of the world have not played a main role in the rising trend of the gold price in the recent decade; instead, newly emerging industrialized countries’ central banks’ gold holdings show their significant power in explaining causality to gold price fluctuations. Third, the reason for the persistent gold buying behaviour of emerging economies may be because the increase in the gold price delivers a kind of short squeeze effect to the central banks of emerging countries.     

Are there asymmetries in the response of bank interest rates to monetary shocks?

This article examines the velocity and asymmetry of the response of bank interest rates to monetary policy shocks. Using an asymmetric vector error correction model, it analyses the pass-through of changes in money market rates to retail bank interest rates in Italy in the period 1985–2002. The main results of the article are: (1) the speed of adjustment of bank interest rates to monetary policy changes increased significantly after the introduction of the 1993 Consolidated Law on Banking; (2) interest rate adjustment in response to positive and negative shocks is asymmetric in the short run, but not in the long run; (3) banks adjust their loan (deposit) rate faster during periods of monetary tightening (easing); (4) this asymmetry almost vanished since the 1990s.     

Should bank branching be regulated? Theory and empirical evidence from four European countries

Along with the liberalisation of bank branching, which was pushed ahead in most OECD member countries during the past several decades, the fear of overbranched markets has arisen. In a model of spatial competition, the welfare effects of bank branching regulation are investigated and empirical results are presented from a pooled cross-section time series analysis from four European countries. It is shown that for all observations in the sample, fewer branches would have been socially undesirable. Moreover, the frequently posed hypothesis that a positive relationship exists between the number of branches and the price for financial intermediation is rejected.     

Lenders on the storm of wholesale funding shocks: saved by the central bank?

We provide empirical evidence on banks’ responses to shocks in the wholesale funding market, using data of 181 euro area banks over the period from August 2007 to June 2013. Responses to funding liquidity shocks for both banks’ lending volumes and loan rates, to households and corporates, are analysed in a panel VAR framework. We thereby distinguish banks by country, extent of Eurosystem borrowing, bank size and capitalization. The results show that shocks in the securities and interbank markets have significant effects on loan rates and credit supply, particularly of banks in stressed countries of the periphery. The results also suggest that central bank liquidity has mitigated this effect on lending volumes. Lending to nonfinancial corporations is more sensitive to wholesale funding shocks than lending to households. Lending volumes of large banks that are typically more dependent on wholesale funding and banks with large exposure to sovereign bonds show stronger responses to wholesale funding shocks.     

A “penalty” discount rate,bank behavior,and price and output stability

The purpose of this paper is to provide an evaluation of the implications of the adoption of a penalty rate discount window policy for bank behavior and for price and output stability. A basic model of the banking firm is used to show that adoption of a penalty rate policy alters the sensitivity of bank portfolio demands to changes in the open market rate, to which the penalty discount rate is deterministically related. In the context of a macroeconomic model that takes into account this interaction of discount window policy and bank behavior, it is demonstrated that adoption of a penalty rate policy generally would have ambiguous implications for the variability of real output and the price level.     

The ‘compensation’ thesis,as exemplified by the case of the Chinese central bank

This paper extends the theory of demand-led money supply endogeneity to the case of an open economy with a fixed exchange rate. This theory is contrasted to the standard Mundell-Fleming view. In the compensation approach advocated here, central banks are able to set interest rates, even in a fixed exchange rate regime, either because there are automatic market mechanisms that will induce the private sector to act in such a way that changes in foreign reserves will be compensated by opposite changes in central bank claims over the domestic economy, or because the central bank will engage in endogenous sterilization operations in its efforts to enforce its benchmark interest rate. Analyzing the balance sheet of the Chinese central bank, we find that the large rise in foreign reserves on the asset side is compensated by large positive changes in items of the liability side, mainly bonds issued by the central bank. Foreign reserves are not cointegrated with the monetary base, meaning that there is no long-run relationship between foreign exchange reserves and the supply of base money. We also find no long-run relation between foreign exchange reserves and the consumer price index.     

Local versus International Crises and Bank Stability: does bank foreign expansion make a difference?

We investigate the impact of global and local crises on bank stability in the MENA region and examine the effect of owning bank subsidiaries in other countries. We consider banks that experienced both types of crises during our sample period. Our findings highlight a negative impact of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2008 on bank stability but, on the whole, no negative impact of the local crisis. A deeper investigation shows that owning bank subsidiaries outside the home country is a source of increased fragility during normal times, yet a source of higher stability during the local crisis but not during the international crisis. Moreover, owning foreign subsidiaries in one or two world regions is insufficient to neutralize both types of crises, while being present in three or more regions is more stabilizing during a local crisis but also more destabilizing during an international crisis. Our findings contribute to the literature examining bank stability and have several policy implications.