Equilibrium with limited-recourse collateralized loans

We address a general equilibrium model with limited-recourse collateralized loans and securitization of debts. Each borrower is required to pledge physical collateral, and bankruptcy is filed against him if claims are not fully honored. Moreover, agents have a positive amount of wealth exempt from garnishment and, for at least a fraction of them, commodities used as collateral are desirable. In this context, equilibrium exists for any continuous garnishment rule and multiple types of reimbursement mechanisms.     

Learning to search

Consumer search behavior in a market characterized by differentiated products is investigated in terms of a psychological reinforcement learning model. It is demonstrated that under these assumptions, consumers will vary in their propensities toward search despite similarities in search costs. There is no ‘equilibrium’ search behavior for an individual household, but there does exist a unique equilibrium distribution of search propensities. Although the behavioral hypothesis which underlies the model is quite different from the usual Bayesian formulations, the mean of the equilibrium distribution has properties which are very similar to those of normative Bayesian search models.     

Nonstandard foundations of equilibrium search models

We develop an equilibrium sequential search model which includes most of the literature as special cases. In particular, the model can accommodate heterogeneity in buyers’ search costs and demand functions and firms’ cost functions, with general demand and cost functions. We identify conditions which ensure existence of equilibrium in pure strategies, utilizing recent progress in the theory of large games by Khan and Sun. These conditions elucidate the essential structure of equilibrium search models. Although we focus on sequential search, our methodology can be used for other classes of equilibrium search models as well.     

Consumer search markets with costly revisits

This paper characterizes equilibrium outcomes in consumer search markets taking the cost of going back to stores already searched explicitly into account. We show that the optimal sequential search rule under costly revisits is very different from the traditional reservation price rule in that it is non-stationary and not independent of previously sampled prices. We explore the implications of costly revisits on market equilibrium in two celebrated search models. In the Wolinsky model, some consumers search beyond the first firm. In this class of models, costly revisits do make a substantive difference and their impact can be of the same order of magnitude as the initial search cost. In the Stahl oligopoly search model where consumers do not search beyond the first firm, there remains a unique symmetric equilibrium that has firms use pricing strategies that are identical to the perfect recall case.     

Equilibrium Search with Continuous Productivity Dispersion: Theory and Nonparametric Estimation

In this article we develop an equilibrium search model with a continuous distribution of firm productivity types within a given labor market. We characterize equilibrium, derive expressions for the endogenous equilibrium wage distributions, and characterize the set of wage distributions that can be generated by the model. We develop a structural nonparametric estimation method for the productivity distribution. We estimate the model using French longitudinal survey data on labor supply, and we compare the results with those from a French panel data set of firms. The results are informative on the degree to which firms exploit search frictions.     

风险分担视角下专利权质押融资估值研究

目前关于专利权质押融资估值的研究主要集中在专利权估值方法、专利权价值影响因素和专利权质押融资风险因素等方面,鲜有研究将风险因素和估值方法结合起来。站在金融贷款机构的角度,在识别专利权质押融资风险因素基础上,从风险分担视角构建了专利权质押融资估值模型。通过分析,专利权质押融资过程中主要存在法律风险、评估风险、信用风险和经济风险。其中,法律风险可转移,评估风险及金融贷款机构自身原因造成的信用风险分别由评估机构和贷款机构自行承担,估值时不必考虑;企业原因造成的信用风险直接影响贷款额度,不影响专利权价值,可通过信用评级确定贷款比例;而经济风险直接影响专利权价值。运用蒙特卡洛模拟方法进行量化分析,并运用实例进行了验证,结果显示,考虑风险的质押融资估值低于传统收益法的估值结果。     

Bargaining and Search with Incomplete Information about Outside Options

This paper considers a model of bargaining in which the seller makes offers and the buyer can search (at a cost) for an outside option; the outside option cannot be credibly communicated, and the seller's offer is recallable by the buyer for one period. There are essentially two equilibrium regimes. For sufficiently high search cost, the game ends immediately; otherwise the search occurs in equilibrium. Compared to the case where the buyer can communicate his outside option, the seller is worse off, and the game results in search for a smaller set of values of the search cost, i.e., less equilibrium delay.C72.     

ON EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS WITH ENDOGENOUS ON-THE-JOB SEARCH

We consider an equilibrium search model and employment contracts when workers have endogenous on-the-job search. When a firm tries to retain an employee by matching outside offers, variable search intensity leads to a moral hazard problem. We first consider workers with identical productivities. We derive an equilibrium where firms commit not to respond to outside offers and workers search less. Second, we investigate the case with heterogeneous workers and asymmetric information. Assuming that firms can commit to retain all workers irrespective of their ability, we establish conditions under which it is optimal to do so. This policy again reduces the incentive for active on-the-job search. We discuss an equilibrium where all firms use these so-called ‘pooling’ contracts.     

Bilateral Search and Vertical Heterogeneity

Just like perfect (frictionless) matching models, a search model is proposed that is characterized by bilateral search and vertical heterogeneity. It allows for a generally specified utility function. The equilibrium allocation is unique and exists in iterated strict dominance. The model is robust with the perfect matching model as frictions disappear. Nonetheless, the equilibrium allocations are surprisingly odd. For multiplicatively separable preferences, the distributions are partitioned endogenously. And for a wide range of preferences, matching sets are naturally disconnected.     

我国国防知识产权质押融资模式与政策研究

国防知识产权作为国防科技工业创新发展的基础,是落实军民融合国家战略的重要保障。国防知识产权质押融资能够有效拓宽军工企业融资渠道,解决国防知识产权成果转化过程中大量资金需求与单一融资渠道的矛盾,提高国防知识产权转化运用效率。基于军民融合战略,从我国知识产权质押融资现状着手,剖析国防知识产权质押融资在目前体制下的制约因素,通过对国外军民融合发展过程中知识产权质押融资制度建设的研究,构建我国国防知识产权质押融资模式总体框架,阐述所涉及各机构、部门的职责,并提出相应政策建议,以期释放我国国防知识产权利用潜能,促进军民融合深度发展。     

Wage and price controls in the equilibrium sequential search model

In this paper, we study the effects of wage and price controls on employment, output, and welfare in a simplified version of the Bénabou (J. Econom. Theory 60 (1993) 140) equilibrium sequential search model with bilateral heterogeneity. We show that a price ceiling increases output but the change in welfare depends on three effects: the reduction in aggregate search costs, the increase in surplus due to increased output, and the transfer of production to the least efficient firm. The model is formally identical to a standard equilibrium search model of the labor market so analogous results hold for the minimum wage.     

Search for financial returns and social security privatization

I develop a general equilibrium model in which the quality of household financial decisions is endogenously determined by the incentives to exert effort in learning about financial opportunities. The model generates predictions for asset market participation and returns across households. Moreover, search for financial returns enables the model to generate a more skewed equilibrium wealth distribution. In this context, social security privatization affects household search effort, asset market participation and the competitiveness of the asset market. Privatization reduces average welfare and this reduction is somewhat magnified by the search friction. While some have suggested that household decision making could be important for the consequences of privatization, my analysis does not bear this out.     

AN EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH MODEL WHEN FIRMS OBSERVE WORKERS' EMPLOYMENT STATUS*

This article considers an equilibrium search model, where firms post wages using information on workers' employment status. Earnings differentials between workers of different employment statuses are driven by firms' ability to discriminate workers' reservation wages. I study how these wage policies depend on firms' and workers' characteristics, and how these policies affect the wage distribution. The model delivers new predictions for the amount of wage dispersion that can be generated with search models and provides a better representation of the left tail of the wage distribution in the presence of a legal minimum wage than standard equilibrium search models.     

港口群/腹地区域供应链物流仓储融资的动态性分析

港口群/腹地区域物流是大型交通枢纽物流的重要组成部分。其仓储融资效果可以影响供应链系统的资金流。本文研究港口群/腹地区域物流仓储融资质押/保理资金流量结构,探讨港口群/腹地区域物流仓储融资受供应链上游仓储物流所有者质押融资量、供应链下游销售物流所有者的保理融资量和港口群/腹地区域物流资金需求量的影响,构建港口群/腹地区域仓储融资物流资金流量结构的数理方程和逻辑模型,论证港口群/腹地区域物流仓储融资是促进、发展大型交通枢纽物流的重要途径,可运用该模型思想,排解实际物流系统库存仓储积压,占用大量生产资金的经济困境。     

控股股东股权质押对企业创新方向的影响——股权制衡与企业可视性的调节作用

控股股东股权质押是中国资本市场中的一种普遍现象,虽然学者们围绕控股股东股权质押对企业创新的影响已经展开了诸多探讨,但鲜有研究关注控股股东股权质押与企业创新方向之间的逻辑关系。以中国2003-2017年A股上市公司为研究对象,从突破式创新和渐进式创新视角,探究控股股东股权质押与企业创新方向之间的逻辑关系,并进一步考察企业股权制衡和企业可视性在其间的调节作用。实证结果显示：控股股东股权质押会抑制企业突破式创新,但不会对企业渐进式创新产生显著影响;随着股权制衡不断增加,控股股东股权质押对企业突破式创新的抑制作用先增强、后削弱,即股权制衡在控股股东股权质押与企业突破式创新之间起着U型调节作用;企业可视性会削弱控股股东股权质押对企业突破式创新的抑制作用。结论有助于更加辩证地认识股权质押的创新后果,对促进企业创新和完善公司治理机制亦具有启示意义。     

Uncertain vacancies and unemployment equilibria

The paper develops a dynamic implicit contracts model to consider the rationale for rejections of qualified applicants in the search process and to explore the implications for unemployment rates under equilibrium in the labor market. The implications are similar to traditional search models, although the effects of stochastic output prices upon equilibrium unemployment can be directly determined. A nearly invariant natural rate result pertains. A stochastic sales-rations variant of the model leads to equilibrium unemployment rates that depend upon both neoclassical and Keynesian factors.     

股权质押与大股东双重择时动机

择时动机是大股东决策和行为的重要影响因素,股权质押行为为我们提供了一个透明的研究视角。文章以大股东决策中可能存在的股票市场和信贷市场双重择时动机为考察对象,研究发现：大股东的股权质押意愿和质押规模与股票错误定价显著正相关,即上市公司股价被高估会推动大股东股权质押;相对于信贷紧缩时期,大股东在信贷宽松时期更愿意进行股权质押,且质押规模更大;股票错误定价和信贷政策会同时影响大股东的股权质押意愿和规模。文章结果表明,大股东股权质押存在对股票市场和信贷市场的双重择时动机。文章的研究结论拓展了关于市场择时和股权质押的研究文献,而且有助于深化对大股东决策动机以及大股东股权质押影响因素和经济后果的理解。     

The Right Man for the Job

This paper describes a search model with a continuum of worker and job types, free entry and transferable utility. We apply a second-order Taylor expansion to characterize the equilibrium, derive the "cost of search" and show that it is decreasing in the substitutability of worker types. This cost of search is then decomposed into three components: unemployment, vacancy costs and mismatch. Our contact technology rules out congestion effects between different worker types and therefore exhibits increasing returns to scale. One third of those increasing returns in contacts are shown to be absorbed by firms and workers being more choosy. The resulting equilibrium is not efficient. Unemployment benefits can reduce the loss by serving as a search subsidy. Numerical simulations of the model show that our Taylor expansions are quite accurate.     

控股股东股权质押会增加企业权益资本成本吗——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

本文以2003—2014年A股上市公司为研究样本,探讨了控股股东股权质押与权益资本成本之间的关系。本文研究发现,相较于不存在控股股东股权质押的上市公司,存在控股股东股权质押的上市公司的权益资本成本更高。进一步分析,本文发现股权质押引起的掏空行为发挥着中介作用,还发现控股股东股权质押与权益资本成本之间的正相关关系在股价崩盘风险较高、上证A股指数较低、熊市年度组、信息质量较低组更加明显,这表明控股股东股权质押与上市公司权益资本成本之间的正相关关系是由控股股东股权质押引起的掏空行为和控制权转移风险引起的。最后,本文发现有效的公司治理能够缓解控股股东股权质押与权益资本成本之间的正相关关系。本文的研究有助于进一步认识和了解控股股东股权质押可能产生的经济后果。     

知识产权质押融资风险补偿基金:运作模式与发展策略

知识产权质押融资风险补偿基金是近年来我国引导金融机构拓展知识产权质押融资业务,缓解中小微科技企业融资难的积极探索。目前,四川、山东、广东、辽宁4省份已开展了风险补偿基金试点工作。鉴于当前风险补偿基金在基金来源、主体结构、管理机制和责任配置等方面的运作模式,从扩展补偿范围、优化合作模式、健全评价体系、完善风险控制4个方面入手,构建风险补偿基金的政策支撑与发展策略,最终形成政府引导、市场运作、风险共担、合理容错的基金运营格局。